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Preface 
Conventional historiography generally concludes that the involvement of 
the federal government in U.S. airline industry regulation began with the 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Historians unfamiliar with aviation see this New 
Deal legislation as one more step taken by the Roosevelt administration to 
bring order from chaos in a nascent industry struggling to survive the ravages 
of unfettered competition as a direct result of inadequate government super-
vision. Although there is some validity to this argument, a better argument to 
the contrary can be made. 
The airline industry was born in the mid-1920s and thrived under the 
watchful eye of the federal government, which fostered its creation and growth 
long before Roosevelt took office. In fact, American commercial aviation was 
largely the creation of the federal government. Under the Coolidge and, par-
ticularly, the Hoover administration, air transport companies were formed to 
take advantage of lucrative airmail contracts awarded by the Post Office De-
partment. This use of an indirect subsidy to foster a fledgling industry and 
provide it with a market and a source of capital until it could stand on its own 
was a typical American response to the traditional antipathy of the public to-
ward direct federal involvement in business. It is also a story that has received 
little scholarly attention. 
The leaders behind this application of government funds were Progres-
sive Republicans, who remained committed to their ideals despite the sup-
posed passing of their time. Indeed, these Progressive Republicans applied 
Theodore Roosevelt's concepts of New Nationalism in creating, in essence, a 
group of"good trusts" in the aviation industry, which, through their firm fi-
nancial backing together with substantial government incentive and guidance, 
could create and develop aviation as a new industry acting in the public inter-
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est, avoiding the predations and inefficiencies witnessed in the expansion of 
an earlier transportation industry, the railroads. 
President Herbert Hoover himself was an active participant and an influ-
ential promoter of aviation at this time, as the recent work of Ellis Hawley has 
shown. Hawley's landmark works have provided a new and richer interpreta-
tion of the accomplishments and motivations of Hoover, both as commerce 
secretary and as president. Hawley's Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: 
Studies in New Era Thought and Practice; "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Sec-
retariat, and the Vision of the Associative State, 1921-1928," published in the 
Journal of American History; and, especially, "Three Facets of Hooverian 
Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 1921-1930;' published in 
Thomas McGraw's Regulation in Perspective, bring a clarifying insight to 
Hoover's presidency. Hawley's work, particularly "Three Facets," explores 
Hoover's active involvement with business and industry and examines Hoover's 
role in promoting aviation, but it is interested only in the creation of formal 
governmental safety regulation through the Department of Commerce and 
the promotion of aviation. The story of the most critical role, that played by 
the government through the activities of the Post Office in creating the air-
lines before and during Hoover's tenure in the White House, is left untouched. 
Hawley's seminal work, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, car-
ries this interpretation of the difficult interwar years into the Roosevelt ad-
ministration while placing Hoover's and Roosevelt's approaches to the question 
of public policy toward monopoly within the context of Progressive attitudes. 
It lucidly illuminates the juxtaposition of the conflicting ideologies of Repub-
lican Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Democratic Woodrow 
Wilson's New Freedom. Hawley's thesis provides the foundation for this book's 
new interpretation of the creation and development of America's air trans-
portation system. 
Among the many works analyzing Hoover, none examine his role in the 
development of commercial air transportation. Despite the detailed analyses 
of the political and economic sphere of Hoover's administration provided by 
Martin Fausold, David Burner, Joan Hoff Wilson, Eugene Lyons, and others, 
little is known or said about perhaps Hoover's greatest legacy, that of America's 
airline industry. Morton Keller follows Hawley's interpretation of Hoover's 
role in aviation but concerns himself only with the creation of formal aviation 
safety regulation in the Commerce Department while ignoring the role played 
by the Post Office in its de facto regulation of the airline industry. 
In his Regulating a New Economy: Public Policy and Economic Change in 
America, 1900-1933, Keller aptly underscores the many conflicting and con-
vergent policies of the nation's political economy and how public policy, in a 
rapidly evolving economy, reacted differently in each case with respect to the 
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question of antitrust actions. His thesis is that both persistence in the depen-
dence of regulators on established legal and political mechanisms to rein in 
monopoly and pluralism in public policy decisions resulted in the various re-
sponses to emerging industries. His argument that the aviation industry was 
still in its infancy and was generally left alone is accurate to a point but over-
looks the tremendous progress made by Hoover by the beginning of the 1930s, 
the de jure regulation over the aircraft industry by the Aeronautics Branch of 
the Department of Commerce, and the de facto regulation of the airline in-
dustry by the Post Office. 
By the end of the period covered by Keller's work, which coincides with 
the last months of Hoover's administration, aviation had largely come of age 
through the positive guidance of the federal government, though much work 
remained. In his Leviathan, Robert Higgs's presumption of the state as a nega-
tive influence in economic development is not accurate in the case of Hoover 
and aviation. Far from restraining and injuring aviation, Hoover's policies ac-
tively promoted the new industry through rational regulation and judiciously 
applied subsidies and incentives, which resulted in a national transportation 
infrastructure within a remarkably short span of only four years. Despite the 
crucial role played by the Post Office Department in the regulation of the air 
transportation industry, only one historian up to now has attempted to exam-
ine the tenure of Hoover's visionary, though irascible, postmaster general, 
Walter Brown. David Lee has produced two excellent articles that detail much 
of this unheralded administrator's critical work. 
Walter Folger Brown was by far the most crucial figure in this story. In 
previous treatments of this period, Brown has been described as "a Toledo 
attorney" who reorganized and rationalized the system, creating a national 
network of airlines by awarding airmail contracts primarily to three large, well-
financed aviation holding companies. Brown was indeed "a Toledo attorney;' 
but he was much more than that. He was also, at one time, the boss of Toledo, 
the leader of the Ohio Republican Party, Theodore Roosevelt's campaign man-
ager during the 1912 presidential campaign, chairman of the Joint Congres-
sional Committee on Reorganization of the Executive Departments, and 
assistant secretary of commerce in the Coolidge administration, working im-
mediately under Secretary Hoover. Brown's promotion of Hoover greatly in-
fluenced the Republican Party's decision to nominate Hoover for the presidency, 
and Brown's reward was the powerful post of postmaster general. 
During his tenure, the visionary Brown fostered development of ana-
tional network of airlines. The airlines would operate, in his words, "from some-
where to somewhere:' unlike trains during the nineteenth century's chaotic 
expansion of the railroads, and always under his definition of the public inter-
est. While his definition often conflicted with Congress's and that of the small 
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airline operator, Brown built the vast domestic air transport network that in 
essence exists today. 
Lee's articles aptly summarize Brown's career but do not concentrate on 
the postmaster general's motivations or detail the effect of Brown's decision 
and philosophy on the airlines themselves. Only Henry Ladd Smith's excellent 
Airways, published more than fifty years ago, has attempted an analysis of this 
critical period of American air transportation, but even Smith's evaluation 
falls short. 
Smith, a journalism professor, was limited in his methodology. Writing 
only shortly after the events occurred, he could not gain sufficient perspective 
on the issues. As expected in a journalistic approach to historical questions, 
his research is heavily dependent upon interviews and contemporary periodi-
cals, particularly newspapers and published congressional hearings. He did 
not have access to the public papers of the government or the private papers of 
most of the participants, both of which are available today. Nevertheless, Smith 
accomplished a truly remarkable task. Up until now, his work remains the sole 
authoritative study, despite its age. Unlike most analyses before and since, Air-
ways is ambivalent toward Walter F. Brown. Smith's conclusions are far less 
damning than he had originally intended, having assumed, as did all subse-
quent historians of the New Deal, that Hoover's airmail policy was corrupt. 
Not possessing the benefit of Ellis Hawley's analysis of this period and not 
understanding the dominant role played by Progressivism in Brown's approach, 
Smith is at a loss to explain Brown's actions. Other volumes have attempted to 
detail the development of commercial aviation in the United States, but all 
without exception depend heavily on Smith's understanding and provide few, 
if any, new interpretive approaches. R.E.G. Davies's superlative Airlines of the 
United States Since 1914 accomplishes the monumental task of examining vir-
tually every airline that has ever flown in America and remains the definitive 
popular reference work on the subject. It relies heavily on Smith's account for · 
the crucial formative years of the industry and, because of its vast scope, does 
not dwell on this important period. Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation 
Policy Under the Air Commerce Act, 1926-1938, Nick Komons's equally im-
pressive official analysis of the formative period of formal federal regulation, 
concentrates on the important role played by the Commerce Department in 
establishing safety regulations and a nationwide infrastructure for air trans-
portation. Komons examines the Post Office within this context but does not 
explore in depth its crucial role in fostering the airline industry. Carl Solberg's 
Conquest of the Skies: A History of Commercial Aviation in America is also heavily 
dependent upon Smith's work and does not provide additional original in-
sight, despite its thoroughness, as Solberg, along with Davies, relies on a wealth 
Preface xi 
of secondary source material only. All other aviation histories, without excep-
tion, rely on these works for an understanding of this crucial period. 
This book places the critical role played by Brown within the context of 
Progressivism and answers the questions posed by Smith about Hoover's post-
master general. When seen in the light of Hawley's conclusions concerning Pro-
gressivism and the government's policy concerning monopoly, Brown's actions 
and those taken by Progressive Democrats in response readily fall into place. 
Walter Brown, a New Nationalist in the mould of Theodore Roosevelt, 
saw the expenditure of public monies through airmail contracts as a means to 
create and guide a nascent airline industry. He made sure these monies were 
spent supporting a few financially sound companies that could expand this 
new industry under the watchful eye of the federal government. Although this 
led to an oligopolistic control of the industry, it ensured that the aviation hold-
ing companies operated within Brown's vision of the public's interest. He regu-
lated the industry and its oligopolies in virtually the same manner as the Civil 
Aeronautics Board later would do for four decades. This book is the first to 
make this connection. 
In 1934, Senate investigations led by Progressive Democrat Hugo Black 
exposed the machinations of the Brown years to public scrutiny. Black's view 
of the relationship between monopoly and the federal government was that of 
Wilson's New Freedom: all monopoly is inherently bad and should be dis-
solved. In emotionally charged and heavily politicized hearings the relation-
ship between the Post Office and the airlines was examined in partisan detail. 
As a result, new postmaster general James Farley recommended and President 
Franklin Roosevelt ordered the suspension of the airmail contracts and the 
carrying of the mail by the U.S. Army. After several well-publicized airplane 
accidents, Roosevelt was forced to return the contracts to the airlines. Under 
new legislation, however, the aviation holding companies were broken up and 
the airlines forbidden to own any interest in the aircraft manufacturers. 
The airmail crisis marked Roosevelt's first major, public defeat, yet it is 
generally overlooked by historians. It was critical, however, for the airmail cri-
sis marked a turning point in FDR's attitude toward, as Ellis Hawley has said, 
"the problem of monopoly." 
As is often the case in writing accounts of military conquest, the victors 
write the history. This adage is equally applicable in politics. Since 1934, a 
spate of Roosevelt biographies have either ignored the airmail crisis entirely 
or have accepted the interpretations of New Deal historians without question 
as complete. Most have treated the question of the airmail and the airlines 
briefly, if at all. As with Hoover's biographers, the story of the creation of the 
air transportation industry and its informal regulation by the federal govern-
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ment before 1938 is generally overlooked. Historians, such as Frank Friedel in 
Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny, state only that "Roosevelt 
created a furor by canceling all commercial contracts for carrying airmail on 
the grounds that they were not competitive .... Roosevelt then obtained legis-
lation placing firm safeguards on contracts and returned the carrying of mail 
to commercial airlines." William Leuchtenburg comments only briefly, while 
James MacGregor Burns ignores the story altogether. Only Arthur Schlesinger 
Jr. mentions the airmail contract problem. He devotes ten pages to the ques-
tion and provides a fair analysis-the only Roosevelt biographer to do so. He 
is not reluctant to remark that the crisis damaged FOR's reputation and sowed 
the seeds of future trouble with business, James Farley, and Charles Lindbergh. 
He is also fair to Walter Brown, although Schlesinger fails to understand Brown's 
methodology, concluding only that "Brown was neither so selfless and farsee-
ing as he presented himself to the Committee nor so wicked as Black pro-
claimed him to the press." 
Generally, when the subject of Roosevelt and the airmail is mentioned, 
the conclusions are based on subjective accounts and therefore overlook the 
larger questions of public policy and government business relations. Kenneth 
Davies's FDR: The New Deal Years, 1933-1937 accepts the interpretation of the 
airmail situation only from the perspective of the Roosevelt administration 
and the independent airlines against the larger, airmail contractors. As such, 
his work draws unsubstantiated conclusions and accepts flawed secondary-
source material as fact. His claim that "the Hoover Administration, obviously, 
had come into office with a clear and definite federal aeronautics policy, shaped 
by corporation lawyers and approved in corporate boardrooms, without the 
benefit or hazard of public debate" is simply wrong, as this work will show. 
Public debate did indeed occur in Congress, and when the contracts or exten-
sions were let, they were done so legally, within the scope of the Watres Act 
and with the approval of the comptroller general. Statements that the aim of 
the Watres Act "was to replace competition with cooperation among large air-
lines-that is, to destroy the free market in commercial air transport:' ignores 
the simple reality that regulation of an infant industry does exactly that, delib-
erately, for the betterment of the public, while purposely excluding those com-
panies incapable of providing the necessary service in the public interest. 
Uncritically accepting opinion as facts, Davies also declares that "this in turn 
involved blatant violations of antitrust law and of the laws requiring open, 
competitive bidding for government contract and their award to the lowest 
bidder that met specifications." This, too, is simply wrong. 
That the New Nationalism of Progressive Republicans was replaced by the 
New Freedom of the Progressive Democrats in the aviation industry is, in sum, 
the essence of my book. The result of this confrontation, nevertheless, was 
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that the industry remained essentially the same. Although the aviation trusts 
were abolished, the airline business quickly returned to normal, as the same 
financially strong airlines that were created by previous administrations con-
tinued their industry dominance until almost half a century later, when under 
deregulation, the government acknowledged the maturity of the airline in-
dustry, at long last opening the market to competition. 
Today's modern airline system is a direct result of the work of those far-
sighted Progressives who, understanding the nature of government-business 
relations in the United States, were responsible for the creation of a sophisti-
cated air transport system. Far from taking a passive role, the federal govern-
ment played a crucial, controlling role from the very beginning. 
Though I alone am responsible for the content of this manuscript, no work is 
the sole product of its author. In the course of the research and writing of this 
book, I became indebted to a host of supportive people who generously gave 
their time and advice. Without their assistance, this book would not have been 
possible. 
Dr. William H. Becker, Professor of History at The George Washington 
University, introduced me to the field of business history and inspired me to 
apply these lessons to the study of the aviation industry. I am indebted to Dr. 
Leo Ribuffo and Dr. Edward Berkowitz, also of the Department of History, for 
their profound knowledge, advice, and encouragement. I must also express 
my thanks to Dr. Chris Sterling, who to my surprise also shares my interest in 
commercial aviation. 
To my friends and colleagues at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air 
and Space Museum (NASM) I express my profound appreciation for their 
support and encouragement. The positive intellectual atmosphere of the Aero-
nautics Division, led at various times by Donald Lopez, Dr. Von Hardesty, Dr. 
Tom Crouch, and Dr. Dominick Pisano, was instrumental in furthering my 
work. I am indebted beyond measure to R.E.G. Davies, the doyen of airline 
historians, for his unfailing encouragement and for instilling in me the fasci-
nation and enthusiasm of the history of the air transport industry. Dr. Howard 
Wolko provided sage advice and gave his moral support that helped keep me 
on track despite constant distractions on the job. I must also extend my thanks 
to the rest of the staff of the Aeronautics Division for tolerating my endless 
monologues on the early history of U.S. air transportation, especially Alex 
Spencer, Dorothy Cochrane, and Rick Leyes. Though visiting scholar Dr. David 
Lee's stay at NASM was brief, he willingly shared his profound knowledge of 
Walter Brown and provided me with invaluable research advice. My conversa-
tions with former Verville Fellow Jacob VanderMeulen were of particular value. 
I am especially grateful to Dr. W. David Lewis, Distinguished University Pro-
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fessor at Auburn University, for his keen insights into aviation history and for 
organizing the International Conference on the History of Civil and Com-
mercial Aviation in Lucerne, Switzerland, where I first publicly presented my 
ideas on Walter Brown and the progressive movement's effect on the develop-
ment of commercial aviation in the United States. 
The staff of the NASM's Library and Archives was indispensable in pro-
viding the reference sources so necessary for this work. Archivists Marilyn 
Graskowiak, Paul Silbermann, and Larry Wilson were particularly helpful in 
cataloging and making available the Clement Keys papers. Reference Librar-
ian Phil Edwards gave me much appreciated advice and access to the museum's 
arcane holdings. 
Most of the research was conducted at the National Archives and Records 
Administration just before its difficult move into new quarters in College Park, 
Maryland. Despite this, the entire staff remained highly cooperative and pointed 
me in new directions that invariably produced results. I am especially in the 
debt of Aloha Smith and Jerry Clark of the Civil Records Division and Joe 
Schwartz at the Center for Legislative Archives. The holdings of the Manu-
script Division of the Library of Congress also proved a veritable gold mine of 
previously unearthed material. The staff was always helpful. It is a blessing for 
all historians that these two excellent federal facilities are so well maintained 
and centrally located for all to use. 
The staff of the Herbert C. Hoover Presidential Library and Archives in 
West Branch, Iowa, were most gracious with their time and advice. Dale Mayer, 
Wade R. Slinde, and their colleagues ensured that my brief stay was extremely 
productive. This jewel of an archive houses not only Hoover's records but also 
those ofWilliam MacCracken and significant, though small, holdings on Walter 
Brown. 
At the Boeing Company's Historical Services Division, former archivist 
Marilyn Phipps was exceeding in her generosity in allowing me access to the 
company's records. Her vast knowledge of the history of this important com-
pany was of inestimable use. Archivist Tom Lubbesmeyer and former Boeing 
historian Paul Spitzer were similarly helpful. I am also always grateful to the 
ever-knowledgeable Jay Spenser, with whom I have enjoyed countless enlight-
ening discussions. Boeing is one of the few companies that are actively aware 
of their rich history. It is a credit to the management of Boeing that they have 
preserved their heritage. 
Greg Kennedy, the former director of American Airlines' C.R. Smith Mu-
seum, made available his airline's collections and enabled me to visit his and 
other facilities. Barb Hansen of United Air Lines generously permitted me to 
use the company's small but useful archival collection in Chicago. I would also 
like to thank Dr. Larry D. Sail, Associate Library Director for Special Collec-
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tions at the University of Texas at Dallas, for access to the Aviation History 
Collection. 
Dr. Deborah Douglas, Curator of Science and Technology at the MIT 
Museum and former NASM denizen, has shared with me a similar interest in 
the history of this crucial period in aviation. I am grateful for her friendship 
and for the numerous hours we spent discussing our respective projects. I also 
greatly appreciate her unflagging support and her tireless efforts on my behalf. 
This book is dedicated to my family for their patience and understanding. 
I thank my parents Frank and Lyn for teaching me English and a love of his-
tory. I owe too much to them to express adequately in words. One look in any 
university library catalog will reveal who is indeed the best historian in the 
family. I have a long way to go to catch up with my father. I am grateful to my 
mother-in-law, Nella, for her support, and to my late father-in-law, Carl, who 
understood better than anyone the value of education, I wish to say, "Thank 
you for the pen." 
I would also like to thank my sisters Margaret and Anne, their husbands, 
Ryan and Greg, respectively, my sister-in-law Carla and her husband Trey, and, 
particularly, Kristin, David, and Michael, who I hope some day will read this 
and know that their Uncle Bob was thinking of them. 
Most of all I wish to dedicate this book to my wife, Sue, who has lovingly 
shepherded this stressed-out curator and historian through life. 
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Chapter 1 
Foundations 
On the morning of May 15, 1918, a crowd gathered around a single-engined Curtiss JN-4H "Jenny" trainer parked at the Polo Grounds near the 
Potomac River in the nation's capital. Thousands of spectators pressed against 
rope barricades hoping to catch a glimpse of the festivities as five hundred 
dignitaries arrived amid much fanfare. Present were Postmaster General Albert 
S. Burleson and Second Assistant Postmaster General Otto Praeger, Secretary 
of the Navy Josephus Daniels and his assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
members of the recently formed National Advisory Committee on Aeronau-
tics, and numerous members of Congress. At 11:15 A.M. President Woodrow 
Wilson and the first lady arrived to witness the inaugural flight of the U.S. Air 
Mail Service. 
Within minutes a truck arrived carrying four large bags of mail. Into one, 
President Wilson placed a letter addressed to the postmaster of New York from 
General Burleson. After a short presentation ceremony, the pilot, Lt. George L. 
Boyle, climbed into his frail craft, started his reluctant !50-horsepower 
Hispano-Suiza engine, and bounced down the Polo Grounds, crawling into 
the air at 11:46, headed for Philadelphia. The plan was for Boyle to land at 
Bustleton, Pennsylvania, where his load of mail would be transferred into an-
other Jenny and flown to New York. Fifteen minutes before Boyle took off, Lt. 
Torrey Webb left from the Belmont Race Track on Long Island and headed 
south for the same destination, thus opening two-way Washington-Philadel-
phia-New York service. That was the plan. Webb reached Philadelphia one 
hour later without incident. Boyle was not so fortunate. 
Navigating by a single road map, Boyle became confused while attempt-
ing to follow the railroad tracks north. Without the aid of an accurate com-
pass, Boyle found himself sixty minutes later over Waldorf, Maryland, 
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Lt. George L. Boyle opened air mail service when he took off in his Curtiss JN -4 from W~st 
Potomac Park in Washington, D.C., on May 15, 1918. (Smithsonian, Sl# 2000-6152) 
twenty-five miles southeast of Washington. Landing to seek directions, Boyle 
flipped his aircraft, fortunately damaging only his pride. When news of his 
accident reached Philadelphia, the connecting flight left for New York, on sched-
ule, but without the Washington mail, arriving on time at 3:37P.M. 
In Philadelphia, Webb transferred his mail load into a Jenny piloted by Lt. 
James Edgerton, who took off with no trouble and smoothly proceeded to 
Washington, where he landed at 2:50P.M. to the applause of numerous well 
wishers, including his sister and fiancee. Thus the first day of regularly sched-
uled air mail service drew to a dose. 1 
Today, we think nothing of flying thousands of miles to conduct business, visit 
relatives, or spend leisure time vacationing halfway around the globe. The ability 
to travel these vast distances, by air, is truly one of the greatest social and tech-
nological accomplishments of the twentieth century. In the span of only ninety 
years, this new and revolutionary means of transportation has changed how 
we perceive the world and has conquered heretofore unconquerable obstacles 
of time and distance. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the industrial age, 
heavier-than-air, powered flight, went from birth to maturity in an unprec-
Foundations 3 
eden ted short period of time. Unlike previous transportation systems, which 
evolved over centuries, aviation developed almost overnight. 
Today, the ability to fly is taken for granted. The average American citizen 
is aware of the story of the Wright brothers and their remarkable creation in 
1903. Most people know that the airplane was quickly forged into a weapon of 
war that is today capable of prodigious destructiveness. They see the sky full of 
gleaming jet airliners effortlessly traversing the continent over invisible routes 
to distant destinations. These aircraft and the airlines that operate them have 
always seemed to exist. That their creation and development in the United 
States was the product of a conscious effort by the federal government is little 
known. That the very existence of the airlines is the product of an often-abused 
bureaucracy is imperceptible. Yet that is the case. 
Since 1792, the Post Office Department, now the Postal Service, has borne 
the responsibility of uniting the country through the communications system 
of the mail. The Post Office provided the vital link between communities, the 
lifeline between businesses and friends, and the one national instrument ca-
pable of spreading information throughout the nation quickly and efficiently. 
So important was this mission that the American citizen has always been will-
ing, though usually grudgingly, to accept the intrusion of the federal govern-
ment and the expenditure of tax dollars, even at a loss, for the benefits of mail 
service. To this end, the Post Office has traditionally sought ways to improve 
service, particularly through improvements in speed. 
Post roads were the first manifestation of the growing federal presence 
across the nation. These public roads, which proliferated in the nineteenth 
century, were usually the first reliable links between new and old communi-
ties, and there was constant pressure from an expanding country for the Post 
Office to keep pace with America's internal development. Concurrent with the 
boom in transportation technologies, first with the roads, then the canals, and 
soon the innovation of the railroads, the Post Office kept pace by placing the 
public mails on stage lines, ships, and rail cars. Through the use of contract 
mail carriers, the Post Office was able to spread the mails across the nation 
while directly supporting new transportation technologies through payments 
for services. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, contractors were carrying the 
bulk of mail between city centers and were dependent upon the federal largess 
to keep their burgeoning enterprises profitable. Subsidies, a term generally 
anathema to Americans, have always been an integral part of the functioning 
of the Post Office. The first subsidies were granted in the 1840s to promote the 
development of American steamship lines that were threatened by foreign com-
petition. This action promoted the creation of improved ship designs, advanced 
the state of the ship builders' art, and directly benefited U.S. business. Regional 
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opposition, particularly from the South and the West, curtailed the use of sub-
sidies until the advent of World War I. During this conflict, the federal govern-
ment once again employed the strategy of subsidies to support the domestic 
merchant marine. With British and German merchant ships engaged in com-
bat, the United States was deprived of the use of much of the world's commer-
cial fleet. Through the renewed implementation of postal subsidies, the federal 
government once again came to the aid of a developing industry. Thus, by the 
end of World War I, the concept of federal support for new transportation 
technologies clearly had been established. 
Concurrent with federal support of transportation came the politicization 
of the Post Office as, over time, its power and influence grew. For almost one 
hundred years the Post office was the only visible manifestation of the federal 
government seen by the average citizen. As such, the control of local post of-
fices and the appointment of local postmasters became crucial political tools 
and rewards for successful campaigns and the means for political parties to 
extend their influence throughout the country. With lucrative federal patron-
age available to the winners, control of the Post Office and its spoils was fiercely 
pursued. The position of postmaster general became the nation's preeminent 
patronage post, usually awarded to the victorious president's most trusted 
advisor. Commonly, the postmaster general was the party leader, campaign 
manager, and critical liaison with Congress. He controlled the money, and it 
was to him that local, state, and federal politicians petitioned for rewards. De-
spite the diminished influence of politics following the creation of a federal 
civil service through the Pendleton Act of 1883, which abolished many of the 
former patronage jobs, and subsequent reforms during the Progressive Era to 
rectify repeated scandals, the influence of the Post Office and the postmaster 
general remained great. 
With the precedent of direct federal assistance to transportation technolo-
gies and the important political role of the Post Office thus well established, 
America entered a new era in the ongoing relationship between business and 
government when, late in the spring of 1918, the Post Office inaugurated the 
nation's first regularly scheduled air mail service. 
That day was the culmination of the efforts of many in both the Post Of-
fice and Congress to reap the promised benefits of aircraft speed. As early as 
1910, Congress began to show interest in the potential of aircraft to carry the 
mail. That year Rep. Morris Shepard introduced the first air mail bill, which 
unfortunately died in committee.2 Despite this setback, Postmaster General 
Frank H. Hitchcock, a promoter of the air mail concept, pressed on. At an 
international air meet on Long Island, Hitchcock allowed a special air mail 
service to fly as part of the festivities. Thus, on September 23, 1911, pilot Earle 
Ovington was sworn in as America's first air mail pilot and, squeezing a full 
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mail sack between his legs, took off in his delicate Queen monoplane for 
Mineola, some five miles away. Six minutes later, Ovington banked his aircraft 
and pushed the bag out of the cockpit. The bag fell to the ground near the 
local postmaster.3 Although purely ceremonial, this was the first time aircraft 
officially carried U.S. mail. 
Hitchcock's subsequent efforts to convince Congress to provide fifty thou-
sand dollars for an experimental service fell on deaf ears. With the advent of 
Wilson to the presidency in 1913, the new postmaster general, Burleson, con-
tinued his predecessor's efforts to foster the creation of an air mail plan. Little 
was done, despite bipartisan efforts. A change occurred on September 1, 1916, 
when Otto Praeger, a former reform-minded newspaperman and Progressive 
city clerk of San Antonio, Texas, became second assistant postmaster general 
and administered the delivery of the mail. Praeger adopted Burleson's desire 
to push for air mail. 
Immediately upon taking office, Praeger began to campaign for air mail 
service in Alaska and Massachusetts. Although these efforts met with failure, 
his determination to push through service between New York and Chicago 
convinced enough members of Congress to authorize an experimental service 
between New York and Washington, D.C. With the support of the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the purpose of which was to 
foster aviation development, and of Standard Aircraft, which hoped that this 
undertaking would prove an outlet for its aircraft products, Burleson approved 
the project, and with the begrudging cooperation of the U.S. Army Air Ser-
vice, which initially was to provide the pilots and aircraft, the service began in 
May. Burleson, a former Populist, had no compunction against the govern-
ment entering what traditionally was the purview of business. Despite the tra-
dition of contracting with private transportation enterprises for the delivery 
of mail over long distances, Burleson realized that this infant industry needed 
substantial government assistance during its formative stages. 
Despite setbacks that any pioneering enterprise would expect, the new 
U.S. Air Mail Service quickly became a generally reliable service, completing 
an average of 91 percent of its flights.4 In August 1918, the army withdrew, 
leaving the Post Office in complete control of the operation, equipped with its 
own aircraft and pilots. Under Capt. Benjamin Lipsner, new Standard biplanes, 
each with a capacity of three hundred pounds, were acquired and the base of 
operations in Washington shifted to College Park Airport (the oldest in the 
world) in nearby Maryland. Under Lipsner's direction the service grew with a 
specific goal: that of a proving ground for eventual civil aviation. According to 
Lipsner, this noble experiment was "the mechanical laboratory for the advance-
ment of commercial aviation .... The first step toward the universal commer-
cial use of the aeroplane."5 
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Once rational procedures and reliable accounting practices were imple-
mented, Lipsner pushed for the logical extension of his vision: transcontinen-
tal air service. Realizing that the time savings afforded by the speed of aircraft 
could be realized only over long distances, the Post Office pressed for New 
York-to-Chicago service, which opened on September 5, 1919. By this time, 
specially modified de Havilland DH-4light bombers were converted as mail 
planes and introduced into the schedules, soon becoming the ubiquitous sym-
bol of the Air Mail Service. Conflicts with Praeger forced Lipsner's resignation 
and the replacement as chief of flying by James Edgerton, one of the original 
pilots on the inaugural route. Despite this and continuing battles with the 
army and Congress over control of the operation, Praeger pushed forward, 
Edgerton building the route infrastructure, writing the operations manuals, 
and selecting and training the pilots and crew as the operation expanded west-
ward.6 On May 15, 1920, two years to the day after opening service, the air mail 
reached Omaha, and on September 8 the transcontinental route to San Fran-
cisco was completed. 
At this point, all schedules were flown during the day as neither the air-
craft nor routes were equipped with measures to allow for night and bad 
weather flying. In a dramatic display of the possibilities of continuous opera-
tion and to counter the attacks by critics that the operation was too costly and 
inefficient, on February 22, 1921, just ten days before the new Harding admin-
istration took office, four pilots, two from each coast, took off. Only one of the 
four schedules was completed, but the event made headlines. Battling bad 
weather, which killed one pilot and grounded the other two, Frank Yeager 
pressed on over his night stage from Salt Lake City via Cheyenne to North 
Platte, Nebraska. Pilot Jack Knight relayed the mail from there to Omaha, where 
he was to hand it over to the connecting flight from Chicago. Unfortunately, 
that flight was grounded, and, braving the night and deteriorating weather, 
guided only by bonfires lit across Iowa, Knight completed his epic flight. Once 
in Chicago, the mail was again transferred and flown without incident to New 
York in the remarkable time of thirty-three hours and twenty minutes.7 This 
astonishing achievement highlighted the potential of air mail service. Yet much 
work remained. 
Incoming postmaster general Will H. Hays was less than enthusiastic about 
this aerial experiment. Hays appointed as the new second assistant postmaster 
Edward W. Shaughnessy, who promptly sought to increase cooperation with 
the army. Shaughnessy's background was in railroads and because of this, 
sought to turn over the air mail operation to commercial carriers. He quickly 
learned that no one would accept the tremendous risk of capital involved in 
such an unproven technology. It was clear that only a subsidy could entice 
investors into the air, but the country was not yet willing to underwrite such a 
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controversial idea. His experience in contracting proved a failure, as Alfred 
Lawson, an early aircraft builder from Milwaukee and a promoter of unsteady 
personality, reneged on his lofty promises to open three air mail routes by 
April1921. 8 Concentrating now on efficiency over diversity, Shaughnessy elimi-
nated air routes where railroads offered almost comparable service, such as 
that between Washington and New York, and concentrated on transcontinen-
tal service while biding time for new legislation. The second assistant's tireless 
efforts to improve service and safety as well as lower costs came to an abrupt 
end when he was tragically killed in the infamous Knickerbocker Theater col-
lapse during a Washington blizzard in February 1922. Shortly thereafter, Post-
master General Hays resigned to accept a more lucrative position in Hollywood 
as the film industry's morals watchdog.9 
The new Second Assistant was Colonel Paul Henderson, who would soon 
prove to be as effective as Otto Praeger in his dedication and results. Henderson, 
a forty-year-old veteran from Chicago who served as an ordnance officer dur-
ing the Great War, was well connected politically, having married the daughter 
of Congressman Martin Madden. His business acumen, first as president of 
his father-in-law's stone company and later as treasurer of the Andrews Engi-
neering Company, together with his political connections made him the ideal 
candidate to serve the new postmaster general, Hubert Work.10 
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A staunch Republican who wanted the air mail service eventually turned 
over to private enterprise, Henderson nevertheless actively worked to improve 
the government's air mail system. Taking control of the army's experimental 
lighted airway between Dayton and Columbus, Ohio, Henderson used this 
short, eighty-mile route as a model for his plan to light the entire transconti-
nental route. Henderson used a system of powerful rotating beacons devel-
oped by the General Electric Company located at every regular and emergency 
field along the way. By the summer of 1923, the crucial section from Chicago 
to Cheyenne had been completed, with 289 beacons, five lighted primary land-
ing fields, and thirty-four lighted secondary fields. Seventeen DH-4 aircraft 
were equipped with special flares, luminescent instruments, and navigation 
and landing lights. A highly successful four-day experimental schedule was 
tested in August 1923, and on July 1, 1924, regular overnight service was be-
gun, cutting transcontinental delivery time by air from ninety-one hours to 
only twenty-nine hours (with the eastbound tailwinds). This was almost three 
days faster than possible by rail. By the fall of 1925, the entire lighted airways 
system was finished, at a cost of $550,000, greatly assisting the subsequent 
expansion of commercial service. 11 
With the completion of the lighted airway system and the inauguration 
of regular, reliable air mail service, the Post Office's pioneering days were coming 
to a close. Just as the U.S. military had pioneered new technologies of mass 
production at the Springfield armory a century earlier, when private capital 
was unwilling to invest, so too did the Post Office invest public funds into 
another new technology, that of aviation, in a successful effort to demonstrate 
the possibilities of a new technology to revolutionize communications. 
When Paul Henderson resigned from the Post Office in 1925 he left be-
hind a flourishing government enterprise operating in the public interest and 
proving every day and night that aviation was no longer the realm of the fool-
hardy, but a viable, though still infant, industry. The times were rapidly evolv-
ing, for aviation was undergoing a rapid and turbulent period of change. 
Although the Post Office was making dramatic progress, the state of avia-
tion as a whole in the United States was chaotic. There was no regulation of 
any kind to control or promote rational growth of aviation as a business or as 
a transportation system. Between the end of World War I and 1926, the air was 
filled with gypsy fliers, the so-called barnstormers, flying from town to town 
in war surplus trainers, willing to take daring local members of the commu-
nity on exciting circuits of the field for a fee. Flight was portrayed as the realm 
of the thrillseeker, the unbridled domain of the risk taker, not a means of safe, 
reliable transportation. Without regulation to promote safety and coherent 
development, there would be no private contractors or, more important, no 
financial backers willing to accept the huge risks for little or no reward. What 
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was needed was rational legislation promoting both the regulation of the op-
eration of the industry and the establishment of necessary incentives to at-
tract investors. 
As early as 1921, a small special interest group of aviation executives and 
enthusiasts began to lobby the halls of Congress in search of a remedy. In the 
words of President Warren Harding's secretary of commerce, Herbert Hoover, 
to Rep. Frederick Hicks (R-N.Y.), "It is interesting to note that this is the only 
industry that favors having itself regulated by the government:' 12 Herbert 
Hoover, in fact, would take the lead in the search for appropriate new legisla-
tion. Working in cooperation with the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce 
(ACC), which represented the aircraft manufacturers, and the National Aero-
nautic Association, which represented wealthy public-spirited aviation pro-
moters, Hoover was able to take the lead and forge a new consensus concerning 
his vision of the role that aviation might play in the future. 13 It is important to 
note the desire was for the creation of operating rules to promote safety, not 
for economic control of the aviation business. 
Hoover applied his notions concerning the associative state, as described 
by historian Ellis Hawley, to forge a viable business-government relationship 
based on voluntary cooperation to the benefit of both parties. He urged the 
formation of professional organizations in the aviation industry, which until 
that time had little representation. 14 During his tenure at the Commerce De-
partment, Hoover actively promoted public acceptance of aviation through a 
series of publicity campaigns as well as by speaking widely on the potential 
advantages to business and transportation offered by the airplane. The air-
plane promised greater efficiencies, and its development opened new vistas 
for business and an expansion of the national economy, all goals of his secre-
tariat.15 Hoover realized that a prosperous aviation industry, led by adequate 
government incentives, would help defray the cost of maintaining a large na-
tional aviation capability. Adequate and immediate legislation was required 
before any substantive progress could result. 
Hoover's initial efforts to create sufficient federal regulation failed to reach 
fruition. Attempts to establish national regulation as outlined in the Wadsworth 
bill of 1921 were successfully attacked by southern states rights' advocates, 
who blanched at the thought of federal control over the airways. 16 A succes-
sive, weaker bill failed to satisfy the aviation community. Further attempts to 
increase the power of the federal government over aviation combined with 
ineffective floor leadership condemned the measure to its premature demise. 17 
Despite subsequent revisions and a renewed offensive in 1923 and 1924led by 
Hoover, civil air regulation failed to fire the imagination of Congress and the 
public sufficiently to force passage. But times were about to change. 
Pressure to reform the airways came again from the Post Office. On Feb-
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ruary 2, 1925, President Calvin Coolidge signed into law the Air Mail Act of 
1925. Better known as the Kelly Act, after its primary proponent, Republican 
representative M. Clyde Kelly of Pennsylvania, the bill for the first time autho-
rized the transfer of the flying of the air mail to contract carriers. Earlier at-
tempts in 1921 by Rep. Halvor Steenerson, a Minnesota Republican and 
chairman of the House Post Office and Post Roads Committee, met a luke-
warm response. Without a provision for a minimum load payment, or a guar-
anteed three-to-five year contract, business simply was not interested in flying 
the mail as it was still a highly speculative proposition.18 
In February 1924, following deliberations with Congress and incoming 
postmaster general Harry New, Representative Kelly proposed new legislation, 
which sailed through the Sixty-eighth Congress with little debate. Signed into 
law one year later, the Kelly Act authorized a special ten-cent-per-ounce air 
mail rate. More important, Section 4 of the act authorized the use of private 
contractors to fly the mail at a rate not to exceed four-fifths of the amount of 
revenue received by the Post Office for the carriage of the mail on each desig-
nated route. 19 
This "fraction of postage" method of payment allayed the fears of the po-
tential contractors by guaranteeing them 80 percent of the postal revenues. 
This was a subsidy in the classic sense, but concern was deflected because the 
payment came from only postal receipts, not from general tax revenues.20 
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Although the law did not specify the length required for the contract, the 
Post Office used its discretionary powers provided in Section 5 of the law to 
make the contracts for four years, the maximum allowed by existing prece-
dent. It was hoped that this would allow the holder of the contract sufficient 
time to invest heavily in route development, equipment, and training while 
still having substantial time to realize a decent return on his investment.21 
The Kelly Act of 1925 created the first successful airlines in the United 
States and supplied the needed impetus to push Congress toward passage of 
necessary regulation of the industry. Without the government promoting air 
safety, a reliable, trustworthy airline system simply could not exist. Without 
government financial incentives, the airlines could not survive. 
The experience of pioneering airlines, such as the St. Petersburg-Tampa 
Airboat Line of 1914 and Aeromarine in the early 1920s, made it clear that 
despite the best efforts of knowledgeable individuals and well-financed, well-
organized companies, some form of government subsidy was necessary, given 
the present state of aeronautics and the general inefficiency of current aircraft 
technologies. 
The question of subsidy was the overriding issue confronting commercial 
aviation. All of the witnesses before the Steenerson committee called for gov-
ernment financial assistance but were unanimous in their opposition to direct 
subsidy, something that was prevalent in Europe and was correctly seen as 
debilitating rather than constructive. All were in agreement over the necessity 
of government economic support; the differences were focused over the defi-
nition of"subsidy;' a word anathema to most Americans at that time. Accord-
ing to testimony, the operators wanted only enough money to cover costs and 
no more. To them, a "subsidy" meant "profit;' and they were deliberately vague 
in interpreting a subsidy as "a grant of funds or property from a government 
to a private person or company in the establishment or support of an enter-
prise deemed advantageous to the public as a simple gift or a payment of an 
amount in excess of the usual charge for a service."22 
In a report prepared for Secretary Hoover and the Commerce Department 
by the American Engineering Council in 1926, the industry flatly rejected subsi-
dies, as they defined them. ''Although every European air line is receiving subsi-
dies;' the report noted, "aircraft operators in the United States are practically 
unanimous that direct government subsidies are not needed or advisable in this 
country .... Traffic conditions in the United States are more favorable for air 
transport than in Europe, and with proper navigational aids it should be able to 
establish itself on a sound business basis without subsidies:'23 
This last point was crucial, for aids to navigation were not seen as a sub-
sidy. In a September 1925 statement prepared for the Morrow Board, which 
was called by President Coolidge to investigate the state of American aeronau-
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tics following the caustic and disjointed attacks led by Gen. William "Billy" 
Mitchell, Secretary Hoover spoke clearly about his vision. "The Department 
of Commerce has been confident for the last two years that the development 
of the flying art has reached a point where it is near the possibility of self-
supporting application to commercial transportation in the United States;' he 
said. "In this belief we have advocated the creation of a Bureau of Civil Avia-
tion that the Government might undertake to give services to commercial avia-
tion comparable with those which the Government has over a century given 
to commercial navigation."24 
In Hoover's view, precedent existed for federal assistance in the form of aid 
to shipping. Since the beginning of the country, the federal government had 
provided for the lighting and marking of channels for navigation, had produced 
detailed charts of the waterways, and had provided information concerning 
weather and geographical changes of the routes. Furthermore, the government 
had provided safety services in the public interest, setting safety standards in the 
shipping industry and conducting inspections to enforce the regulations. Stan-
dards were set not just for equipment but for the personnel operating the equip-
ment as well. Washington had also assumed responsibility for the development 
and improvement of the waterways and ports. In Hoover's farsighted opinion, 
such regulatory action was essential for the industry's survival.25 
The committee was composed of many of the leading figures in the avia-
tion industry and was reflective of Hoover's associative views of voluntary 
business-government cooperation to solve national problems. Appointed in 
June 1925, the committee was composed of nine prominent individuals, in-
cluding J. Walter Drake, who served as chairman; J.W. Roe, past president of 
the Society of Industrial Engineers, who served as vice chairman; Edward P. 
Warner, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and C. Townsend 
Ludington, a prominent aircraft operator. 
The committee outlined four fundamental problems in U.S. civil aviation. 
First, there was a lack of definite legal status and government control over civil 
aviation. Second, an absence of an established government policy to encour-
age the civilian and industrial uses of aircraft hampered development. Third, 
there were at present no aircraft or supporting equipment adapted to efficient 
and profitable commercial operation. This resulted, fourth, in the lack of pub-
lic and business confidence and support.26 
In order to address these issues, the committee recommended the imme-
diate enactment of a civil aeronautics law to create the Bureau of Aeronautics 
within the Department of Commerce. This bureau would issue licenses for 
aircraft and pilots, establish regulatory guidelines, and enforce inspections while 
creating and maintaining national air navigation facilities. The committee as-
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serted that the public possesses a right of free air navigation and further rec-
ommended that commercial aviation be regarded as common carriers, thereby 
limiting the liability of future airlines. In an attempt to assuage local fears of a 
possible growing and intrusive federal presence, it left to the states and local 
governments the heavy responsibility for developing airports. Of greatest im-
portance, the committee strongly urged that the government refrain from 
nonmilitary flying that could be better served by private enterprise. 27 
Reflecting Hoover's associative state once again, the committee stressed 
the importance of cooperation and sought the creation of interdepartmental 
committees to coordinate all nonmilitary government air activities in order to 
promote civil aviation in the best manner. If these steps were taken, the com-
mittee believed, a solid foundation would result, eliminating much risk and 
thereby provide incentive for investment. 28 
The council's report clearly underscored Hoover's position concerning the 
relationship between government and business in aviation. With this report 
and the Kelly Act pointing the direction for the country, the road to rational 
regulation seemed open. There remained one large obstacle. 
One of the most prominent and controversial figures in American avia-
tion during the 1920s was Gen. William "Billy" Mitchell. Returning from World 
War I a hero and thoroughly enamored with the possibilities of air power, 
Assistant Chief of the Army Air Service Mitchell embarked on a crusade to 
establish an independent air force along the lines of Britain's recently formed 
Royal Air Force. His overriding concern was to unify all aviation, both civil 
and military, into a Department of the Air, under his control. This last goal 
was a tactical error, as it alienated most of those individuals in civil aviation 
who were otherwise in agreement with the general.29 
Behaving in an undisciplined manner, using propaganda and political con-
nections, and manipulating the press and public opinion, Mitchell thrust him-
self into public view, decrying the sorry state of American military aeronautics 
while staging dramatic demonstrations of the potential of air power. To this 
end Mitchell mobilized his forces in Congress, much to the consternation of 
President Coolidge and the nation's senior officers, and called for a congres-
sional committee to investigate the state of U.S. aeronautics. 
Chaired by Rep. Florian Lampert (R-Wise.), this committee sought to ex-
amine claims made by Progressive Republican representative John L. Nelson 
of Wisconsin that the administration was protecting a so-called aircraft trust 
attempting to monopolize commercial aviation. Most of the wild claims were 
based on politics, as during the 1924 election, insurgent Republicans backed 
another Wisconsin native for the presidency, Robert M. La Follette. Despite 
Coolidge's overwhelming victory in November, the committee convened in 
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the Sixty-ninth Congress. Despite the fact that two of the five Republicans 
along with the four minority Democrats might undermine the administration's 
efforts, the committee behaved in a surprisingly professional way. 
Mitchell's testimony before this committee and the sympathetic House 
Military Affairs contrasted with the sensible approach taken by Lampert. His 
outbursts against the administration in January and February 1925 angered 
the War Department and the White House. As a result Mitchell was removed 
from his post as assistant chief of the Army Air Service, transferred to the 
Eighth Corps in San Antonio, Texas, and reduced to his permanent rank of 
colonel.30 
Mitchell did not go quietly. After spending several months in relative iso-
lation, he once again burst onto the scene in September, following the crash of 
a U.S. Navy dirigible, the USS Shenandoah, during an Ohio thunderstorm and 
the disappearance of the navy's PN -9 flying boat during a record setting flight 
attempt from California to Hawaii. Having lost his close friend Cdr. Zachary 
Landsdowne on the Shenandoah, Mitchell claimed that the accidents were the 
result of incompetency and criminal negligence and the "almost treasonable 
administration of the National Defense by the Navy and the War Depart-
ments:'31 Such insubordination could not be tolerated. Coolidge called for 
Mitchell's immediate court-martial while countering his critics by forming a 
commission of his own choosing. 
Coolidge stacked the deck in his favor placing on his board eight conser-
vative Republicans and one Democrat. Two board members were officers, in-
cluding Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and only one, Sen. Hiram Bingham of 
Connecticut, was an aviator. Bingham, in fact, was a vocal proponent of civil 
aviation legislation along the lines that Secretary Hoover was proposing at 
that time and therefore was ideal. Heading the board was Coolidge's close friend 
and partner in J.P. Morgan and Company, Dwight W. Morrow. 
The Morrow Board performed precisely as expected. Delving into the state 
of America's aviation industry, it worked feverishly to complete its investiga-
tion before December, when the Lampert committee was set to release its find-
ings.32 Working diligently for eight weeks, the Morrow Board interviewed 
ninety-nine witnesses, most of whom had already testified before the Lampert 
committee. 
The conclusions reached by Morrow, released on December 2, were con-
servative and predictable. The board rejected Mitchell's assertion for a unified 
military and civilian aeronautics department and confirmed the program out-
lined by Hoover and the Drake Committee, which was also advocated by most 
of the civil aviation community.33 The Lampert committee's findings were sur-
prisingly moderate as well. Although it recommended a single department of 
defense on military affairs, it rejected the concept of an air ministry and Rep. 
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Nelson's accusations of a sinister "aviation trust" while endorsing Hoover's 
plan for an aeronautics branch within the Department of Commerce. 
With the blessing of two committees, Hoover now turned to William P. 
MacCracken, a Chicago-born attorney, to lead his efforts to reform aviation. 
MacCracken first became interested in aviation during World War I, when he 
learned to fly. A friendly, unassuming man, MacCracken possessed a sharp 
mind and was a proficient debater. When he chose to write a paper on aviation 
law he discovered that the body of literature was virtually non-existent. He 
took it upon himself to concentrate on this new branch of law and by 1921 
became chairman of the Committee on the Law of Aeronautics of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, leading the fight for legislation. When his interest brought 
him to Washington in 1922 to meet with a state aviation law committee, 
MacCracken was introduced to Rep. Samuel Winslow, chairman of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Desirous of implementing 
strong federal regulation, Winslow introduced the bill that MacCracken wrote 
with Frederic B. Lee, an attorney on the staff of the House Legislative Drafting 
Service. MacCracken and Lee would eventually form an important law prac-
tice in Washington.34 
Problems concerning federal versus states' rights doomed the Winslow 
bill as well as the far weaker Wadsworth bill it replaced.35 Nevertheless, Sen. 
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Hiram Bingham (R-Conn.) reintroduced legislation to regulate commercial 
aviation. This bill spurred the young MacCracken into action.36 By appealing 
to Reps. Schuyler Merritt and James S. Parker, who also sat on the Morrow 
Board, MacCracken managed to win approval of his much stronger bill, which 
possessed the strengths of the earlier Winslow and Wadsworth bills and few of 
their weaknesses. Giving federal authority precedence but leaving to the states 
and municipalities the control over airport development, the Air Commerce 
Act was passed and signed into law on May 20, 1926.37 
The Air Commerce Act of 1926 reflected exactly Hoover's ideas on federal 
regulation of civil aviation. He now had the tools to direct the rational devel-
opment of aviation. Not unexpectedly, William P. MacCracken accepted 
Hoover's invitation to become the assistant secretary of commerce for air in 
charge of the new Aeronautics branch of the department. 
Thus was established the regulatory framework for the development of 
civil aviation in the United States. The federal government now had control 
over aviation and the authority to develop rational routes, to construct aids to 
navigation, and to promote the safe growth of the industry. With this struc-
ture in place, the way was clear for the next step in providing the country with 
a new transportation technology. 
Chapter 2 
The Birth of an Industry 
Although the Kelly Act became law on February 2, 1925, it would take many 
.1'1.. months before private contract air carriers could begin to fly the mail. 
The Post Office was realistic in handling the situation. Relinquishing the routes 
would be done in a gradual, methodical manner to ensure the reliability and 
safety of the service. Because the airlines were new and unproven, the Post 
Office required that all potential applicants conform to rigid requirements of 
operation and finance. Routes were to be awarded through competitive bid-
ding, the award going to the lowest responsible bidder. The Post Office would 
determine the definition of"responsible." 
In one of his final acts as second assistant postmaster general, Col. Paul 
Henderson issued the department's new regulations, the most important of which 
was that both the pilot and aircraft had to receive a certificate of airworthiness 
from the Post Office. This requirement, made because proper civil aviation regu-
lation as yet did not exist, ensured that the airline would operate safely or risk 
cancellation of their contract. Each company was required to post a minimum 
of ten thousand dollars in bonds to show good faith and serve as collateral if the 
company failed to comply with the terms of the contract. 
The contract air mail carrier would receive four-fifths of the revenue from 
the special ten-cent-per-ounce air mail rate, as determined after an accurate count 
by local postmasters. The companies were encouraged to seek other sources of 
income, such as passengers, air express, and cargo, provided that none interfere 
with the carriage of the mail. Such contracts could also be sublet with Post Of-
fice approval. Each operator was required to maintain all primary and emer-
gency landing fields and radio and navigation aids. American citizenship was 
required of all contractors, only American-made aircraft could be flown, and at 
least 75 percent of the company's capital stock had to be owned by U.S. citizens. 1 
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The Post Office remained cautious. It was not about to hand over all of its 
routes immediately to untested neophytes but would let contracts first on the 
routes feeding the main, transcontinental route. Only when the operators dem-
onstrated their proficiency would the Post Office offer the potentially highly 
lucrative New York-to-San Francisco line, the nation's most important busi-
ness route. In opening up a new industry that held great promise for the fu-
ture, the government was aware of what could and should result. In a prescient 
editorial, the trade journal Aviation summarized the prevalent state of mind 
of the Post Office and the industry. "The United States covers a large area:' it 
noted, "and it is inevitable that the most obvious routes will be controlled by 
great corporations. But there will always remain plenty of routes where smaller 
companies can operate with good chances of success:'2 
With these thoughts in mind, Postmaster General Harry New called for 
bids on July 25. Sealed bids would be received until 4:30 on the afternoon of 
September 15, 1925. Bidders were expected to state the number and type of 
aircraft they were planning to use, complete with a physical description. All 
aircraft were required to have a fireproof mail compartment, and potential 
operators had to provide a bond with two or more individual sureties ap-
proved by the postmaster general. An average speed of ninety miles per hour 
was expected. All routes were designed to connect with the transcontinental 
route. 
Eight routes with no more than six round trip flights per week were 
advertised: 
1. Boston to New York by way of Hartford, Connecticut. 
2. Chicago to Birmingham, Alabama, by way of Indianapolis, Louis-
ville, and Nashville. 
3. Chicago to St. Paul and Minneapolis by way of La Crosse, Wiscon-
sin. 
4. Chicago to Dallas and Fort Worth by way of Moline, Illinois; St. 
Joseph and Kansas City, Missouri; Wichita; and Oklahoma City. 
5. Chicago to St. Louis by way of Springfield, Illinois. 
6. Elko, Nevada, to Pasco, Washington, by way of Boise, Idaho. 
7. Salt Lake City to Los Angeles by way of Las Vegas. 
8. Seattle to Los Angeles by way of Portland and Medford, Oregon; 
Sacramento; San Francisco; Fresno; and Bakersfield. 
Leading the Post Office's air mail service was a new second assistant post-
master general, Warren Irving Glover. Effective August 1, 1925, Glover ad-
vanced from the rank of third assistant and was placed in charge of the 
transportation of mail. Brooklyn-born, the new forty-five-year-old air mail 
chief entered the woolen industry after leaving high school at the age of eigh-
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teen, eventually becoming a sales representative for the Phoenix Woolen Com-
pany. By 1908 he had organized both the Afton and Sussex Holding Corpora-
tions, which controlled construction firms in the New York City area. As a 
member of the Third Ward Republican Club, Glover first entered politics sup-
porting Theodore Roosevelt for the governorship. After moving to Englewood, 
New Jersey, he entered Bergen County politics, eventually rising to the New 
Jersey State Assembly, where he served a record five terms in office. As the state 
house speaker, he led the difficult fight for the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment.3 
He came to prominence in 1920, when, during a trip to Central America, 
he returned home on board the same ship as President -elect Warren Harding. 
Soon Postmaster General Will Hays appointed Glover as third assistant, launch-
ing his active and productive career in federal service.4 For the next seven years, 
Glover would seize the opportunity presented him and lead the operation of 
the air mail. His stewardship would prove critical guidance through difficult 
times and would in turn prove controversial. 
As advertised, on September 15, 1925, before a roomful of anxious report-
ers, Postmaster General Harry New opened the bids for contract air mail routes.5 
A total of seventeen bids were received for the eight routes offered. Of the 
eight, five awards were given. The Boston-New York route went to Colonial 
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Air Transport, the Chicago-St. Louis route was awarded to the Robertson Air-
craft Corporation, the Chicago-Dallas-Fort Worth route was won by National 
Air Transport (NAT), the Salt Lake City-Los Angeles route was given to West-
ern Air Express (WAE), and the Elko-Pasco route was acquired by Walter T. 
Varney.6 Two routes were already in operation: CAM-6, Detroit to Chicago, 
and CAM-7, Detroit to Cleveland. 
In a move that startled the aviation industry and lent immediate credence 
to the possibilities of commercial aviation, automobile magnate Henry Ford 
entered the fray. In 1923 he began to invest in a struggling company built by 
promising aircraft designer William B. Stout. Stout had developed a rugged 
single-engined transport with a high-mounted, cantilevered wing that carried 
all of its structural support within its thick cross-section and built the aircraft 
of tubular steel, covered with corrugated aluminum, similar to construction 
techniques popularized by Junkers, the German firm. After the tests on the 
transport were successfully completed, Ford purchased the assets of the Stout 
Metal plane Company for approximately $500,000 in the summer of 1925 and 
invested another $2 million in the new division of the Ford Motor Company.7 
Stout and William B. Mayo, Ford's chief aircraft engineer and designer, 
immediately went to work improving the design of the 2-AT, and in the spring 
of 1926 they revealed the Ford 4-AT Tri-Motor, an aircraft destined to change 
the face of aeronautics. It was powered by three reliable Wright Whirlwind 
engines and capable of carrying ten passengers safely in unequalled comfort, 
for its time. It would quickly become the model for the industry. 
On April3, 1925, Ford opened cargo air service between Detroit and Chi-
cago to speed delivery of auto parts between the factory and his suppliers. 
More important, the route was intended to demonstrate the reliability and 
soundness of the new Ford Air Transport and to impress the Post Office offi-
cials who were to weigh the bids along this air mail route. On July 31, the date 
Ford bought control of Stout, the auto manufacturer opened air service be-
tween Detroit and Cleveland. 8 
February 15, 1926, marked the opening of Ford Air Transport's inaugural 
air mail service and the first contract air mail route. In ceremonies attended by 
Second Assistant Glover and the postmaster of Detroit, Henry and his son 
Edsel Ford loaded the first sacks of mail into their Ford 2-AT Maiden Dearborn 
1 at Ford Airport in Dearborn, Michigan, for the flight to Cleveland. At 10:40 
A.M. the large, Liberty-engined monoplane rolled down the grass-covered field, 
lifting off for its one-hour-and-seventeen-minute flight, escorted by a squad-
ron of army fighters to the state line. Five and a half hours later a similar 2-AT 
took off for Chicago, and one hour and thirty-eight minutes later it touched 
down at Maywood Field.9 Detroit was now only eight hours from New York 
and twenty-six hours from San Francisco. 10 
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When Irving Glover accepted his new post in August 1925, he replaced 
Paul Henderson, the "father of the night mail;' as second assistant postmaster 
general. Paul Henderson resigned his position, which he had held with such 
dignity and efficiency, to become the general manager of the most impres-
sively financed company to emerge following the passage of the Kelly bill, Na-
tional Air Transport. 
National Air Transport was the first company founded specifically as an 
airline and was the brainchild of a Canadian, pioneer aviation financier Clem-
ent M. KeysY Keys was perhaps the preeminent aviation financier and inves-
tor of his time. In 1920, he rescued the Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company 
from certain extinction when he took a gamble on the new industry by acquir-
ing all of the company's common stock and borrowing heavily to sustain the 
fragile enterprise. He returned the company to profitability, in part to pre-
serve its engineering expertise. 12 
Keys had another motive as well. Since graduating from the University of 
Toronto in 1897, he had been enamored with the power and efficiency of the 
large railroads. In 1901 he moved to New York, where he became a reporter for 
the Wall Street Journal and its railroad editor. Three years later, he became the 
finance editor of World's Work. His affinity for the well-organized, vertic.ally 
integrated, railroad-holding companies was immediately evident in his nu-
merous articles praising the railroad magnates, particularly E. H. Harriman of 
the Union Pacific. These individuals, in Keys's view, were not dangerous specu-
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lators but true industry pioneers who built huge, well-run enterprises that 
benefited the economy and served the public interest. 
In 1911, Keys founded C.M. Keys and Company, a firm of investment bro-
kers and bankers, becoming a noted speaker and author on financial subjects. 
Through his work he became known to most of the prominent financiers of 
the time, giving him the access to the Wall Street investment houses he needed 
to pursue his aviation interests. In 1919, Keys traveled to Europe as a member 
of the American Aviation Commission, which first interested him in aviation.13 
He took up the cause of aviation, hoping to produce, almost singlehandedly, 
an efficient enterprise from the confusion and waste generated during the Great 
War. He was imbued with the promises of commercial aviation. 
When Keys returned to the United States, he sought to emulate his rail-
road idols and apply their methods to the new business of aviation. As owner 
of Curtiss Aeroplane, he sought to expand vertically by creating National Air 
Transport to make money carrying mail and to serve as a market for Curtiss 
products. As such, he joined with Howard Coffin, another prominent mem-
ber of the American Aviation Commission, to take advantage of the new po-
litical and economic situation presented by the recent air mail legislation. 
Keys brought together a diverse group of some of America's most promi-
nent investors immediately after the passage of the Kelly Act and on May 21, 
1925, formed NAT at a meeting held at the Drake Hotel in Chicago. With Keys 
as executive committee chairman, Howard E. Coffin, organizer of the National 
Aeronautic Association, head of the Hudson Motor Car Company, and war-
time chief of the controversial Aircraft Production Board, took the lead in 
forming the new company. Among the prominent investors and members of 
the board of directors were Philip K. Wrigley as well as Wayne C. Taylor and 
Charles F. Glore of Marshall Fields of Chicago; Charles Lawrence, president of 
Wright Aeronautical and developer of the first practical air-cooled aircraft 
engine; Chester Cuthell, a prominent New York attorney; William A. Rockefeller 
of New York; Richard F. Hoyt, chairman of the board of Wright Aeronautical; 
Harold H. Emmons of Detroit; C. Townsend Ludington, a successful trans-
portation investor; and Harold Pitcairn from Philadelphia. 14 
The company was capitalized for an astonishing $10 million, $2 million of 
which was sold to the organizers of the company. The original authorized capital 
comprised one hundred thousand shares of common stock, each with a par 
value of $100_15 In order to prevent speculation, no stock was issued to the 
public at that time. So much money was raised, in fact, that most was rein-
vested as it was not needed.16 This kind of financial backing was exactly what 
the Post Office wanted. 
National Air Transport was the recipient of CAM -3, the coveted Chicago-
Dallas route, and began operating at 6:05A.M. on May 12, 1926, from Maywood 
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Field, Chicago. The promoters hoped they would eventually receive the cov-
eted Chicago-New York route, once they had demonstrated their ability to 
carry the mail. Using specially built Curtiss Carrier Pigeon single-engined bi-
planes, NAT met immediate success over the one-thousand-mile route. 17 It 
was estimated that NAT brought air mail to more than twenty million citizens 
within four hundred miles of the new route. 18 
Although Ford and NAT were by far the best financed and most impres-
sive of the new entrants, other entrepreneurs won contracts for the feeder routes. 
The route from New York to Boston, CAM-1, was awarded to Colonial Air 
Transport. Colonial had been in business since 1923, operating a Connecticut 
charter service known as the Bee Line. The company was reorganized in 1925 
following the Kelly Act and brought in several prominent entrepreneurs, in-
cluding Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney; former Connecticut governor John H. 
Trumbull; W. Irving Bullard of Boston; Sherman M. Fairchild, a pioneer in 
aerial photography; Juan T. Trippe, a wealthy aviation enthusiast and future 
head of Pan American Airways who would serve as general manager and vice-
president; and William A. Rockefeller, the same individual who was already 
investing in NAT. 19 Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan, a hard-nosed, prideful man of 
great energy, was named president of the company, bringing with him addi-
tional financial support from New York banking and industrial houses. O'Ryan 
had commanded the Twenty-seventh Division during the war and was now a 
practicing attorney with important political connections as member of the 
New York State Commission.20 
Colonial opened service on July 1, 1926, and soon, unlike other contractors, 
was also attempting to carry passengers using single-engine Fokker Universals 
and, later, twelve-seat Fokker Tri-Motors. Despite difficult weather conditions 
along the New York-to-Boston corridor, Colonial managed to maintain reliable 
service within three months of the commencement of service.21 
Maj. William B. Robertson, a successful St. Louis aircraft dealer, and his 
brother Frank, garnered CAM-2, the route from St. Louis to Chicago. The 
Robertsons had created a very profitable business buying and selling war sur-
plus aircraft, forming the Robertson Aircraft Corporation in 1921. As with the 
larger aircraft manufacturers, the brothers sought an additional outlet for the 
sales of their aircraft and a chance to make a steady government guaranteed 
income, opening their air mail operation on April 15, 1926.22 
Walter Varney, another pilot veteran of the war, operated an aerial ferry 
service across San Francisco Bay. When he learned of the opportunity for air 
mail payments he immediately placed a winning bid of 80 percent of revenues 
(eight cents per ounce), correctly gambling that no one else would think to 
bid on the obscure CAM-S from Elko, Nevada, to Pasco, Washington. The 
route was not as obscure as it would first appear. When Varney opened service 
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on April6, 1926, this little airline was carrying mail from a connection on the 
transcontinental air mail route to a stop along the Northern Pacific Railroad 
that led into Seattle.23 
Vern Gorst, the owner of a thriving bus line in Oregon, sought to acquire 
the direct connection to the Northwest when he successfully bid on the Pacific 
coast route from Los Angeles to Seattle. Gorst was concerned that CAM-8 
would compete directly with his bus operations and attempted to head off a 
potential economic confrontation. After many months of careful planning and 
raising $175,000, Gorst opened service over this difficult route with his Pacific 
Air Transport (PAT) on September 15, 1926.24 
Although a successful promoter, Gorst lacked essential knowledge about 
financial management. 25 While seeking advice from the Wells Fargo Bank in 
San Francisco, Gorst became acquainted with a young bank officer who would 
figure prominently in the immediate future of air transportation: William A. 
Patterson. "Pat" Patterson's advice concerning aircraft purchases and invest-
ment as well as loans greatly aided the success of PAT.26 
The CAM-9 route from Chicago to Minneapolis proved troublesome to 
the Post Office. The contract was originally awarded to Charles Dickenson, 
who began flying on June 7, 1926. After only two months of flying and several 
crashes, Dickenson ceased operations. On August 1, 1926, a syndicate of De-
troit and Minnesota businessmen headed by Col. Lewis H. Brittin assumed 
the contract and restarted the service on October 1 under the name of North-
west Airways. Brittin, originally from Derby, Connecticut, was educated at 
Harvard and served in the Spanish-American War as a corporal in Battery A 
of the First Massachusetts Volunteers and in World War I as a lieutenant colo-
nel in the Quartermaster Corps. From that point onward, he was known as 
Colonel Brittin. In his civilian life, Brittin was an engineer for the Newhall Engi-
neering Company and spent five years in Mexico constructing factories for the 
Sierra Madre Land and Lumber Company. Returning to the United States, Brittin 
accepted a position as manager of the National Lamp Division of the General 
Electric Company and later as the vice president and general manager of the 
Northwestern Terminal, a prosperous industrial center in Minneapolis. 
In 1926, at the age of forty-nine, he organized Northwest Airways follow-
ing the demise of Dickenson's operation. As vice president of the St. Paul As-
sociation of Public and Business Affairs, Brittin had already fought hard for a 
bond issue in St. Paul for the construction of an airport and was determined 
to bring air mail service to the area. As vice president and general manager of 
Northwest Airways, he implemented strict economies in operations, with his 
company ranking among the most efficient of the air mail operators, despite 
the difficult climate of the upper MidwestY 
Two more wartime veteran pilots entered the civil aviation scene along 
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CAM-10, the line between Atlanta and Miami, Florida. Reed Chambers and 
America's ace-of-aces, Edward V. "Eddie" Rickenbacker, organized the Florida 
Airways Corporation. Though it opened service on April 1, 1926, and was 
soon carrying passengers, the ·company eventually ceased operations follow-
ing the loss of two aircraft. Chambers would become involved in the critical 
business of aviation insurance, while Rickenbacker would reenter the airline 
field in a few years. 
Perhaps the most profitable airline possessed the shortest route. Clifford 
Ball, of McKeesport, Pennsylvania, operated CAM -11 from Cleveland to Pitts-
burgh, across the Allegheny Mountains. Organized as the Skyline Transporta-
tion Company but generally known as Clifford Ball, the airline made a 
substantial profit after the air mail payment rates were amended in mid-1926, 
starting service on April21, 1927. Not coincidentally, Ball was the brother-in-
law of Rep. Clyde Kelly, "father of the air mail."28 
Colorado Airways was created to carry the mail from Pueblo, Colorado, 
through Denver to connect with the transcontinental route at Cheyenne, Wyo-
ming, along CAM-12.29 Despite operating at the maximum 80 percent rate, 
Colorado Airways ran into revenue problems because oflow mail loads. Worse, 
it ran afoul of postal regulations when it was revealed that it had colluded with 
another potential operator to rig its bid. The company's contract was later 
turned over to Western Air Express. 
Western was the creation of a prominent West Coast aviation pioneer and 
entrepreneur, Harris M. "Pop" Hanshue. A native of Mendon, Michigan, 
Hanshue accepted a job as chief factory tester for the Olds Motor Company 
following his graduation from the University of Michigan in 1902. The com-
pany sent the young Hanshue to California the following year to demonstrate 
and distribute their products along the West Coast. While there, he became 
intensely interested in automobile racing until his marriage in 1914. With his 
inherent fascination with speed, Hanshue took up the challenge of aviation in 
1925, forming Western Air Express with the substantial financial backing of 
Los Angeles Times owner and publisher Harry Chandler and Richfield Oil 
magnate James A. Talbot. Together they bid successfully for CAM-4 from Los 
Angeles to Salt Lake City, opening service on April17, 1926.30 In no small part 
due to Hanshue's organizational ability as a successful businessman, the ser-
vice operated without a hitch, cutting transcontinental travel time from Los 
Angeles to New York to only thirty hours. Not surprisingly, unlike most of the 
other operators, Western immediately made a great deal of money over this 
heavily traveled route.31 
The first ten routes were awarded under the original payment plan, which 
allowed a maximum of four-fifths (80 percent) of the revenue collected by the 
Post Office to be given to the contract carrier. Costs were calculated along a 
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zone system. Unfortunately, this unwieldy system required the local postmas-
ters to count and weigh each letter mailed at each stop, a tedious method at 
best, which fostered delays and inefficiency. A concerned Clyde Kelly sought 
and received an amendment to his Air Mail Act of 1925, changing the method 
of payment to a poundage system. 
As originally proposed by Postmaster General New, the new provision in 
the bill would allow payment at a fixed rate determined through negotiation 
with him. Sufficient members of Congress were concerned that this left too 
much discretionary power in the hands of the postmaster general. As finally 
agreed, the new legislation provided for a maximum payment of three dollars 
per pound for the first one thousand miles and no more than thirty cents per 
pound thereafter for each additional one hundred miles. 
It was intended that the actual payment would be approximately the same, 
with 80 percent of revenue from the sale of air mail stamps going to the con-
tractor. In reality, the amendment now separated the payments due the con-
tractors from actual revenue. 32 In other words, the payment was no longer tied 
to the income generated from the sale of stamps, leaving open the possibility 
of excessive payments. Still, under this system, no subsidy was intended, and 
as a result most, though not all, of the airlines continued to lose money be-
cause of payments insufficient to cover the operating costs of unrefined and 
inefficient aircraft (despite the excellent management of most of the airlines). 
This also opened the door to direct air mail appropriations for the contract 
carriers in the form of indirect subsidy if postal revenues fell short of the con-
tracted payment rates. In so doing, however, the 1926 amendment also en-
couraged the creation of numerous uneconomic short routes. 33 
With a solid core of well-financed companies flying the mail, and the air 
mail act amended sufficiently to permit greater efficiency, the Post Office De-
partment prepared to relinquish its transcontinental route. The line would be 
divided into two separate routes, similar in practice to the railroads, none of 
which operated coast-to-coast: CAM -17 from New York to Chicago and CAM-
18 from Chicago to San Francisco. 
Late in 1926, the Post Office finally called for bids along the two new routes. 
National Air Transport's officials were already prepared; this route was their 
reason for being, and they had spent the last two years working toward that 
goal. To head off possible competition from a potentially powerful opponent, 
NAT initiated merger agreements with Colonial Air Transport during the sum-
mer of 1926 and entered discussions with WAE. Though the negotiations bore 
no fruit, Colonel Henderson well understood the nature of this new industry. 
"By the very nature of air transport;' he asserted, "some sort of monopoly, 
such as this would indicate, is almost necessary to success."34 Although neither 
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Colonial nor Western agreed to merge with National, in two years time, merg-
ers and oligopoly would sweep the industry. 
Barring an unsuspected bid from an unknown source, NAT expected to 
win the contract. When the postmaster general opened bidding on January 
15, 192 7, the attendees were astonished at the low bids. Three companies sought 
the contract. An unknown entity, Columbia Air Lines, bid $1.73 per pound for 
the first thousand miles. Colonial offered to carry the mail at $1.88, and NAT 
made two bids, one for $1.98 and the other a complicated sliding scale system 
ranging from $1.25 for loads over six thousand pounds per thousand miles up 
to $2.57 for loads ofless than seven hundred pounds.35 
Postmaster General New was concerned with the wide differences in the 
bidding. The numbers were so disparate that he chose to reject the original 
offers and call for new bids, by March 24. This problem of open, competitive, 
and possibly destructive bidding was manifested here for the first time. It would 
not be the last. 
Three weeks before the new bids were opened, the comptroller general, 
J.R. McCarl, handed down an opinion concerning the power of the postmas-
ter general to determine competent bidders. At stake was the definition of 
"responsible" bidder. New wanted an interpretation that would allow him to 
reject questionable bids. He requested the full authority of the law to decide 
the best bidder for the job, even to the exclusion of competitive bidding alto-
gether. Despite the postmaster general's wishes, McCarl flatly rejected the no-
tion that the routes could be awarded through negotiation. 36 
At noon on March 24, 1927, General New opened the resubmitted bids 
for CAM -17. Four bids were received this time. Colonial Air transport now 
dropped its offer to $1.68 a pound, NAT bid $1.24, and a new organization, 
North American Airways, bid $1.23. One New York speculator, E.F. Stewart, 
offered to carry all air mail and first-class mail for only 35 cents a pound. His 
bid was summarily rejected as not conforming to the requirements of the ad-
vertisement. 
The challenge from North American Airways was another matter. This 
company had just been formed by a group of fourteen air mail pilots who 
were flying the eastern route together with Superintendent Carl Egge, sub-
scribing to $100,000 in shares of capital stock. Underwriting the project was 
eccentric New York junk dealer and aviation enthusiast Charles Levine, with 
an additional $500,000 in capital supplied by Cleveland business interests.37 
After much discussion, General New awarded the lucrative contract to 
NAT, considering it the lowest "responsible" bidder, even though Levine's group 
underbid them by a penny per pound. Paul Henderson had protested that 
North American Airways' bid was improper because government employees 
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had illegally participated. Although Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes of the 
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that North American's participation was in 
fact legal because the government employees were not officers in the company 
and, therefore, not "interested parties;' the Post Office thought NAT the better 
of the two based on their experience operating CAM-3.38 By September, NAT 
was flying to New York. 
William E. Boeing of Seattle forged the final link in the transcontinental 
network. Born in Detroit, Michigan, the son of a wealthy German-born lum-
ber magnate, the tall, bespectacled Boeing followed his father into the family 
business after attending Yale and making an independent fortune in the min-
ing business, subsequently establishing his own lumber company in Seattle to 
exploit the vast potential of the magnificent forests of the Pacific Northwest. 
An astute businessman, Boeing invested well; he held controlling interest in 
Pacific National Bank, a decision that allowed him much freedom in pursuing 
his varied interests. The quiet young Boeing was introduced to aviation in 
1914 at the age of thirty-two, when he flew as a passenger off nearby Lake 
Washington in an early Curtiss flying boat. In 1916, he pooled his resources 
with U.S. Navy commander G. Conrad Westervedt to produce the B&W 
floatplane, patterned after the Martin TA aircraft that Boeing had purchased 
earlier. The B&W aircraft performed well enough for Boeing to incorporate 
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this new business as the Pacific Aero Products Company. In the age of wooden 
construction, the establishment of an aircraft company in the lumber-rich 
Northwest was a logical step. Quickly, a contract was received from the navy 
for trainers and Curtiss HS-2L flying boats under license during World War I. 
The firm was renamed the Boeing Airplane Company in 1917 and soon moved 
from its first site on Lake Union to a larger facility on the Duwamish River, 
south of the city.39 
Military and naval contracts dried up briefly for the Boeing Airplane Com-
pany after the Armistice, temporarily forcing the company, with its force of 
skilled woodworkers, into the manufacture of furniture and boats. In search 
of new uses for aircraft and alternative sources of money, Bill Boeing first 
stepped into the field of air transport with an improved version of his Type C 
floatplane, which he had built for the navy and named the Model CL-4S. With 
this aircraft, Boeing, with pilot Edward Hubbard, flew sixty letters from 
Vancouver, British Columbia, to Seattle on March 3, 1919. Inspired after this 
flight, Hubbard flew a similar route, only now from Victoria, British Colum-
bia, in October 1920 using a B-1 flying boat purchased from Boeing. With this 
flight, Hubbard Air Transport, later known as the Seattle-Victoria Air Mail 
Line, became the first to exercise a U.S. Post Office Foreign Air Mail contract 
and was able to cut one day off the delivery time ofU.S.-bound letters arriving 
in Victoria on Pacific steamships and making the same improvement on the 
outbound journeys. This small, independent enterprise would continue until 
1937. Eddie Hubbard himself would soon become a major figure in Boeing's 
plans for future air transport.40 
William Boeing had already shown some interest in the possibilities of air 
transport when he flew with Eddie Hubbard from Canada in 1919, and he had 
remained close to Hubbard during the ensuing years. Hubbard had served as a 
Boeing Airplane Company test pilot while running his air mail operation. In 
1926, Hubbard approached his friend with another idea. To seize the opportu-
nity offered by the Post Office for the lucrative CAM-18 route between San 
Francisco and Chicago, Hubbard suggested that Boeing Airplane enter into 
the air mail business. 
First, Hubbard approached Clairmont L. Egtvedt with the idea. Egtvedt, 
the designer in charge, was a young, round-faced, soft-spoken man originally 
from Stoughton, Wisconsin, who had come to work at Boeing straight from 
the University of Washington in 1927, when William Boeing had asked the 
university for young engineers. Earlier, the company had wisely donated funds 
to assist the university's aeronautics studies and produce new talent. The pro-
gram paid off handsomely, as Egtvedt was to lead the company for decades 
and eventually become chairman of the Boeing Aircraft Company. Another 
Washington undergraduate, Philip G. Johnson, was also chosen and joined 
30 Airlines and Air Mail 
Philip G. Johnson, president of the Boeing Airplane Company 
and president of the United Air Lines, 1932 (Smithsonian, 
SI# 2000-6124) 
Boeing at this time. These two highly creative young engineers were to figure 
prominently in the future of the company. 
Hubbard and Egtvedt discussed the details at length; Hubbard examined 
the operational aspects of the proposal while Egtvedt worked on producing a 
suitable aircraft for the role. When they had jointly concluded that such a plan 
was feasible, the two presented their case to Bill Boeing. After some hesitation, 
Boeing realized the possibilities presented by the project and agreed to gamble 
and finance the new airlineY 
Promptly, Hubbard was assigned the task of creating Boeing Air Trans-
port (BAT) with Philip Johnson as first president. Hubbard immediately hired 
Duard B. Colyer, an ex-Army pilot and former superintendent of the Central 
Division of the government's transcontinental route, as superintendent of 
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operations. Colyer in turn hired many veteran air mail pilots he had known 
while with the Post Office and thus rapidly established a reliable system with 
experienced personnel.42 
Boeing Air Transport's success was based on Egtvedt's trump card, the 
Model40-A aircraft. This remarkably efficient mail plane was the logical out-
growth of Boeing's experience in building sturdy, metal-fuselage, wooden-
winged biplane fighters. The first Model40 was designed in 1925 in response 
to a Post Office request for new aircraft to replace its aging DH-4s. This ver-
sion was powered by a single 400-horsepower, water-cooled, V-12 Liberty en-
gine of World War I vintage as required by the Post Office, and incorporated a 
fuselage of mixed wood and metal construction. Despite the soundness of its 
design, only one Model40 was purchased.43 In 1927, Egtvedt resurrected the 
aircraft, incorporating several significant improvements in the process. 
First, he redesigned the fuselage with an all-welded steel tube frame, which 
improved the aircraft's strength. Of greatest importance to BAT's future suc-
cess as a commercial carrier, the 40-A was built to include two passengers as 
well as a payload of twelve hundred pounds of mail. Although the pilot sat 
exposed to the elements in an open cockpit well behind the trailing edge of the 
wings, the two passengers could ride in reasonable comfort in an enclosed 
cabin immediately behind the engine. This arrangement, although not ideal, 
was certainly an improvement over competing designs, which paid little if any 
attention to the needs of the few courageous early passengers. This inclusion 
of adequate extra space for passengers was meant to ensure BAT a source of 
additional income. Finally, the incorporation of a major technological break-
through in powerplant design, the air-cooled radial engine, made the 40-A an 
outstanding success.44 The inclusion of a 420-horsepower Pratt & Whitney 
Wasp was a result of Boeing's close relationship with the navy while building 
fighters and William Boeing's friendship with Pratt & Whitney founder 
Frederick B. Rentschler. 
A determined man of stern appearance and disposition, Rentschler learned 
metal working firsthand at his family's successful foundry in Hamilton, Ohio. 
He was a formal man who guarded his privacy and whose modesty and shy-
ness could often be interpreted as coldness toward others. Standing six feet 
two inches in height, the broad-shouldered Rentschler acquired his obsession 
with engines while working with his father's abortive experiments in automo-
bile manufacturing. Educated at Princeton, the young Rentschler took these 
lessons with him when he entered the army as a captain in World War I. As-
signed to the New York district, he was given the task of supervising the pro-
duction of aircraft engines. After the war ended, Rentschler joined the Wright 
Aeronautical Corporation, where he actively pursued his new interest in air-
craft powerplants.45 
32 Airlines and Air Mail 
During the early 1920s, the U.S. Navy became increasingly interested in 
the air-cooled engines produced by the tiny Lawrance Aero-Engine Corpora-
tion of New York City. In the immediate postwar years, the only engines pro-
ducing enough horsepower for high performance aircraft were bulky 
water-cooled types. With the rise of the aircraft carrier as an important weapon, 
the navy had to find an engine that could produce sufficient power without 
the weight and maintenance problems of the water-cooled motors. The 
Lawrance J series of engines seemed ideal for the task because they had no 
troublesome and heavy radiators, water pumps, or vulnerable cooling lines. 
Wishing to find a large company with enough resources to produce and 
develop this engine, the navy threatened and cajoled Fred Rentschler, then 
president of the Wright Aeronautical Company, into purchasing the Lawrance 
Company in 1923. By 1924, the Wright J-3 and J-4 engines, better known as 
Whirlwinds, were in service. Incorporating Englishman Samuel D. Heron's 
revolutionary sodium-cooled valves, which virtually eliminated the chronic 
problem of burned exhaust valves, the improved J -5 series was the first to offer 
power and great dependability.46 This powerplant, the world's first truly reli-
able aero-engine, made possible Charles Lindbergh's nonstop flight from New 
York to Paris in thirty-three and a half hours with no problems. With such 
proof of its technical experience, Wright was producing vast numbers ofWhirl-
winds for the navy and civilian interests. 
In 1924, frustrated with banker-dominated management, Rentschler left 
Wright after a dispute over the future development of the air-cooled engine, 
disagreeing with the director, who he felt did not appreciate the engineering 
problems of aircraft engine production. Rentschler brought with him two of 
his colleagues, Chief Designer George Mead and Assistant Engineer in Charge 
of Design A.V.D. Willgoos. After securing the necessary financial backing 
through the good offices of Rentschler's brother George of the National City 
Bank, they formed the Pratt & Whitney Company in 1925, assuming the name 
of an idle tool factory in Hartford, Connecticut.47 
The trio immediately gathered information and began the development 
of a new, higher-horsepowered engine. Incorporating numerous changes, their 
new Wasp engine could generate 400 horsepower from nine cylinders at 1,900 
rpm, a vast improvement over the latest engines from Wright. By May 1925, 
the Wasp was undergoing flight tests. The navy was so enthusiastic over the 
results that two hundred engines were soon ordered for its new series of com-
bat aircraft.48 
From Seattle, William Boeing followed these developments closely. He had 
worked with Rentschler before and had formed a close working relationship. 
Boeing realized that, with the Wasp engine, the extraneous weight of water 
and the cooling system could be exchanged for payload. Unfortunately, he was 
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frustrated in his efforts to acquire the engine because all of the production 
Wasps for 192 7 were earmarked for the navy. Keenly aware that the fate of his 
new commercial enterprise hung in the balance, Boeing approached his old 
acquaintance Rentschler to see if any of the batch of two hundred Wasps could 
be allocated to BAT. Rentschler, acting on his friend's request, persuaded the 
navy to delay acceptance of some of the Wasps, allowing Boeing to receive a 
sufficient number on the assurance that Pratt & Whitney could step up pro-
duction sufficiently to complete the navy contract on time.49 Once in service, 
the twenty-five Wasp-powered Boeing 40-As fulfilled their potential and made 
BAT an important carrier almost overnight. This collaboration was to prove 
central to the subsequent development of commercial aviation. 
On January 16, 1927, Bill Boeing and his wife Bertha boarded Great North-
ern Railway's Oriental Limited Number 2 eastbound to attend the opening of 
air mail bids in Washington, D.C. Traveling across the northern transconti-
nental route rail to St. Paul, the couple nervously anticipated the impending 
competition with numerous scotch highballs. They arrived at Union Station 
at nine o'clock on Saturday morning, January 22, and were taken by Boeing 
representatives to their room at the Carlton Hotel. For a week they waited 
while accepting visits from numerous government, military, and industry lead-
ers, including the MacCrackens and Ralph Williams, the vice chairman of the 
Republican National Committee. 5° 
On Saturday, the Boeings returned to their hotel room following visits 
with Senator Jones of Washington and lunch with Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy Trubee Davison. They were greeted on their arrival with the telephone 
message they were hoping for: 
Ten minutes after we returned to our rooms at the Carlton, the 'phone rang 
and George [Tidmarsh, the Boeing D.C. representative] answered it. After the 
first few words his expression changed-and he fairly yelled into the 'phone, 
"You don't mean to say we got it?" The man who 'phoned was the U.S. Fidelity 
and Guarantee Company representative. George then 'phoned the Post Office 
Department and Mr. Glover confirmed the good news, our bid was accepted .... 
Many wires and 'phone calls of congratulations poured in, and many callers 
came. 
Sunday January 30 was a day of rest and relaxation. Monday-more callers, 
among them a Mr. Rentschler of the Pratt & Whitney "Wasp" Engine Company 
arrived to have a business talk with Bill. Mr. Rentschler is delighted to get an 
order for 25 "Wasp" engines that are to go in the mail planes. Bill says it is the 
biggest single commercial order that has been given in this country. 51 
Indeed, Boeing and Rentschler had a business talk. Their discussion in 
Washington presaged many other conversations' over the next several years. 
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Air mail is loaded on an NAT Douglas M-2 at Cleveland Airport, c. 1927. Note the armed 
guard. (Smithsonian, Sl# A5314A) 
Boeing and Rentschler were about to change the face of American commercial 
aviation. 
In the meantime, on January 29, 1927, Boeing Air Transport won the con-
tract from an incredulous Western Air Express. Western, well established as an 
airline presence in the region, felt it had a lock on the bidding. Its sturdy, wa-
ter-cooled, Liberty-engined Douglas M-2/4 mail planes had pioneered the air 
route from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City. Based on its substantial experience, 
Western bid a reasonable $2.24 per pound for the first one thousand miles and 
24 cents per pound for each additional one hundred miles. In contrast, BAT's 
bid of $1.50 per pound for the first one thousand miles and 15 cents per pound 
for each additional one hundred miles, half of the maximum allowed by law, 
seemed ridiculously low. Nevertheless, BAT opened service as agreed on July 
1.52 The transcontinental route was now complete. 
Chapter 3 
The Aviation Industry 
Comes of Age 
Six weeks before Boeing Air Transport opened service, a courageous twenty-five-year-old air mail pilot sharply focused the nation's attention on the 
potential of commercial aviation. On May 20, 1927, Charles A. Lindbergh took 
off from Long Island's rain-soaked Roosevelt Field, wrestling his overladen 
Ryan NYP Spirit of St. Louis into the air and toward Paris, 3,610 miles away. 
With his single but reliable Wright J-5 Whirlwind droning faithfully on-
ward through the night and into the next day, the young Lindbergh fought 
fatigue and worsening weather as he struggled across the dangerous North 
Atlantic. When he landed at Le Bourget Field outside Paris thirty-three and a 
half hours later on the evening of the twenty-first, Lindbergh ignited an ex-
plosion of public interest in the possibilities of aviation. 
Lindbergh was a quiet, almost stoic individual of unremarkable accom-
plishments before his flight. The son of a Minnesota congressman, Lindbergh 
attended the University of Wisconsin but never graduated. He learned to fly 
after a few lessons in Lincoln, Nebraska, and embarked on an aviation career 
after purchasing a Curtiss Jenny in April1923. He barnstormed around the 
country, enlisting in the Army Air Service Reserve and winning his wings in 
March 1925. One year later, he found a more permanent position as an air 
mail pilot for the Robertson Aircraft Corporation in St. Louis. 
As chief pilot, Lindbergh opened Robertson's air mail route on April15, 
1926. Together with two other pilots, he flew the mail in de Havilland DH -4s 
between Chicago and St. Louis along CAM-2 and twice was forced to bail out 
with his load of mail when trapped by fog. During this time he became enam-
ored with the idea of uniting America with Europe and winning the twenty-
five-thousand-dollar prize offered in 1919 by hotelier Raymond Orteig for the 
first successful nonstop flight from New York to Paris. 
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Methodically, Lindbergh undertook this task, first gaining the financial 
support of Major Robertson and other St. Louis business leaders. He ap-
proached several aircraft manufacturers before settling on a modified M-2 
mail plane built by Ryan Airlines of San Diego, California. With dogged deter-
mination, Lindbergh precisely calculated his requirements and those of his 
aircraft, producing his Ryan NYP (New York-Paris) and naming it in honor of 
his St. Louis backers. 
Lindbergh, though stunned by the incessant public attention he received, 
nonetheless understood the effect of his flight across the Atlantic and his sub-
sequent twenty-two-thousand-mile tour of the United States advocating avia-
tion. In messages he delivered in person or through notes dropped above towns 
he flew over, Lindbergh underscored the promising future of passenger air 
travel. 1 During a press conference in Hartford, Connecticut, reported by the 
New York Times on July 21, 1927, Lindbergh described his vision for air trans-
portation. "Passenger service will follow the mail service;' he said. "The time 
when there will be an air service available for all who want to use it depends 
upon what use you make of the present air facilities. We now have a mail ser-
vice that is struggling for existence and with 50 percent more cooperation and 
assistance from the public it would be a great success."2 
Lindbergh suddenly became the quintessential hero in an age of Ameri-
can heroes, all the more so because of his quiet, unassuming manner. To mil-
lions of citizens, his flight represented a breakthrough in their conception of 
aviation. No longer was aviation the purview of the crackpot. The effect, com-
ing at the beginning of the boom of Wall Street, cannot be underestimated. 
Suddenly, as part of the public feeding frenzy in the stock market, the stocks of 
the tiny aircraft manufacturers and airline operators attracted buyers in droves. 3 
In fact, aviation stocks would prove a barometer of the state of the market, 
outperforming a number of more mainstream industries, until the collapse in 
late 1929. In the meantime, the possibilities for growth in the aviation indus-
try seemed endless. Wall Street had discovered the airplane. 
As before, the leader in the aviation financial world was Clement Keys. His 
Curtiss Aeroplane was a leading aircraft manufacturer and National Air Trans-
port the preeminent airline. Now he was getting serious company; not only 
were enthusiasts investing in aviation but mainstream Wall Street investment 
houses were turning their attention to aviation for the first time. The possi-
bilities for rapid growth seemed limitless, but he was aware of the serious fi-
nancial pitfalls. 4 
Nineteen twenty seven marked the beginning of an enormous expansion 
of the aviation industry in general and air transportation in particular. The 
Post Office continued to effect changes to improve the delivery of mail and 
streamline the method of payment. For the first time, it willingly began to run 
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an air mail deficit. On February 1, the Post Office abandoned its cumbersome 
zone system of payment, replacing it with a standard rate of ten cents per half-
ounce anywhere in the United States. Although the new payment method 
greatly increased the simplicity, it did so at the cost of deficit expenditures 
estimated to be almost 25 percent.5 The decision markedly increased the vol-
ume of air mail sent, as was its intention, but the new flat rate had its pitfalls. 
Despite the increased tonnage, most of the operators, with the notable excep-
tion of Western Air Express on its Los Angeles-Salt Lake City route, and Clifford 
Ball in Pennsylvania, all were losing substantial sums of money, as Clement 
Keys had predicted. 
Following his retirement from active control of his business interests in 
the early 1920s, mining magnate Daniel Guggenheim was actively engaged in 
the philanthropical support of aviation, particularly following his creation of 
the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics on January 
16, 1926. He and his foundation spent considerable sums to advance the sci-
ence of aeronautics. The fund sponsored aeronautical research and education 
and, under the auspices of Daniel's son Harry, supported Lindbergh on his 
1927 tour promoting commercial aviation around the United States.6 
Daniel fervently pressed for improvements in commercial air transpor-
tation and, to this end, encouraged Harry to provide loans to airlines for the 
purchase of new equipment. The Guggenheims were aware that air mail air-
craft were generally unsuitable for passengers, but comfortable passenger-
carrying aircraft were much more expensive to acquire and operate. On May 
27, 1927, Harry called a conference of airline operators in New York; attend-
ing were all of the preeminent names, including Harris Hanshue of WAE. 
Because of its huge profits along CAM-4, Western had been able to open 
regularly scheduled passenger service almost exactly one year earlier. In fact, 
only they and Pacific Air Transport were carrying passengers to any signifi-
cant degree, all other airlines were comfortable flying air mail and express 
and did not wish to carry people, who had to be treated much more care-
fully than mail. 7 
The decision was made to award no more than $400,000 in low-interest 
loans to Western Air Express based on its excellent record of safety and reli-
ability. Harris Hanshue gladly accepted and turned his attention to finding a 
suitable large aircraft. After much deliberation, Western decided to purchase 
the Dutch Fokker F-10, an improved version of its successful F.VII/3m, now 
built in the United States by Atlantic Aviation, a Fokker subsidiary. The F-10, 
with its fabric-covered steel-tube fuselage and an all-wood cantilevered wing, 
was conventional in every way and was noted for its mild handling character-
istics and superior safety features. 8 
On October 2, 1927, WAE and the Guggenheim Fund announced that 
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Western Air Express flew Fokker F-10 airliners on the Model Air Line as well as on its later 
routes in the West. (Smithsonian, SI# 95-8033) 
Western would begin operation of the Model Air Line, flying between Los 
Angeles and San Francisco. The fund lent $155,000 at 5 percent interest for 
two years, enough to purchase three of the plushly equipped Fokkers. On May 
28, 1928, Western opened its new passenger service up the California coast 
amid much fanfare and publicity and was soon operating with great regularity 
and reliability with a dispatch rate of 99 percent.9 So pleased was Western that 
it formed a holding company, Western Air Express Inc., with $5 million in 
financing and in 1929 bought control of the manufacturer, by then known as 
the Fokker Aircraft Corporation. Western unfortunately lost money on the 
Model Air Line. Although ticket prices were as high as $50 per person, the ten-
seat F-1 Os were so inefficient that they could not cover the operating costs. 
Despite Western's difficulties, other investors remained undaunted. The 
dream of carrying passengers by air drove Clement Keys to risk his personal 
fortune on an experiment that he knew was filled with risk but promised to 
reap long-term rewards. In order to benefit the country the most, it was im-
portant that regularly scheduled, long-distance passenger travel begin as soon 
as possible. The initiative came from an unexpected source-the railroads. 
Initially, U.S. railroads saw the nascent aviation industry as both an in-
vestment opportunity and a potential rival that should be controlled from the 
outset to prevent ruinous competition. In fact, in order to curtail the 
government's successful air mail operation, the railroads, through their con-
gressional representative, former Progressive Republican Clyde Kelly, were di-
rectly responsible for the Contract Air Mail Act of 1925. The implementation 
of the law removed the threat of government competition and gave the rail-
roads an opportunity to invest in a new and potentially profitable industry. 
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Because of Keys's close ties to the New York investment houses and his 
known support of the railroads from his days at World's Work and the Wall 
Street Journal, he was the obvious choice as an aviation executive with whom 
the railroads felt they could do business. As early as 1926, the Pennsylvania 
Railroad approached Keys and National Air Transport with a novel air-rail 
proposal to link New York City and Los Angeles10 
It was felt that flying passengers at night over the treacherous Allegheny 
Mountains of western Pennsylvania with the current generation of aircraft 
was too risky a venture for passengers. 11 The Pennsylvania Railroad's offer re-
moved the problem by carrying passengers by train at night from New York to 
a central terminus at Columbus, Ohio, where passengers would transfer to a 
waiting aircraft, fly during the day to Oklahoma, transfer again to an over-
night train to New Mexico, and again take an airplane over the last leg to Los 
Angeles. Total travel time was estimated at forty-eight hours, cutting at least 
one full day from the normal transcontinental crossing. 
Beginning in April1928, Keys's ideas began to take shape: 
i 
The plan is to form a company the general purpose of which shall be to 
establish passenger transportation by aircraft as a supplement to the railroad 
systems, to this end that passengers desiring very rapid transportation over great 
distances will be afforded facilities giving the maximum safety and comfort as 
well as speed. 
As the first link in a proposed nation-wide system of this combination plane 
and rail service it is proposed to establish a service from New York to Los Ange-
les in cooperation with the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Atchison, Topeka, & 
Santa Fe Railroad. 12 
Keys was methodical in his approach. His tentative plan outlined all of the 
financial and operational problems and their alternatives he expected to en-
counter. He detailed the known factors. First, Pennsylvania Railroad was to be 
responsible for the New York-Columbus stage. In discussions, it was agreed 
that the Pennsylvania reserved the exclusive rights to sell "through" tickets from 
New York to points west, thus reserving any available space on the aircraft out 
of Columbus. In return, the Pennsylvania Railroad Board of Directors was 
expected to vote $200,000 for the route to St. Louis and $500,000 in total for 
development costs for the entire transcontinental route. The board was eager 
to begin and receive the publicity value for being the first eastern railroad to 
initiate such a route. National Air Transport, in turn, was willing to subscribe 
$2 million and operate the route in order to protect its position. It was equally 
willing to cooperate with Western Air Express and divide the flying portion of 
the route with NAT operating from Columbus to Wichita and Western from 
Los Angeles to Clovis, New Mexico. Ford Motor Company was amenable to 
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the deal and wished to exchange its aircraft for an equal value of stock in the 
new enterprise. 
In St. Louis, Keys hoped for $500,000 to $750,000 in financial support to 
be sold in the Columbus, St. Louis, and Tulsa areas. With the backing of banker 
Harry Knight, Harold Bixby, and others, Keys wanted Lindbergh to enter the 
equation to help St. Louis become the center of the new operation and pro-
vide additional public promotion. Keys envisioned WAE as the sole operator 
of the new airline's western division. Although Keys had sought to broach the 
subject with Harris Hanshue, he was confident that Knight and, especially, 
Lindbergh could convince WAE to join Keys. 
Lining up Curtiss Aeroplane to provide financing and equipment would 
be a simple task because Keys controlled the company. The Boeing Company, 
however, would pose a problem. Keys correctly felt that Boeing was the most 
ambitious of the aircraft builders and one of the few airline operators to carry 
air mail and passengers successfully. 13 
Keys's plan was straightforward. He and his group from NAT and the Penn-
sylvania Railroad were to organize an operating airline using the latest three-
engined passenger aircraft available from Fokker, Ford, or Boeing, the decision 
to be made independently by a technical committee. The route would be ad-
ministered by three divisions, each responsible for raising $500,000 from local 
investors subscribed in nonvoting, Class B stock. To ensure efficient manage-
ment, something notably lacking in many aviation enterprises, the president 
of each operating division would receive a salary for operating his office while 
"doing nothing else." The eastern division would have its headquarters in St. 
Louis and would control the route from Columbus to Wichita by way of In-
dianapolis and St. Louis, capitalized at $1.5 million. With headquarters in Los 
Angeles, the western division would control the route from Clovis, New Mexico, 
to Los Angeles through El Paso and Yuma, also capitalized at $1.5 million. The 
northern division, which flew feeder routes, would link St. Paul to Columbus 
by way of Chicago. 14 
Once his plans were completed, Keys would create his "Transcontinental 
Airways" as a holding company to buy $1 million of Class A voting stock in the 
eastern and western division. In turn, he planned to issue $4 million worth of 
Transcontinental stock: $3 million to acquire the three divisions and $1 mil-
lion for a cash reserve for future expansion and as a hedge against expected 
startup losses. A wise and responsible investor with a keen awareness of the 
increasing problems of stock speculation, Keys wanted the Transcontinental 
stock issued to the public in small amounts with the full understanding that 
this was a pioneering enterprise "rather than an established business" and there-
fore possessed great risk. 15 
This point was central to Keys's behavior and beliefs. He was adamant that 
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aviation be controlled by responsible individuals willing to assume great risks 
on the behalf of the public in developing a potentially lucrative new form of 
transportation. Because of this, Keys insisted the "Board of Directors and of-
ficers must be strong, because their character is the only thing that would jus-
tify offering and buying these shares. The Board must include: character, 
experience, public reputation, (and possess) financial standing beyond re-
proach." In addition, all policies, accounting practices, rules of discipline, and 
operations would be controlled by the board of the holding company to pro-
mote uniformity. 16 
The complicated arrangement of separate operating companies was de-
signed to appeal to western interests in WAE and Southern Pacific Railroad. It 
was crucial from the outset to determine the degree, if any, of western partici-
pation in Transcontinental. Initial conversations looked promising. Keys had 
discussed the proposition with WAE representative Herbert Fleishacker, who, 
as the largest stockholder, also spoke for Southern Pacific and several banks. 
Fleishacker recommended an even larger investment but seemed to possess 
ulterior motives. "These people are full of energy and big ideas;' Keys said. 
"They think that the company should be a $5 million company instead of a $3 
million company. They think it should be financed to run connections with all 
railroads, both east and west wanting to run connections and also have some 
ideas that would make it uncomfortable for Boeing."17 
It was generally agreed thereafter to raise $5 million in order to lay a sub-
stantial foundation and establish Transcontinental as the predominant line. 
Writing to St. Louis investor stockbroker Thomas N. Dysart, Keys stated, "There 
seems to be a general feeling, in which I think your group shares thoroughly, 
that this job should not be done piecemeal because if it is we shall have confu-
sion and competition in every part of the country. That is the reason for the 
slowness in moving in the matter, which requires an awful lot of thinking and 
hard work." 18 Dysart agreed with Keys's assessment and his deliberateness. "I 
can quite appreciate the difficulty in setting up properly the transcontinental 
deal;' he commented. 19 
Keys was still concerned about western participation. He reiterated his 
tentative plan to Dysart, especially the idea of three operating companies. Ac-
cording to Keys, this curious plan was evolved in order to give the West Coast 
people a chance to buy the actual stock of the operating company if they pre-
ferred, to the extent of $500,000, rather than the stock of the holding com-
pany, and to let the banking operation be purely in holding company stock, 
with the holding company owning all of the voting shares of the operating 
companies.2° Keys wanted to spread the stock in such a way as to prevent one 
group or individual from gaining control, allowing each group the option of 
purchasing $500,000 in either operating stock or holding company stock.21 
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Despite Keys's best efforts, Southern Pacific was not interested. Getting 
Western's concurrence was seen as vital before the Pennsylvania Railroad would 
agree to the deal. 22 That concurrence did not come. On April24, Harris Hanshue 
politely but firmly declined to participate. More to the point, Western had its 
own vision of the future and wanted to control its own transcontinentalline.23 
Colonel Henderson was concerned about the possibility of competition 
from Western and Hanshue. Western was already one of the few air mail op-
erators making a substantial profit and now was showing definite signs of ex-
pansion into NAT's territory. He reminded Keys that Hanshue possessed a war 
chest of more than $1 million for future projects. Because of this and WAE's 
lack of nighttime flying experience, Henderson perceived Western as "perhaps 
less timid about a plan ... than we might be with our varied experiences in 
that sort of work."24 Henderson specifically expressed his concern that WAE 
was a direct and growing threat. "I have a growing conviction that Western Air 
Express has a reasonably well matured plan for the operation of multi-engine 
ships for passengers (and mail if they can get a contract) from Los Angeles 
through to Kansas City, St. Louis, or Chicago;' he declared. "In declining to 
come into the larger plan, Hanshue has said that he would be willing to meet 
up with our eastern operation at some point to be determined upon."25 Keys 
understood that Hanshue's tactics would give Western a transcontinental ser-
vice at virtually no cost. All they had to do was extend their existing route 
some six hundred miles east to meet eastern railroad and airline connections 
without spending a penny for the development of the eastern portion. Ac-
cording to Keys, "The result of this plan would, therefore, be that the WAE, 
operating the Western line alone and owning it outright would be the direct 
beneficiary of all the development cost and effort of the Eastern lines and would 
undoubtedly be much the more profitable division of the whole enterprise."26 
Keys was also aware that several Western stockholders had complained to 
their New York bankers that the proposed transcontinental line would inter-
fere with WAE's expansion plans and that Western's actions placed two air 
mail lines at risk. "I think it may be taken for granted," Keys asserted, "that if 
that plan went forward this new line [Western's] would constitute sharp mail 
competition for Boeing and N.A.T. and a complete breaking up of the situa-
tion as it exists at present:'27 
For the time being, no more would be heard from Western. Three years 
hence, however, the story would change dramatically, and with the direct help 
of the Post Office. 
Keys pressed on. On May 14, 1928, Transcontinental Air Transport (TAT) 
was born under the laws of the state of Delaware. It authorized one million 
shares of capital stock at no par value with Keys as president and Henderson as 
vice president. A banking syndicate headed by J. Cheever Cowdin of Blair and 
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Company sold five hundred thousand shares at $10 per share to members of 
the syndicate, thus raising the required $5 million.28 
Under the terms of the sale, no stock could be sold to the public and any 
stock resold to members of the syndicate had to be sold at no less than $12.50 
per share.29 Along with Blair and Company and Keys's personal fortune, other 
substantial financial interests backed TAT, including Hemphill Noyes and Com-
pany, Howard Coffin, William Mayo, Jeremiah Millbank, Richard Hoyt of 
Hayden Stone and Company, and Charles Lawrance of Wright Aeronautical. 30 
This was clearly not a "fly by night" organization but a powerfully financed, 
serious operation that would soon attract the interest of the Post Office. 
Within three days stock was exchanging hands at $28 per share. Keys 
promptly began organizing TAT with the goal of opening service in one year. 
It was a prodigious undertaking, but one he was more than capable of han-
dling. As part of his methodical organization, Keys established a technical com-
mittee to make objective decisions on aircraft and equipment purchases. To 
this end, Keys approached Charles Lindbergh through the Daniel Guggenheim 
Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics. Lindbergh had completed his pro-
motional tour of the United States and Central America and donated his Spirit 
of St. Louis to the Smithsonian Institution. 
Lindbergh, who was extremely careful in his business dealings, agreed to 
join Transcontinental Air Transport. Keys offered him twenty-five thousand 
shares at $10 per share, for which Keys would pay Lindbergh $250,000. In 
addition, TAT would pay Lindbergh an annual salary of $10,000. For this siz-
able sum, Lindbergh would head the technical development of the new corpo-
ration, acquire the equipment, and develop the route system.31 
Lindbergh was free to pursue other activities so long as they did not com-
pete with TAT. This was a serious offer. Lindbergh was not merely "window 
dressing"; he was expected to take a leading role in the creation of this new 
airline and did so. In return, Keys received his expertise and the right to call his 
airline the "Lindbergh Line." Keys was also aware that the association of this 
famous airman with TAT could lead to unwise stock speculation. He suggested 
that Lindbergh put only a small portion of stock in his name: "When you sell 
it-and I hope that you will sell part of it on the first favorable opportunity-
either the delivery of the stock in your own name or the transfer of it on the 
books, would excite a lot of attention which is quite unnecessary:'32 This ad-
vice would later be recalled under much different circumstances in wrongful 
efforts to embarrass and discredit Lindbergh. 
Following TAT's well-publicized activities, other companies began to show 
interest in aviation in 1928. Although an effort by New York Central failed, the 
formation of Universal Airlines on July 30, 1928, posed a real threat. Invest-
ment bankers in Minneapolis, St. Louis, and Chicago pooled their resources to 
44 Airlines and Air Mail 
open the inaugural leg of an ambitious transcontinental operation, flying first 
from Chicago to Cleveland. Universal's backers quickly exercised their expan-
sionist tendencies, purchasing Continental Air Lines, along with its mail con-
tract from Louisville to Cleveland (CAM-16), and the Robertson Aircraft 
Corporation, with its air mail contract from St. Louis to Chicago, Lindbergh's 
former route. Led by John A. Love of St. Louis, the new organization had vi-
sions of overnight growth and of forming a holding company to coordinate its 
activities, ostensibly buying into Fokker Aircraft and Mid Plane Sales and Transit 
Company of Minneapolis. 
Western was also expanding aggressively, making plans to extend passen-
ger service throughout the Southwest and into Kansas City while acquiring 
large blocks of Fokker Aircraft stock as they consolidated their interests. West-
ern was serious, and Colonel Henderson nervously noticed their efforts: 
It is my personal opinion, however, that they intend to fly from Los Angeles 
to some point like Fort Worth, then up our lighted airway to perhaps Oklahoma 
City, maybe Wichita, then maybe east to St. Louis for their eastern terminal, 
where the Robertson company could take their passengers to Chicago, with the 
Universal company connecting with them east out of Chicago. 
Unquestionably, there is some very definite hook-up between Hanshue and 
this Robertson-Universal hook-up.33 
Nevertheless, Keys stressed the industry-wide need for cooperation in or-
der to advance aviation. Writing to Western board member and major stock-
holder J.A. Talbot, he reiterated his desire for mutual assistance rather than 
destructive competition, particularly on technical matters, including two-way 
radio communications systems. "This is only an example which could be mul-
tiplied many times;' he noted. "It seems to me that in all these matters where 
the air industry is dealing with much bigger, older and rather ponderous out-
side industries, the weight of our united force would get results more quickly 
and probably better results than any of us could acting alone." Keys under-
stood that eventually there would come an accommodation. Although TAT 
stockholders refused to let WAE operate the western part of the line, Keys re-
assured his supporters that Talbot "and Hanshue promised full cooperation in 
matters like terminals, traffic development, etc." Of crucial importance to the 
future, Keys strongly felt that "both these men believe that ultimately there 
will be [a] merger with us."34 These were very prophetic words indeed. 
This gentleman's agreement to avoid competition and promote coopera-
tion held fast, leaving only one major player unaccounted for-William Boeing. 
Boeing's enterprises were efficient and well managed, reflecting the keen mana-
gerial instincts of its founder. It also reflected his personality, which made the 
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company appear somewhat insular and mysterious to its competitors. But as 
with Hanshue and Keys, Boeing was a serious investor.35 
Keys had no desire to antagonize Boeing and was careful in explaining his 
plans to his peers in Seattle, even though BAT declined to invest in TAT. Keys 
carefully analyzed Boeing's position in the sincere effort to avoid irritating a 
potentially powerful opponent. Boeing, like Keys, was seen to have a sophisti-
cated vision of the future of aviation, having invested substantial personal capi-
tal on CAM-18 from San Francisco to Chicago and developed a nascent 
passenger business along that route. Keys stressed the advantages of coopera-
tion where NAT and TAT met Boeing Air Transport as he had spent consider-
ably capital developing eastern lines, something Boeing chose not to do, at 
least at this time. "On this view;' Keys stated, "I think that we can meet Boeing 
people squarely, taking the attitude that while his existing line will be fed by 
the Eastern development, the Eastern development will also be fed by his present 
capital outlays and all his efforts in development."36 
Keys was willing to cooperate on developing complementary schedules and 
wished to let the market determine whether a new transcontinental line could 
be created from St. Paul to Seattle.37 As for Keys's expansion westward to Los 
Angeles, he was hopeful that William Boeing would not take offense. "I do not 
see that it has any bearing on our plans for Los Angeles;' Keys remarked, "al-
though he might remotely consider that line a competitor with his line. Frankly, 
I want to cooperate with Boeing in every way and I think that he will see that 
even if we do run a Los Angeles line in cooperation with his passenger line to 
Chicago it will be more helpful to him than harmfu1:'38 Keys had no real inten-
tion of encroaching on Boeing's territory in the Pacific Northwest, only of coun-
tering local speculators, Universal in particular, between Chicago and St. PauP9 
In any future TAT plan to extend to San Francisco, Keys wished for Boeing's 
assistance. "My idea is;' he said, "there are two air links in any air-rail line 
across the continent, and, since you are already established, I should certainly 
prefer to see you operate the Western line, if any line at all is to be operated."40 
While Boeing graciously declined to enter into Keys's securities company as 
well as TAT, he reciprocated Keys's desire for cooperation, much to Keys's re-
lief. ''As you already know, we are shortly going to start operations with 12-
passenger planes;' Boeing replied. "We are most anxious to cooperate with all 
other lines and do not look upon our colleagues in the transport game as 
competitors, as it is now our intention to devote our entire efforts to the building 
up of our own project and staying on our own lines, taking such traffic as the 
other lines might give us and reciprocating by turning our passengers over to 
the other lines at the terminals .... We are desirous of hearty cooperation with 
all other lines."41 
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Still, Keys was concerned about the rumored joint effort of New York Cen-
tral, Boeing, and the Union Pacific. Such a link would force TAT to complete a 
line from Columbus to Chicago originally intended to extend to St. Paul. If 
this three-way link were completed, Keys said, "we shall have to run an inter-
mediate line between the Union Pacific and New York Central or Boeing will 
run it and this would bring him into Eastern territory and would not be very 
good business from anybody's point of view." Keys asked Cuthell to find out if 
the stories were indeed true. "I think the Bankers Trust Company, or the Mor-
gan Partners can and will check up on the New York Central;' he suggested, "if 
you have any difficulty in getting this information from Mr. Harriman of the 
Union Pacific Board."42 Harriman would soon show his interest in aviation in 
a different and unexpected manner. 
Cooperation was indeed paramount for both Boeing and Keys. As their 
attention refocused on organizational and financial matters concerning their 




Following Lindbergh's dramatic transatlantic flight, the public's interest in 
aviation as transportation and as an investment grew exponentially. Until 
March 1928, however, only Curtiss Aeroplane and Wright Aeronautical had 
issued public securities.1 All other stock was privately owned or unissued. With 
the market booming in other stocks, the temptation had now become too great, 
and most of the aircraft companies went public in successful attempts to raise 
new capital and satiate the public's newfound craving. Most stocks were highly 
speculative common shares of no par value, and, as a result, countless indi-
viduals entered the fray to make a fast dollar. It was against these "wildcatters" 
that serious aviation backers, such as Keys and Boeing, fought so hard. Poorly 
managed, highly speculative enterprises such as Universal gave aviation a poor 
reputation, which hurt legitimate companies. But for eighteen months, there 
was fast money to be made by all. Aviation securities would prove a barometer 
for the entire stock market, rising faster than any other stocks and crashing 
sooner. 
The Post Office Department unintentionally encouraged the aviation stock 
boom. Its activities to this point, though beneficial, were indeed haphazard, as 
aviation grew too quickly and without constraints. In 1928, before the advent 
of direct leadership from the department central to the industry's future de-
velopment, the Post Office rode the tide as well, paying ever increasing public 
monies unevenly to an increasingly disorganized airline industry. 
Once again, former Progressive Republican Clyde Kelly stepped in, this 
time sponsoring the Second Amendment to the Air Mail Act of 1926 in an 
attempt to increase the volume of air mail. It would also lead to the beginning 
of massive, unevenly distributed overpayments amounting to a subsidy for 
many of the airlines. Introduced on January 4, 1928, the amendment reduced 
the minimum rate per ounce of an air mail stamp from 10 to 5 cents. Al-
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though mail loads were steadily increasing, most flights departed with mail 
compartments less than half full. Also, though payments were steadily increas-
ing, averaging 73.6 cents per mile by late 1927, this still was generally less than 
half the operating expenses for most of the air mail carriers. It was hoped that 
the expected increase in mail volume would more than offset the losses from 
the rate decrease. 2 
The second part of the amendment was an attempt to address a poten-
tially destructive problem while concurrently providing a stabilizing measure 
for the airline industry. Kelly and industry leaders realized that the original 
four-year term of the air mail contracts would expire soon. It was generally 
agreed that it would be grossly unfair to those pioneering companies that had 
invested millions of dollars in aircraft, equipment, and development costs to 
risk forfeiture of their contracts to a lower bidder after they had done all of the 
trailblazing work. To this end, Kelly sponsored a provision calling for the ex-
change of the four-year contract for a ten-year route certificate, providing the 
contractor had performed according to Post Office standards for at least two 
years. It was hoped that this provision would encourage long-term capital in-
vestment, thereby promoting development and consequently reducing oper-
ating costs while improving service. As part of the arrangement, the postmaster 
general was now empowered to modify the rate of payment for each carrier 
after consultation, though not above the amount originally contracted.3 After 
some debate concerning the term length of the route certificates and a pre-
liminary discussion of similar rate determination by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) for the railroads, (a point Colonel Henderson argued for), 
the measure passed Congress and became law on May 17, 1928. As economist 
Paul David noted, the amendment also changed the rules for subsequent con-
tracts, setting a precedent for the removal of competitive bidding with the 
awarding of long-term route certificates.4 
The changes wrought by the modified law allowed investment to increase, 
it was hoped in the public interest, thus marking an important change in pub-
lic policy, for now the airline industry, at least that which carried the mail, 
could operate under a long-term set of rules. Surprisingly, Postmaster General 
New refrained from issuing route certificates for the remainder of his term in 
office. The reason would soon become clear. With the expansion of the nation's 
economy, the promise held by the Second Amendment to the Air Mail Act of 
1925 enabled the aviation industry to enter a new stage-consolidation. Be-
fore making the routes essentially permanent, the Post Office adopted a wait-
and-see attitude to determine how it and the taxpayer could benefit from the 
dramatic changes now taking place in the industry. 
When William Boeing and Frederick Rentschler met the previous year in 
Washington, D.C., following the awarding of CAM -18, their discussion touched 
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on many aspects of aviation. With the stock market boom capturing the atten-
tion of investors across the country, the time appeared right for major changes 
in the industry, now that capital was becoming readily available. To this end, 
Boeing and Rentschler continued their conversations. Boeing, a very success-
ful businessman in his own right before he became involved in aviation, un-
derstood the potential savings and efficiencies possible through the vertical 
integration of capital intensive industries. Although the barriers to entry in 
aviation were low for the moment, they were growing, and with breakthroughs 
in aircraft technology on the horizon, development costs were certain to in-
crease exponentially. A large, consolidated, efficient organization encompass-
ing every aspect of the aviation industry appeared to be the answer. Boeing 
took the first step. 
In the late summer of 1928, Boeing realized that even his substantial per-
sonal resources were insufficient to finance such a merger. He had already 
backed the creation of the Boeing Airplane Company and Boeing Air Trans-
port with his own money. In addition, he personally underwrote the surety 
bond required by the Post Office. Although he had access to additional local 
sources of capital through his control over the Pacific National Bank in Se-
attle, the bank's resources were also inadequate for the task at hand. 
Through Dietrich Schmitz, president of the Pacific National Bank, Boeing 
contacted Joseph P. Ripley, vice president of the National City Bank in New 
York with his proposal.5 Boeing required $5 million but realized that the sepa-
rate public offering of the stock in these companies would not raise sufficient 
capital. To solve the problem, Ripley suggested the merger of the three compa-
nies into Boeing Aircraft and Transport Corporation (BATC), a holding com-
pany. While in Seattle, Ripley examined both Boeing and Pacific National and 
found them solid organizations. Pacific at first wanted one million shares of 
the new corporation but National City was reluctant because of the Seattle 
bank's relatively small size. A compromise was reached at five hundred thou-
sand. Ripley's primary concern was with the Post Office Department. He was 
desirous of making their plans clear to the authorities in Washington and re-
ceiving their blessing before National City would proceed with the merger.6 
Second Assistant Warren Glover voiced no objection, though he and the post-
master general had the power to prevent the merger simply by invoking clauses 
in the air mail contracts that gave power to the department to control the 
financial activities of the contractors. 
As for the question of a public offering, Boeing and National City were 
cautious, given the speculative environment of Wall Street at that time. They 
wished to ensure that BATC stock not fall into the hands of speculators and 
attempted to keep the negotiations as quiet as possible.7 The newspapers learned 
about the discussions, but not before the deal was nearing completion. 
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On October 30, 1928, the Boeing Airplane and Transport Corporation 
was officially formed in Delaware. The corporation was created with an au-
thorized capital stock of 650,000 shares of no-par common voting stock and 
an authorized $10 million of preferred stock of a par value of $50 each. Na-
tional City agreed to purchase 90,000 shares of the preferred stock, series A, 
for $4.5 million and 90,000 shares of no-par common stock for $500,000, thus 
raising the $5 million in cash that William Boeing needed for his development 
plans.8 For its efforts, Pacific National Bank received 10 percent. 
National City was pleased and immediately offered this new stock to its 
"special friends" and industry insiders. The combination of these solid com-
panies, with the blessing of the Post Office and Department of Commerce, 
promised great profits for the future. On October 31 the stock was offered on 
the curb market, before approval from the New York Stock Exchange. Na-
tional City attempted to restrict the trading to a degree, but to no avail, as 
enthusiastic investors rushed to buy the new offering.9 Immediately the of-
fered shares were in high demand. Common stock prices soared, opening at 
57 and ranging from 55 to 70. Preferred stock prices opened at 60 and fluctu-
ated from 57 to 70 1/4 almost overnight. 10 
The overwhelming success of the BATC issue prompted William Boeing 
to expand his horizons. Recalling the excellent working relationship he had 
developed with Frederick Rentschler of Pratt & Whitney, Boeing took the next 
logical step and recommended the merger of their complementary organiza-
tions. Rentschler readily agreed that joining the diverse companies of BATC 
with one of the nation's premier engine manufacturers made an ideal vertical 
combination. Together they would form the strongest aviation organization 
in the country. Negotiations began in earnest in December and quickly in-
cluded the Chance Vought Company, a builder of outstanding naval aircraft. 
By the middle of the month, the details had been completed and a new com-
pany, United Aircraft and Transport Corporation (UATC) was formed. 11 
More specifically, BATC purchased all of the shares of Pratt & Whitney 
with 868,000 shares of its own stock as well as all of the shares of Chance 
Vought for 90,000 shares ofBATC. Because the investment firm of Niles Bement 
Pond owned half of Pratt & Whitney, they received 434,000 shares of BATC at 
a rate of 2 1/8 of UATC to one of Niles Bement Pond. National City then 
purchased $7.5 million of UATC, 6 percent preferred at $50 par value of each 
share. This resulted in United Aircraft having $12 million of preferred stock 
outstanding, the market value of which was estimated at a prodigious $150 
million, a phenomenal amount. 12 According to the New York Times, the new 
holding company was to have an authorized capitalization of 1 million shares 
of 6 percent preferred stock valued at $50 per share and 2.5 million shares of 
common stock of no par value.13 
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The new holding company would allow William Boeing to proceed with 
his aviation plans and greatly expand his development of passenger air travel 
and the carriage of air mail and express. Boeing was to serve as chairman of 
the board, typical of his managerial style, leaving the day-to-day operations to 
others. Rentschler assumed the duties of president and in essence ran the new 
corporation. The vice president was Chance Vought; Charles W. Deeds was 
secretary and treasurer. Eleven other individuals completed the board, includ-
ing Deed's father, Col. Edward A. Deeds, director of National City Bank and 
chairman of the board of Niles Bement Pond; Philip G. Johnson, president of 
Boeing Air Transport and the Boeing Airplane Company; Gordon S. Rentschler, 
assistant to the president of National City Bank and the brother of Frederick; 
and Joseph P. Ripley, vice president of National City. 14 
Immediately after the formation of UATC an attempt was made to ac-
quire Western Air Express. Borrowing 150,000 shares of stock from William 
Boeing, National City approached WAE in the hope of completing a stock 
switch as the market for UATC stock had reached $72 per share and was still 
climbing. Desirous of maintaining their relative independence, even in the 
face of great temptation, Western and its stockholders declined.15 Despite this 
setback, United Aircraft and Transport comprised the most formidable avia-
tion organization in the United States. But they were not alone. 
In October, Clement Keys wired Boeing to congratulate him, offering to 
purchase shares of BATC. Boeing politely deferred the request to the National 
City, but in so doing underscored the industry-wide drive toward consolida-
tion following the growth of the economy and the changes in the postal laws. 
Keys was genuinely pleased with these events, as such moves were seen as greatly 
benefiting the industry as a whole. Writing to Western stockholder Harry Chan-
dler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times, Keys expressed his approval. "I have 
myself purchased the small amount that was available of the Boeing Com-
pany," he stated, "and hope to do the same thing when the Western Air Express 
financing comes into the market, if it does come. I believe that, while passen-
ger transportation is still purely experimental and cannot be regarded as any-
thing but that, it will arrive in time."16 
That time was approaching rapidly, and Keys was taking steps to take ad-
vantage of it. After three years of operation, National Air Transport appeared 
on the verge of profitability and had become a valuable commodity on the 
market, especially after the passage of the Second Amendment to the Air Mail 
Act of 1926Y 
Like Boeing, Keys sought to make rational his diverse aviation holdings. 
Although TAT was still many months from opening service, by December, 
most of the organizational work was complete. Leaving the details to subordi-
nates, Keys also sought to streamline his many operations and improve effi-
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ciency, thereby improving profits. In addition to NAT, TAT, and his interests in 
Curtiss Aeroplane and Wright Aeronautical, Clement Keys was anxious to find 
ways to raise money for future investments in aviation. For this he arranged 
the formation of North American Aviation, a Delaware company, on Decem-
ber 6, 1928, with an authorized capitalization of six million shares of no par 
value. According to Keys, NAA was organized for the purpose "of holding, 
buying, selling, and trading in the securities of aviation companies." But the 
company, he continued, "will not confine its operations to purchasing and 
selling securities, as it plans to take a part in furthering the expansion of avia-
tion, especially in the commercial field." 18 Working with Blair and Company, 
Keys sold two million shares of the new company at 12 1/2 per share, thus 
raising $25 million. It was offered to the public at no less than 15.19 
North American immediately began to reinvest its capital throughout the 
industry, particularly, but not exclusively, in Keys's airline holdings. This hold-
ing company was more loosely organized than United Aircraft; Keys thought 
that in the early stage of the industry it was important to preserve the relative 
independence of numerous small companies, which would create a larger pool 
of creative individuals for future leadership when the industry settled down.20 
North American also purchased large blocks of stock in UATC, Western 
Air Express, Douglas Aircraft, Sperry Gyroscope, and Berliner Joyce Aircraft. 
The company's executive committee and board of directors contained most of 
the members of the boards of NAT and TAT, including Keys as president and 
his executive committee, which included J. Cheever Cowdin and Chester W. 
Cuthell. Fifty-three directors were appointed to the board. Keys himself fi-
nanced a great deal of the North American formation as well as his other avia-
tion acquisitions through his own firm, C.M. Keys and Company. This company 
handled the transactions of North American and carried the larger portion of 
NAA's cash in a call loan account, which Keys himself controlled.21 Although 
this arrangement allowed Keys a great deal of freedom to acquire new compa-
nies for North American, it later would prove his undoing. 
The Aviation Corporation was the third and last of the large holding com-
panies to emerge. A product of the machinations of some of the greatest fi-
nancial minds on Wall Street, it was nevertheless the most convoluted and 
poorly run of the companies. 
The company's beginnings were conventional. Sherman Mills Fairchild 
was a thirty-one year old Harvard graduate who was denied enlistment in the 
U.S. Army during the Great War because of poor health. Moving to the dryer 
climes of Arizona, this brilliant engineer began to study the art of photogra-
phy. His remarkable ability to take clear, sharp, long-range photographs at-
tracted the attention of the U.S. Army Air Service, for which he rapidly 
developed cameras for use in aerial reconnaissance. He translated this ability 
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to the commercial and civilian market in the early 1920s, becoming a pioneer 
in his field. 
Fairchild developed better and smaller cameras for his Fairchild Aerial 
Surveys Company, but he always felt that the current state of aircraft design 
limited his productivity. Never one to wait for others, Fairchild designed and 
built his own aircraft to fit his special needs and created a line of small, high-
powered aero engines. In November 1927, he formed the Fairchild Aviation 
Corporation, which sold aircraft, engines, and cameras as well as aviation ser-
vices throughout the United States, Latin America, and Europe.ZZ 
Fairchild Aviation profited from the wave of public and private invest-
ment interest in aviation at the time. As early as 1924, Sherman Fairchild had 
hoped to interest Robert Lehman of Lehman Brothers in investing in his fledg-
ling organization, but without success. Four years later, the economic climate 
had improved dramatically, and Fairchild took advantage of the situation 
through the same Wall Street contacts he had wisely maintained. As a result, 
Fairchild was able to find adequate financing to form his company in 1927. 
On September 13, 1928, Fairchild and his business partner, Graham Grosvenor, 
a former president of Otis Elevator, completed an exclusive contract with noted 
aeronautical engineer Virginius E. Clark. The purpose of the new Superplane 
Corporation was to design and build a huge flying boat for commercial uses in 
hopes of opening transatlantic air service in the near future. 
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Gathered at a meeting at the Post Office headquarters in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 
1927 are (left to right) Harris M. Hanshue, president and general manager, Western Air 
Express; William B. Robertson, president, Robertson Aircraft Corporation; Walter T. Varney, 
owner, Varney Airlines; Col. Paul Henderson, Second Assistant Postmaster General; Mr. 
Varney Sr.; E.P. Lott, manager of operations, National Air Transport; G.A. Parsons, Colonial 
Air Lines; and Donald Bartlett, assistant to the general manager, National Air Transport. 
(Smithsonian, Sl# 89-12165) 
Concurrently, Sherman Fairchild had made other important contacts. Pitts-
burgh attorney and investor George R. Hann had thoroughly investigated 
Fairchild's holdings in 1927 before enthusiastically becoming a major investor 
and a director after arranging financing on several occasions. An honest and 
forthright individual, Hann would soon become a major player in the expan-
sion of commercial aviation. Hann was also successfully attempting to foster 
interest in aviation at home. He had seen the results of civic boosterism in 
New York, St. Louis, Chicago, Los Angeles, and, especially, Cleveland, his city's 
rival, and feared that Pittsburgh would fall behind without prompt action by 
civic leaders from the financial and political community. Through great effort 
in overcoming civic inertia, Hann, Richard W. Robbins, and C. Bedell Monro 
formed the Pittsburgh Aviation Industries Corporation (PAIC) on November 
15, 1928.23 
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By the end of December, Hann and his associates had raised $6.25 million 
through the subscription of 250,000 shares of stock in their new holding com-
pany "to control, manage, and develop in the Pittsburgh district the various 
phases of aviation." PAIC would serve as an investment trust to promote gen-
eral transportation, aerial surveys, air taxi service, express delivery, and, most 
important, the transportation of air mail.24 The corporation stood ready to 
participate in the rush to consolidate and to help anyone who could benefit 
Pittsburgh's growth. 
At this time Sherman Fairchild was becoming increasingly concerned that 
one of his distributors was being courted by Clement Keys and Curtiss Air-
craft. In 1927, entrepreneurs T. Higbee Embry and John Paul Riddle had formed 
the Embry-Riddle Aviation Corporation to operate a flying school, an air taxi 
business, an airport, and sell aircraft-particularly Fairchild aircraft. In July 
1927, the Post Office advertised for bidders for CAM-24, the route from Cin-
cinnati to Chicago. Embry-Riddle bid and won, opening mail, passenger, and 
express service on December 17, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Wright 
brothers' first powered flight. The company had raised almost $100,000 for 
the effort but soon realized that this amount would be insufficient if capital 
improvements were to be made. 
During the search for additional capital, Keys and company made their 
offer to provide additional financing, provided that Embry-Riddle forfeit their 
Fairchild connection and sell only Curtiss products. An alarmed Sherman 
Fairchild approached his board, one member of which was George Hann, and 
recommended that they step in to prevent the Curtiss incursion. With great 
enthusiasm, the board went one better and quickly raised $500,000 to make 
Embry-Riddle a subsidiary of Fairchild and search for similar air mail opera-
tors to acquire.25 
Fairchild and Hann realized that the success of such an enterprise required 
a serious injection of capital and, therefore, approached their connections on 
Wall Street. Their request fell on receptive ears. Earlier, in July 1928, Fairchild 
and Hann had helped arrange for the acquisition of West Indian Aerial Ex-
press, a small U.S.-owned airline operating over the Dominican Republic that 
possessed a tempting and profitable foreign air mail contract from the U.S. 
Post Office. Included in the formation were Fairchild directors Graham 
Grosvenor and Col. Thurman Bane, the latter an expert in aviation; Arthur 
and Robert Lehman, two prominent financiers who formed Lehman Broth-
ers; and Roland Palmedo of Lehman Brothers. 
After lengthy negotiations, Fairchild and company sold the airline on De-
cember 15, 1928, to a covetous Pan American Airways at a considerable profit. 
In so doing, Fairchild and his associates gained entry to Pan American's hold-
ing company, the Aviation Corporation of the Americas, headed by financier 
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Richard Hoyt of Hayden, Stone. More important, the deal had whetted their 
appetites for more such deals.26 
Promptly, Robert Lehman contacted W. Averell Harriman, son of Union 
Pacific Railroad entrepreneur E.H. Harriman and president of Harriman and 
Brown, a New York investment house. Intrigued with the possibility of creating 
what they called the "General Motors of the Air;' Fairchild's group sat down 
with Lehman Brothers and Harriman to forge a new company to consolidate 
the remaining domestic airlines holding air mail contracts with Fairchild's avia-
tion interests and hopefully repeat their earlier success on a much greater scale.27 
This new proposal suited all parties. In January 1929, after preliminary 
discussions were completed, Fairchild sought to bring his Superplane Com-
pany into the fold. Superplane was in need of a factory building, and Harriman 
possessed the empty Cramp Shipyard in Philadelphia. The arrangement seemed 
perfect and obviated Colonel Clark's need for new financing to build his huge 
flying boat. Telegraphing Clark, Fairchild informed him, "Our attorneys [are] 
having a meeting with W.A. Harriman in an effort to have them put all of their 
banking and financing with you."28 
By February, George Hann was drafting a proposal to Grosvenor for the 
holding company formation and to determine the proper valuation for the 
issuance of stock. Hann's primary concern was to keep the price of the stock in 
line with the actual value of the new corporation as much as possible. Because 
these enterprises were still very much in the early, entrepreneurial stage, de-
spite the sudden input of outside capital, much of the value of the consoli-
dated companies rested in the intangible worth of their dominant personalities, 
such as Sherman Fairchild. Hann understood very well the importance of in-
dividuals at this early stage of industry development and recommended that 
the Fairchild Company consider insuring its key decision makers. 
Hann further recommended that the investment group immediately un-
dertake the consolidation of their interests along his proposed lines with an 
exchange of stock and supply any additional funds that might be necessary 
from their own pockets. This plan, he felt, had little risk, as he expected the 
stock to rise rapidly in value, as had the stock in UATC and North American. 
"Upon the announcement of such consolidation;' Hann prophesied, "the se-
curities of these consolidated companies would immediately enhance in mar-
ket value and would permit the issuance by the bankers of stock in the holding 
company at a much higher figure than would otherwise be warranted if the 
larger financing is done hand in hand with the corporation."29 
The investors agreed. Two weeks later, the plans for the new corporation 
were taking shape. It was agreed to issue two grades of stock: A, or preferred, 
stock would be used for purchasing tangible assets with a par value of twenty 
dollars, the B, or common, stock was designated for purchasing intangibles 
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Originally a Fairchild design, the obsolescent American Pilgrim 100A was the only airliner 
produced by the AVCO combine. All sixteen were flown by American Airways. (Smithsonian, 
SI# 91-9172) 
such as good will, with no par value.30 The corporation authorized ten million 
shares of common stock of no par value, of which two million were offered to 
the public on the curb market at twenty dollars per share.31 
On March 2, 1929, a contract was signed between the Fairchild interests 
and Lehman Brothers and W.A. Harriman and Company creating the Avia-
tion Corporation of Delaware. Among a wide variety of tasks, AVCO, as the 
company was popularly known, was authorized to trade in aviation securities, 
manufacture and distribute aircraft, and acquire aircraft and other transpor-
tation vehicles, aviation equipment, and landing fields. More important,AVCO 
was created to "transport in intrastate, interstate, and/or foreign commerce by 
aircraft, motor and/or other means of transportation, passengers, freight, se-
curities, and articles of merchandise of every nature and description:' Of great-
est significance, the new corporation was explicitly authorized "to carry mail 
under contract with the United States Government:'32 
Other backers quickly evinced interest in AVCO. In Pittsburgh, George 
Hann encouraged one of his associates to push his father to buy AVCO stock 
immediately. To Richard Mellon, Hann telegraphed, "[I] understand your fa-
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ther cabled you he is favorably inclined-(it is) absolutely necessary to tie in 
Pittsburgh situation with this group. Humphries ofWestinghouse has accepted, 
please cable me today. Your Aviation Corporation of America stock [is] selling 
at 90." Richard's father was Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon. 33 
Heading the new corporation was W. Averell Harriman as chairman of 
the board of directors, Graham Grosvenor as president, Robert Lehman as 
chairman of the executive committee, and George Hann as vice chairman of 
the executive committee. In addition to Lehman and Hann, the executive com-
mittee also included Harriman, S.W. Walker, Harvey L. Williams, Frederick C. 
Coburn, corporate attorney William Dewey Louckes, and Louis Piper. The 
board of directors included prominent names from business and government 
from all over the country and eventually reached some sixty-four in number. 
Of the 2 million shares offered, 1.6 million were reserved as options for AVCO's 
original investors. Lehman Brothers held 381,250; W.A. Harriman and Com-
pany, 288,250; Charles D. Barney and Company, 80,000; E.F. Hutton, 25,000; 
and Pittsburgh Aviation Securities, 17,700. Each director was offered an op-
tion for 1,000 shares at twenty dollars a share.34 
The immense size of the board was a portent of future organizational prob-
lems, but this was not seen at the time. George Hann also was concerned about 
the heavy burden of operational leadership assumed by Graham Grosvenor. 
AVCO was quickly becoming a huge organization and was negotiating with both 
Colonial Airlines and Universal Airlines interests for imminent acquisition. 
Grosvenor, whose personality was convivial but prone to micromanage-
ment, was expected to perform well as president, if he could delegate his 
responsibilities. 
Grosvenor had worked his way up the corporate ladder, starting as an office 
boy at Otis Elevator. By the time he was thirty-three, he had reached the vice 
presidency. Grosvenor then left Otis, serving briefly as a consultant before ac-
cepting the presidency of Fairchild Airplane Manufacturing Company. His self-
reliant nature led him to concentrate his hard-won authority, which unfortunately 
prevented him from sharing responsibility with others. Hann strongly felt that 
no one man could handle the difficult tasks involved the birth pangs of an infant 
industry, and urged the company to take steps to delegate and decentralize enough 
so that AVCO would have a chance to prosper under enlightened management. 
Hann had expressed his concerns to Grosvenor and received his grudging con-
currence.35 Three days later, a meeting of the AVCO organizers agreed to find an 
understudy for Grosvenor.36 
The following week, Hann and Grosvenor interviewed candidates. They were 
particularly desirous of finding individuals with aviation backgrounds who un-
derstood the industry and the inherent problems of flight. ''A splendid business 
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executive, no matter how keen;' Hann wrote Lehman, "might well be a liability 
to Graham during these coming months, because it would take both time and a 
great deal of coaching to supply for such a man the aviation background and 
knowledge which is so essential in order to be of any real assistance at this criti-
cal time to Graham:'37 These were indeed prescient words, for AVCO's future 
difficulties were inextricably intertwined with cumbersome management knowl-
edgeable in finance but inexperienced in aviation. It would take the leadership 
of the Post Office and of outside challengers to forge an efficient company from 
AVCO's diverse holdings. 
George Hann was perhaps the most dynamic and dear-thinking individual 
involved with AVCO. His reflections on proper management and the incipient 
difficulties faced presaged the problems AVCO was to face. He also was keenly 
aware of the inherent benefits of such an organization and pushed hard for more 
consolidations after the corporation came into being. His first target was the 
Colonial system.38 
Colonial had come under increasing pressure from its stockholders to ce-
ment a merger in order to avoid being subsumed by the wave of consolidations 
sweeping the economy. Since mid-1928, Colonial president John O'Ryan had 
attempted, without success, to forge an alliance with Stout Air Services. Stout 
was more interested in a lucrative offer from United Aircraft, which therefore 
left Colonial without access to the Chicago-Buffalo route and threatened to open 
the door to an unwanted incursion by United into New York and New England.39 
Colonial had to act quickly but ran into resistance from the numerous stock-
holders of the Colonial component companies, each wanting to improve his 
financial position. In addition to Colonial, which operated CAM-1, O'Ryan 
and company had also formed Colonial Western, to fly the mail from Cleve-
land to Buffalo and eventually to Albany along CAM-20, and Canadian Colo-
nial to carry the U.S. mail north across the border. These three companies 
were now operating at cross-purposes, to the dismay of O'Ryan.40 
O'Ryan was leery, however, of combining with any holding company that 
manufactured aircraft on a large scale and therefore rejected Stout Air Services's 
last minute attempts to draw the Colonial interests in with Boeing and United 
Aircraft. As a result, O'Ryan turned toward his New York connections, par-
ticularly Sherman Fairchild, who was a major stockholder. O'Ryan did not 
favor any one investment house, feeling that any of the major firms was solidY 
In fact, Colonial was being courted by all of the major holding companies. 
Writing to Sen. James Wadsworth, a Colonial director, O'Ryan outlined a tele-
gram he sent him to explain the situation: "Great pressure from National City 
Company to get me and Colonial into their picture. Similar pressure from 
Keys, Curtiss and Blair & Co .... Much pressure from Lehman & Company to 
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have me go on their Aviation Corporation Board. Said I could not consider it 
without conferring with my associates .... None of us seem so keen about 
Stout Airways. They ought to play ball or get off the diamond."42 
On April1, 1929, Colonial and Stout mutually agreed to break off nego-
tiations, releasing each other "from any obligation whatever because of prior 
oral or written negotiations between officers or agents of either said parties."43 
Now Colonial turned to AVCO, and within days an agreement was forged, 
although not without some pointed questions from stockholders. To John H. 
Baker, O'Ryan's eagerness to merge with AVCO and its small manufacturing 
companies instead of the strong aircraft and engine companies of United was 
perplexing. "I remember very clearly you stating verbally, objections to any 
merger set-up which would involve Colonial stockholders in the manufactur-
ing risks of other companies;' Baker wrote. "You now propose to enter into a 
merger which consists only of weak units. I do not quite follow you."44 Baker 
was also concerned that, unlike United's and North American's stock, AVCO's 
recently issued shares had not immediately appreciated and, in fact, had de-
clined from their twenty-dollar par value. 
Unfortunately, Baker's suspicions were to prove well founded. The boom 
in aviation stocks was coming to an end, and despite the support of two of the 
strongest investment banks in the nation, the Aviation Corporation had no 
coordinated plan for air transportation. The declining value of the corporation's 
stock posed an immediate problem as it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
purchase the outstanding shares of Colonial.45 
The situation grew worse, compounded by the ever-increasing value of 
United Aircraft's stock, which had risen from $80 to $120 a share during the 
time of the Colonial negotiations with AVCO. Colonial stockholders were aware 
of this fact and were increasingly anxious. "It would be regrettable if our con-
solidation agreement were not consummated by reason of failure to secure 
the required stock;' O'Ryan wrote Robert Lehman. "Such an outcome is not 
unlikely should dissatisfied stockholders coordinate their views and decide 
upon affirmative opposition .... The market advance in the stock of United 
Aircraft does not simplify our difficulties:'46 
O'Ryan was also distressed at the apparent laxity of Lehman Brothers. "I 
am very much concerned about the apparent apathetic attitude of Lehman 
Brothers in relation to the market value of the Aviation Corporation stock;' he 
complained. "There has been no material change during the past several weeks. 
The result is that our Colonial stock is not coming in for exchange for the 
Aviation Corporation stock in a satisfactory manner. Our stockholders can 
hardly be blamed for their apparent unwillingness to exchange their stock which 
cost them $125 for stock which instead of netting them a profit nets them a 
loss of over $5 a unit."47 
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Gradually, after much effort, enough stockholders exchanged their shares, 
and on May 20, a sufficient number of shares were acquired for the Aviation 
Corporation to gain control over Colonial, Colonial Western, and Canadian 
Colonial Airways.48 Colonial and AVCO had made less tangible arguments to 
persuade the reluctant stockholders. Replying to an inquisitive reporter ask-
ing about the price differential, James Walsh, the assistant treasurer of Colo-
nial Airways, reiterated that the board of directors felt that price alone should 
not be the exclusive factor. The deal allowed for the exchange of nonvoting 
preferred stock for voting common shares, and that unmarketable stock was 
being exchanged for marketable and diversified stock that had an unlimited 
earning power. The presence of ten Colonial members on AVCO's board of 
directors was stressed as adequate insurance to protect their interests. 
Of greatest importance, the merger presented an opportunity for tremen-
dous future profit. For months, the talk in the industry was the coming deci-
sion by the Post Office to establish additional transcontinental routes. Although 
no formal discussion was underway, the decision seemed to many a foregone 
conclusion. Unless Colonial merged, it would be in a poor position to bid 
because the routes were expected to be in the South, not the North.49 
In fact, the Post Office was entering a new activist phase, unprecedented 
in its scope. In May, the Post Office Department called the first of many con-
ferences bringing together industry leaders and the administration to reach 
workable solutions to the problems of the aviation business. These meetings 
would touch off a new, highly productive yet politically charged period in the 
relationship between government and industry. This associative approach, so 
typical of the former commerce secretary and now president Herbert Hoover, 
would forever change the face of commercial aviation, struggling to come to 
grips with the changing economy and the rapidly growing industry. The meet-
ing, the first of many that were to alter permanently the shape of American air 
transportation, was called by Hoover's chief political lieutenant and new post-
master general, Walter Folger Brown. 
Chapter 5 
1929: The Calm before the Storm 
I ndustry leaders were cautiously optimistic concerning the incoming ad-
ministration and its new air mail chief. Immediately before the election, 
Clement Keys and Col. Paul Henderson attempted to predict the Post Office's 
course of action under the incoming leadership, and in so doing outlined with 
remarkable clarity the issues facing the industry and the department. 
Henderson spent a considerable amount of time at the main Post Office head-
quarters at Eleventh and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. He was primarily inter-
ested in the department's plans for implementing the new Second Amendment 
to the Air Mail Act. 
In discussions with Deputy Second Assistant Postmaster General Chase 
Gove, Henderson was able to determine that there were no plans extant to 
extend the air mail contracts, most of which were coming to an end in 1929, 
past their expiration date. This was an obvious point of contention as the in-
dustry was rapidly consolidating, in large part because of the promise of these 
contract extensions, which would protect investors' extensive capital invest-
ments in the airlines. A uniform system of payment was also necessary to 
streamline the overly complicated and inefficient system of payments to the 
contractors. Despite improvements in the law, difficulties remained. Post Of-
fice officials, Henderson told Keys, "have no plan yet for negotiating exten-
sions to our contracts under the new law. Mr. Gove, who I think is after all the 
strongest man and the straightest thinker in the Post Office, believes these 
contracts should be based on some sliding scale, not unlike our New York-
Chicago contract. I don't think we need expect any action along this line for 
several weeks to come:'t In fact, action was not forthcoming at all, as the de-
partment was waiting to see the results of the industry-wide consolidations 
before acting. Henderson also voiced concern over the Post Office budget as a 
whole, noting that an appropriation of $15 million was requested, but the 
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Bureau of the Budget authorized only $13 million. With monthly payments to 
the contractors increasing as a result of the postage rate decrease, a shortfall 
was imminent. 
Of greatest concern to Henderson and indeed the entire airline industry 
were the department's plans for the creation of new routes. By the end of 1928, 
the Post Office had expanded service throughout the country, but had done so 
in a way that lacked coherence and was marked by a surfeit of short and inter-
mediate lines, often operating against one another. The sole advantage prom-
ised by air mail was speed-effectively demonstrated only on long routes. 
Consequently, talk among the airlines centered on the establishment of new 
transcontinental routes. Henderson found Gove's position reassuring. "Rela-
tive the route proposed from Los Angeles east, there is an agitation for a route 
from Atlanta to Los Angeles:' reported the colonel. "Gove believes that it should 
run from Atlanta to Birmingham, Shreveport, Dallas and Fort Worth, and from 
there to Los Angeles." Gove was well respected by the industry and was ex-
pected to soldier on in the new administration, as were Glover and most of the 
second-level administrators. 
Profitable lines such as NAT were not eager for any rate revision, but clearly 
they expected it would happen. For sister airline TAT, both Henderson and 
Keys were hoping for a friendly administration that would eventually reward 
their pioneering efforts with an air mail contract over their ambitious trans-
continental line once it opened in 1929. Keys was only concerned about the 
present economic conditions and the frenzy of consolidations that were trans-
forming the industry. "I am not afraid of Western Air or Universal or Boeing," 
he declared. "The only thing I am afraid of is the results of the general clean up 
of stock selling companies, which must come before very long and which will 
undoubtedly make our task more difficult than it now is, but it won't be bad 
provided we have obtained the money we need and use it honestly."2 
All of these points would prove central issues in the coming months. In 
the meantime, Henderson was correct in stating that nothing would change 
until the coming of spring-and with it a new postmaster general. He hoped 
that President-elect Hoover's choice would be a wise one, for much lay in the 
balance.3 
Walter Folger Brown, the incoming postmaster general, was an individual 
of great intelligence, unassuming in appearance, who avoided publicity, pre-
ferring to work quietly and effectively behind the scenes. Several historians 
have described him simply as "a Toledo attorney." Indeed he was, but he was 
also much more. Walter Brown was a political animal of great influence in the 
Republican Party of Ohio, whom President Hoover referred to as having "a 
greater knowledge of the federal mechanism and its duties than any other man 
in the United States."4 Brown brought to the government the vintage 
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Progessivism of Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism with regard to busi-
ness. Monopoly operating in the public interest was efficient, beneficial, and 
worthy of support. Unbridled monopoly operating against the public interest 
was intolerable. 
Brown came of age politically at the beginning of the Progressive era. He 
campaigned on behalf of William McKinley's successful gubernatorial cam-
paign before entering Harvard Law School. After his graduation in 1894, Brown 
joined his father's law firm and quickly reentered politics. By 1897, he was 
elected chairman of the Republican central committee of Toledo. His political 
acumen ensured the election of noted Progressive reformist Samuel M. "Golden 
Rule" Jones as mayor of Toledo, from whom he eventually broke. Brown allied 
himself with the very powerful camp of Sen. Marcus Hanna and continued to 
exert his growing influence first by controlling Toledo through his strength in 
the Republican Party and later, from 1906 to 1912, as chairman of the Ohio 
Republican Central Committee.5 
A friend of Theodore Roosevelt, Brown bolted the Republican Party in 
1912 to support Roosevelt's Bull Moose bid for the White House as chairman 
of the newly formed Progressive Party. Brown, a supporter of Roosevelt's New 
Nationalism, had broken with Taft because he felt the president was overly 
zealous in antitrust prosecution, particularly of the steel industry.6 
Following Roosevelt's defeat, it took Brown several years to regain his power 
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base after he rejoined the Republican ranks. His power remained prodigious. 
Through his careful work, Brown helped secure the nomination of dark-horse 
senator Warren G. Harding at the 1920 Republican National Convention. De-
spite losing his only bid for elected office that year, Brown declined Harding's 
offer of the ambassadorship to Japan but accepted a presidential appointment 
as chairman of a joint congressional committee on the reorganization of the 
executive branch of the government. The committee sought to rearrange gov-
ernment along principles of business management to improve efficiency. 
Harding's untimely death coupled with bureaucratic intrigues stymied any 
attempts at change. 7 
During this time in Washington, Brown forged a friendship with then-
Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. In 1927, Brown accepted an offer 
from Hoover to become assistant secretary of commerce, a move widely seen 
as Hoover's unofficial announcement of his candidacy for the upcoming 1928 
Republican presidential nomination. Once again Brown excelled in his role as 
president-maker as Hoover won the election easily, rewarding his campaign 
manager Brown with the top patronage position of postmaster general,S 
Assuming office in 1929, Brown, charged with the task of promoting com-
mercial aviation as well as efficiency in the Post Office, wished to bring reason 
to the rapidly growing yet still fledgling industry. Many small airlines had been 
created overnight and flew haphazard, disorganized routes in many areas of 
the country. Passenger traffic in particular was confused and sporadic. The 
existing situation, similar to that of the railroads in the nineteenth century, 
with which Brown was familiar, offered little chance for improvement if left 
uncontrolled. 
Brown was expected to move slowly, as he had no experience in aviation 
matters. Universal Airlines' Washington representative Hainer Hinshaw, the 
brother of top Republican David Hinshaw, commented, "Of course, the inau-
guration killed everything in Washington for about five days and then the in-
coming administration made it necessary to go out and make over all the 
contacts we had established prior to the old administration going out. I am 
not saying this officially, but it is my belief that Walter Brown is going to be 
very cautious about future air mail contracts and I am afraid our Dallas line is 
yet some distance off."9 
This assumption proved incorrect. Brown's quick mind immediately 
grasped the problems facing air mail and the airline industry and sought solu-
tions through cooperative meetings between government and industry. Brown 
was a believer in Hoover's associative state and hoped to apply this effective 
methodology of cooperative informal regulation to this new industry, setting 
it on a course to efficiency in the public interest. Most important, Brown fully 
understood the impact of the mergers and consolidations affecting the indus-
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try and knew that if he acted with dispatch, the government could reap the 
benefits of the industry's new, inherent efficiencies. With the airlines com-
pletely dependent upon the Post Office for their primary source of revenue, 
the department had a unique opportunity to control this new oligopoly from 
its inception, protecting the public interest without the need for a formal regu-
latory agency. This was Brown's goal and the perfect model of Theodore 
Roosevelt's New Nationalism with regard to the question of monopoly. Mo-
nopolies acting in the public interest were seen as good and deserved encour-
agement. This latter-day embodiment of Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive 
Republicanism was never more clearly demonstrated. It was the sole driving 
force behind Walter Folger Brown's actions for the next four years. 
Brown studied the air mail situation with regard to the newly emerging 
aviation holding companies, and within weeks of taking office, began to take 
action. At this stage the new postmaster general felt it was his duty to reduce 
the payments made to the contractors and bring the growing postal budget 
deficit under control. It was a daunting task. One of the original purposes of 
the Second Amendment to the Air Mail Act of 1926 was to reduce both air 
mail expenditures and postage rates. Determining the actual costs of the ser-
vice to the contractors was virtually impossible due to the plethora of account-
ing methods used. Compounding the problem was the fact that every air mail 
contractor had an individual contract and was paid a separate rate, ranging 
from nine cents per pound to the maximum three dollars per pound allowed 
by law. 10 Such payments were confusing in the least. 
With operating costs averaging more than one dollar per pound, some 
carriers were reaping huge profits and others were going bankrupt. The new 
postal rates were to have reduced the maximum payment to two dollars per 
pound in exchange for a long-term route certificate, but Brown's predecessor, 
Harry New, had refused to act, delaying his decision six months to see the 
effect of the postage cut on the amount of mail sent. This effectively left the 
difficult job up to Brown. In addition, while the postage was halved, the con-
tracts remained unaltered, presenting a highly profitable, and legal, opportu-
nity to the few unscrupulous operators. These individuals would mail heavy 
packages to themselves at the new lower postal rate while in return receiving a 
much higher payment for their service from the Post Office. Stories of airlines 
mailing bricks, engine parts, and other heavy equipment were rife throughout 
the industryY 
To deal with the mounting chaos, Brown worked with industry and gov-
ernment to find solutions. He called all of the air mail contractors to meet in 
Washington on May 27 to discuss new certificates and rates. 12 In his typically 
blunt manner, the postmaster general made his opinions clear at the meeting. 
"Many contractors are now making money in their transactions with the gov-
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ernment;' he stated, "and I am glad they are because a bankrupt is a poor 
person to do business with. Some negotiations, however, must be made in the 
near future looking to a readjustment in the pay rate. The government is spend-
ing a very large sum for air mail in excess of its return." 
This disparity brought up an important point. Hitherto, the air mail con-
tractors had received only that which was necessary for their survival. With 
the changes in the law and subsequent problems, the government was over-
paying to an extent that could only be defined as a subsidy. At this stage, at 
least, a subsidy was unthinkable and went against all that the Republican lead-
ership had argued several years earlier. "There is not, in air mail," said Brown, 
"the fundamental reason for subsidy that exists in shipping where foreign com-
petition in ship construction and cost of operation are essential factors. The 
air mail lines, under consideration, are wholly within the United States and 
are without foreign competition. However, I am not disposed to drive a hard 
bargain with you men who have put your money and skill into the flying game. 
We want you to prosper and the service to grow. I want to give the air mail 
every encouragement consistent with sound business." 
Brown wanted to change the method of payment from the current pound-
age basis to a mileage or distance system, which he felt would more equitably 
distribute the air mail funds. Together with the operators, it was decided to 
study the matter, the Post Office first preparing a detailed questionnaire that 
would gather all relevant information on operating costs and other expenses 
facing the contractors. Only after this data was digested would the depart-
ment, working in conjunction with the operators, devise an improved pay-
ment method. 13 
Part of this questionnaire contained a new uniform accounting system, 
which was desperately needed if the department were to compare real costs 
among the contractors. The new system was devised by the Post Office based 
on the uniform accounting practices in use by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for determining revenues and expenses of common carriers. The sys-
tem was designed to factor in all of the economic information concerning the 
air mail revenues of the contractors and the monies collected from passenger 
service, aerial sightseeing, and express and freight delivery. The system also 
made provisions for determining expenditures and, especially, losses in actual 
operations. Uniform depreciation rates were incorporated, with the under-
standing that with the rapidly evolving state of aeronautics, improvements in 
design and construction made aircraft, engines, and instruments obsolete of-
ten within two to three years. "It is expected;' the Post Office summarized, 
"that the application of this system will serve not only in the determination of 
fair rates for carrying mail by air but will also provide for comparison of re-
sults of different companies looking for economy of operation."14 
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To President Hoover this last point was key. He convened a meeting with 
the Post Office leadership on July 8 to discuss methods by which all postal 
expenditures could be cut. As part of his campaign to balance the budget and 
economize government operations across the board, Hoover sought reduc-
tion in railroad, marine, and air mail contracts. Second Assistant W. Irving 
Glover announced that a reduction from $1.5 to $2 million was in the works 
and that the operators could expect this to be reflected in their negotiations 
when their contracts come up for discussion beginning in October, when the 
original four-year term of the first awards came up for review.15 
To Brown and the department, the application of the uniform accounting 
system was a practical part of the solution of rational rate revision and clearly 
indicated his attitude toward the airlines as common carriers. He realized the 
need for some form of regulation in the public interest at this early stage, but 
only without the bureaucracy of a regulatory agency and its inherent, and pos-
sibly detrimental, interference during the industry's formative stages. The op-
erators left Washington to return home and mull over Brown's proposition 
until summoned again in the fall. 
Rumors began circulating in the halls of the Post Office Department about 
the formation of another committee, this one to determine future air mail 
routes. The department had been inundated with requests from all over the 
country for the extension of air mail service into virtually every city and town. 
Such overwhelming and contradictory petitioning resulted in much lobbying 
in Congress and the department but few practical solutions. Representatives, 
particularly from the South, hounded the Post Office for the creation of a 
southern transcontinental route. Explaining the Post Office's position on such 
a route, an exasperated Glover made clear his support for rational growth and 
abandonment of the haphazard methods of the former administration: "We have 
already in operation a two-a-day transcontinental service between New York 
and San Francisco and with the railroads entering into the passenger carrying 
business by air, it would seem to me that we should await the results of this 
experiment before attempting to establish another transcontinentalline."16 
Postmaster General Brown sought to apply more rational means in plan-
ning new transcontinental routes. At the suggestion of President Hoover, Brown 
announced the formation of the Interdepartmental Committee on Airways. 
Composed of officials from the Post Office and Department of Commerce, its 
task was to "hear and determine questions relating to the extension of the civil 
airways system of the United States." It was the intention of the committee to 
hold public hearings with members of the airlines, private citizens, and repre-
sentatives from federal, state, and local governments. 17 
The six members of the committee were W. Irving Glover, second assis-
tant postmaster general; Chase C. Gove, deputy second assistant postmaster 
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general; Earl B. Wadsworth, superintendent, Air Mail Service; William P. 
MacCracken, assistant secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics; F. C. Hinsburg, 
chief, Airways Division, and Harry H. Blee, chief, Airports Division. 
It was announced that on May 22 the committee would hear petitions 
concerning the creation of a possible airway between Pittsburgh and Norfolk 
by way of Washington, D.C. On May 23, a hearing was scheduled for discus-
sion of an East Coast route from Richmond to Charleston, South Carolina. 
The third gathering would hear arguments for establishing a route from Pasco, 
Washington, to Seattle, Spokane, Portland, and Tacoma.18 
In California, the former secretary of the treasury under President 
Woodrow Wilson saw the announcement of the formation of the Interdepart-
mental Committee in his morning edition of the Los Angeles Times. William 
Gibbs McAdoo was deeply interested in starting his own airline and saw this 
announcement as an opportunity to present his case and find financial sup-
porters. He also accurately perceived the motivations behind the creation of 
the committee. He enclosed the Times clipping in a letter to his son-in -law and 
law partner Brice Clagett, explaining that the committee was a form of na-
scent regulation that would protect the existing large enterprises: 
The Interdepartmental committees have no legal authority to restrain or to 
approve airway lines ... but they can, of course, exercise considerable influence 
upon public confidence in them by expressing their approval or disapproval. I 
doubt if it is the intention of this Interdepartmental Committee to go this far, 
but it may go so far as to express a preference in favor of certain lines for air mail 
contracts; that, in itself, would accomplish much in favor of existing quasi-mo-
nopolies in air mail transportation, and I have no doubt that the big companies 
are doing their utmost to secure, through this committee, what they would like 
to have enacted into law. It is analogous to the power confirmed by the Trans-
portation Act on I. C. C. in reference to railroad construction, either original or 
by way of extension of existing lines. 19 
As scheduled, the Interdepartmental Committee met in May and heard 
the arguments put forth by the representatives of local governments along 
several possible routes. On June 12, the committee met once again, this time 
to hear testimony on the proposed line from Louisville to Dallas and Fort 
Worth and, most important, to discuss the creation of the first leg of a south-
ern transcontinental line from Atlanta to Fort Worth. For the time being, these 
meetings were called only to gather information and were not a call for bids.20 
Numerous representatives from Congress attended the June 12 gathering. 
Among those present who were to later prove of great importance were Demo-
cratic representative Joseph P. Byrns of Tennessee, a member of the House 
Appropriations Committee, who urged a connection from Nashville to Mem-
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phis to join the line from Louisville to Fort Worth. The loudest proponent of a 
Nashville-Memphis line was Sen. Kenneth McKellar, a longtime southern 
Democrat and staunch Progressive who would later prove to be a large thorn 
in the side of the Post Office. A Memphis resident, McKellar insisted that the 
route run through his hometown and forcefully reminded the committee that 
it was he who wrote the amendment granting the Post Office permission to 
inaugurate service between Washington and New York in 1918. His position 
on the Senate Appropriations Committee also placed him in a powerful posi-
tion to influence future legislation and funding. 21 He was not to be trifled with. 
The numerous delegations expressed their concerns, anxious that they 
receive the full benefit of air mail services to their respective communities. 
They were also deeply worried that if service were not granted, their towns 
would fall by the wayside, as had so many communities when the railroads 
bypassed them. These concerns were real and still fresh in the memories of the 
representatives present. 22 
The initial meetings accomplished a great deal in helping the Post Office 
sort out the numerous claims and representations. In Washington, D.C., James 
Edgerton, one of the original U.S. Air Mail pilots, had joined with McAdoo in 
his efforts to create a new airline. As part of the planning, Edgerton attended 
the meetings and aptly summarized the events: 
The Interdepartmental Committee charged with investigating new air mail 
routes has favorably reported on a route from Richmond to Jacksonville with 
stops at Raleigh, Charleston, and Savannah, with a feeder to the present New 
York-Atlanta route from Augusta through Columbus to Charlotte .... The In-
terdepartmental Committee is understood to have reported favorably on a route 
from Birmingham to Fort Worth and from Norfolk to Cleveland, with stops at 
Washington and Pittsburgh .... 
The Interdepartmental Committee is understood to be still considering a 
route to Dallas-Fort Worth, the choice lying between the Louisville-Dallas, and 
a route from St. Louis via Tulsa to Fort Worth-Dallas. It is understood that the 
committee will hold hearings on this subject about the 27th of this month.23 
The routes from New York to St. Louis and from St. Louis to Dallas and 
Fort Worth were of interest to many parties, but none more so than Col. Paul 
Henderson. After months of planning and expenditures of more than $3 mil-
lion to create the infrastructure along its route, Transcontinental Air Trans-
port opened its passenger service on July 7 amid great celebration. The next 
day eastbound service was started by none other than TAT's technical advisor, 
Charles Lindbergh, who was at the controls of a new Ford 5-AT-B Tri-Motor, 
the City of Los Angeles. With one-way ticket prices ranging from $337 to $403, 
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Charles Lindbergh warms up the Ford S-AT Tri-Motor "City ofLos Angeles" before taking off 
on Transcontinental Air Transport inaugural eastbound flight from Los Angeles, California, 
on July 8, 1929. (Courtesy of TWA) 
the service was plush and expensive.24 The threat of competition was real as 
well. Western Air Express had already opened service from Los Angeles to Kan-
sas City and was poised to move farther east, particularly through its associa-
tion with the Universal organization. Of equal importance, such a new air 
mail route would also parallel National Air Transport's operation along CAM-
17 from New York to Chicago. It also could jeopardize their CAM-3 route 
from Chicago to Fort Worth. Much was at stake. These two proposed routes 
would inevitably drain mail loads from this route and harm NAT's bottom 
line, which was beginning to show a profit. Now, with the specter of a new air 
mail route paralleling the eastern half of their transcontinental route, NAT 
and TAT fought back. 
The president of the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, Walter B. 
Weisenburger, appealed to J.V. Magee, the local representative of TAT, for that 
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line's cooperation in placing St. Louis more solidly on the air mail map. The 
Robertson route from St. Louis to Chicago was adequate to some degree, but a 
direct link to New York promised much greater returns.25 
Immediately, Magee contacted Henderson, who told him not to respond 
to Weisenburger's request. Stated Magee, "I have not answered this letter and 
as a matter of fact, I have been steering clear of any definite attitude one way or 
the other regarding air mail for St. Louis."26 Henderson, in turn, emphatically 
expressed his concern to TAT director Chester Cuthell. "This is the line which 
we are most anxious to avoid being installed;' he remarked. "Consequently, I 
am returning to Washington in plenty of time to prepare a statement setting 
forth N.A.T:s position with respect to this new route."27 
On August 1, the Interdepartmental Committee met to hear arguments 
for the New York-St. Louis and St. Louis-Fort Worth lines. With Walter Brown 
presiding, more than one hundred individuals attended the meeting and heard 
numerous well-prepared and professionally presented presentations. Surpris-
ingly, no decision from the Post Office was forthcoming, largely due to the 
efforts of Henderson and company. Particular attention was paid to Clifford 
Ball. Ball, the brother-in-law of Clyde Kelly and possessor of one of the most 
lucrative and least important mail contracts, realized his airline was located 
strategically in western Pennsylvania, across the proposed line from New York 
to St. Louis. He let it be known that his small line was available for purchase 
but wanted the department's opinion. Officials from the Post Office made it 
clear to Ball that the New York-St. Louis route would not be offered for bids 
until the rate revision question was settled. They strongly suggested that he 
sell now to Pittsburgh Aviation Industries Corporation at a reasonable price 
or face ruination, for his contract and those of the other air mail carriers flying 
at the maximum three-dollars-per-pound rate were soon to be cut drastically, 
perhaps by as much as 50 percent, when the rate hearings reopened in the 
autumn.28 
In the meantime the Post Office called for bids following the earlier deci-
sion of the committee for extending the Salt Lake City-Pasco route to Spo-
kane and Seattle. Not surprisingly, after the call for bids was answered, Varney 
Air Lines won with an astonishingly low offer of nine cents per mile. This was 
not as absurdly low as it would seem. Varney was a well-established company 
with a proven record, unlike other petitioners on other routes, and already 
possessed the contract from Salt Lake City. The extension would cost Varney 
little extra in developmental expenses. Boeing Air Transport offered $1.19 per 
pound and lost.29 Varney now controlled the most direct access to the North-
west, but within a year this would be a moot point. Although no one perceived 
the stock market crash about to strike the nation's economy, the aviation in-
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dustry was undergoing sudden, unexpected paroxysms that presaged the im-
pending crisis. Money was becoming scarce during this time of plenty. 
Clement Keys took the opportunity to enhance his holdings by consoli-
dating his properties even more during the summer of 1929. Working closely 
with Richard F. Hoyt of Hayden Stone and the president of Wright Aeronauti-
cal, Keys forged the merger between two of the industry's leading manufactur-
ers, creating the Curtiss-Wright Corporation. This union joined Curtiss' aircraft 
manufacturing companies with Wright, one of the nation's preeminent air-
craft engine builders, thus creating a powerful industrial rival to the well-di-
versified United Aircraft and Transport Corporation. Curtiss-Wright 
authorized twelve million shares and had an estimated value of $70 million. 
This new corporation greatly improved the efficiency of production and opened 
new avenues for research and development. It did not, however, include air-
lines. Keys wished to keep these holdings separate, though they would work 
closely in improving commercial air travel. To this end, under the aegis of his 
other holding company, North American Aviation, Keys completed his air trans-
portation consolidation. 
At the same time the Curtiss-Wright negotiations were being completed, 
Clement Keys personally purchased all of the capital stock of Pitcairn Avia-
tion, which held CAM-19 from New York to Atlanta and CAM-25 from At-
lanta to Miami. These routes had been heavily patronized since their inception. 
Harold Pitcairn, one of the original investors in National Air Transport and a 
friend of Keys, was losing interest in air transportation and wished to concen-
trate his efforts on manufacturing. He sold his airline for $2.5 million.30 
On June 12, the deal was completed. Immediately Keys offered the line to 
North American. Personal profit was not his motive. Keys wished to open pas-
senger service to complement Pitcairn's profitable air mail operation and 
thereby feed passengers to his recently opened Transcontinental Air Transport 
and to passenger service recently proposed by National Air Transport.31 
Two weeks later, Keys offered all of the stock of Pitcairn to North American 
Aviation at cost of $2.5 million. It was accepted on June 27. To reflect the change 
in ownership and the expanded vision for the new acquisition, the corporation 
decided to change the name of Pitcairn to Eastern Air Transport. Keys, J. Cheever 
Cowdin, and Chester Cuthell were to serve on the board of directors.32 
While these negotiations were underway, Keys purchased a substantial 
interest in Varney, which was expanding to Seattle, and, more important, ac-
quired total control of an influential Southern California company, Maddux 
Air Lines. Maddux had been formed by a Los Angeles automobile dealer, Jack 
L. Maddux, who became fascinated with the possibilities shown by the Ford 
Tri-Motor during a demonstration in 1927. On July 21 of that year, he opened 
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regularly scheduled passenger service between Los Angeles and San Diego, and 
on April14, 1928, he extended the service to San Francisco. Using the ubiqui-
tous Fords, Maddux Air Lines spread throughout the Southwest, eventually 
reaching Phoenix.33 
This company was a natural rival to Western Air Express. In late 1928, 
Western was so concerned with Maddux and the rumored entry of Boeing Air 
Transport into southern California that Harris Hanshue attempted through 
legal means to halt the expansion. Using the threat of state regulation, Western 
tried to restrict competition and protect its interests by introducing legisla-
tion giving the California Railroad Commission power to control intrastate 
air travel.34 Fortunately for TAT, the legislation was forestalled. Taking no 
chances of a recurrence, however, TAT decided to solidify its position in Cali-
fornia by purchasing Maddux and thus obtaining an excellent network to feed 
its transcontinental service and directly face Western's challenge.35 
Western did not sit idly by. Already in May 1929 Hanshue had opened 
direct service between Los Angeles and Kansas City by way of Albuquerque 
and Amarillo, Texas. This was Western's part in its own transcontinental air-
rail scheme, connecting with several different rail companies at Kansas City 
for the trip east. With the direct challenge of the TAT-Maddux acquisition, the 
complete merger of which was completed in November, Western purchased 
Union Air Lines of Sacramento and its subsidiary, West Coast Air Transport. 
West Coast, based in Portland, Oregon, operated a purely passenger line from 
San Francisco to Seattle, in direct competition with UATC's Pacific Air Trans-
port. This acquisition gave Western a route system along the entire Pacific Coast. 
United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, while basically complete, made 
other important additions to round out its holdings. As previously noted, the 
Stout Air Services had rebuffed Colonial's advances and had cast its lot with 
UATC earlier in the year. This move gave UATC access to markets as far east as 
Cleveland with the 'hope of eventually reaching into New York. Earlier, in July 
1928, Henry Ford had decided suddenly to abandon his interests in aviation 
and concentrate on his automotive empire. William Stout was left in control 
of the air mail lines out of Detroit as he had acquired the assets and the air 
mail contracts of Ford's two routes, CAM-6 and CAM-7, in addition to his 
own route, CAM-14 from Detroit to Grand Rapids, which he had operated 
since August 1926. Ironically, Stout willingly relinquished the mail contracts 
because oflight loads and concentrated on carrying passengers and high-value 
freight between Detroit and the auto suppliers around the Great Lakes. The 
purchase was completed on June 30, 1929.36 
At this time United also acquired control of three prominent aircraft manu-
facturers. Russian-born Igor Sikorsky was the world's preeminent designer of 
large aircraft, having built the first four-engined aircraft, the "Grand;' in 1913 
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and a series of successful heavy bombers for Tsar Nicholas II before coming to 
the United States after the Russian Revolution. United outbid Curtiss for con-
trol of Sikorsky Aviation Corporation, the world's foremost manufacturer of 
large flying boats and amphibians in July.37 In August UATC purchased the 
Avian Corporation. Avian was the creation of perhaps the greatest aircraft de-
signer in the United States, John K. "Jack" Northrop, a pioneer in structures 
and, particularly, metal aircraft designs. The company was renamed the 
Northrop Aviation Corporation.38 Completing the diverse product line was 
the acquisition of the Stearman Aircraft Corporation, a noted builder of light 
general and smaller commercial aircraft.39 UATC now possessed a varied and 
highly complementary product line. 
The Aviation Corporation, consisting almost entirely of airlines, used this 
time to complete the acquisition of a dizzying variety oflarge and small carri-
ers in anticipation of new rates and postal policies expected from Washington. 
Southern Air Transport (SAT) was an important acquisition that brought AVCO 
into the huge, untapped market in the Southwest. SAT had been recently formed 
itself, combining the interests of Texas Air Transport with the former St. 
Tammany-Gulf Coast Airways. Texas Air Transport was the creation of Fort 
Worth bus line owner Temple Bowen and other local investors who formed the 
company in October 1927 to operate the mail contract, originally awarded to 
Seth Barwise, along CAM-21 from Dallas to Galveston via Fort Worth, Waco, 
and Houston. After receiving permission from the Post Office to start flying the 
mail on February 6, 1928, Bowen began service along CAM-21 and inaugurated 
CAM-22 operations between Brownsville and Dallas through San Antonio.40 
In November 1928, Alva Pearl ''A.P:' Barrett, a prominent Fort Worth busi-
nessman, bought controlling interest in Texas Air Transport along with other 
investors, including Amon Carter, prominent newspaper magnate and pub-
lisher of the Fort Worth Star- Telegram. He owned interest in the Dixie Motor 
Coach Company, radio station KTAT, and several real estate properties. When 
he acquired control of Texas Air Transport from Temple and Chester Bowen, 
A.P. Barrett immediately reorganized the company, promoting an accountant, 
Cyrus R. Smith, to run the enterprise.41 Barrett invested considerable sums of 
money into this profitable enterprise before merging his company with Gulf 
Air Lines to form Southern Air Transport on March 1, 1929.42 
By early 1929, Texas Air Transport had also extended mail and passenger 
service to San Antonio and El PasoY During the merger wave sweeping the 
industry, Clement Keys evinced considerable interest in acquiring Texas Air 
Transport in order to extend NAT's route southward from Dallas-Fort Worth. 
After a detailed financial investigation that revealed some inconsistencies with 
the mail contract between Seth Barwise, the original holder, and Texas Air, 
Keys decided to bow out of the negotiations.44 
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St. Tammany-Gulf Coast Airways operated CAM-23 from New Orleans 
to Atlanta through Mobile and Birmingham beginning on May 1, 1928. After 
an infusion of additional capital to restructure the company following heavy 
losses, in October 1928 the company was reorganized as Gulf Coast Airways, 
operating as part of a holding company known as Gulf Air Lines. On January 
23, 1929, Gulf Air opened CAM-29linking New Orleans with Houston.45 
After the creation of Southern Air Transport, A.P. Barrett, who served the 
new airline as president, placed C.R. Smith in de facto control as vice presi-
dent and treasurer. The airline then was separated into three parts: Division 1, 
encompassing the mail operations of Texas Air Transport; Division 2, control-
ling the air mail activities of Gulf Coast; and Division 3, handling all passenger 
service through the Texas Flying Service. By the summer of 1929, AVCO had 
acquired control of the assets of SAT, providing direct connections with their 
eastern holdings and the promise of a national network of routes. 
For months, complicated negotiations had taken place with the backers of 
the Universal Aviation Corporation. This rapidly organized company possessed 
a voracious appetite and, in a remarkably short period of time, swallowed 
numerous airlines, both with and without air mail contracts, in its drive for a 
transcontinental route. Universal had rapidly become a thorn in the side of 
National Air Transport and TAT, and was suspected of having a shaky finan-
cial and organizational base. Despite Clement Keys's hope that Universal's ex-
pansion had been temporarily blunted in late 1928, Universal kept spreading. 
After Robertson, Universal's most important acquisition was Braniff Air-
lines, which carried passengers throughout Oklahoma and into Kansas and 
Texas, roughly paralleling National Air Transport's service. Braniff was the cre-
ation of brothers Thomas and Paul Braniff of Oklahoma City. Thomas, the 
elder of the two, had made his fortune selling insurance and became inter-
ested in aviation through his brother in 1928, establishing the Paul Braniff Air 
Transportation Taxi Company of Oklahoma. The first route was between Okla-
homa City and Tulsa, two major oil-production centers, and by February 1929 
their line had extended to Dallas and Fort Worth. Paul served as company 
president; Tom's substantial financial interests meant that although he held 
no post, he was an active participant in all major company decisions.46 In ad-
dition, Universal purchased another small company, Central Airlines, which 
flew between Wichita and Tulsa, with an extension to Kansas City. 
It was in early 1929 that Louis H. Piper, the president of Universal, sought 
the consolidation of his companywithAVCO. Negotiations between Piper and 
the Aviation Corporation went much more smoothly than they had with Co-
lonial. George Hann, as early as March 1929, was calling for the integration of 
AVCO's airline holding with that of Universal and Embry-Riddle to ensure a 
smooth transition to a national route systemY Problems did arise, however, 
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and for the same reason they had with Colonial: many stockholders were leery 
of exchanging their holdings for shares in AVCO, as its stock was not gaining 
on the market as expected. Several stockholders correctly believed that too 
many shares of AVCO were outstanding and that this was depressing its value. 
One investor wrote AVCO's accounting firm of Hitt, Farwell and Company, 
voicing his concerns: 
The Universal stock at today's price shows actual assets of about $9 of $10 per 
share, with an excellent chance of earning the other half after the company gets 
going on a good commercial basis. But what way is there of knowing when the 
Aviation Corporation could pay a profit with twenty times the capitalization? 
Of course, the Aviation Corporation has absorbed two or three other valu-
able properties and may absorb more, but to us it looks like we are asked to 
exchange stock with SOo/o assets and SOo/o water, for stock which may ultimately 
represent a much larger percentage of water, with future appreciation discounted, 
that many extra years.48 
The firm attempted to calm the investor's fears by stating that asset value 
of AVCO's stock value was actually 90 percent of the present market price. 
They also reminded the investor that AVCO earned $215,000 in March, whereas 
Universal had lost $60,000 in 1928. Most important, AVCO possessed a large 
cash reserve almost thirty times the total capital held by Universal with which 
to support its stock.49 As with Colonial stockholders before, these arguments 
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on behalf of AVCO were sufficient to sway enough shareholders to exchange 
their holdings for AVCO stock. By July, the merger was complete. 
During the summer of 1929, AVCO continued its acquisition program, 
eventually gaining control of eleven of the twenty-five outstanding contract 
air mail routes. In addition to Colonial and Universal's holdings, AVCO final-
ized the acquisition of Embry-Riddle and purchased Interstate Airlines, which 
owned the rights to CAM-30 from Chicago to Atlanta. 5° 
With the consummation of the deal with SAT, Universal, and Interstate, 
AVCO turned its attention to a new battery of problems. But first it had reason 
to celebrate. On June 14, just three weeks ahead of the well-planned opening 
of Transcontinental Air Transport, Universal beat its arch-rival to the punch 
by opening its version of air-rail transcontinental service. Universal's route 
took sixty-seven hours rather than the forty-eight hours by TAT and involved 
only one leg by air. Less sophisticated and involving much less planning, 
Universal's system involved a lengthy train trip along the New York Central to 
Cleveland, where passengers transferred to an awaiting Fokker F-XA tri-mo-
tor for the flight to Garden City, Kansas, after which the passengers once again 
transferred to the Santa Fe for the trip to Los Angeles. 
On board the Fokker on the inaugural flight was George Hann, who en-
thusiastically wired W.A. Harriman en route: "This has been a great trip. Left 
this morning early from Cleveland over Universal system with two other twelve 
passenger Fokkers. All seats taken. Breakfast at Chicago. Lunch Kansas City 
and will soon be at Garden City for dinner. Total 8,870 miles and right on 
schedule. Beautiful sight other ships with us in formation. Jones, Dunwoody, 
Eison and other Universal officials deserving heartiest congratulations and 
Mrs. Willebrandt has been a splendid representative. Big crowds at both ports 
and very broad publicity. I only wish that poor old Louis Piper could have 
witnessed the splendid result of his handiwork."51 Piper had died of pneumo-
nia in late March, just after the negotiations for the merger with AVCO were 
concluding. 
Carrying a thermos filled with water from the Atlantic Ocean on this trip 
was AVCO's new corporate counsel and lobbyist, Mabel Walker Willebrandt. 
President Hoover had just amicably ousted her, the former assistant attorney 
general and chief enforcement official of Prohibition in the Department of 
Justice, from her post, in part because of her overzealousness.SZ On June 7, she 
accepted Grosvenor's invitation to join AVCO. 53 Her presence underscored the 
seriousness with which AVCO, as well as the other major airlines holding com-
panies, considered their political and economic positions and their willing-
ness to use every tool available to protect their interests. It was hoped that 
Willebrandt's political connections and Universal's representative in Wash-
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ington, Hainer Hinshaw, would bring considerable influence on behalf of their 
struggling corporation. Such help would soon be needed. 
Financial problems continued to dog AVCO throughout the summer of 
1929, despite the general national prosperity. Its newly acquired companies 
were diverse, often competing lines operating under considerably different 
managerial styles and efficiencies. With a few exceptions, such as Southern Air 
Transport, most of AVCO's airlines were losing money. This, coupled with the 
considerable amount of stock authorized and on the market, combined to 
continue to depress the value of AVCO's stock. The problem was affecting the 
corporation's ability to raise cash and continue their consolidation plans. 
In June, Roland Palmedo set in motion AVCO's attempt to secure a listing 
on the New York Stock Exchange. Heretofore, AVCO had been listed only on 
the curb market and was thus eager for acceptance on the big board to make 
its stock more attractive to investors. Because of AVCO's weak performance 
since March, when its shares had first been issued, Palmedo was surprised at 
the warm reception AVCO received from the Stock Exchange-especially con-
sidering that the general speculation endemic to the market that summer was 
heating up to crisis proportions.54 On June 26, Palmedo sent the official re-
quest to the exchange, and on August 2, AVCO won a place on the big board. 55 
Harriman was ecstatic. Now, after months in the doldrums, AVCO's stock 
would finally rise. Unfortunately, the honeymoon was over before it started. 
Almost immediately, the value of the stock dropped back below twenty dollars 
a share, thereby negating all of the AVCO's hard work and affecting the 
company's ability to borrow capital. Though not a financier, William Dewey 
Loucks, AVCO's general counsel, understood the situation all too well. "I per-
sonally am greatly disturbed over the action of Aviation stock on the Big Board 
since it has been listed," he wrote Harriman. "The unanimous thought of ev-
erybody was that if we could accomplish what seemed an almost 
unsurmountable task, of getting this stock upon the Big Board so that it would 
have a borrowing power and all brokers would trade in it, it not being a Curb 
stock, that the stock could be maintained at least around $20 a share. It struck 
20 for a few minutes, and has constantly sagged to 16 1/2 with no support 
whatsoever, and with very little stock changing hands."56 Loucks pleaded for 
the immediate creation of a syndicate to buy up shares and bolster the price 
before the value declined further. A meeting was called but little was done: 
AVCO's stock remained below its initial offering price. 
AVCO's directors continued to cast about for additional ties to improve 
the company's weak position. Links with Western Air Express were forged fol-
lowing discussions in April leading to the acquisition of 10 percent of Fokker 
Aircraft's stock by Universal, in which Western had control. This led to nego-
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tiations whereby Western sold five hundred of its shares at fifty dollars per 
share to AVCO and Western purchased eighteen hundred shares of Universal 
at fourteen dollars, in effect an even swap and a promise for more cooperation 
and the placement of a representative on each other's board of directors. 57 
Western's control ofFokker had led General Motors into the aviation busi-
ness as GM was beginning to look toward investing in this new industry. De-
sirous of forming a bond with this industrial power, AVCO hoped that some 
arrangement could be reached through its growing ties with Western and 
Fokker. It was hoped that General Motors' expertise in manufacturing could 
be employed to improve the poor performance of AVCO's Fairchild and Kreider 
Reisner aircraft companies, which were struggling with poor products and 
inefficient management and construction techniques. Access to GM's vast sup-
ply of capital was tempting as well. 58 
General Motors was indeed interested but wished to move slowly. Its ex-
ecutives wanted in the aviation game but apparently were cautious as to with 
whom they would play. Although AVCO's numerous liabilities were hurting 
its chances to attract large investors such as GM, Loucks and George Hann 
pressed harder to forge alliances that could improve the corporation's posi-
tion prior to the Post Office Department's forthcoming meetings. Loucks had 
been in conversation with officials at United Aircraft who were contemplating 
acquiring AVCO's airline holdings-but only without Graham Grosvenor. 
Loucks telegraphed George Hann concerning the matter: "Harriman and 
Walker very anxious you to attend luncheon Monday to discuss proposal of 
United on acquisition transport lines. At present time they do not want to 
discuss with Grosvenor and want it kept confidential from him. Try and be 
here. My present attitude negotiations premature but should be kept alive."59 
George Hann agreed, and although he could not attend the meeting, 
strongly felt that an association with the powerful United Aircraft, with its 
diverse, well-run, and profitable companies, would greatly benefit AVCO. As 
United's airlines were primarily in the West, such a merger would comple-
ment AVCO's holdings and result in the elimination of a great deal of over-
head and administrative duplication. 
What was really hurting AVCO's chances at further mergers was the poor 
performance of its stock, despite the success of other aviation stock. Hann 
blamed the investment banks themselves for this predicament, allowing too 
many inside investors to purchase too many shares, thus preventing a wide 
distribution throughout the country while creating too much speculation.60 
Talk of additional consolidations raised the issue of antitrust actions by 
the Justice Department and consequent regulation by law or court action added 
to AVCO's mounting concerns. Loucks believed the corporation was safe from 
any prosecution but wanted the company to stay on guard just the same. Writ-
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ing to board member Alexander Royce, Loucks stated, "Being such a large en-
tity I have felt from the outset that we must guard ourselves most carefully so 
that any investigation that might take place, Federal or otherwise, we would be 
thoroughly protected on. We have done nothing so far, as far as I can see, that 
brings us under the Clayton Act; but from now on we may get into situations 
in which we might purchase controlling interests which might lessen compe-
tition between companies interested."61 
Hainer Hinshaw expressed his concerns to Willebrandt, stressing his posi-
tion that the Aviation Corporation was probably exempt from any action be-
cause of its close relationship with the government as a Post Office contractor. 62 
Willebrandt's reply is not known, but she and AVCO were aware that the in-
dustry was making rapid advances and could no longer be seen as a purely 
private operation. At a conference on aviation legislation held at New York's 
Hotel Roosevelt on June 27, 1929, AVCO's top executives were brought to-
gether to discuss the future. 
The participants, Loucks, Willebrandt, Hann, Hinshaw, Cletus Keating, 
and Talbot Freeman, understood that their industry was rapidly maturing and 
that its perception by the public was changing as swiftly, now that transconti-
nental service had begun. Despite their reluctance to admit it, these AVCO 
board members knew that their air transportation companies were now viewed 
as common carriers and subject to eventual public control beyond that of the 
Post Office and the Department of Commerce. Already the Post Office De-
partment was discussing the exchange of their contracts for certificates of public 
convenience and necessity.63 
Although regulatory legislation was not encouraged, the participants agreed 
that federal rather than state control would be the lesser of two evils. "I am quite 
clear in my own mind that if Congress did occupy the field, a great many legis-
lative troubles would be ended;' said Cletus Keating. "First of all, we would have 
one legislature instead of forty-eight, and ... if jurisdiction is exclusively in the 
Federal courts, you would have a very speedy and uniform law .... There are very 
few directions where you can fly without crossing the state line; therefore, it 
seems to me that it is the kind of thing that the Commerce clause is designed to 
deal with, and is something that Congress ought to deal with" ( 15). 
The question of the regulation of rates proved contentious. Responding 
to Loucks's suggestion that increased regulation inevitably led to rate control, 
Willebrandt put the matter before Keating. "I have been through a good many 
fights on the regulation of rates;' she said. "I was always opposed .... I have 
come to the conclusion that what we need is a fair, reasonable rate, enforced by 
a policeman, and the only policeman I know is the United States Government" 
(16). Arguing against Loucks's assertion that such an act would harm an in-
fant industry such as aviation and that the time was not ripe, Keating responded, 
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"One thing is certain: we are going to have regulation of rates, so wouldn't you 
rather have regulation of rates by the Federal Government than by forty-eight 
states? State Rate Commissions are pretty dubious bodies; they are the lowest 
type of political adventurers:' Keating reminded Loucks that the airline industry 
was a public utility. "You may put off the regulation of rates for a few years, but 
everything of that character is regulated sooner or later," he declared ( 9-11). 
Loucks saw the matter differently. He understood that often the regula-
tory agency involved was slow or unwilling to provide rates that provided a 
reasonable return and was therefore injurious to the industry, such as the ICC 
was to the railroads. "The difficulty is that the rate will be made on present 
conditions, not taking into consideration the fact that any line loses money 
when first started;' Loucks said. "For two years it runs at a substantial loss. The 
Post Office Department is, incidentally recognizing that in the readjustment 
of rates:' Regulation, he continued, "is bound to come, but I have been hoping 
that it would be deferred for several years. ( 11) 
Organized under the auspices of the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, 
the national trade association for the aviation industry, the First National Air 
Traffic Conference opened in Kansas City, Missouri, on September 16, 1929. 
ACC president Frederick Rentschler, the head of United Aircraft and Trans-
port Corporation, opened the three-day event, which centered on the com-
mon problems of the airline industry and was attended by 150 representatives 
of 30 air transport lines. 
General agreement was reached on most topics, but one remained a point 
of contention. T.B. Clement, the general traffic manager of TAT, stressed that 
with greater passenger traffic would come increased pressure for the airlines 
to be considered common carriers. AVCO had already begun to address the 
question, but Clements placed it before the entire industry, recommending 
that the industry declare itself a common carrier in order to head off unwanted 
outside interference.64 
Common carriers, of course, could be offered protection by the govern-
ment as they were operating in the public interest, but this in turn raised the 
specter of regulation. This tendentious issue was raised by independent airline 
owner and operator Erle P. Halliburton, the founder of Southwest Air Fast 
Express, which flew passengers throughout Texas and Oklahoma and did not 
have a mail contract. Halliburton was a quarrelsome individual, possessing a 
knack for infuriating most people he met, but he was equally determined in 
his well-founded opinions and felt that regulation by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission was the solution to the industry's financial problems. 
As with the railroads, Halliburton contended, the ICC determined rates 
based on the return against the property investment. For airlines a similar 
method, based on a return against the capital stock would insure steady and 
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profitable rates. The rate determination methods of the ICC, he felt, would 
guarantee that the industry could charge rates that would guarantee a profit 
while not being too high to scare off traffic. These rates must consist of pas-
senger fares, express delivery, and, particularly, air mail, which "is quite an 
important source of revenue in the development of commercial aviation."65 
Halliburton called for an equitable distribution of the air mail traffic and a 
flat-rate payment system to encourage development across the country. Un-
der the present system, only those lines that carried heavy loads received large, 
weight-based payments, to the disadvantage of the smaller lines. Federal regu-
lation would accomplish this end. 
Speaking at the conference on behalf of Halliburton was his assistant, 
W.J.Winn: 
The airlines have reached that stage where they should be regulated and 
protected by an institution similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion if not by the Commission itself. Thus the public would derive the full ben-
efits of fast transit afforded by air and the inventor's money secured by building 
up traffic and elimination of the transportation wastes that are existent amongst 
certain air lines today. If regulation is had aside from the great benefits derived 
by mail traffic there would be no wasting of the public's money in the establish-
ment of non-essentiallines in duplication of service and the like . 
. . . It seems appropriate at this time now since so many other air lines have 
come into the scheme of things to enact some laws protective alike to the air 
lines, their patrons present and potential and to the investing public.66 
Winn called for a resolution from the Conference supporting Halliburton's 
views that would then be forwarded to Congress for appropriate action. Assis-
tant Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics William P. MacCracken responded 
on behalf of the industry in rejecting direct rate regulation by the ICC. His 
statements reflected as well the ambivalence of business in general toward gov-
ernment intervention: 
It has been my experience the last three or four years that just as soon as 
anybody gets well started in commercial aviation their first thought is they want 
Government regulation of their business for them. After they have been in it for 
about two or three years they are pretty well satisfied that they are running their 
own business and not having the Government run it for them .... Let me point 
out that the railroads weren't regulated until after they had been running about 
75 years ... before there was any real regulation. In that time they did develop 
some very pernicious habits. If the aircraft industry follows in the footsteps of 
the railroads they will get the same type of regulation that the railroads have. It 
will be difficult at first. It will work out all right in the long run. But if the air 
transportation industry can avoid the pitfalls that the railroads put themselves 
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into, I think they can avoid this type of regulation on the part of the Federal 
Government to the benefit of all concerned, and certainly in the early stages of 
the industry, when it is changing so rapidly, you cannot expect any Governmen-
tal organization to keep pace with it. 
I want to cite just one example .... That was the famous bid the Boeing 
Company, at $1.50 a pound made on the Chicago-San Francisco air mail. There 
wasn't a single government official that thought it was possible for that line to 
make money to that rate, and yet we all know from practical experience that 
they have made money. 
Now an industry that is changing as rapidly as this one ... can't afford to 
have the thing run by any set of government officers, I don't care how wise or 
intelligent they may be. Keep it in your own hands and if you can keep it clean, 
you will never need Government regulations. If you don't, you will get it.67 
After much discussion, MacCracken's persuasive arguments prevailed. In 
the forthcoming months, the matter of equitable rates and the protection of 
the industry by an individual or an instrument of the federal government would 
consume the Post Office as it focused its attentions on the questions of air 
mail payments and new routes. 
Chapter 6 
The Post Office Takes Charge 
Aviation Corporation's financial woes were reflective of the growing prob-lems in the economy: the hyperactive stock market, the problems of over-
production, and the growing uneasiness with the overvaluation of the airlines 
and other industries. By the early autumn of 1929, most of the nation's air-
lines had been consumed by the three major holding companies. It was clear 
to the industry's leaders that aviation was rapidly coming of age technologi-
cally and financially and that mergers were a logical step in the growth of air 
transportation. These consolidations promised greater efficiencies, lower over-
head costs, and greater productivity as, it was hoped, a more rational airline 
system emerged. 
Unfortunately, without external direction, this growth was haphazard and 
uneven. The first rumblings for state or federal regulations were heard, which 
added increased pressure for changes in the present system. Postmaster General 
Brown had begun to address these problems with the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee on Airways and during the rate revision meetings with the airlines earlier 
in the year. Now, the Post Office was to take serious steps to bring reason to the 
airline industry by increasing its attention to the establishment of crucial routes 
and by creating a rational and fair system of air mail payments. This was done in 
order to improve mail service and ward off the threats of formal governmental 
rate intervention. Brown sought to regulate without regulations. 
Slated for November, the most important meeting of the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Airways would determine the route for the forthcoming south-
ern transcontinental line. The promise held forth by the department was a 
lucrative air mail contract to the winning contractors once the route was de-
termined and advertised. With United Aircraft involved in the Northwest and 
North American flying primarily in the East and Midwest, the southern route 
was open to the few independents that were left as well as the fractious lines of 
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the Aviation Corporation that operated in the South. The competition was 
expected to be fierce. 
Into the fray came former secretary of the treasury William Gibbs McAdoo 
with his proposed Southern Sky-Lines. Born in Georgia, raised in Tennessee, 
trained in New York, and now living in southern California, McAdoo was a 
forward-looking Wilsonian Democrat aware of the efficiencies inherent in large 
enterprises but wary as well of their potential for detrimental behavior. This 
Progressive southern Democrat, who shared Louis Brandeis's aversion to mo-
nopolies, fervently embraced Woodrow Wilson's concept of New Freedom 
policies regarding the evils of concentrated wealth and power. 
McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law, had become aware of the problems and 
opportunities inherent in transportation from the earliest days of his career. 
He invested twenty-five thousand dollars in a Knoxville mule-powered street-
car line and immediately recognized the need for capital to upgrade the sys-
tem. His search for money led him to New York, where his pleas fell on deaf 
ears because northern investors cared little about struggling southern enter-
prises. By the time a Philadelphia investor was found, the money was too little 
and too late to convert the system to electricity and save the line. Undaunted, 
McAdoo moved to New York, where he quickly proved his mettle as an attor-
ney and financier, becoming involved with the successful reorganization of 
failed railroads. 
In 1901, at the age of thirty-eight, he joined with corporation attorney 
John R. Dos Passos and acquired the rights to the corporation that had at-
tempted but failed to build a tunnel under the Hudson River. McAdoo ably 
found new sources of capital, and, under his leadership, the Hudson Tubes, 
the first tunnels connecting Manhattan with New Jersey, was opened in 1907, 
solidifying McAdoo's reputation as a highly respected railroad entrepreneur. 1 
As biographer Jordan Schwartz points out, McAdoo understood that rail-
roads, finance, and politics were interconnected. This in turn led him into the 
political sphere, following fellow southern Presbyterian Woodrow Wilson's New 
Freedom tenets, which favored the small businessman over the powers of en-
trenched wealth. The New Freedom appealed to capital-hungry entrepreneurs 
such as McAdoo, who had earlier been denied access to Wall Street. In 1912, 
Wilson asked this prominent southern financier and recent widower to enter 
his cabinet as secretary of the treasury. McAdoo's marriage to the president's 
daughter in 1914 raised eyebrows in Washington as Eleanor was twenty-six 
years his junior. As secretary, McAdoo proved successful, leading the fight for 
the Federal Reserve banking system, centered in Washington rather than New 
York, thus breaking the hold of Wall Street over investments in other regions 
of the country. 
Under his stewardship, the government took on a new, active role in pro-
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viding state funds for worthy projects in which conventional sources of capital 
were leery of investing. This form of state capitalism was, in fact, reflected by 
Hoover's policies toward the aviation industry. McAdoo took the lead again in 
mobilizing the nation for war and actively fought against monopolies in ship-
ping. His greatest success came with the nationalization of the railroads in 
1917. McAdoo correctly perceived that the railroads were in a sorry state be-
cause of a lack of capital and did not have the ability to coordinate their ac-
tions on behalf of the war effort. Under his direct leadership of the Railroad 
Administration, the nation's rail system developed a well-integrated national 
infrastructure, operating in the public interest. 2 
After losing his bid for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1924, 
McAdoo moved to California to take up his law practice and invested heavily 
in oil and real estate, adding considerably to his wealth. When he renewed his 
interest in transportation in 1929-first by buying his own aircraft, a modern 
high-speed Lockheed Vega-and then elicited the aid of former air mail pilot 
James Edgerton to form their ambitious Southern Sky-Lines transcontinental 
airline, McAdoo well understood the financial and political situation surround-
ing aviation, the newest transportation industry. 
In April 1929, following the widely publicized creation of the Aviation 
Corporation, McAdoo first expressed his interest in aviation and in the possi-
bility of acquiring the southern transcontinental route from the Post Office. 
Writing to fellow entrepreneur H.P. Wilson, he explained that this undertak-
ing had great potential for profit, either from operating the route under con-
tract or from the profit entailed through merger and acquisition. McAdoo 
reasoned that the route from Atlanta to Los Angeles was the only one "not yet 
occupied;' and that, because of the better climate in the South, the probability 
for success was greater. "My idea is that you and I and a few other acceptable 
friends should form a corporation and submit a bid;' he wrote. "We could 
then finance it on whatever seems to be the most desirable set-up." Aviation 
stocks were hot, he declared. "There seems to be no difficulty whatsoever in 
financing any well-conceived and sponsored aircraft organization, leaving our 
group, which will do the initial work, in control of the common stock or eq-
uity at nominal cost, or perhaps merely for service rendered."3 
McAdoo, ever cautious, wanted to secure the mail contract before orga-
nizing his airline, despite the Post Office's known desire to give awards only to 
companies with operating experience; it would be a major mistake.4 
Throughout the spring, McAdoo attempted to interest other airlines in 
joining his plan. Unfortunately, St. Tammany-Gulf Coast and Robertson, 
though interested, cast their lot with AVCO. McAdoo was growing wary, fear-
ful that all the existing airlines were being snapped up by the holding compa-
nies, making it "extremely difficult to successfully compete for any mail 
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contract."5 He feared that the growing oligopolies would force out the inde-
pendents before they had a chance to enter the business: 
The activity in the aviation field is so great and the consolidations that are 
going on are so numerous that they foreshadow, in my opinion, an early group-
ing of the various sections of the United States into strong companies which 
will preempt the entire field and have a tremendous advantage over later entries 
because they will be in possession of some desirable mail contracts and in posi-
tion to bid to better advantage on the new ones that are offered than any new 
company . 
. . . I am inclined to think that it might be well to get together immediately 
a small group, with a limited amount of capital, say $100,000, ... and organize a 
company for the specific purpose of operating a line between Atlanta and Los 
Angeles, via Dallas, Fort Worth and El Paso, and another line between Chicago 
and New Orleans .... It might be well to start this going immediately. We will 
then be in a position to bid on the mail contracts when they are offered .... Since 
[Frank] Robertson has severed his connection with his old company, I won-
der ... if he would be willing to join the new enterprise. 6 
Robertson was not willing, having decided to reenter the field on his own. 
Edgerton, to whom McAdoo entrusted all technical details, urged him to form 
the airline as soon as possible and was willing to devote all his attention to this 
project if McAdoo decided to proceed. Still cautious, the former treasury sec-
retary was willing to make all of the necessary arrangements just short of op-
erating and decided to call the new enterprise Southern Skylines. McAdoo was 
anxious to form a syndicate to raise the necessary two hundred thousand dol-
lars. Aware of the importance of political expediency, he would ask prominent 
Republicans to be among the subscribers.7 
Raising money was not as easy as McAdoo had hoped. His friend H.P. 
Wilson had subscribed to twenty thousand dollars, but no other money was 
forthcoming. He pressed on regardless, but was becoming increasingly aware 
that his competition was from Wall Street, not in the air. "The big aviation 
investment trusts seen to be corralling everything in sight;' he stated. "Perhaps 
they may be able to make it impossible for the small fry to get into the game:'8 
Investors were also not completely confident that Southern Sky-Lines was suf-
ficiently well organized and were fearful that the airline's cost estimates were 
far too rosy.By late spring, investors were growing increasingly wary of avia-
tion stocks, which, as in the case of AVCO, were not performing as well as 
advertised. McAdoo's good friend Bernard Baruch forwarded a negative re-
port prepared by an anonymous acquaintance that criticized Southern Sky-
Lines' initial prospectus as too enthusiastic and based on incomplete research.9 
McAdoo was appreciative of the comments but rejected the substance of 
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the remarks, firmly believing that he and Edgerton had correctly assessed the 
market and the costs of entry. In the meantime Edgerton and McAdoo began 
an intensive survey of their proposed route and contacted potential investors 
in every city along the way. Though interest was fleeting, McAdoo was unde-
terred. As part of his efforts, he traveled on TAT's new transcontinental service 
and was deeply impressed with the operation. "We had a wonderful trip;' he 
declared. "Made Los Angeles in two days .... Without mail contracts, I don't 
think these propositions will pay immediately, but eventually they will be won-
derful investments."10 He hoped that the commencement of TAT's line would 
renew interest in his plan among potential investors. "The opening of the T.A. T. 
has enormously increased the general interest in commercial air transporta-
tion;' he stated, "and it seems to me that it makes sense for any banking house 
of standing to raise the capital needed for our Southern Sky-Lines .... I think 
it is a good time to strike."11 
McAdoo was slowly listening to Edgerton's insistent advice to open an 
operating company to prove Southern's qualifications to the Post Office. The 
quickest way was to either merge or forge an operating agreement with a cur-
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rent airline. McAdoo had just the airline in mind. Erle P. Halliburton, owner 
of Southwest Air Fast Express, which had been flying since early April, was his 
neighbor in Beverly Hills. In fact, Halliburton owned a home down the street 
and the two men's daughters were classmates. Halliburton had assisted McAdoo 
in arranging for the purchase of McAdoo's private Lockheed Vega, named The 
Blue Streak, and now he was being approached to join Southern Sky-Lines. 
Halliburton gave a qualified positive reply to McAdoo's suggestion. "I would 
be glad to know more about your organization and the method you intend to 
use in raising capital before I would commit myself in connection with a con-
solidation;' he wrote. "The SAFE Airline has raised all of its money without 
the use of a banking group, and as a result nothing but earnest money has 
been used to finance the organization. If you would care to purchase some 
stock in the SAFE Airline on the same basis that all the rest of us have come in, 
that is $25.00 per share, we would be glad to have you participate with us:' 12 
McAdoo knew Halliburton was interested in expanding and was desirous 
as well of obtaining a mail contract. Writing to Edgerton, McAdoo commented, 
"A friend of mine, Mr. Halliburton, is operating an air service over this route 
and I know he is keen for a mail contract. I talked to him once about hooking 
up with me, but I haven't had a chance to discuss it with him since my return 
home." 13 McAdoo had been slowed by a troublesome impacted wisdom tooth 
that had caused him a painful distraction throughout the summer, and only 
by August was he sufficiently fit to return to business. He replied to Halliburton 
with a qualified answer of his own: "I thank you for the offer of taking a par-
ticipation in your company but I think I had better wait until we meet before 
doing anything in that direction." These words would later come back to haunt 
him. In the meantime, McAdoo was sure that the current sorry state of the air 
mail could not last. "I have no doubt that that policy will be radically changed 
in the near future;' he stated. 14 
Edgerton had attended the Interdepartmental Committee on Airways 
meetings throughout the summer and reported enthusiastically about the pros-
pects. With the determination of the Louisville to Dallas line completed, the 
Post Office had promised a November meeting to establish the final route, the 
southern transcontinental. This was now McAdoo's and Edgerton's objective: 
to organize Southern Sky-Lines and present their application for this essential 
route. McAdoo had finally listened to Clagett and Edgerton's pleadings and 
understood that the Post Office was sincere in its firm decision to contract 
only with experienced operators, not pretenders. "Until a company actually 
goes into operation somewhere, its backers are looked upon as 'promoters' 
and are viewed with more or less suspicion in all quarters, and are not taken 
seriously by the companies themselves;' stated Clagett. "The companies which 
are operating are building up a trained personnel and gaining valuable experi-
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ence on all sorts of problems and inevitably governmental agencies and busi-
ness people are much more inclined to do business with established compa-
nies than with those which exists only on paper .... The requirements at the 
Post Office Department for mail bids include the fact that the bidders must be 
'responsible: Being 'responsible' means more than mere financial responsibil-
ity and includes experience in operation."15 
Clagett had examined all of the proposed routes and concluded that the 
southern transcontinental was an excellent opportunity if they acted immedi-
ately and showed their good faith by opening service somewhere along the 
proposed route from Washington to Los Angeles by way of Atlanta and Dallas, 
or from Chicago to New Orleans. "I doubt that if at this stage of the game a 
company which has no operating mileage will secure any contracts;' warned 
Clagett. "It seems to me there are two possible methods of procedure. Either 
( 1) to complete the syndicate of $500,000 and proceed to map and begin op-
erations on a route ... or (2) to enter into a combination with an existing 
company like Standard Air Ways or 'Great Southern Air Ways' which you men-
tion as belonging to California interests and being in process of projecting a 
line over our southern route:' 16 They hoped that Halliburton would provide 
the practical operating experience required by the Post Office, and by Septem-
ber, this, they thought, had been arranged. On September 20, 1929, McAdoo 
confirmed to Brice Clagett that Halliburton had decided to "go on board" and 
join with Southern Sky-Lines in their joint offer to the Post Office for the 
southern transcontinental route. 17 
Efforts continued in the hope of putting together the airline in time for 
the Post Office and Interdepartmental Committee. McAdoo's difficulties in 
raising capital were mounting. His constant delays because of his caution and 
health problems meant that they were running out of time as the state of the 
stock market continued to deteriorate. McAdoo was also anxious for some 
action from the department and was hoping that a statement made by Second 
Assistant Postmaster General Glover would allow the Post Office to place first-
class mail on the airlines at the postmaster general's discretion. An anxious 
McAdoo was willing to submit a proposal to the Post Office for Southern Sky-
Lines to carry first-class mail between New York and Los Angeles in an at-
tempt to force Brown's hand. "If you think well of it;' wrote McAdoo to Clagett, 
"we could proceed with the permanent organization of the Sky-Lines board 
and officers and make a serious effort to get the business:' 18 
An operations staff was needed. McAdoo approached William MacCracken 
to head the airline, now that the assistant secretary had announced he was 
leaving government service. The offer was graciously declined as MacCracken 
wished to enter private practice and represent numerous airlines before the 
government. McAdoo was beginning to feel the pressure from a worsening 
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economy and the growing presence of the large operators consuming most of 
the extant capital and qualified personnel. He was aware that the meeting be-
tween the department and the contractors was to reopen soon and that this 
could be a bad omen for the small independents. "I hope that you will attend 
the conference which the Postmaster General is going to hold with air mail 
contractors, beginning September 30th, if it is permissible;' stated McAdoo. "I 
hope that new lines and independent lines are not going to be swept aside in 
order to strengthen the position and monopoly of a few large companies now 
in the field." 19 
McAdoo now focused his attention on the Interdepartmental Committee 
meeting scheduled for November 25 to make his pitch to the Post Office. 
Edgerton reported that the time was ripe, for with "the Post Office negotiation 
underway for the reduction of [the] air mail deficit, it is the opinion at the 
Department that new routes ... will soon be advertised. We cannot afford to 
waste the long months occupied by all new and large organizations in growing 
pains, as we are now in position to start actual work."20 
To get a head start on the potential competition, McAdoo and Halliburton 
submitted an unsolicited offer to the postmaster general offering to carry the 
transcontinental air mail for seventy cents per pound for the first thousand 
miles and seven cents per mile for each additional one hundred miles, ap-
proximately half of what Boeing Air Transport was currently being paid. In 
addition, they offered to carry first-class mail for sixty cents for the first thou-
sand miles and six cents per hundred miles thereafter. McAdoo and Halliburton 
were hoping that the postmaster general could award them this route without 
the cumbersome necessity of competitive bidding, which usually drove the 
bidding prices so low that no contractor could make a profit. This they con-
sciously did, even though such an arrangement could be interpreted as an 
unfair practice that favored insiders and the large holding companies. Accord-
ing to McAdoo and Halliburton, both Democrats, "We are familiar of course 
with the opinion of the Comptroller General, dated March 1, 1927, ... to the 
effect that under the Air Mail Act there appears no reason why advertising for 
bids 'is not incumbent or is not contemplated by the law.' While we realize that 
up to the present time you have followed this opinion of the Comptroller Gen-
eral in making air mail contracts, we are not sure that such advertising for bids 
is mandatory. We do not believe that it is mandatory.''21 
Halliburton and McAdoo printed their two proposals and, attaching a cover 
letter, mailed their offer to the chambers of commerce, merchants' associa-
tions, and trade organizations in all of the major cities along the proposed 
route to garner local support for their effort. This was a wise move because it 
was expected that these same local representatives would attend the forth-
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coming Interdepartmental conference and their support for Southern Sky-
Lines and Southwest Air Fast Express was crucial. 22 
Second Assistant Postmaster General Glover gave a lukewarm response to 
the offer, referring Halliburton and McAdoo to the Interdepartmental meet-
ing. "Air mail routes are only established after the most careful consideration 
has been given to every factor surrounding such matters;' he wrote. As to the 
offer to receive a contract without competitive bidding, Glover reminded them 
that, at present, their offer "could not be accepted under law, even if the De-
partment was so inclined."23 
Brice Clagett wrote to his father-in-law and told him not to worry about 
Glover's reply. He felt that the department was looking favorably upon their 
proposal but was being cautious pending the outcome of the conference and 
was concerned about angering the comptroller general, John McCarl, who by 
law passed on the validity of all government contracts before they could be 
executed. "In view of the Comptroller General's opinion, which I sent you;' 
stated Clagett, "there is a decided tendency at the Department not to let any 
mail contracts without bids."24 
Clagett was emphatic that it was essential to complete as much prelimi-
nary work as possible to impress the department. This would include deter-
mining schedules, equipment, landing fields, and financing to demonstrate 
that they were, in the department's terms, a "responsible bidder." Clagett sug-
gested that Southern Sky-Lines bid under Halliburton's name alone because 
he had operating experience and, despite his irascible nature, which offended 
some people in the Post Office, his record was sound.25 
McAdoo took this suggestion seriously. He and Halliburton had tenta-
tively agreed to a merger of their two operations, on November 22, 1929, with 
McAdoo as chairman of the board and Halliburton as president. The airline 
was to be named the Southern Air Fast Express and was to be advertised as the 
"Southern Sky-Lines route" if, and only if, they won the contract.26 
As scheduled, on November 25, 1929, more than two hundred representa-
tives from dozens of communities in the South and Southwest together with 
their members of Congress gathered in Washington before the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Airways. Chairing the session was Postmaster General 
Brown. The only airline representative present was McAdoo. Brown opened 
the proceedings by stating that numerous routes had been suggested over the 
past year and that those in attendance must maintain an open mind about the 
decisions made that day. He emphasized that at present, the South was the 
only region of the country without adequate air mail service, and he felt it his 
duty to address this problem, but in a rational manner without favoritism and 
bound by the limits of congressional appropriations. "It is a matter of small 
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importance whether or not any particular city be located on a direct air mail 
line;' Brown said. "Cities can be supplied feeder lines for a distance of two or 
three hundred miles." As for money, the postmaster general stressed, "We have 
no control over appropriations and cannot pay for any service for which we 
have no. money. The only reservation is that Congress must furnish us the 
money to establish additional air mail lines throughout the country."27 
When his turn came, McAdoo did not disappoint. He formally presented 
his offer to the Post Office to carry the mail and air mail as he had outlined 
earlier, only this time providing even more detail and persuasion. McAdoo left 
the hearings exuberant, firmly believing that he had made a convincing case, 
taking full credit for the success of the event. 
While the committee was deliberating, Halliburton was in Michigan at-
tempting to interest investors, particularly the Detroit Aircraft Corporation, 
the holding company that now controlled Lockheed Aircraft, to join with him 
and McAdoo.28 Merger negotiations were put on hold, however, pending the 
decision of the committee. 
McAdoo was beginning to express some concern about the loyalty of his 
volatile partner. He was growing increasingly wary that, after all of his work in 
seeking a contract for the southern transcontinental line, Halliburton was go-
ing to abandon their partnership, take the contract, and leave Southern Sky-
lines to wither on the vine. McAdoo expressed his worries in a letter to Clagett: 
Halliburton is on the train and I am reviewing the entire situation with 
him, but I don't see any particular light, at the moment, although he feels quite 
confident that he will ultimately get a mail contract since he is actually operat-
ing an airways system. I have reemphasized to him that since we started out to 
do the job together, we must stick together, which says he is going to do, and I 
think he will. Since the idea of the present campaign originated with me and has 
been given great impetus because of my work, it does seem that we ought to get 
some benefit from it, but Halliburton, having the only operation portion of the 
joint system, stands to get everything and my end nothing. This will be the irony 
of fate if it happens because I don't think he would have gotten far, if anywhere, 
for a long time but for our effective work and strategy. 29 
McAdoo's fears were well founded. 
The Post Office released the committee's decision on December 11, the 
same day McAdoo wrote Clagett about Halliburton. After the completion of 
almost a year's worth of work, the Interdepartmental Committee on Airways 
decided that three routes should be pursued in the coming months. All would 
be delayed pending appropriations and the completion of the lighting of the 
airways for night flight by the Department of Commerce. The committee offi-
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cially confirmed that an airway between Louisville and Dallas was approved, a 
line from New York to St. Louis via Philadelphia and Pittsburgh was granted, 
and, most important, the southern transcontinental was authorized from At-
lanta to Los Angeles by way of Birmingham, Jackson, Mississippi, Shreveport, 
Dallas, Fort Worth, El Paso, and San Diego. To McAdoo's dismay, no decision 
was reached on when the contracts would be advertised. A subsequent letter 
from W. Irving Glover drove the point home that Southern Sky-Lines would 
have to wait pending new legislation proposed by the postmaster general. 
McAdoo begrudgingly understood the situation but had faith that he would 
still win the contract, although he was growing increasingly aware of the 
strength of the competition. He expected strong opposition from Clement 
Keys, particularly as his holdings controlled National Air Transport, which 
operated the routes from New York to Chicago and Chicago to Dallas and Fort 
Worth, as well as Eastern Air Transport, which flew from New York to Miami 
through Washington and Atlanta along the eastern seaboard. "If they enter 
into a spirited competition with us for this business;' McAdoo warned, "the 
bids may be so low that nobody can make any money out of it."30 
He also expected pressure from Western Air Express through its recently 
acquired Standard Air Lines division, which operated passenger service from 
Los Angeles to El Paso. "It would be greatly to their advantage;' stated McAdoo, 
"to have a good air mail contract between Los Angeles and El Paso and extend 
it to Dallas and Atlanta." McAdoo was less concerned with United Aircraft and 
Boeing Air Transport as they were occupied in the Northwest and with their 
route from San Francisco to Chicago.31 
The former secretary of the treasury was astute in his predictions of strong 
competition for the southern route. He did not know the extent of the in-
volvement of the Post Office in forging a new, rational transcontinental air-
ways system, however, for within the year, great changes were to be wrought in 
the industry through the iron hand of Walter Brown. 
The legislation that Glover spoke of was to have a profound effect on the 
industry and was the culmination of months of difficult negotiations con-
cerning Brown's determination to bring efficiency and productivity to the air 
mail service through a revision of the rate system of the contract air mail car-
riers. A change in the law was essential if the airlines were to survive, now that 
the boom on Wall Street had just come to an abrupt end. 
The air mail operators waited in nervous anticipation throughout the late 
summer for the postmaster general's new rate revision plan. They had expected 
some action from the Post Office for some time. In a letter to Harold Emmons, 
Col. Louis Brittin ofNorthwestAirways, who had earlier spoken with Superinten-
dent Wadsworth concerning the postal deficit and the air mail rate problems, noted, 
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From my discussion with Mr. Wadsworth, the Department evidently has in 
mind a plan by which the operators will submit a sworn statement of their op-
erations once a year and accept from the Postmaster General a rate that will give 
then a "reasonable return." This of course will require the operators to also in-
clude in their statements their program for new equipment, hangars, machin-
ery, etc. The Department would naturally take all of this into consideration in 
fixing new rates. 
Mr. Wadsworth stated very frankly that whatever the Department did in the 
way of adjusting rates, would be done in such a way as to protect and foster the air 
mail service. As he expresses it, no one "will get hurt." He, however, frankly says 
that the profits earned by Western Air Express and one or two others are entirely 
out of reason and cannot be continued without injuring the entire service.32 
Although many were resistant to change, some understood that the present 
system was flawed and that the responsibility for making profits lay in the 
hands of the operators. "Now, it is true that if the Government would wipe the 
slate clean and start all over again tomorrow, they would do the thing in a 
somewhat different way;' stated Hainer Hinshaw of Universal andAVCO. "They 
admit that. But they are wholly powerless to do this and we simply must make 
the best of what we have because there is no way of changing it. If a line cannot 
make money; if the traffic force cannot sell air mail in the territory the route 
covers and if the operation personnel cannot cut their cost to a point below 
the income, then, it would seem the only thing to do would be to give the Post 
Office sixty days notice and cancel the contract:'33 
The operators realized that the revised law from 1928 allowed the Post 
Office to issue certificates as contract extensions, but that came with a provi-
sion allowing the government to modify the method of payment and the 
amount. Those making the maximum allowed by law were resistant to change; 
others, receiving much less per pound mile, wanted more money but were 
concerned about possible new restrictive provisions. In an editorial, Aviation 
voiced its concern on behalf of the contractors, stating that "any approxima-
tion of fairness among the contractors requires some adjustment in planning 
compensation for a long term of years, for at present absurd differences in the 
scales of payment exist .... The need for reconsideration is clear:'34 
Aviation understood that with the lowering of the air mail postage, the 
Post Office would soon attempt to restore some balance in its bookkeeping to 
overcome the postal air mail deficit. "Complete self-support must be the goal 
at the end of the air mail's road," stated editor Edward P. Warner, "and we must 
move steadily in that direction. The progress toward financial independence 
cannot, however, be pressed too rapidly." Warner supported President Hoover's 
belief that because aviation was in an experimental stage, temporary govern-
ment assistance was appropriate to promote air mail and passenger air travel. 
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It was felt that air transportation would eventually become profitable on its 
own when the industry reached maturity. Warner was most concerned about 
Brown's insistence on a uniform system of accounting. He feared that this 
would lead to direct rate regulation, which "at this early stage of development 
would be paralyzing to initiative and to efficiency" because it restricted earn-
ings. Warner was adamant that the percentage of profit made should have 
nothing to do with relative rates. Those rates should depend upon only three 
factors-the average mail load, the distance that it has to be carried, and the 
inherent difficulties of the route and administrative costs. "It is earnestly hoped;' 
wrote Warner, "that in the rearrangement of rates no penalty will be laid upon 
the contractors whose accounts reveal them already to have obtained an ex-
ceptional degree of economy and efficiency of operation."35 
The new rates were not going to be unilaterally imposed by Brown but 
would be the product of joint meetings between industry and government, 
with the postmaster general setting the guidelines. He was willing to work 
with industry provided they were willing to cooperate in this associative ap-
proach. He did not desire formal rate regulation but did want the government 
to receive a better return on its investment through a change in the payment 
process that would provide greater efficiencies for all involved. 
The Post Office Department announced on September 11, 1929, that rate 
revision discussions were to resume on September 30 to effect reductions in 
the carrying charges paid by the government to the air mail contractors as well 
as adjusting the payment rates on a more sound basis. Operating under the 
authority of the Second Amendment to the Air Mail Act, passed on May 17, 
1928, Brown wanted to open discussion on the contract extension plan, which 
would allow the air mail carriers to exchange their contracts, soon to expire 
(the first on October 7), for ten-year route certificates. The Post Office had 
also spent the summer analyzing the data collected from the questionnaires 
that the contractors had completed. Armed with this information, the depart-
ment was anxious to find an equitable way to reduce its expenditures while 
increasing the effectiveness of the air mail service. 
The problem facing the Post Office Department was considerable. Expen-
ditures for fiscal year 1929 were expected to be $15 million. Unfortunately, the 
appropriation was for only $13.3 million. Brown and Glover had no intention 
of curtailing service; on the contrary, they hoped to expand air mail through-
out the country as witnessed by the recent Interdepartmental Committee on 
Airways hearings. Greater efficiencies were seen as the way to overcome the 
$1.7 million shortfall, and, in fact, Glover was hoping to cut approximately $3 
million from the department's air mail expenditures on the present routes to 
allow for expansion. "Looking at the situation from every standpoint;' stated 
Glover, "there is no idea in the minds of the Post Office Department officials 
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to curtail any of the routes now in operation, but, on the contrary, it is be-
lieved that there will be sufficient money available when the time comes to 
take care of any normal and reasonable expansion of the air mail service 
throughout the country."36 This came as somewhat of a surprise to Superin-
tendent Wadsworth, whose job it was to administer the contracts. According 
to Hinshaw, "He points out that they are three millions of dollars in the red 
and that we all know Postmaster General Brown well enough to know that he 
would not sanction further extensions until there had been some indication 
that could be made up without a great fight." 37 
In advance of the Post Office meetings, the operators formed a committee 
among themselves and met in Washington and Chicago to determine a joint 
course of action. The results were mixed. They could not decide what they 
wanted; they only knew what they did not want. They did agree that a system 
based on weight per mile flown was preferred, but details could not be worked 
out. A straight mileage system was not desired.38 
Each airline was to confer individually as part of the rate revision confer-
ences. According to Hinshaw, some of the rate cuts were going to be dramatic. 
"The Post Office will definitely indicate the rate we are to have on the certifi-
cate;' he stated. "I am rather inclined to believe that the $3.00 boys will get a 50 
percent reduction and Robertson will probably find himself somewhere be-
tween $1.50 and $1.75."39 
Each operator met individually with Second Assistant Postmaster General 
W. Irving Glover and Superintendent Earl B. Wadsworth together with an ac-
countant from the department. All of the contractors brought their financial 
records with them for a detailed, confidential review and analysis.40 At the 
conclusion of the private sessions, Glover called the operators back to discuss 
the matter in a joint session on October 3 and asked that they formulate their 
own rate reduction plan. Despite their best efforts, the operators' committee, 
headed by Colonel Henderson, could not find enough common ground, leav-
ing the hearings deadlockedY 
Harris Hanshue ofWAE and Clifford Ball, two of the so-called "$3.00 boys;' 
were understandably reluctant to relinquish their highly profitable routes, 
whereas Boeing and National Air Transport, which were operating profitably 
on not so generous a payment, realized that a revision would not hurt them 
nearly as much and were more willing to negotiate. 
At the general conference, Walter Brown made it clear to the operators 
that he felt the airlines required no more assistance from the government than 
they were already receiving. An alarmed Mabel Walker Willebrandt, represent-
ing all of the airlines of AVCO, adamantly stressed that she believed it was the 
intention of Congress to provide an indirect subsidy. Brown was more con-
cerned about balancing the department's budget at this point, but a problem 
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raised its head to the consternation of all, for at this juncture, the specter of 
ICC regulation reappeared. 
In Congress, Sen. Sam G. Bratton of New Mexico and Rep. John L. Cable 
of Ohio introduced bills calling for the removal of authority for aviation from 
the Commerce Department and its transfer to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. In essence, Cable proposed exactly what Brown was attempting to do, 
only through an outside agency, the ICC. 
William McAdoo wrote to Senator Bratton to voice his objections, believ-
ing that the bill was unnecessary and cumbersome: "I think that it would be 
easy to seriously impair the development of air commerce through unwise or 
unsatisfactory legislation. I am convinced that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is already overloaded and that it would be a mistake to place this new 
transportation arm under its jurisdiction. While I am strongly opposed to the 
creation of unnecessary independent commissions, I feel that a new commis-
sion is the only way to deal with the subject." Part of the proposal, however, 
seemed good. The restrictions on new entrants through the use of certificates 
of convenience and necessity would allow solid companies to prosper. "The 
present policy of allowing the Postmaster General to lay out mail routes and 
seek competitive bids is having a very unfortunate effect upon the develop-
ment of commercial aviation," McAdoo noted, "because it is throttling many 
excellent companies which must have the opportunity to carry the mails in 
order to sustain themselves."42 
Despite the opposition by the large carriers, who objected to the known 
inefficiency of the ICC and the fear of direct government control limiting their 
profitability, Brice Clagett felt that the powerful airlines might support the 
bills because of their protectionist nature. McAdoo was of two minds con-
cerning the legislation, seeing the benefits of the certificates but also fearing 
that the big companies would take advantage of the law and use it to exclude 
independents.43 
The postmaster general indicated to the gathering that he would support 
neither the Cable nor Bratton bill, but warned the operators that if they did 
not reach an acceptable rate formula, some other agency might do so for them 
in the near future. 44 Lacking the support of the Post Office and meeting suffi-
cient opposition on Capital Hill, both bills died in conference. 
The Post Office was beginning to lose patience. The general meeting on 
October 7 adjourned without reaching a consensus; the operators requesting 
additional information from the Post Office. On October 15, a frustrated de-
partment took the initiative, issuing a new proposal and its own questionnaire 
for the air mail contractors to be answered within the week. Negotiations would 
begin anew during the first week in November. 
In the meantime, Brown was going to approach Congress and seek legisla-
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tion in the forthcoming session to permit the department more leeway in the 
interpretation of the existing law. He wanted the authority to extend the routes 
up to four hundred miles without submitting the action to open competitive 
bidding. This move, intended to streamline the routes, would benefit the ex-
isting carriers and permit the postmaster general greater flexibility in expand-
ing and rationalizing the nation's air route structure. It would give Brown even 
more direct control over the airways while affording greater income to the 
existing carriers, thereby offsetting their expected losses from the coming rate 
reductions.45 To this end Brown had the support of Rep. Clyde Kelly, who was 
willing to introduce the requested legislation on Brown's behalf with the un-
derstanding that some shorter routes would face elimination if extensions were 
not practical.46 
The contractors were puzzled, however, by Brown's public remarks. Al-
though clearly supporting the established air mail carriers, the postmaster gen-
eral sent conflicting signals in his address to the Advertising Club of 
Washington. "The air mail," Brown said, "should be used when speed is of 
such importance as to justify the increased cost, and then only between points 
which are actually served by air transportation." His point was obvious: the 
present state of aviation was such that air mail did not reach into every city at 
this stage, so it was pointless for a customer to pay the extra expense of air mail 
to send a letter that would have to be delivered by conventional methods. "The 
Department does not recommend the promiscuous use of the air mail;' he 
continued, "and does not approve ballyhoo campaigns designed to influence 
the public to make all mailings by plane:'47 
These remarks upset the airlines. "Tex" Marshall of Thompson Aeronau-
tical Corporation, which held the air mail contract from Chicago to Pontiac, 
Michigan, expressed his concern to Henderson after reading an article on 
Brown's address in the Detroit News. Marshall interpreted Brown's remarks as 
not supporting air mail completely and noticed a new unwillingness to coop-
erate on the part of the Post Office in Michigan as a result.48 
The postmaster general was already "sold" on the air mail, but not at any 
cost. He firmly believed in its importance and in the continued need for gov-
ernment assistance until the airlines could survive on their own in the near 
future. He proudly sent President Hoover an editorial from the Boston Herald 
that summarized his speech. "Until the people of the United States become 
more thoroughly convinced of the safety and utility of air transportation for 
themselves;' he told the Herald, "it is the duty of the government to continue 
its support:' More important, he stressed his belief of the future shape of air 
transportation in America. Together with the continuing regulation of safety 
and the technical control of aviation by the Department of Commerce, Brown's 
plan for air mail favored the concentration of federal efforts "on a few natural 
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transportation routes which have been travelled by ox team, pony express, 
railroad, automobile, and airplane."49 
The debate over the new rate system was causing consternation on Wall 
Street. In late September and early October all the aviation stocks were taking 
a beating as investors were anxious to sell off and take their profit before the 
new rates came into effect and lessened the perceived value of the air mail 
carriers. An agreement was urgently required to bolster sagging stock values 
by restoring order to the industry and untangling the rate conundrum. As 
expected, the hearings resumed in November, but with little progress because 
no one could agree on a suitable yardstick to measure costs. Other arguments 
ensued over the new question of rate "variables;' which were offered as a slid-
ing scale of bonuses for flying in difficult weather, at night, over dangerous 
terrain, and with certain types of aircraft. 50 
With the threat of expiring contracts looming in the background, Brown 
decided he would indeed impose his own order on the system. Fortunately, 
under law, the postmaster general had the right to extend contracts for up to 
six months, which Brown chose to do when the first contract, that of Colonial 
along CAM-1, expired on November 6. 
To Brown it had become increasingly apparent that more drastic changes 
were necessary to affect the program he desired and that this required new 
legislation. He felt that the current air mail act did not give him enough power 
to exercise the needed revisions and implement the radical alterations that 
would make the air mail system more efficient and eventually a profitable means 
of public transportation. 51 
While Brown wrestled with the nagging rate revision problem, the arena 
shifted to the White House, where representatives of the industry asked to 
meet with the president to discuss the general situation of aviation. Every year, 
President Hoover called in representatives of the Aeronautical Chamber of 
Commerce for a report on the industry to aid in his annual message to Con-
gress. This year, with the rate revision matter still up in the air and the collapse 
of the stock market present in everyone's mind, the presentation took on a 
new sense of urgency as the operators met in Washington. They assembled at 
the request of Julius Barnes, who, on orders from the president, initiated a 
series of conferences of all the major industries to decide upon a course of 
action to deal with the market crisis. 
To prepare for the presidential meeting, the members of the ACC sat down 
with Clarence Young, the new assistant secretary of commerce for aeronautics, 
together with the industry's legal representatives and lobbyists. They engaged 
in a heated exchange over the rate revision situation, the postmaster general, 
and the state of the industry. An ad hoc committee that included Frederick 
Rentschler, Clement Keys, and Paul Henderson drafted a memorandum for 
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the president critical of the postmaster general's handling of the air mail situ-
ation and pressing him to take immediate action. Hainer Hinshaw and Will-
iam "Doc" Bishop of Western Air Express took vocal exception to the idea of 
openly criticizing Brown, as their two companies held fourteen of the twenty-
four outstanding air mail contracts and had the most to lose from angering 
the Post Office. 
At a breakfast in the Carlton Hotel, the issue came to a boil as Henderson 
desperately tried to force Brown's hand to grant a contract to his financially 
ailing Transcontinental Air Transport. Bishop, a new arrival in Washington 
and not one to mince his words, reported: 
You know that Henderson is about out on his can. He has only one chance 
and that is to get these mail contracts and I don't think he has much time to do 
it in. At this breakfast Keys openly ignored his suggestions, vigorously contra-
dicted him and then Keys finally left the room. 
Immediately he started in talking about the mail contracts. Keys had gone. 
He said the only way we were going to get anywhere was to go to the Postmaster 
General and tell him that we had been trying for months to work this thing out 
between ourselves and that we had failed. Therefore, as a body we had decided 
to come to him, tell him to decide what he wanted and to call us in and tell us 
what we could have. These suggestions met with some approval, especially from 
Rentschler, Bell, ... and Halliburton. 
Hainer and I kept still .... Following the meeting with the President, Hainer, 
Mr. Grosvenor and myself went into a huddle and determined immediately that 
to allow Henderson to get away with that idea might be fatal . 
. . . Not being able to reach you by phone to advise you of the move to force 
the contracts[,] ... I called Mr. Hanshue. He said substantially as follows: 
'You tell them that when we left Washington it was with the under-
standing with the Postmaster General that he would call us back to 
Washington when he was ready to talk business with us and that 
until he does call us back we are not interested and will not be a 
party to any move to force him to take steps he is not ready to take: 
Hainer called Mr. Brown's office after we had all determined upon our course 
and tipped Mac [William MacCracken, who now represented Western] off to 
what was coming. Brown immediately decided he had to attend a funeral some-
where in Ohio Friday ... so that ended Mr. Henderson's swell idea. 52 
Later during an afternoon conference with Assistant Secretary Clarence 
Young, the question of a petition to the president outlining the dire condition 
of the industry was again brought forward and almost passed, but Bishop, 
Hinshaw, and Colonel Brittin of Northwest quashed it once more. Hinshaw 
related the events to Gilbert Grosvenor: 
The Post Office Takes Charge 103 
The meeting was called for 4:40 instead of 4 o'clock. This allowed Bishop 
and myself to have a few words with Clarence Young. Young indicated to us that 
it was against his wishes for the memorandum to be presented but that if it was 
the sense of the meeting he would present it to Mr. Lamont [the Secretary of 
Commerce]. Of course we could not indicate this to the rest of the meeting. 
Fortunately the memorandum contained what Bishop, Col. Brittin and myself 
thought was a severe rebuff to the Postmaster General. ... Bishop made a vigor-
ous fight on this point and Brittin and I supported him. We had the paragraph 
completely eliminated. 53 
"Making a long story short;' Bishop concluded in his report to Wooley, "the 
argument continued for a half hour, with Hainer supporting me and Henderson 
leaving the room so damn mad he didn't dare stay for the finish. We stopped 
the whole thing."54 
Henderson was persistent, however. He and Clement Keys had earlier made 
an appointment for December 12 at 11:30 A.M. to meet with the president to 
express their views on the aviation situation. 55 Henderson, with his old con-
nections, knew Hoover's aide Walter Newton well and thanked him for "lis-
tening to my tale of woe:'56 At 11:30 A.M. on the appointed day, Hoover received 
the gentlemen from TAT and their personal report on the declining condition 
of aviation in the country. Keys reiterated his publicly stated belief that the 
present crisis in the stock market was just a seasonal lull and that the economy 
would rebound by spring. Henderson pointed out the difficulties the airlines 
were having developing a new rate system. He was moderate in his opinions, 
stating that such a delay was perhaps to be expected because it took several 
decades to work out a rate plan for the railroads. 57 Hainer Hinshaw, not know-
ing that Henderson had modified his views, at least for the moment, reacted 
strongly when he learned of the meeting, telephoning the White House di-
rectly and expressing his opinion that the two were not speaking for the 
industry. 58 
Bishop and Hinshaw were correct in their approach. The postmaster gen-
eral was not one who took criticism lightly, and he would have been greatly 
offended if he had learned that any of the operators had gone over his head 
and criticized him to the president. Bishop and Hinshaw confirmed this when 
they spoke to Kenneth McPherson, Brown's personal secretary, following an 
attempt on December 10 by Henderson and others to speak privately with the 
postmaster general: 
When Hainer and I got together, we called McPherson, who advised us not 
to allow any of them to press the Postmaster General or do anything to make it 
appear that we are not satisfied with the way he has been doing things. 
When we got down there Henderson and Bing Seymour were the only ones 
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there. Halliburton had been told by Henderson and Colonel Brittin too, that 
there would be no meeting held. When we walked in he just about turned those 
pyles he's crying about inside out. 
In about five minutes he was ready to call the meeting off, which was done 
and he left the building. MacPherson called Hainer and told him that every-
thing turned out fine. According to the dope, the Postmaster General is going to 
have something to offer in about a week. He also let it be known that he appre-
ciates the attitude Hainer and I have assumed. 59 
While at the department, Bishop ran into Erle Halliburton, who had be-
come a virtual denizen of the Post Office building that fall following his joint 
presentation with partner William McAdoo to the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee on Airways. When pressed, Halliburton revealed to Hinshaw he had 
spoken with Brown and learned that the postmaster general was leaning to-
ward proposing a space-based method of payment similar to that used by the 
railroads during World War I. This method would ensure an equitable distri-
bution of payments based on the space available on the aircraft, not on just the 
weight of the mail load. Thus airlines with thin routes would receive as much 
revenue as those airlines carrying much greater loads over a heavy route .of the 
same length. A good lobbyist, Bishop knew how to extract information from 
Halliburton: 
Got him stiff last night and he told me of having been in a two-hour con-
ference with Brown that afternoon. He claimed that Brown told him he wanted 
to put the operators on a space basis with a minimum guarantee. 
I told Wadsworth this when I saw him today and Earl said he's crazy. Have 
it doped out that Halliburton told Brown he thought the space idea was the best 
and after taking a lot of the PMG's time to convince him of the merits of it-the 
PMG then told him he thought he [Halliburton] had a swell idea.60 
In the meantime, Erle Halliburton was actively campaigning for a con-
tract to the point of irritating Brown and the department. "The damn fool is 
talking himself out of Washington;' Bishop declared.61 
Halliburton, like many of the independents operating without a mail con-
tract, thought he could make money carrying passengers alone but soon real-
ized his error. Without a mail contract, given the existing state of aeronautics, 
no airline could make money with the current generation of inefficient air-
craft. Transcontinental Air Transport's grandiose air-rail experiment was hem-
orrhaging money, as was Halliburton's SAFE Way, despite the companies' 
excellent organization and preparation. Henderson was in Washington repre-
senting NAT, which had contracts, but also TAT, which did not, and desper-
ately needed help. Halliburton, in his blunt way, stormed into D.C. and 
pressured anyone he could for a contract. Whether working with McAdoo or 
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working alone, Halliburton would stop at nothing to snare a contract. He was 
even threatening Western Air Express with the establishment of competing 
service along their Los Angeles-Kansas City route, though Bishop was not 
very concerned. "[I] can't imagine him doing much damage with his Fords 
across that run:' he said, "in spite of the fact that he claims he has netted 40 
cents a flying mile and that his cost has only been 72 cents."62 
Halliburton was getting desperate for a contract during the meetings in 
Washington, pressuring the other operators for support as well as pounding 
the halls of the Post Office. The ever-observant Bishop noted his competitor's 
tactics and underscored the cutthroat competition between the airlines: 
Halliburton was crying like a stuck hog because he couldn't get any sympa-
thy for his line. He and Henderson had a nice battle, but the latter elected to 
ignore him as well as did everybody else. 
Halliburton nailed me in the lobby of the Carlton and threatened to raise 
hell unless the committee took some action on changing the mail situation so 
he could live. I filled him full of crap about having heard he was sitting pretty to 
get a big hunk of the southern route just to find out how well he did stand on it. 
That was funny. He hit the ceiling. "Hell;' he said, "you're crazy. They're 
playing around with this thing so we never will get it." He sure convinced me 
that he thinks he is in a bad way as far as that deal is concerned and I've got an 
idea of making it no better fast. 
Hainer, Grosvenor, and I got together again and decided that this memo-
randum should contain only a general constructive mention of air mail and 
that any attempt by Halliburton should be blocked if he wanted to try to force 
the issue between the operators and the PMG. But he was playing a lone hand.63 
Western Air Express and AVCO were interested in securing all or part of 
the southern transcontinental line offered by the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee on Airways and thought they had an inside track. Halliburton was lobby-
ing actively because he sensed that the department did not take the Southern 
Sky Lines proposal seriously. "McAdoo is clear out of the picture as far as 
Wadsworth is concerned;' stated Bishop. "He is down on them."64 
The operators expected a decision from the postmaster general within a 
few days, but nothing was heard. Brown finally spoke in January, and when he 
did, all took notice. 
Chapter 7 
The Watres Act 
T A ,7hile the operators anxiously awaited Postmaster General Brown's deci-
Y Y sion on the new rate plan, troubles were mounting in the airline indus-
try. Aviation stocks in particular were taking a beating. By the end of 1929 the 
drop was catastrophic. North American Aviation fell from a high of 19 3/4 to a 
low of only 4. Its two major airlines, National Air Transport and Transconti-
nental Air Transport, fell from 48 1/4 to 10, and 33 5/8 to 6, respectively. The 
Aviation Corporation dropped from 20 to 4 1/2, and profitable Western Air 
Express sank from 78 1/4 to 15. Even solid United Aircraft was hard hit, falling 
from an astounding 162 to 31 of its common stock and 109 1/2 to 44 7/8 of its 
preferred.' Were it not for the fact that the industry had raised a large capital 
pool through stock sales rather than debt financing, the aviation industry could 
have failed entirely. 
As it was, the companies managed to struggle on, buoyed only by their 
dwindling cash reserves. Most of the airlines, with the enviable exception of 
those of United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, were losing money at 
prodigious rates. National Air Transport, Western Air Express, and Clifford 
Ball managed to make money during the last months of 1929. None of the 
independents did. Transcontinental Air Transport reported a net deficit of 
$986,591 from July 8, when it opened service, until December 31, 1929. Of this 
total, TAT lost $746,519, and its new acquisition, Maddux Air Lines, lost 
$240,072. The actual loss was much greater. Transcontinental offset the deficit 
by adding miscellaneous income: the actual total operating losses for TAT-
Maddux was an astounding $1,291,679.2 The Aviation Corporation fared no 
better, and it had the majority of air mail contracts to offset its costs. Primarily 
an airline holding company, AVCO reported a net loss of $1,443,822 for 1929, 
most of which was attributed to losses in air transportation.3 From July to 
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December,AVCO's losses averaged almost $300,000 per month-$10,000 per 
day-totaling a gross deficit of $1,795,600, with nothing done by manage-
ment to stem the bleeding.4 
After Black Thursday and Black Tuesday struck in late October, industry 
analysts turned to Clement Keys for his opinion of the recent events. Keys, a 
longtime player on Wall Street, saw the collapse only as a seasonal decline and 
a necessary readjustment in reaction to the perceived inflated values of all stocks 
that had occurred over the last two years. "After a very complete study of all 
phases of aviation, I have no hesitation in stating that the reaction in the trade 
is grossly exaggerated in the public mind," Keys told the Wall Street Journal. 
"Most of it is, in fact, a reaction from the hysterical estimates of a silly boom, 
which played no part in the plans or policies of the old companies in the busi-
ness." Keys felt that the market shakeup was, on the contrary, beneficial. "In all 
branches of the trade there is a wholesome, but widespread, cleaning up of 
loose ends;' he continued. "Dozens of little transport concerns that started in 
the boom because they could get easy money, and have operated planes at 
from half to three-quarters the true cost of operation, are going out of busi-
ness for lack of new capital to pay operating expenses. Flying a big tri-motor 
plane at five or six cents a passenger mile may be fun while it lasts, but it won't 
last long." For Keys, this was a necessary and welcome reaction that would 
benefit the solid companies and remove the harmful speculators and below-
cost operators.5 
By December, Keys was beginning to comprehend the depth of the widen-
ing crisis, stating that the results of the manufacturers and, especially, the com-
mercial airlines were "seriously disappointing;' compounded by the problem 
in the negotiation for the air mail rate readjustments. The airlines were par-
ticularly vulnerable, he noted, as "the passenger business is still in the pioneer-
ing stage which requires a lot of courage, hard work, and patience."6 In his 
opinion, the passenger business was in trouble because the traveling public 
was not educated enough to understand its great advantages, but, more im-
portant, costs were not being matched by revenue. According to Keys, "The 
tremendously rapid growth of passenger facilities brought about an unsound 
rate structure-in other words, that the service is being furnished at less than 
cost."7 The problem of fare structures was only getting worse, however, as pas-
senger traffic as well as mail poundage was decreasing, not increasing. 
It was widely known and accepted that the independent airlines had expe-
rienced financial difficulties for some time. Despite charging fares well above 
the cost of first -class Pullman rates offered by the railroads, the passenger car-
riers could not cover their operating costs, much less make a profit. Now with 
the collapse of the stock market and the general precipitous decline of the 
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economy, other airlines were beginning to feel pressure and were forced to cut 
their fares drastically to stimulate traffic in a losing battle to stay in business. 
Transcontinental Air Transport made the most important of the fare cuts. 
Despite Keys's earlier correct assertion that the airlines could not make a profit 
at the current high ticket prices, TAT lowered its rates in late November by 25 
percent, cutting the cost of a transcontinental ticket from $338 to $267. West-
ern Air Express and Universal followed suit in the hope of increasing traffic 
during the slow winter months. 8 The editors of Air Transportation trumpeted 
the change as great news for the industry and the consumer. ''As the traffic 
builds, the operating and overhead costs per passenger will decrease;' they 
stated, "and soon profits will begin to come as a result of the lowered fares." 
Transcontinental's reputation as a well-financed and well-organized opera-
tion led Air Transportation to the incorrect conclusion that this was a studied 
move, not one bred from desperation.9 
Desperation, however, was the driving force. Ridership increased while 
losses mounted. By the beginning of the new year, Keys was willing to try any-
thing to increase traffic and profits even at the risk of destructive competi-
tion.10 His solution was another fare cut, this time to as low as the "wild-cat 
speculator's" 5 cents per mile fare structure. Transcontinental dropped its prices 
an additional $107.51 to a mere $159.62, less than half of its original fare and 
now below the cost of a first -class train ticket with a Pullman surcharge _II 
Further, TAT instituted a cost -cutting policy consolidating its national offices 
in Los Angeles and moving its eastern offices from St. Louis to Columbus, 
Ohio, and the Pennsylvania Railroad increased its influence, placing its vice 
president in charge of traffic, Daniel M. Shaeffer, on the TAT Board as chair-
man of the executive committee. Other executives were let go and not replaced.12 
Even Western Air Express, which operated the very profitable mail route 
from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City, lowered its fares and consolidated its orga-
nization. Between Los Angeles and Kansas City, Western dropped its fares to 
$120 to compete with TAT, despite the fact that the corporation reported a net 
profit for 1929 of$1,087,852, 80 percent of which came from mail contracts. 13 
In the meantime, Harris Hanshue acquired the Aero Corporation of Califor-
nia on a one-for-twelve stock swap. 14 The deal netted Western control over 
Standard Air Lines, which operated a route from Los Angeles to El Paso, and 
thus positioned WAE well for the expected request for bids from the Post Of-
fice for one of the two transcontinental routes. 
The Aviation Corporation was in the deepest trouble. The officers' valiant 
attempts to bolster the value of its stock had failed even before the market 
collapsed. Now, they were in desperate straits. This huge corporation, orga-
nized by some of the finest financial minds on Wall Street but overladen with 
sixty directors and a plethora of executives, was in danger of total collapse. For 
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AVCO, all depended on the outcome of the rate revision negotiations. The cor-
poration anxiously supported the idea for a space payment as its haphazard 
routes were generally sparsely traveled with light mail loads. Of all the compa-
nies, it was in the most urgent need for reorganization to stave off extinction. 
By late 1929 a small-scale revolt was brewing from within the ranks, mani-
fested in pointed complaints to top management. Director J. Gates Williams 
of Francis, Brother and Company, a St. Louis securities firm, decried the poor 
performance of AVCO's stock and the bad morale within the company, plac-
ing the responsibility clearly upon leadership problems. "The collapse and 
shrinkage in the value of the stock of The Aviation Corporation, dominating 
the industry as it did at its inception;' stated Williams, "can be chiefly credited 
to the fact of mismanagement." Williams analyzed the company and recom-
mended that AVCO reorganize and replace the financial experts running the 
company with men with operations experience. The corporation was attempt-
ing to control its entire empire from New York with managers who had little 
practical experience. The results were chaotic. Williams reiterated that he and 
other investors had understood that AVCO was to be strictly a holding com-
pany to invest in aviation securities and acquire solid companies in an effort to 
effect economies of scale through efficient, well-coordinated operations. It was 
with this belief that he and others had agreed to invest and now were seeing 
their money wasted because of poor management. 15 
Williams recommended splitting the corporation into four divisions, sepa-
rating the manufacturing companies from the airlines, with aviation schools 
and sales also separate. He felt strongly that each division should have an au-
tonomous head, each directly responsible only to the president, rather than 
the current centralized control under Graham Grosvenor. Each division should 
be led by someone "thoroughly competent and experienced and charged with 
the full responsibility and accountability and with sufficient authority to ac-
cept that responsibility. The only man capable of such a charge is a man who 
has had experience in transport operation." An angry Williams pulled no 
punches: "In view of the time elapsed since its formation, it is inconceivable 
that so little has been accomplished in the way of coordination and that so few 
economies obvious to the least experienced have been effected:' 16 
High overhead costs were crippling the company, and the need to hus-
band vanishing resources was vitally necessary if AVCO were to survive. "I do 
know that the New York payroll is terrific, and it might be advisable for you to 
look into the matter;' Williams stated. ''As I said at the last meeting, it was 
absolutely necessary for this company to conserve all its cash. I understand 
that they are starting to cut down and revise all their budgets in their various 
subsidiary companies. It is my feeling that the interest on the twenty odd mil-
lion the company has in cash or securities should carry the complete over-
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head, not only the losses in the operating unit, but also the overhead of the 
office in New York." 17 
Williams urged that Harriman seek out the advice of A.P. Barrett of their 
Southern Air Transport subsidiary, who possessed the knowledge and ability 
to operate an airline profitably. The necessity for this recommendation under-
scored the friction between the eastern and southern operations of AVCO's 
airlines. The coordination between the two sections was poor, and generally 
only the southern operations were sufficiently well run to turn a profit. 
Harriman, unfortunately, held a narrow view, possessing no practical avia-
tion expertise and concerned only with the immediate problems of mollifying 
stockholders in the short run while ignoring long-term problems and solu-
tions. This attitude was no more clearly evident than in his reaction to reason-
able suggestions forwarded by George Hann for improvements in AVCO. Hann 
wrote AVCO president Graham Grosvenor, stressing how important it was for 
AVCO to expand its research and development planning in order to produce 
aircraft of sufficient efficiency to operate profitably. It was the only way the 
company could weather the financial storm that was upon it and remain pre-
pared for the future. "I believe that we have been quite correct in cutting down 
on our passenger operations," stated Hann, "and these should be built up again 
only as they may prove economically worthwhile. Meanwhile we should de-
vote the great majority of our attention to solving the problems of better plane 
construction:' Hann further noted that "a few million dollars spent along proper 
lines, such as the development of more perfect flying apparatus with better 
visibility, slower landings, larger payloads, ... will mean much more to The 
Aviation Corporation's future than would the same amount of money expended 
in trying to force air transportation upon a public which must be gradually 
educated .... Times have changed and I believe that our policy should also be 
changed:' 18 
This logical and farsighted approach the myopic Harriman decried as "the 
ravings of a wild man." He was appalled that Hann would suggest risking the 
company's money on unproven research and development projects. "He sug-
gests spending a few million in development of aviation equipment for the 
benefit of the industry and all concerned;' Harriman remarked, "except the 
stockholders of the Aviation Corporation." Grosvenor's reply was equally vi-
sionary: "I consider this real piffle-and dangerous." 19 
The Aviation Corporation's management was not totally oblivious to the 
growing crisis. Lehman Brothers hired Frederick G. Coburn of the engineer-
ing consulting firm of Sanderson and Porter to analyze the company and make 
their own recommendations. Coburn agreed with Hann that the time had 
come to promote research and development, but, more important, it was time 
AVCO decide on its future policy. "The Aviation Corporation has done a good 
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bit of floundering;' stated Coburn, "and I think a number of false starts have 
been made. It is getting better all the while." Changes were underway in im-
proving accounting and in streamlining the management of Fairchild and the 
airline holdings. Coburn aptly described AVCO as "a big corporation with a 
big opportunity, but with corresponding big responsibilities and perils; and I 
am strongly of the opinion that its management should have policies and pro-
grams and some information as to what it owns and what are the earning 
power prospects thereof."20 
Coburn wanted the executive committee to decide whether AVCO was to 
be an investment company, as originally intended by some, or a holding and 
operating company (especially with regard to air transportation), or a combi-
nation of the two.zt Unfortunately, no decision was forthcoming. Grosvenor 
had forwarded Hann's letter to Coburn expecting a sympathetic reply con-
cerning aircraft development. Much to his surprise, Coburn supported Hann's 
approach and wanted to keep funding aircraft development, including Virginius 
Clark's Superplane project.22 
The founder of AVCO, Sherman Fairchild, was also frustrated with the 
lack of progress in aircraft development and was deeply concerned about the 
fate of the company's airline holdings, quickly becoming the corporation's most 
vocal critic. To him changes were essential or AVCO would be forced to make 
some painful choices. He echoed to a large degree the criticism of Williams 
and suggested that the company be divided into more manageable sections: 
transportation, investment, and manufacture. Of this, transportation was the 
most important and the most troublesome. To Fairchild, in turn, the trans-
portation question could be divided into five parts: passenger transportation, 
air mail, air express and air freight, schools, and airports. And of this, the two 
most important issues were air mail and passenger transportation. 
Air mail, in his view, was the only salvation for the industry and for AVCO's 
woes. With this government support, Fairchild felt that the airlines could gain 
practical experience that eventually could be applied to passenger carrying. "I 
recommend;' concluded Fairchild, "that we continue our air mail, that we get 
the best brains available working on possibilities of reducing the cost, possi-
bilities of better operation through a study of blind flying and through the 
medium of air mail we establish our airport contacts which will be available if 
air passenger transportation is solved within the next five years."23 
Fairchild was one of the few within AVCO to state openly that carrying 
passengers without subsidy was not possible given the current state of aero-
nautics. With passenger load factors averaging less than 50 percent, it was not 
possible to carry passengers for less than eighteen to twenty-five cents per mile. 
Despite expected increases in efficiencies in the next few years, Fairchild did 
not see the costs dropping to a point where passenger fares or reliability and 
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safety of service could be competitive with the railroads. "My recommenda-
tion, with regard to air passenger lines:' he threatened, "is, therefore, to cut 
them all out." Fairchild concluded that "the only possible hope is government 
subsidy and I feel that that will be brought about more quickly if we cut out 
our passenger lines than if we run them."24 
Without help, the elimination of passenger service was a very real possi-
bility, and one that the postmaster general wished to avoid. Planned changes 
in AVCO's air transportation following the investigation and recommenda-
tions of new AVCO president James Hamilton were expected to cut their losses 
dramatically but not entirely. The pending decision by the Post Office Depart-
ment would alone determine AVCO's future course in air transportation. With-
out a federal subsidy, the company would be forced to shut down its passenger 
service completely to cut its mounting losses.25 
The Aviation Corporation deferred this drastic step pending the outcome 
of a general reorganization and other cost -cutting measures. George Hann 
emphatically stressed the need for greater decentralization of the corporation, 
and by January 1930, management began to take his suggestions seriously. 
The executive committee decided to follow the suggestions of Williams, 
Fairchild, and Hann and separate AVCO's air transportation holdings from its 
other interests, combining the management of these numerous small airlines 
under an umbrella organization devoted strictly to managing air transporta-
tion. The new company would have a small board of directors composed only 
of Harriman, Lehman, Grosvenor, Hann, Hamilton, Bane, and Loucks. All of 
AVCO's airlines would be joined together under a single management, although 
the original companies would remain in existence on paper as they held the 
air mail contracts, which by law could not be transferred.26 Under the central 
headquarters, run by president James Hamilton and assisted by Tom Hardin, 
the airlines would be formed into three operating divisions: Colonial, based in 
New York; Universal, with offices in St. Louis; and Southern. Graham Grosvenor 
suggested that they name the new airline Universal Air Ways.27 The executive 
committee, however, decided to choose a new name reflecting the national 
scope of the airline: American Airways. 
The sudden market crash revealed glaring problems in the airline indus-
try, even with the well-financed holding companies such as North American 
and AVCO. Following the October economic debacle, Postmaster General 
Brown became increasingly aware of the need for active governmental inter-
vention to save not only the air mail carriers but also the entire air transporta-
tion industry. He saw a pressing need for a rational and equitable method of 
air mail payments designed to promote every aspect of the industry and in-
tended to foster its growth-for both the short-term results of air mail deliv-
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ery and the long-term encouragement of air transportation as a viable means 
of passenger travel. For Brown, the former Bull Moose Progressive, the best 
way to promote this infant industry was through the support of those enter-
prises best suited financially and organizationally to fulfill his desire to de-
velop a national transportation network operating in the public interest under 
the control of the government. In so doing, Brown hoped to avoid the chaos of 
ruthless competition that hampered the railroad industry during the nine-
teenth century. Large oligopolies, dependent upon the government, would do 
the people's bidding in a manner exactly as the New Nationalist Walter Brown 
would expect. 
The Aviation Corporation's representative, Hainer Hinshaw, worked ac-
tively with the postmaster general, as did other industry representatives, to 
hammer out a new rate plan. By early January the plan was beginning to take 
shape, and Hinshaw reported that Brown was leaning heavily toward a space 
system of payment, which had been rumored earlier. Writing to Colonel Brittin 
of Northwest Airways (in whose company AVCO held a 22 1/2 percent inter-
est), Hinshaw reported that Brown was actively seeking this method as a way 
to place mail on the passenger carriers and thereby save those struggling air-
lines. "Confidentially;' Hinshaw stated, "Mr. Brown is striving to work out some 
sort of basis for buying space in a ship that is a passenger ship in order that it 
will help the passenger lines and naturally if he does this, it will effect the rates 
on the regular air mail lines .... He stated he was willing to spend from seven 
to ten million dollars a year for mail on passenger ships in order that passen-
ger transportation may become definitely established." Hinshaw even 
complimented himself and his fellow lobbyists on their successful efforts. "From 
this statement you can see that he is being carefully educated;' he wrote.28 
Hinshaw was in fact one of Brown's teachers. He revealed that he had spoken 
with Brown and other department officials on numerous occasions and helped 
form the postmaster general's plans. 
At long last, on January 14, 1930, Walter Brown revealed how much he 
had indeed learned. Before a gathering of the Cleveland Chamber of Com-
merce, Brown set forth his proposal for the overhaul of the nation's air trans-
portation system in an address entitled "Commercial Aviation and the Air Mail:' 
Problems began to emerge, Brown stated, when the enthusiasm of aviation 
advocates was not matched by that of the traveling public. Although millions 
of dollars were poured into the industry, millions of passengers did not mate-
rialize. "Aircraft factories sprang up all over the country and air passengers line 
inaugurated flying services east and west, north and south;' said Brown. "Many 
of these lines were planned and equipped in accord with the best practice of the 
flying art; others were less well considered. With a paying load of only 16 to 40 
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percent of capacity, all closed the year with operating deficits so great that the 
very life of the passenger transport industry today is in the balance." 
Brown blamed the well-intentioned organizers for the problem. "The men 
who were most ambitious for the industry and who with infinite pains planned 
the longer passenger routes:' he said, "perhaps forgot their own experiences in 
the air, perhaps forgot that children creep before they walk, that they toddle 
from chair to chair before they engage in marathon races." The public was 
simply not ready to fly in sufficient numbers to justify the expense of air travel. 
Air mail payments were unbalanced, allowing some lines to profit greatly 
and others to starve. Because of the strict rules of the Second Amendment to 
the Air Mail Act of 1925, the government was prevented from addressing the 
inequities and affording relief to struggling contractors, despite their pioneer-
ing efforts on the public's behalf. The severe economic problems in the indus-
try required rectification or all of the money invested by the government and 
private capital would be lost. 
Brown offered a solution. As expected, he recommended that the weight-
based method or payment be abandoned in favor of a new space-based system: 
The system of paying by the pound is manifestly unsound. Such a system 
compels the contractor to gamble on the volume of mail he will carry and cre-
ates an inducement for him to swell his volume by unethical practices. He is 
obliged to make his flight whether the Post Office Department furnishes him 
one pound or a thousand pounds of mail and he should therefore be paid a just 
compensation for his readiness to serve, as well on his service performed. 
The Post Office Department recommends that the Act of June 3, 1926, as 
amended May 17, 1928, be amended so as to authorize the Postmaster General 
to contract for the transportation mail by aircraft between such points as he 
may designate at fixed rates per mile for definite weight spaces. 
Carriers, Brown said, should receive incentive bonuses for hazardous fly-
ing-at night, over mountains, or in foggy conditions-and greatly increase 
mail service to the public by placing mail on passenger aircraft. ''At the same 
time:' Brown continued, "it would enable the Post Office Department to give 
immediate assistance to air passenger carriers on such routes that were deemed 
essential, by paying for carrying the mails a substantial sum, based upon a 
definite weight space preempted." 
Most controversially, Brown also recommended that he be given author-
ity to extend the existing contracts to a maximum period of ten years from the 
date of the original award, thus preserving continuity but also excluding new 
entrant carriers. He also wanted to ensure that only well-financed companies 
participated, thereby giving preference to the established lines belonging to 
the holding companies. His New Nationalism perspective regarding monopoly 
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was clear. "With the passenger lines, as with the exclusively mail lines," Brown 
concluded, "preference if possible in the awarding of contract should be given 
to pioneers in the air transport industry of good character and financial 
responsibility."29 
Second Assistant Postmaster General W. Irving Glover concurred with 
Brown's remarks, stating that if implemented, the new plan would establish 
the air mail system and the passenger lines on a solid foundation and would 
go far in reviving the industry. "Legislation will of course be needed to carry 
out successfully the plans which the Postmaster General has in mind," stated 
Glover, "and I am sure that the Congress, which has been ever ready to lend a 
helping hand to this new industry which has very quickly taken its place along-
side some of its older brothers, will not fail in this instance to give its aid to the 
fullest extent and quickly too." Glover added, "The increase in cost to the Post 
Office Department will be but a few million dollars over the present estimated 
Budget figures and, when one thinks what this additional amount of money 
means to the industry in general, no one with the interest of the industry at 
heart will refuse to assist and get behind this most progressive and life-giving 
plan to the Commercial Aviation Industry of the country."30 
Word of Brown's speech spread rapidly throughout the industry. Colonel 
Brittin wired Hainer Hinshaw from Minneapolis to ascertain the specifics of 
the remarks and to determine the expected effect on the airlines. Brittin was 
particularly interested in the postmaster general's position about placing mail 
on passenger ships, new entrants, and competitive bidding. Brittin, as with the 
other air mail contractors, wanted to extend his routes without fear of cut-
throat competition and was concerned about the effect of this proposed legis-
lation on the creation of competing routes. Hinshaw calmed Brittin's nerves. 
The department had no intention of taking seriously any bid to carry mail 
from any upstart airline that would spring into being as a result of Brown's 
address. "I pointed out to Brown that a number of mushroom lines will prob-
ably spring up;' warned Hinshaw, "and he insisted he would deal only with those 
established pioneers who were still financially and physically able to operate." 
Most important, Hinshaw wrote, "he will do nothing towards giving lines that 
may be established this week or next week-but rather he will extend and re-
align the present existing lines in the territories which they now serve:'31 
No better statement could be made concerning Brown's Progressive ap-
proach to the problems of the industry. Unsound companies would not be 
given routes, and those airlines that pioneered their service would not face 
unfair competition. The well-financed lines, held by the responsible holding 
companies, were clearly in a superior economic position to provide the public 
with the service it needed and expected. Commenting further on Brown's ideas, 
Hinshaw stated, "I will reiterate that the present air mail contractors will be 
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enabled to enlarge and extend their lines without competitive bids and will be 
given preference and protected from competition" (1). In effect, the proposed 
air mail legislation would enable the postmaster general to act as a regulatory 
agency acting in the public interest by restricting competition. 
Brown did, in fact, wish to protect solid, independent passengers lines as 
well as the passenger service provided by the holding companies. By this time, 
most of the little independents had either expired or joined one of the three 
combines. Some, such as Erle Halliburton's SAFE Way, were adequately financed 
and managed but were in deep trouble. Stout, Standard, and TAT were all strug-
gling passenger-carrying lines owned by the holding companies. As for put-
ting mail on TAT, Halliburton, Standard, and Stout, Hinshaw stated that Brown 
"will put mail on these ships but he will not go over 100 or 200 pounds" and 
hoped to put first -class and other mail on these lines, rather than just air mail. 
"He intends to keep the actual mail lines the same highly specialized type of 
transportation of this special mail service;' Hinshaw declared. "That is, he does 
not intend to disturb air mail" ( 1). 
Far from employing the dictatorial methods he was later accused of using, 
Brown sought the advice of industry in the formation of the actual legislation. 
"I have talked with Mr. Brown, Mr. Glover, and Mr. Wadsworth several times 
about this whole thing;' stated Hinshaw. "As a matter of fact, Mr. Brown per-
mitted me to read his speech a week before he delivered it and we had two 
discussions on the matter. I believe their intentions are good and I will state 
further, for your own confidential information, that this proposal is a balloon 
in order that he can get some definite reaction from the operators and the 
public" (2). 
Brown was also an astute politician who sought to co-opt his opposition. 
He intended to call the operators to Washington to help him forge the legisla-
tion to their mutual satisfaction. In this way he could bring powerful pressure 
on virtually every member of Congress whose state or district was served by 
air mail. By passing strong legislation that would enable the survival of the 
airlines, Brown would also maintain control over the airlines themselves forc-
ing them to act in the public's interest without the expensive bureaucratic 
framework of a formal regulatory agency (1). 
Hinshaw was willing to follow Brown's plan, provided it was applied equi-
tably. The proposed law would benefit the industry, even though it would give 
the postmaster general unprecedented power to determine new routes, award 
extensions, and even forge new consolidations of routes and companies. 
Hinshaw approved, as long as "where passenger lines compete with mail lines 
that the mail line should get the preference; that the variables he speaks of 
shall be added to the maximum price of $1.00 and not come underneath it; 
that the consolidations and extensions be worked out by negotiation with these 
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companies now operating in that particular field and other phases that we 
have to face" (1). 
The industry's trade journals lauded Brown's new approach. Aviation was 
now convinced that Brown was a friend of aviation with a visionary approach, 
not a near-sighted penny-pinching bureaucrat. "The suspicion that Postmas-
ter General Brown is inherently unfriendly to aviation, and desirous of find-
ing some secret means of stifling the air mail, cannot survive a careful reading 
of his recent address before the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce;' the jour-
nal stated. "He has approached the problem as a business man and with the 
desire to get it onto a common sense business footing:' They were comfortable 
that now the department could set fair rates and restore airline profitability 
and some sense of reason to the air mail system to the benefit of the tax-pay-
ing public. Aviation believed that the Post Office could now "produce a for-
mula that would be fair to all the contractors and that would hold out to the 
Post Office Department the hope of ultimate financial equilibrium."32 
Brown soon called a meeting of representatives of the operators to discuss 
the forthcoming legislation. To the department came Col. Paul Henderson of 
North American, Philip Johnson from United Aircraft, Harris Hanshue of 
Western Air Express, Col. Lewis H. Brittin from Northwest Airways, and Hainer 
Hinshaw, Frederick G. Coburn, Mabel Walker Wille brandt, Graham Grosvenor, 
and Gen. John O'Ryan of the Aviation Corporation.33 By early February, the 
operators and Brown had agreed on the text of the proposed legislation and 
were anxious to proceed. 
All but one. Much to the department's dismay, independent operator Erle 
Halliburton objected strenuously to the proposal. Earlier, rumors had circu-
lated that his airline, SAFE Way, had been acquired by the Pennsylvania Rail-
road in an effort to prevent him from extending his line to Los Angeles in 
competition with TAT. "Halliburton is very clever and means to do things in a 
big way;' remarked Brittin. "All of this adds up to the fact that Halliburton was 
a very desirable man to get rid of from the point of view of these operators." 
Although the rumors later proved false, the idea reflected the general antipa-
thy felt by the air mail contractors toward the obstreperous Halliburton. Stated 
Brittin, "Halliburton has been a thorn in the side of some of the larger operators 
in the south west for a long time. He has started certain things in Washington 
that were very embarrassing to some of the larger groups. If his schemes had 
gone through it would have upset a load of apple carts:'34 Between his call for 
ICC regulation and his joint offer for the southern transcontinental route with 
William Gibbs McAdoo and their Southern Sky Lines, Halliburton had few friends 
in the industry. Now, he was attacking the Post Office as well, with the expressed 
intention of receiving a mail contract, regardless of the consequences. 
Halliburton wrote to his partner McAdoo, expressing his view of the situ-
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ation. He was adamant that he was expanding westward and that all depended 
on a contract. "The air mail situation seems to be in a muddle that will require 
some time to straighten out;' stated Halliburton. "I have given one year's hard 
work to the industry and have personally invested approximately $1,750,000, 
and am confident that in the end this investment will be protected by an air 
mail contract."35 
Halliburton expressed his objections in a telegram that was delivered to 
Irving Glover. He was extremely wary of the wide discretionary powers it gave 
the postmaster general, which he felt could be used against independents such 
as himself:" [The] Watres Bill gives to the Postmaster General powers that will 
make it possible for him to discriminate to the end that the development of 
commercial aviation might be retarded for a period of ten years. Such a mea-
sure might be all right if we knew Postmaster General Brown would hold of-
fice during [the] entire period and his administration was not influenced by 
special interests but if this bill is enacted into law it is my opinion that it will 
retard the development of commercial aviation rather than cure a situation 
that is pressing for satisfaction."36 
Glover was both surprised and outraged by Halliburton's attack. When 
last in Washington, Halliburton had shown support for the bill but had now 
inexplicably changed, though this quixotic behavior was in keeping with his 
volatile character. The bill was specifically designed to aid independent pas-
senger lines such as Halliburton's as well as foster aviation in general. An an-
gry Glover fired back a telegram: 
Mr. Philip has just showed me your telegram regarding new Air Mail legis-
lation and to say contents your telegram astonish me is putting it lightly. The 
Department can truthfully say that yours is the only operating line which has 
made any objection to proposed legislation. On the other hand we are in receipt 
of favorable comment from practically every independent operator. You will 
remember last time you were in my office you said you were heartily in favor of 
it and would do everything to support proposed legislation. Natural to suppose 
that your operation would benefit under this legislation .... Iflegislation of this 
character does not pass this session of Congress Commercial Aviation will be 
the sufferer. 37 
Halliburton's outburst was, in essence, an attempt to force the department to 
buy his silence in return for a contract. The department noted this problem 
for later action. Regardless of Halliburton's objections, work progressed steadily. 
Brown had the bill, H.R. 9500, introduced into the House by Rep. Laurence 
H. Watres of Pennsylvania, a member of the House Committee on the Post 
Office and Post Roads. Pointedly, Brown did not choose to have his political 
rival Clyde Kelly introduce the measure. This was to prove a strategic and tactical 
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error by the otherwise politically astute postmaster general and would have se-
vere repercussions, as Kelly, for reasons of his past advocacy, felt he was the guid-
ing force behind the air mail in Congress. Brown's study of the air mail situation 
had revealed numerous flaws. He wanted a dean slate in order to straighten out 
the department and the industry. By visibly snubbing Kelly, with whom Brown 
had personal differences and blamed in part for the chaos, he turned the Pro-
gressive Republican from Pennsylvania into a powerful enemy. 
Hearings were scheduled for Wednesday, February 19. Immediately be-
forehand, Clifford Ball sought to preserve his endangered airline by visiting 
the Post Office to ask for clarification of the pending legislation and seek out 
his brother-in-law, Clyde Kelly, for help. At the department, Ball met with Glover 
and Wadsworth, who reassured him that his contract would be continued but 
insisted that the law would change. 
After his meeting, Ball proceeded quickly to Capitol Hill, where he met 
with Kelly and engaged in a long conversation concerning the airlines and the 
proposed legislation. Kelly was adamantly opposed to Brown's desire to make 
the postmaster general so powerful and was particularly concerned about the 
question of Brown's desire essentially to suspend competitive bidding. Kelly 
had also proposed alternative legislation addressing his concerns. "It was his 
opinion;' remarked Ball, "that too much power will be given to the Postmaster 
General in the bill proposed by himself." Furthermore, "Under Mr. Brown, 
who is eager for the expansion and extension of air mail, this might work out 
very good, but we have the danger of someone succeeding Mr. Brown that 
might not be of the same political party and a very chaotic condition would 
also be probable:' Kelly was determined that the new bill would preserve his 
poundage payment system, which he thought encouraged healthful competi-
tion and kept Ball's coffers full. 
Ball was reassured that his airline was safe regardless of future events. "Mr. 
Kelly assured me;' he stated, "that the contract will be continued, as under his 
original bill it clearly states that certificates will be given, and in the case the 
Postmaster General should refuse we have good reason to ask him to show 
cause:' The forthcoming hearing would determine the final structure of the 
bill, and Clifford Ball had every intention of attending to protect his interests 
and those of the other contractors. 38 
Brown received his formal invitation from committee chairman Rep. Archie 
D. Sanders (R-N.Y.) to appear as the first witness. In his opening remarks, the 
postmaster general recalled the history of the air mail service and reminded 
the committee that the purpose of all air mail legislation during the air mail's 
brief history was the encouragement of aviation and "to the end that the habit 
and practice of the people of the United States might be developed to use air 
transport in their ordinary affairs oflife, in traveling and in sending their mer-
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chandise and communications."39 His new law would clean up the present sys-
tem, eliminate waste and "unethical practices" by removing the incentive for 
contractors to cheat, and install a space method of payment that would ensure 
and equitably distribute payments. This in turn would promote the develop-
ment of not only the air mail but also passenger travel by air, thereby protect-
ing and fostering the new air transportation industry. 
Brown quickly focused his attention on the need to support the oligopo-
lies. In typically Progressive Republican fashion, he underscored the necessity 
for legal changes that would enable the Post Office Department to reap the 
benefits of the recent consolidations that occurred in the industry. As the merg-
ers absorbed the numerous little lines, the new holding companies held prom-
ise of great economies of scale in their operations. Up to this time, the Post 
Office could not benefit from these economic changes as the contracts were 
already set in place and could not be modified. A new system whereby four-
year contracts would be exchanged for ten-year certificates would allow stabil-
ity in the industry and permit the department to adjust the payment rates 
downward to reflect increased efficiencies from the airline holding compa-
nies. Other proposed incentives would encourage the development of more 
modern, efficient aircraft and equipment and a realignment of the route sys-
tem in a coherent and rational manner while protecting the rights of the pio-
neer companies. His proposal would greatly strengthen the position of the 
postmaster general, placing almost total control of the airline industry in his 
hands. In return, he would protect and promote the industry while encourag-
ing its rational growth. 
Brown clearly stated his support for the holding companies that in his 
view operated in the public interest by providing a national service at the low-
est reasonable cost by responsible operators. When he assumed office in 1929, 
he quickly learned that the route system was hardly that: lines were haphaz-
ardly drawn in an illogical web of routes across much of the country. Short 
routes were particularly uneconomic and failed to provide a faster service when 
compared with surface transportation. To Brown it was clear that the speed 
advantage of air mail could only be realized over longer distances and over 
certain, natural routes. "When we examined the certificate law with a view to 
making the extensions of the contracts for the 10-year period, we discovered 
that the air mail map of the United States had grown a little at a time and, like 
any map made in this fashion, was entirely illogical," Brown said. "There were 
short lines and there were long lines. There were some lines that had no real 
excuse for existence and others that could be very greatly improved by slight 
additions. If we put into effect the certificate feature of the law, it would be 
necessary to fasten that illogical air map on the United States for a further 
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period of six years, or for a total of 10 years from the time that the first con-
tract was issued. That we dislike to do" ( 5). Changes were necessary in order to 
make the route system more efficient while taking advantage of the recent 
airline consolidations sweeping the industry: 
It was obvious that the economic law was coming into play and that some 
of the short lines, and longer lines too, were passing under a single ownership. 
Holding companies were being formed and taking over the smaller lines. The 
result was, of course, that economies in operation of those lines were being ef-
fected, due to the cutting down of overhead and supervision, but the govern-
ment could get none of the benefits of consolidation, because from our viewpoint, 
the viewpoint of the law, each of the original contracts was an entity and had to 
be dealt with by itself. 
So it was desirable that the air mail map, if possible, be revamped and made 
a logical map, like the railway map of the United States. That has been made by 
economic law, largely, through in recent years some control by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission .... However, up to this point economic law has put 
together railway systems, has combined little lines that were 50 or 100 miles 
long, until we have the great railroad systems as the result of natural law. The 
same thing has started with the airways. But under the present, inflexible air 
mail law, the department is able to take no advantage of the consolidations that 
economic laws are forcing. ( 5) 
Brown felt obligated to protect the vested interests of capital and the so-
called pioneer rights of the original contractors who had invested heavily, and 
at great cost, in the establishment of their route infrastructure and equipment. 
"It will be necessary to change the law," he said, "if any relief is to be given to 
these pioneers in the business who have been losing their money" ( 10). It was 
unfair that the contractors who had risked their capital on behalf of the gov-
ernment and the people also risk losing their contract to a lower bidder after 
four years of hard work, just when their efforts were about to pay off. Brown 
told the committee that he fervently believed that the only way to protect the 
rights of these courageous companies was to permit the postmaster general to 
make route extensions and let new contracts without resorting to potentially 
ruinous competitive bidding: 
Now, the proviso is the matter that you will want to consider the most care-
fully. This language permits the Postmaster General to make a contract when, in 
his opinion, public interest so requires, without advertising or considering bids, 
but by negotiation. That involves a departure from a time-honored policy of 
our country, and should have very careful consideration .... 
We recommend this proviso, not because I want any such responsibility-
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personally I should be glad to have anybody else have it-but because we can 
think of no other way in which, in the present condition of the aviation indus-
try and the art of flying, we can save to the United States the experience of the 
men who have done the flying for the last ten years, and in no other way to 
protect what we believe to be an equity, if not a right of the pioneers who are in 
this business. If we throw these matters all open to competitive bidding, you will 
find promoters coming in and wanting to bid off the contract, having no knowl-
edge of costs .... They will come in and bid a price that will be lower than the 
experienced man who has had his fingers burned .... As I say, I can think of no 
other way to protect the rights of the public in the experience that has been 
gained at the expense of many, many lives; I can think of no other way to do it 
than by placing in the discretion of some official of the Government the power 
of negotiating these contracts directly, within certain maximum limits. If you 
gentlemen can think of any other way of doing it, we shall be very glad to have 
you do it. (24) 
Brown was not averse to competitive bidding but felt that under these special 
circumstances, such a drastic measure was necessary. "We would use the pro-
viso only where we were very clear that the public interest required it;' he said. 
"I personally believe in competitive bidding as a fundamental principle." Rep-
resentative Kelly agreed that the rights of the pioneers deserved protection, 
but without sacrificing an open competition. "I realize that you ought to have 
some power to go ahead for the protection of those who have risked their 
money and property and all that," said Kelly. "I am very much in favor of that, 
and I would like to see it on a certificate basis in some way or other, where you 
could protect them, instead of favoring new companies without any bids and 
making contracts which would bind the Government." 
Brown stood firm in his support for this extraordinary measure, despite 
the pressure it placed on his shoulders because he felt it was vital for the very 
survival of the industry. "I am inclined to think, Mr. Kelly;' he said, "that if you 
pass this bill, you will add about six years to my age by so doing. But somebody 
has got to try to solve this problem or we are going to have a collapse of the 
passenger carrying industry in this country" (25). In Brown's defense, Mabel 
Walker Willebrandt, speaking for AVCO, reminded the committee that prece-
dent already existed within postal law for the awarding of contracts without 
competitive bidding. She reminded them that Section 571 of Title 39 of the 
United States Code permitted this, as it stated, "The Postmaster General may 
enter into contracts for carrying the mail with railway companies without ad-
vertising for bids thereof" (38). 
Supporting the passenger-carrying business was one of Brown's primary 
objectives. He underscored the department's fundamental belief that the air 
mail was created to encourage aviation throughout the country, to encourage 
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people to fly, and to make the public aware of the potential of aviation while 
forming a strategic reserve of trained pilots and mechanics in case of war. 
Brown reiterated that the present law did little to encourage aviation beyond 
that of the air mail and in so doing risked the collapse of this nascent industry 
at the moment when it was on the brink of success. "There is not anything in 
the present law:' he said, "that encourages passenger flying in any way." Ameri-
cans had yet to acquire the habit of flying, and as a result the nation had not 
"obtained the supremacy in the air that is necessary for national security." 
Through experience it was found that the aircraft developed to carry mail were 
not suitable for carrying passengers and so passenger traffic growth was ham-
pered. Brown realized this inherent problem and was seeking to address it 
through his legislation, thereby protecting those airlines that were adequately 
financed but losing money carrying passengers: 
So the problem was to find some method of promoting passenger lines. 
Well, during the last calendar year passenger lines sprang up all over the coun-
try, some operated by people who had air mail contracts and many by those 
who had not. The impression seemed to get out that it was an industry that was 
coming very fast, and that there were opportunities for great profit in it. I think 
perhaps the speculative era that came to close in the Wall Street collapse had 
something to do with it. The public was very ready to subscribe to flotations of 
securities for aircraft factories and for air lines, and there was plenty of money, 
and for that reason it was possible for these lines to start up. Without exception 
they lost money. There was not a single passenger line in operation in 1929 that 
did not lose money. ( 1 0) 
The discussions with the operators in late 1929 were conducted in part to 
address the difficulties of the passenger lines and to promote the development 
of larger, more efficient aircraft until such time as the passenger lines could 
become self-sufficient. "When we got to studying this problem in the autumn 
of last year, the problem of passenger operators:' said Brown, "they were dis-
couraged and about ready to give up. That perhaps stimulated us to try to 
formulate a plan which would give them some hope to carry on until the pub-
lic should be educated to travel by air." The recent fare cuts and resultant in-
crease in passenger loads showed that the public was indeed willing to fly, provided 
the price was within reason. Unfortunately, the current state of the aeronautical 
art was so inefficient that it was impossible to charge a competitive fare when 
the average cost per flying mile of an airline was more than one dollar. Stated the 
postmaster general, "The cost, apparently, can be reduced only by increasing the 
capacity of the planes." Of critical importance to the future technological devel-
opment of American aviation, Brown reasoned that wisely placed incentives 
would encourage the development of newer, more profitable aircraft: 
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At a time when people were reluctant to travel at all and pay for this service, 
there was very little inducement for inventive genius to design, or for capital to 
produce the larger planes, which would naturally cut down transportation costs. 
In this transition period in the development of the art, we think it is necessary 
to give some aid to the passenger-carrying lines, particularly if by giving that aid 
we greatly increase the air mail facilities of the country. That is the principle 
motive, perhaps, back of the suggestion in this bill, which is to promote directly 
the major purpose of all the legislation of our country with respect to air trans-
portation, to go right to the heart of the matter, to encourage the transportation 
of people by air, to get the people of the United States to fly themselves, so that 
we will have a great flying personnel and a great flying industry with efficient 
planes and efficient equipment. ( 11) 
In answering Kelly's direct challenge to his position, Brown asserted that 
"in the evolution of this problem the suggestion is now made that we put 
some mail on the passenger ships on regular lines, enabling them to carry on 
until the flying public increases sufficiently to pay the costs of air transport 
and until those costs can be reduced by the development of larger planes and 
other improvements that are in contemplation" (12). 
Brown did not intend to waste taxpayer's money on frivolous lines. It was 
his intention that the passenger carriers receiving aid would do so only along 
those routes most heavily traveled. "The purpose of this bill;' he continued, 
"would be to enable the passenger-transport people to build up a passenger 
service on routes that appear to be essential, on routes where there is natural 
traffic back and forth: ... I would not think of establishing a line where there 
never had been an actual route and where people are probably are never going 
to travel but we all know that there are routes in our country that have been 
traversed ever since the Indians used to traverse them, because they are natu-
ral routes for transportation" (14). 
Instead of spending money to create lines all over the country, whether 
needed or not, Brown had a recommendation: "We think the right way to do it 
is to pick out some essential transportation routes that the public are using 
now and have been ever since we had a country, and to give all the Govern-
ment encouragement we can to those lines. We want to see if we can not make 
these main lines self-sustaining and develop a habit of air travel which will 
then spread to all the other lines" ( 22). The department was already planning 
those routes, primarily the two transcontinental lines discussed and agreed 
upon during the meetings of the Interdepartmental Committee on Airways. 
Those existing lines that followed natural transportation routes and that 
could be improved with judicious planning Brown hoped to support through 
the method of route extensions, without the burden of advertising the exten-
sion as a new route through competitive bidding. The proposed bill would 
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allow the postmaster general to effect such changes at his discretion. "Section 
6 authorizes extensions and consolidations when the public interest will be 
promoted thereby;' stated Brown. "The purpose of that is to enable us to re-
vamp the air mail plan of this country and make it a logical one, so far as we 
have the wisdom to do so" (27). 
As expected, Brown hoped to change the payment scheme from the weight 
to a space system that would distribute the air mail largess equitably among 
the carriers. Kelly sharply questioned the postmaster general on this point, 
expressing his opinion that the contractors knew the risks when they bid and 
that although the present rates were not entirely fair, part of the airlines' re-
sponsibility was to generate additional mail through promotion campaigns. 
That they failed to receive sufficient poundage was their problem, not the 
government's. To this argument Brown replied forcefully, "There is no fair-
ness, there is no sound business in asking a mail contractor to gamble on the 
amount of mail he is going to get, but that is what he is required to do now. He 
must go on schedule. When 8:30 at night comes at Chicago, the contractor 
must start whether he has got 1 pound or 1,500 pounds, and to ask him to 
gamble on it, in my judgment, is immoral. I think it is unsound from every 
viewpoint" ( 14). 
Although the exact rate of payment was yet to be determined by the de-
partment, Brown felt that a base rate of ten cents per mile was probably ap-
propriate but that variables should be applied depending on the size of aircraft 
and the type of equipment. In this way the department could pay the airlines 
enough to cover the difference between their costs and revenue but not ensure 
their profitability at government expense. Based on existing information pro-
vided by the airlines and based on the new uniform system of accounting, the 
Post Office would be able to ascertain the correct amount to pay for the space 
available on the aircraft. 
In responding to Chairman Sanders, Brown wanted to keep an open mind 
concerning the actual process of rate determination, as numerous technical 
and operational factors would influence the decision. "We do not know what 
the changes will be in the art," replied Brown, "and we think that the rate mat-
ter should be made as flexible as possible" ( 23). The department was willing to 
provide enough money to allow the carriers to break even-any profit would 
be the responsibility of the airline by generating additional revenue through 
passenger or express service. "What we want to do," said Brown, "is to give to 
the passenger lines on essential routes enough money to keep them from go-
ing out of business and making us lose all the money that we have put into the 
aviation business" (21). Thus, in the view of the postmaster general, the mail 
payments were not a direct subsidy in the strictest sense and would be steadily 
reduced as the airlines improved their efficiency until such time they required 
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no assistance. The government would not buy more space than it required 
along each route. This method was precisely how the railroads were paid to 
carry mail (20). · 
Because the Post Office had a space system of payment for the rails, they 
also had a greater flexibility in directing the mail. The department could choose 
whatever line it thought best to carry the surface mail by train without inter-
ference. Although the rates were set by the Interstate Commerce Commission, 
"determining which roads shall carry the mail is a matter that rests solely within 
the discretion of the Post Office Department, because there is not any other 
practical way to work it out;' stated Brown. "Now there is precedent all through 
the mail service for permitting us to choose the carrier, the compensation to 
be within certain limits" (26). 
Brown had no illusions about the future of air transportation as an indus-
try and as a public utility. Although he wished to control its development dur-
ing its formative period, he understood completely that once aviation was able 
to stand on its own, it would naturally be subject to the normal forces of fed-
eral regulation based on the experience of the railroads. In fact, he expected it. 
"I am quite sure that some day or other the rates will be fixed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, in the natural evolution of things, and that this is 
merely one step in the development of the air mail service;' he told the com-
mittee. "I think, in view of the present condition of the art, that we should 
carefully consider the unwisdom of junking the valuable experience, the in-
valuable experience, that had some to the pioneers in the art" (26). 
For this new and expanded air mail system Brown requested an additional 
$3 million on top of the previous year's $15 million appropriation. "The air 
mail routes that have been recommended by the Interdepartmental Commit-
tee, the Post Office Department, and the Department of Commerce aggregat-
ing 224,953 miles a month;' stated Brown, "would call for an additional cost 
under the plan of the bill of $230,733. The passenger routes that we have un-
der consideration now, in addition to those which would form a part of the 
day service of the regular air mail operators, would call for $66,159 additional 
[per month]" (28-29). Concluded Brown, "We believe that the entire job can 
be done, that the industry can get its essential support from the Government 
at this time, and that the air mail service be greatly expanded for the public for 
a maximum of $18 million a year" (29). 
Subsequent testimony from the department and from members of indus-
try supported Walter Brown's plan to change the air mail system and directly 
assist passenger lines. Second Assistant Postmaster General W. Irving Glover, 
Mabel Willebrandt, and Col. Thomas Bane, vice president of AVCO, spoke in 
support of Brown's bill. Philip Johnson of United Aircraft and William 
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MacCracken, representing Western Air Express, underscored the need for im-
mediate action to save the industry and promote passenger transportation. 
Col. Paul Henderson, privately one of Brown's antagonists, publicly sup-
ported the postmaster general and his effort to save the airlines. Henderson 
approved of the plan to encourage mail lines to carry passengers and thought 
the idea to suspend competitive bidding wise under the circumstances. Most 
surprisingly, he openly stated his trust in the actions of Brown, affirming that 
"this bill places the responsibility for air mail and passenger lines of the United 
States, right on the desk of the Postmaster General. I have been acquainted 
with four Postmasters General, and I do not know one whom I would not 
trust with the job of making a good deal with my company." He openly sup-
ported the department and its air-mindedness. Asked if he had any question 
about the ultimate fairness of the postmaster general in dealing with contrac-
tors, Henderson replied, "No, sir. I think that the worst that could happen to 
those of us in the business would be to have some postal administration un-
sympathetic to air transport generally. The interest of the public in it is such 
that no matter what the personal feeling of any Postmaster General might be, 
the public interest in air transport would force the Postmaster General to do 
what this law gives him authority to do" (47). 
James Edgerton was present during the day-long hearing and reported his 
observations back to his partner, William Gibbs McAdoo. In his opinion, the 
deliberations went well and the postmaster general presented his case force-
fully. Some question remained in the minds of several of the congressmen 
regarding the request to abolish competitive bidding, but Edgerton felt that 
this would be easily overcome. Edgerton was more concerned with the ques-
tion of new entrant carriers but was reassured by Glover that the department 
would not recognize the validity of any operation created simply to take ad-
vantage of the new law. According to Edgerton, Glover said that "where a new 
company announced or seemed to start operations between now and the time 
the bill is approved it would be considered by the Post Office Department as 
an obvious subterfuge which the Department would disregard:' Edgerton rec-
ommended that McAdoo get Southern Sky-Lines flying as Glover was recep-
tive to those companies that were already organized. "He did intimate, however;' 
stated Edgerton, "that the Department would take a keen interest in the orga-
nization of the would-be contractor, his financial status, personnel employed, 
and other pertinent points. In other words, the thing the Department desires 
to avoid is the concern organized simply to secure a contract, which might 
have the objective of selling outright, or who would not show proper financial 
responsibility."40 
Other contractors immediately began a letter-writing campaign to influ-
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ence their respective representatives, particularly Pittsburgh Aviation Indus-
tries Corporation, which wanted a mail contract for a line to Washington, as 
recommended by Brown. Despite the intensive campaigning, Clyde Kelly and 
several holdouts refused to support what was now known as the McNary-Watres 
Act, or, more simply, the Watres Act. As Laurence Watres introduced the bill in 
the House, Senate Majority leader Charles McNary of Oregon introduced it in 
the Senate. There it met no significant opposition. The House of Representa-
tives was another matter, as the bill could not make it out of committee. 
Kelly was obstinately fighting for the retention of competitive bidding with 
an unexpected determination. Richard Robbins of PAIC wrote Postmaster 
General Brown to relate to him his recent meeting with Kelly. "We are hopeful 
that we made some progress in convincing him of the importance of this leg-
islation at this time:' Robbins remarkedY Nevertheless, he reported that "things 
[are] going badly."42 William "Doc" Bishop of Western Air Express was more 
sanguine. "The President is confident the bill will get through okay:' he wrote, 
"and since I have been here I think, with the exception of two members of the 
House, the attitude of those opposed to the several features of the bill has 
changed for the better."43 
Brown held a meeting with the full Steering Committee of the House Post 
Office Committee on March 15 in hope of ironing out the differences con-
cerning the bill. Rather unexpectedly, Kelly led off with a rancorous speech 
condemning the unlimited power it seemed to give the postmaster general 
over contracts and expenditures. Bishop was surprised at the attack, noting 
that William MacCracken, Western's legal representative, had just concluded a 
conversation with Kelly in which the congressman had toned down his objec-
tions. Instead, Bishop stated, "Kelly made a violent speech against the bill after 
he had told Bill he thought it would be okay with a few changes. After making 
his speech, he left the hearing and aroused the ire of every member of Con-
gress in attendance by the disrespectful attitude he displayed. He seems to have 
lost practically all of his standing."44 
The rest of the Steering Committee supported the bill. Rep. Frederick P. 
Lehlbach felt strongly that the government should aid the aviation industry to 
the same degree that it supported the merchant marine and concluded that 
competitive bidding was not workable under the special conditions of the air-
line industry and Brown should be given the right to negotiate directly.45 "One 
of the interesting features of the meeting:' noted Bishop, "was two speeches by 
two members of the steering committee in favor of the bill-both calling at-
tention to the fact that if the government decided to help an industry that it 
should do so to the best of their ability and that any attempt to curtail the 
powers of the executive officer working with the industry would only hurt the 
industry. Both urged passage of the bill with the provision to allow the post-
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master general to negotiate contracts without throwing the routes open to 
competitive bids."46 
Majority leader John Q. Tilson also lent his support and reassured Brown 
that he would report the bill favorably to the House and that any further diffi-
culties could be worked out between the committee and the postmaster gen-
eral. Brown was heartened. According to Glover, "Speaker Longworth brought 
the Postmaster General down in his car and said that he did not think there 
was any doubt but that it would be passed; said that some of the members 
thought that there was too wide a latitude given the Postmaster General but 
felt that this could be overcome. In any event, the Postmaster General was very 
much encouraged over the hearing."47 
Brown was cautiously optimistic, for although it appeared he was near 
victory, time was running out not only for the industry in general but, more 
specifically, because several of the contracts were due to expire within the next 
two months. Recalled Glover, "The Postmaster General left with the Commit-
tee the parting word that-'bear in mind that some of these contracts are 
expiring on May 5, 1930, and, if no legislation is available, the situation will be 
serious:"48 The outspoken Bishop summarized the situation aptly to Jim Wooley 
after his meeting with President Hoover: 
There is this much about it, Jim. Neither the President, Brown, or the Re-
publican Party can stand the public consequence of being responsible for the 
bankruptcy of commercial aviation. The seriousness of the national defense angle 
... ; not even to mention the loss of service to the nation as a public carrier of 
fast mail and rapid transit; are two factors we can depend upon to force the 
government to continue their support. 
As you know, all of the operators are in an extremely pessimistic frame of 
mind. Should they tell the truth publicly, were we to threaten operation cancel-
lations on our systems, using the powerful publicity avenues available; I am con-
fident the public would be or could be aroused to such a favorable fighting frame 
of mind Congress and the Administration would be convinced public accep-
tance of aviation is as commonplace and important as it had made radio and 
the railroads. 
This may sound like a wild dream, Jim, but damn it all Jim, let's not forget 
the good will we have developed through the banks, brokerage houses, manu-
facturers and others. If these fellows really knew that air mail operations over 
the nation may cease after May 17, then this bunch of baboons here would think 
Washington had been hit with a cyclone of condemning mail.49 
Recalling his trip back from his visit with the president at Rapidan with 
Hoover's aide Lawrence Richey, Bishop stated that although he and the others 
had the utmost confidence in the postmaster general and his new air mail 
plan, "I let him know that all operators are keenly worried, that the saturation 
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point had been reached and that unless the bill becomes a reality and is hon-
estly and fairly applied, the commercial aviation structure will fall." Bishop 
was comforted by the knowledge that Brown had the full support of the presi-
dent and that Hoover would back neither any plan in opposition nor any plan 
to place the industry under ICC control. It was rumored that Senator Bratton 
wanted to reintroduce his bill and Bishop and the other operators, with the 
exception of Colonel Henderson and Erle Halliburton, were strongly opposed. 
Ritchie, reported Bishop, reiterated that "the President would not let the in-
dustry fail and while he didn't say so in so many words, he made me feel sure 
the President would veto any bill placing us under the control of any agency 
other than the Department of Commerce."50 
Despite the best efforts of Brown, the department, industry, and most of 
the committee, Kelly still refused to compromise. He had earlier introduced 
his own revised bill H.R. 9556, which would allow route extensions or consoli-
dations provided that the Post Office not pay the carrier more than the rate 
previously determined by contract. 51 This small amendment was referred to 
the committee, where it was allowed to expire without action. Undaunted, 
Kelly continued his attack against the Watres bill. 
Despite Speaker Longworth's assurances to Brown that the Watres bill was 
proceeding smoothly, the legislation was in trouble. 52 The longer some mem-
bers thought about it, the less comfortable they were with extending virtual 
dictatorial power to the postmaster general over the entire air transportation 
industry. Both Colonel Henderson and William MacCracken were now voic-
ing doubts that the bill as written would pass. Henderson appeared particu-
larly pessimistic as his personal fortune was rapidly being devoured by TAT's 
huge losses. Edgerton feared that concentrating power in the hands of Brown 
would give him "a powerful club" that would favor the large oligopolies at the 
expense of the small independents. In Section Five of the bill the department 
would only deal with responsible contractors with two years' actual operating 
experience, thereby by definition excluding new entrants. Edgerton feared the 
worst. "The effect of this two year proviso," he noted, "would be to concentrate 
all air mail operations and in fact all air transport operations, in the hands of 
one or two very powerful holding corporations."53 Edgerton had correctly 
judged the postmaster's intentions, though not his motives. 
Brown did wish to concentrate the industry, but he did not wish to de-
stroy healthy competition. He wanted to weed out the unfit and reward those 
companies that possessed sound financial and organizational backing. De-
spite McAdoo's best intentions, Southern Sky-Lines existed only on paper, and 
the department was not about to risk tax dollars on unproven enterprises, no 
matter how well intentioned they appeared to be. 
Halliburton also feared the growing power of the postmaster general but 
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was attempting to cut his own deal through direct pressure on the Post Office 
Department. Halliburton and Brice Clagett, McAdoo's law partner and son-
in-law, were wary of the potential for monopolistic control of the industry, 
but Clagett could not shake the feeling that Halliburton was working behind 
his back. 54 
While McAdoo and company were hoping to head off action, the bill was 
faltering on its own. Chairman Sanders withdrew his support, forcing Brown to 
call a special conference on Friday, March 17. During this meeting with congres-
sional leaders, it was decided to let the bill be reported and brought to the House 
floor for debate, where the supporters believed the measure would pass. 55 
In response to a request from Second Assistant Glover for help, William 
MacCracken lobbied the four dissident committee members, Republicans Clyde 
Kelly and David Hogg of Indiana and Democrats James Mead of New York 
and John H. Morehead of Nebraska. Although Kelly and Mead were unavail-
able, MacCracken thought he had made some headway with the others. "Saw 
Hogue [sic] and while he said he did not feel enthusiastic enough about the 
bill to speak for it;' MacCracken wrote Richard Robbins, "he was going to vote 
for it, and if the Postmaster General had been willing to consider some amend-
ments on the subject of competitive bidding, he would have been glad to speak 
for the Bill."56 Writing to Harris Hanshue, MacCracken explained that even 
though Hogg disagreed with Brown, he did not wish to break party ranks. 57 
Hogg was still concerned about the legality of the competitive bidding exemp-
tion, and although he agreed to vote for the bill, he also sought the legal opin-
ion of the comptroller general, John McCarl. By the end of the month, McCarl 
had reviewed Hogg's request and rendered an unofficial opinion against the 
measure along similar lines to those ofKelly.58 
MacCracken used his old political connections to contact the former Popu-
list Democrat and Nebraska governor Morehead through Ruth Bryan Owen, 
the representative from the Miami district of the state and daughter of Will-
iam Jennings Bryan. "I saw her and had a talk with her;' stated MacCracken, 
"and she promised to see Morehead. She now advises that while he had signed 
the minority report before she reached him, he has promised to vote for the 
Bill, and stated that he did not think the minority report would carry much 
weight or have much effect."59 
The report of the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads was re-
leased on March 24, when the Watres bill was reported out of committee and 
sent to the floor of the House. They agreed with the arguments made by Post-
master General Brown and recommended its passage, stating, "Finally, it should 
be frankly stated that while aviation has unquestionably demonstrated its eco-
nomic importance, it is not as yet on a self-supporting basis in the United 
States or any other country. The air mail at the present stage of development is 
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necessarily the backbone of commercial aviation. The American people have 
shown enterprise, courage, and faith in their support of aviation. If private 
capital is to continue our national progress in this field, it must have some 
reasonable hope of at least a fair return on capital actually invested .... To fail 
to continue support at this critical time would possibly result in the loss of all 
the progress made:'60 
Representatives Kelly and Morehead filed their minority report condemn-
ing the legislation for its haste and for giving the postmaster general too much 
power. They were particularly concerned about Section 4, which gave Brown 
the authority to award contracts through negotiation alone. "This provision 
making the Postmaster General a law unto himself," the report noted, "elimi-
nates competition, and is nothing more than a subsidy in the interest of the 
aircraft industry. While we favor, and have in the past voted for liberal appro-
priations and liberal legislation in the interest of the development of aeronau-
tics, we believe this legislation is a step in the wrong direction and some limitations 
and safeguards should be written into the bill before it becomes law:'61 
Clyde Kelly remained adamant in his objections. "The Postmaster General's 
air mail bill is a most unprecedented grant of power to one man," stated Kelly 
to fellow representative Judge Robert Moore ofVirginia. "The Postmaster Gen-
eral is anxious to assume this responsibility, but I am of the opinion that it will 
lead him into great difficulty in the future. Something should be done to help 
the air passenger lines, but I would like to see it hedged around with proper 
restrictions."62 
By early April, it was clear that some form of the bill would pass, though 
perhaps with some compromising amendments. James Edgerton recom-
mended to an increasingly skeptical William Gibbs McAdoo that they focus 
all their efforts on the pending legislation to secure their fair share. Edgerton 
thought that the current political situation might work in their behalf, as the 
Republicans were sure to lose much support in the upcoming fall congres-
sional elections.63 McAdoo remained in a pessimistic mood and on the brink 
of withdrawing entirely, correctly believing that the bill would favor the large 
oligopolies. Writing to Brice Clagett, he lamented, "Frankly, I am loath to have 
anything to do with it."64 
With Brown and Glover working behind the scenes to twist arms to gar-
ner enough support, the industry's representatives were for a time left won-
dering about the fate ofH.R. 9500. In a letter to James Wooley, William Bishop 
openly wondered about the effectiveness of the politically astute Brown in 
saving this bill. "Having watched the Hoover political machine rise and fall, 
with much of the credit given to Brown and knowing what I do about Glover, 
Henderson, Hainer, and Mabel," pondered Bishop, "I've been doing a lot of 
deep thinking-just trying to figure what there is to justify the confidence all 
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of us seem to place in the political judgment of these men."65 Bishop did not 
expect any action on the House floor until mid-April because primary elec-
tions called most of the members home until then. 
In the meantime, the industry lobbyists were working hard to forge a com-
promise acceptable to both Brown and Kelly. It was difficult. Richard Robbins 
of PAIC met with Kelly to discuss the air mail bill and left with the hope of a 
breakthrough. Robbins was under the impression that Kelly was more con-
cerned about what he called the "indefiniteness" of the bill and wanted the 
payment rates to be more specific. On the most tendentious issue, that of com-
petitive bidding, Robbins believed Kelly could compromise. Robbins and Wil-
liam MacCracken had proposed a compromise based on the wording of the 
Air Corps Act of 1926, which allowed the issuance of negotiated contracts 
under certain specific circumstances and Kelly's own Foreign Air Mail Act of 
1928, which in effect allowed the government to negotiate with one national 
flag carrier if it were deemed in the public interest, when faced with possible 
ruinous foreign competition. According to Robbins, if such changes were made, 
Kelly would agree to support H.R. 9500.66 
Brown still wanted total control, which the compromise would not give 
him. Robbins attempted to convey the proposition to Brown but was rebuffed 
by an angry Glover. William Bishop observed this attitude with concern. "Brown 
has expressed deep hatred for Kelly and will not, under any condition, try to 
meet his demands, not even halfway;' he remarked. Rumors were rampant 
that Kelly was willing to cut a deal to save his brother-in-law Clifford Ball, "but 
there is no truth to it." Bishop understood that these decisions were no longer 
rational but emotional. "It's a case of hurt pride, more than anything else;' he 
concluded. "But I would tell you I think it's just as much a case of a political 
blunder on Brown's part as anything else."67 James Edgerton agreed with this 
analysis. "Opposition has developed on this Bill which seriously threatens its 
passage;' he wrote. "In the first place Brown, the so-called political expert of 
the Administration, has shown very poor judgment in handling this Bill through 
trading Watres for Kelly, the latter rather considering himself as the real father 
of air mail legislation. As a result Kelly has declared war on the Bill, and is a 
powerful enemy. In addition, as I anticipated, the Comptroller General has 
just answered an inquiry from a member of congress, which says that he con-
siders it absolutely unnecessary and contrary to public policy to eliminate com-
petitive bidding. The Bill will at least have a stormy passage, and may fail 
altogether :'68 
Bishop, Edgerton, and the rest of the industry were concerned about their 
fate should the Watres bill fail. Five routes were to expire on May 5, and pres-
sure was on the department to find a solution through either legislation or a 
less suitable alternative.69 Edgerton believed the postmaster general would be 
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in an embarrassing position if the bill failed and the contracts lapsed. He 
thought that, if possible, Brown would use the opportunity to his advantage. 
"If the Bill fails of passage he will undoubtedly allow the short routes to die for 
the purpose of consolidating them in longer routes:' he stated. "I have particu-
larly in mind the route from Cleveland to Pittsburgh, which they desire to 
extend to Washington, and the Chicago-St. Louis, which should go through to 
New Orleans."70 
It appeared that regardless of events, Clifford Ball's expensive line would 
soon disappear, but not without due process. In fact, as of April 26, Brown 
extended Ball's contract for six months to cover the possibility that H.R. 9500 
would not pass in time.71 Richard Robbins was most interested in an explana-
tion for this action, as his PAIC was hoping to acquire the expected route from 
Pittsburgh to Washington, D.C., and Ball's reluctance to cooperate with them 
was causing great consternation. Brown was not showing favoritism but only 
following the letter of the present law until he could consolidate this costly 
line. William MacCracken checked with the department and was informed 
that this was indeed the case. "Glover tells me that they have already granted 
Cliff an extension of six months;' MacCracken wrote Robbins. "This was done, 
I presume in order that there might not be any charge of discrimination be-
tween him and the other contractors:'72 In the meantime, the department asked 
for bids for temporary two-month contracts on the original five contract air 
mail routes while reserving the right to withdraw the advertisement or reject 
any bid should H.R. 9500 be passed.73 
Despite his reluctance to cooperate with Kelly, by mid-April Brown was 
left with no choice. Hainer Hinshaw reported that "the war goes merrily on" 
and he now expected the removal of the clause, which would allow Brown to 
negotiate for space on aircraft. Hinshaw believed that the law could still be 
written to preserve the contractors pioneering rights. "I think that we can word 
it so that we would shut off anyone starting competition," he stated.74 
After a tiring six-hour session in the House Rules Committee, Brown and 
Kelly forged a compromise that eliminated the postmaster general's power to 
negotiate contracts on routes but restricted bidders to those with six months 
of actual flying experience on routes of four hundred miles or more. This in 
effect confined the pool of prospective bidders to those large, well-financed 
airlines Brown favored but opened the door to some independents. Of great-
.est importance, the new space method of payment, the rate variables system, 
and the right to extend routes without bidding remained untouched. 
Under Section 4, the postmaster general was authorized to pay a fixed 
amount per cubic foot of available space, not to exceed $1.25 per mile for 
purely air mail operations. Each cubic foot equated to 9 pounds of mail. A 
maximum of 225 pounds, which occupied 25 cubic feet, could be carried at 
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no more than 40 cents per mile. This 40-cent payment was intended as a sub-
sidy for passenger aircraft operation. The department was prohibited from 
entering any new contract from two points not previously served by air mail 
after July 1, 1931, that was not authorized or paid for by Congress.75 Brown 
wanted a raise in the air mail postage rate to help pay for route growth, but no 
additional monies from the Treasury would be provided.76 Section 2 gave the 
postmaster general the power to exchange contracts for route certificates, not 
to exceed ten years from the date of the original contract and provided that 
the airline had operated satisfactorily for two years. In return for the security 
of a long-term certificate, the postmaster general could revise the rate of pay-
ment at his discretion and at least annually in order to take advantage of"ad-
vances in the art of flying and passenger transportation." This gave him the 
power to lower the rate of payments at will. Under Section 7 the postmaster 
general was given the right to make extensions or consolidations of existing 
routes in the public interest. 77 On April 17, the new bill, H.R. 11704, was re-
ported out of committee. 
The bill was not exactly what the Post Office or industry wanted, but it 
was the best they were going to get. Richard Robbins of PAIC was not pleased 
by the compromise bill. He and others found the wording muddled and diffi-
cult to understand. "Speaking generally, the language of Section 4 is involved, 
and certain to be a source of grief to the Post Office Department and to the air 
mail contractors;' stated Robbins. Regardless of Brown's interpretation, he felt 
that the comptroller general would dictate the terms of the bill and upset the 
department's plans for the industry. "It is oflittle consequence what the Post-
master General's intent is, or what the legislative intent is, or how the Post 
Office Department may wish to administer the law;' complained Robbins, "the 
Comptroller General will hold that 'the language of the Act speaks for itself; 
and that will be the end of it:' Robbins would soon see firsthand the accuracy 
of his prediction. 
Robbins wanted MacCracken to see what he could do to improve the bill 
before it was passed. "I think the thing to do is to get busy and see if something 
cannot be done about amending this bill from the floor of the House or, if it 
passes the House, in the Senate Committee," he stated. "The Postmaster 
General's plans are thrown in the discard by this bill, and I see little hope for 
any sound development of commercial aviation under its provisions."78 He 
overstated the case, as events were to prove. The space/mileage payment sys-
tem would provide a fair and widely distributed method of payment for all of 
the contractors while the passenger lines were now given a subsidy along im-
portant routes. The postmaster general could now alter the air mail map at 
will. But the law, as worded, was unclear on key issues and their interpretation. 
Despite Robbins's objections, the bill quickly passed the House and was 
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sent to the Post Office Committee of the Senate on April22. Postmaster Gen-
eral Brown wanted no more modifications, even if the bill was not exactly 
what he wanted. According to MacCracken, "I talked with the Postmaster Gen-
eral after he had been before the Committee, and he said he hoped no amend-
ments would be offered on the floor, as he was afraid it would only tend to 
complicate the situation, and he thought there was enough flexibility in the 
Bill to take care of almost any kind of situation."79 
Sen. Lawrence Phipps of Colorado, chairman of the Senate's Post Office 
Committee, had discussed Robbins's concerns with Brown and assured Robbins 
that they would be eligible for any new contract: 
For your private information, I believe I am justified in stating that it is the 
desire of the Postmaster General to consider any bids which your company will 
be in a position to make; that he is anxious to have your company qualify as 
contractors and does not know of any reason why your bids should not be con-
sidered for any air mail route which it is proposed to establish or extend. 
The necessity for securing prompt passage of this Act is such that it was 
believed unwise to make any modifications of the bill in the form in which it has 
just passed the House, as this would necessitate a conference which might un-
duly delay the adoption of the measure. In the light of the explanations made by 
the Postmaster General it was thought unnecessary to modify the bill along the 
lines suggested by you. 80 
With this information, Robbins withdrew his effort to amend the bill. "We 
do not wish to be obstructionists:' PAIC president George Hann wrote Brown, 
"and we appreciate that the best good for the whole aviation industry will 
certainly have its eventual compensations for Pennsylvania and for the Pitts-
burgh community:'81 Guided by Senators Charles McNary and Phipps, the 
McNary-Watres Act was approved without further difficulty on April 24. On 
April 30, President Hoover signed H.R. 11704 into law. 
Chapter 8 
Realignment 
T A Jhile the fight raged in Congress over the future of air transportation, 
Y Y industry was preparing for the expected changes in different ways. Some 
airlines fought desperately just to survive until the new legislation passed; others 
sought to position themselves to take advantage of the coming reforms. It was 
a time of turmoil. All the airlines and air mail contractors felt the pressure, but 
none more so than the Aviation Corporation. 
Chaos still reigned in New York despite the recent reorganization and the 
creation of American Airways. The disparate operations and business philoso-
phies of the numerous component parts of Aviation Corporation continued 
to work against efforts to streamline the corporation's activities. Embry-Riddle, 
over which the idea of AVCO was born one year earlier, refused to join with 
the other air mail carriers and submit to control by American until the minor-
ity interests of their stockholders were better protected. The continuing prob-
lem of integrating the various accounting systems plagued the company while 
losses mounted. A top-heavy organization with no clear-cut lines of communi-
cation or authority undermined attempts to improve the corporation's perfor-
mance; management divided into competing cliques issuing conflicting orders, 
and top leaders micromanaged and refused to listen to constructive advice. 
The crisis came to a head while AVCO's Washington representatives were 
working strenuously on behalf of the Post Office for passage of the Watres bill. 
A frustrated and distracted Hainer Hinshaw expressed his opinions to Inter-
state Airlines chief Col. William Schauftler. "There has been very little change 
in the New York situation as yet;' stated Hinshaw. "There has been a great ado 
with orders to do this and that and the others and about what is going to be 
done, but as yet, the companies have not been dissolved, or the operating com-
pany legally formed, and I have expressions from the different companies to the 
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effect that they are going to fight it as long as they can." Hinshaw expected the 
chaos to continue until, in desperation, significant improvements were made. 1 
Aviation Corporation director George Hann demanded immediate steps 
be taken to sort out the difficulties and find a solution before the company 
collapsed and their best efforts over the past year were wasted. He reiterated 
his complaint that Graham Grosvenor's management style was paralyzing the 
company. "Graham has been his own worst enemy;' he declared. "His refusal 
to delegate authority enmeshed him in the constant petty bickerings and mi-
nor problems best left to middle managers to solve. He should have freed him-
self instead to apply his skills to the long range tasks required of a corporate 
president."2 
Despite Hann's support for the new president of American, James 
Hamilton, he was concerned that the lack of aviation expertise in upper man-
agement was crippling the company. Grosvenor knew Otis Elevators well, and 
Hamilton was an experienced bus line operator, but neither of them under-
stood the new business of aviation sufficiently to run an aviation holding com-
pany or an airline. They needed to travel to the field to acquire a better 
understanding of actual operations, not remain isolated from the industry's 
real problems while still issuing conflicting and inappropriate commands.3 
Hann felt that these top-level problems were enervating the entire com-
pany and damaging its effectiveness and even the safety of operations. He 
strongly pressed Chairman W. Averell Harriman to make additional organiza-
tional reforms before time ran out.4 Hann urged that the board immediately 
authorize creation of a special investigating committee to examine the wors-
ening situation and make recommendations for changes. "The investigation 
should be a thorough one and, if properly accomplished, will require consid-
erable time;' stated Hann. "If necessary, the Aviation Corporation could con-
sider this report as a professional service and make payment therefore .... 
They will be the cheapest dollars we have ever spent." Hann suggested that 
Roland Palmedo and Frederic Coburn of the engineering firm of Sanderson 
and Porter arrange for the special committee. "It is very apparent that a period 
of readjustment is confronting the industry at the present time;' he concluded. 
"If we are to build wisely for the future, it is necessary that we now 'put our 
house in good order' and profit by our past experiences:'s 
Harriman and the board of directors agreed to form an executive advisory 
committee with members Roland Palmedo, R.H.M. Robinson, W.L. Campbell, 
Thurman Bane, and Frederic G. Coburn. Their first meeting, held on Febru-
ary 18, examined the organization of AVCO, the organization of American 
Airways, and the accounting systems used by AVCO and American. Seven 
meetings were held over the next two months. On March 7, the committee 
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released an interim report so that AVCO could take immediate action on the 
most pressing issues. 
The committee urgently requested that clear lines of authority be deter-
mined and that all presidents of the subsidiary companies report to the AVCO 
Executive Committee through the president of AVCO. At present, Hamilton, 
the president of American Airways, had a free hand and was not working with 
Grosvenor, the president of AVCO, or the executive committee. Hamilton's 
dictatorial management style during his brief tenure was clearly not working. 
Frederic Coburn shouldered the blame for the managerial failures. "I had a 
man in mind whom I hoped would be brought in with an idea of contributing 
something along the lines of organization and operating routine that air line 
operators up to date seem to have lacked," he stated, "but not at all the idea of 
letting a public utility man come in and attempt to run the whole works." 
Coburn concluded, "The czar idea is all wrong."6 
This problem reflected other difficulties, as the leadership of American 
Airways was not coordinating its technical and engineering matters with the 
other branches of the corporation. Earlier, Coburn had noted that American 
Airways had a responsibility to AVCO to consider itself"a sales outlet for the 
manufacturing divisions of the parent company."7 The report concluded that 
"a Technical Department, with personnel competent to exercise technical con-
trol over the operations of [American] Airways, be created and put into op-
eration promptly" and "a competent technical control of all purchases be 
inaugurated." 
In addition, the newly created treasury and accounting departments were 
discovered to have been working at crossed purposes, complicated by the fact 
that a third branch, a different accounting department, was operating in New 
York. The problem was so acute that American Airways had no way of know-
ing their true costs of operation. The cavalier methods of accounting had hid-
den the actual costs of running the airlines and were ruining the corporation. 
A careful audit prepared for the committee revealed that previous estimates 
were grossly inaccurate. Earlier, it was believed that it cost 40.5 cents per mile 
to fly a Wright J-5 powered, single-engine, open-cockpit mail plane and $1.33 
per mile to fly a Ford Tri-Motor. Actual costs were 89.2 cents and $2.09 per 
mile, respectively. 8 
The advisory committee recommended that "the Treasury and Account-
ing Departments be combined under a Treasurer, he to be Treasurer in addi-
tion to all subsidiaries of Aviation [Corporation]:' Two principal assistants 
would share the workload and report directly to the treasurer. This, it was 
hoped, would unify control and improve cooperation within AVC0.9 
On March 24 and April2, while the Post Office was battling for the Watres 
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bill, the advisory committee released its final report. Along with making de-
tailed recommendations concerning Fairchild and the manufacturing aspects 
of AVCO, the report made explicit recommendations concerning air mail and 
the fate of passenger operations. It was clear that without government help, AVCO 
should admit defeat and withdraw from the passenger-carrying business. The 
industry was too new and too volatile to risk further capital expenditures with-
out some assurance of profitability at some time in the future. Committee mem-
bers agreed thatAVCO should continue in the mail transportation business "but 
that it remain in passenger transportation business only to such extent as may 
be necessary to retain mail contracts." They would recommend abandoning pas-
senger service "if it should be found possible to retain mail contracts without 
continuing in the passenger transportation business;' and suggested that in such 
a case, AVCO fly customers only on an experimental basis. 10 
The committee hoped that if AVCO were compelled to carry passengers, the 
Post Office would help them by consolidating existing unprofitable routes into a 
more rational and profitable network. The fate of American Airways and pas-
senger air travel now lay completely in the hands of the Post Office. "Under the 
new law;' the report continued, "the Post Office Department should have avail-
able funds and latitude of authority such as probably to make all of Aviation's 
mail contracts profitable, and also such as to make some contribution toward 
the cost of passenger transport; but the Committee understands that as one of 
the purposes of the mail contract law is to foster passenger transport, Aviation 
will be required to remain in the passenger transport business to some extent:' 11 
To this end committee members recommended that AVCO's existing pas-
senger lines, operated by Southern Air Transport from Dallas to El Paso, be 
retained to gather experience and, more important, "to not give up the present 
priority rights for a portion of the southern transcontinental mail contract." 
They also suggested that the passenger routes operated by Braniff and 
Robertson be continued between Chicago, St. Louis, and Tulsa in order to 
strengthen American Airways' bargaining position with the Post Office. Un-
der the new law, they reasoned, Robertson's CAM-2 would be extended from 
St. Louis to Tulsa. All other passenger routes were to be abandoned. 12 
While the advisory committee was working on its report, a self-appointed 
committee composed of board members made its own recommendations con-
cerning AVCO's management crisis, dealing specifically with operations. This 
committee, operating with the approval of the advisory committee, under-
took a detailed field examination of AVCO's operations and reached similar, 
damning conclusions about the organization's lack of well-developed programs, 
poor coordination, and consequent huge losses. Specifically, this group exam-
ined AVCO's New York organization and transport operations. The pending 
changes in the postal laws pressed this committee to force a reorganization so 
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thatAVCO would be better positioned to take advantage of the expected changes 
wrought by the Watres Act and thereby give the corporation defined objec-
tives and a chance for profitability in airline operations. 
They, too, discovered confused lines of authority and responsibility be-
tween AVCO and American Airways. Local managements were over-organized 
and carried excessive overhead costs, often with overpaid and redundant ex-
ecutive staff. Although middle management was competent and actual opera-
tions proceeded well, overhaul, maintenance, and shop facilities were generally 
inadequate and the acquisition of aircraft and related equipment haphazard 
and uncoordinated. The poor coordination with the corporate leadership was 
found to produce "resentment, jealousy, and friction locally and between local 
executives and the New York office."13 
This problem, which manifested itself through the rise of cliques in the 
New York organization, was largely responsible for the confusing state of 
AVCO's accounting practices. The committee agreed with the earlier findings 
that the existing three accounting systems were causing tremendous problems 
and that one standardized method, based on the model developed by the Post 
Office, should be agreed upon. In this way, accurate data, necessary for the 
computation of true costs with relationship to the Post Office Department's 
requirements, could be determined ( 4-5). 
Equipment was found to be obsolete and inefficient, and the consequent 
economic losses were heavy. Although maintained properly, the aircraft were 
generally used incorrectly. Aircraft of too great a capacity were flown on thin 
routes, unnecessarily producing high operating costs. It was further learned 
that of the 289 aircraft in American's fleet, 132 were surplus to their needs but 
had not been written off or sold. There was apparently no attempt to stan-
dardize on any one type that could have reduced acquisition and operating 
costs as well ( 6). Although traffic had greatly improved because of the recent 
rate cuts, with load factors increasing from an average of 35 percent before the 
cuts to an average of 65 percent after, the new fares were too low to permit a 
profit without a government subsidy. 
Attempts to cut costs through the suspension of subsidiary operations by 
Braniff Air Lines and Central Air Lines in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas were 
offset by the replacement of cheaper single-engined aircraft with more expen-
sive tri-motor airliners. The committee laid the blame for this situation squarely 
at the feet of AVCO president Graham Grosvenor, just as George Hann had 
feared the year before (9-10). 
The chaotic conditions in the field were reflective of the disorganization 
of the New York office. The committee discovered a very loosely knit, unorga-
nized department run by a president unwilling to share authority or responsi-
bility. The absence of any delegation of duties produced poor communications 
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and resulted in the rise of competing cliques within headquarters. This in turn 
resulted in much wasteful duplication of efforts on the part of the operating 
companies when confronted with conflicting instructions and requests. As with 
the operating companies, AVCO was burdened with overhead, particularly in 
excessive personnel, exorbitant salaries, and the leasing of extraneous office 
space. The original plan, which was to operate with a decentralized manage-
ment that would allow each subsidiary more freedom of action, had never 
been implemented. They found that the creation of American Airways was 
too hasty and the selection of James Hamilton as president a poor choice based 
on his subsequent performance. This resulted in a conflicting line of author-
ity, as Hamilton was responsible not to the president of AVCO, which was the 
proper channel up the organizational chart, but only to the American Airways 
Board of Directors. Consequently, many important decisions were being made 
without the knowledge of AVCO's complete board (12). 
The committee was astonished to discover that neither Grosvenor nor 
Hamilton had bothered to contact the Post Office Department to explain the 
new organization of American Airways. This was a crucial point, as postal 
contracts were essential to American's survival, yet American's management 
had "taken little interest in this important phase of the organization's activi-
ties" ( 4). Given the cooperative nature of the Post Office and the possibility of 
improving service through route consolidations, the committee expected 
American to take advantage of this opportunity. Unfortunately, they had not 
done so. The cavalier manner of management had, in fact, imperiled American's 
relations with the department ( 13). 
Despite the tireless efforts of Hainer Hinshaw to fight for the Watres bill, 
the committee discovered thatAVCO's board of directors had little knowledge 
or understanding of these critical negotiations because all contact with the 
Washington office had been through either Grosvenor or Loucks. Hinshaw 
had performed admirably for the company in representing AVCO's interests 
before the department, yet "it is lamentable that Mr. Hinshaw has not received 
greater support from New York" (14). 
The pending legislation was seen as providing the necessary support for 
AVCO and American to stay in the air transportation business and even oper-
ate profitably, if management could take advantage of the changing situation. 
It was correctly seen that of all the contractors carrying the mail, those under 
AVCO's control would benefit greatest under the proposed mileage payment 
plan, as American had numerous routes with substantial distances but little 
poundage. Estimates made by the committee concluded that AVCO would 
reap an additional $100,000 per month under the Watres Act, essentially dou-
bling their subsidy to $3 million and increasing AVCO's share of the postal 
subsidy from 11 to 22.5 percent. 14 
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Unfortunately, management had taken no steps with the Post Office to pre-
pare for the coming changes by determining new routes, consolidated routes, or 
cost -accounting measures. With limited government funding, the department 
would no longer support inefficient operations and routes of dubious utility. 
The committee stressed the importance of developing a trunk line, operating 
directly from coast to coast, which would interest the department to the exclu-
sion of other competitors. The corporation was faced with two options con-
cerning passenger transportation: it could eliminate all unprofitable routes and 
later acquire other profitable airlines or it could continue all of its operations, 
even at a loss, in order to maintain control and the rights over certain routes and 
"cut out competition." Committee members suggested acceptance of the first 
option, except where the Post Office could provide an adequate subsidy. Most 
critically for the future of the air transportation industry in the United States, if 
the Watres Act failed to become law, they recommended that "all passenger lines 
be suspended, with the exception of an experimental modelline."15 
Their research revealed that the Post Office Department was willing to 
cooperate if AVCO showed a willingness to improve its management. The de-
partment also expected in return to participate directly in determining poli-
cies within the contracting companies for the promotion of air mail and 
passenger operations. The committee concluded, "Prompt steps should be taken 
to impress the Department with the desire of the Aviation Corporation to 
operate along such lines in close cooperation with the Department."16 
Drastic measures were required for American Airways to survive the cur-
rent crisis. The large size of the board of directors and their lack of knowledge 
hampered efficient operations, but the committee felt that little could be done 
to reduce the number of members. Instead, it strongly urged that the execu-
tive committee redouble its efforts to inform all members of the board of 
AVCO's activities and that the executive committee itself reorganize and ac-
quire more members with actual operational experience. Most important, the 
committee recommended a significant change at the top: the removal of Gra-
ham Grosvenor. Committee members also recommended that James Hamilton 
be relieved of his duties as president of American Airways and did not mince 
their words: "The Committee believes that Mr. Hamilton is not qualified for 
the position which he is occupying and that immediate steps should be taken 
to sever his connection with American Airways, Inc."17 
If these changes were implemented and if the important pending postal 
legislation passed Congress, the committee felt that AVCO had a good chance 
to emerge from the crisis in good order. The corporation had substantial cash 
reserves that, if not depleted because of bad management and unprofitable 
operations, would eventually enable the company to take advantage of the 
opportunity presented by the Watres Act and future developments. 
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The AVCO Board of Directors agreed with the recommendations of both 
committees and acted promptly. Grosvenor was relieved of his duties and el-
evated to the ceremonial position of vice chairman of the board and replaced 
by Frederic Coburn. 18 Hamilton was fired. 
Throughout AVCO's convulsions, the executives of United Aircraft and 
Transport did not sit idly by. With the Post Office Department busy with the 
fight for the Watres bill, Fred Rentschler and company sought to strengthen 
their position for the immediate future through astute maneuvering on Wall 
Street. Their target was National Air Transport. 
With the clear understanding of Postmaster General Brown's plans for the 
future of air transportation and his desire to expand passenger service, UATC 
saw an opportunity to jump ahead of the competition while fulfilling the per-
ceived program of the Post Office Department to create a system of long, trans-
continental routes. The lengthy discussions in the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Airways during the past year clearly demonstrated the 
government's plan for a middle and a southern transcontinental route. Through 
Boeing Air Transport's control and operation of the air mail route from San 
Francisco to Chicago, United Aircraft was in a strong position to take control 
of the existing transcontinental route through to New York. 
Already, United Aircraft had acquired Stout Air Service, which extended 
United's network to Cleveland through Detroit. This move, while gaining con-
trol of another mail contract, was not a direct line upon which to base trans-
continental service. The creation of a new airline or an extension of Stout to 
New York was impractical and potentially disastrous economically. National 
Air Transport already controlled CAM -17 from New York to Chicago and was 
operating efficiently. A direct confrontation would only prove catastrophic to 
both parties. To Fred Rentschler, the answer was obvious: buy NAT. 
Quietly and carefully, United began to purchase NAT stock in February 
1930. By March, United had enough shares to approached Earle H. Reynolds, 
president of NAT, with a proposal to exchange a large block of United com-
mon shares for a controlling interest in National. The NAT Executive Com-
mittee received the proposal favorably. In anticipation of the conclusion of the 
deal, United deposited eighty thousand of its common shares in the City Bank 
Farmers Trust Company of New York on March 26 with the understanding 
that each share of UATC was to be swapped for four shares of NAT. 19 The 
proposed merger would result in the creation of the most powerful airline in 
the country with over $33 million in assets.20 
Clement Keys was not initially opposed. He was becoming increasing over-
burdened with the operations of his vast empire and was primarily concerned 
with saving Transcontinental Air Transport. His overarching concern was the 
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promotion of aviation and air transportation. National Air Transport was a 
going concern that did not require his attention. TAT did. William MacCracken, 
an interested industry observer, expressed his opinion of the pending merger 
to Harris Hanshue. "There is to be a special meeting of the Board of Directors 
on Thursday of next week (April 5) to consider the proposition and make a 
recommendation to the stockholders;' he stated. "I do not know what C.M. 
Keys' attitude is on this particular proposal, but I do know that he is inclined 
to get his affairs in such shape that in the future they will not require as much 
of his personal attention as they have in the past, and I also happen to know 
that he thinks very well of the United organization's management:'21 Keys's 
confidence in the excellent management of UATC was well placed, so losing 
control of NAT was not a primary concern. 
His health, however, was a concern. Keys's years of stress dealing with busi-
ness and Wall Street had left his nerves frayed. The collapse of the market in 
October had wiped out his personal reserves and had left him vulnerable. 
Unknown to most in the industry, including those in his own companies, Keys 
had personally borrowed $14.5 million from North American in call loans 
before the crash. He used this money to invest in various other aviation and 
nonaviation stocks as he had done successfully for years. But now the securi-
ties were virtually worthless. At some point the board would recall the loans, 
but Keys had no money to repay them. The resulting stress was understand-
ably considerable. Increasingly, Keys spent time away from New York recover-
ing from nervous collapses at his Saint Catharine's Island vacation home off 
the Georgia coast. The board eventually did recall the loans, but Keys was un-
able to pay back all that he owed. An arrangement was made, but it cost him 
his job. By the end of 1931, Keys withdrew from aviation after he was forced to 
leave North American and Curtiss-Wright and repay what he could. 22 
The acquisition of NAT by United was at first endorsed by Clement Keys. 
He analyzed United's offer for his board of directors following a meeting of 
the NAT Executive Committee on March 26, 1930. Although direct compari-
sons were difficult because NAT was strictly an operating company and UATC 
was a much larger and complex holding company, Keys calculated that the 
offer was profitable to NAT stockholders. Based on their reported earnings per 
share for 1929, he estimated that one share of United returned $4.52, whereas 
four shares of National returned $4.12. Although Boeing Air Transport was 
expected to have a reduced income following poor weather and the expected 
lowering of the air mail rates, it was seen as a very solid component of a very 
solid corporation. Based on this analysis and a comparison of their respective 
assets, Keys recommended accepting the offer. 23 
But when the matter reached National's board of directors, many, though 
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not all, opposed the arrangement, not willing to relinquish control of their 
profitable airline. Col. Paul Henderson of NAT raised the stakes, announcing 
that, for the first time, National was to inaugurate passenger service along its 
routes. The new service would follow the mail route exactly but employ a sepa-
rate schedule designed for passenger convenience, not that of the Post Office. 
This was in direct challenge to Boeing Air Transport's earlier announcement 
that they were to expand their regular passenger service along CAM -18 to 
Chicago. After United reduced its bid to a 1 for 3 1/2 exchange, following a 
reconsideration by the UATC Board, the NAT Board of Directors promptly 
and unanimously rejected the lesser offer.24 
Undaunted, Rentschler pressed harder and announced that United would 
attempt to gain control through the acquisition of controlling interest in Na-
tional. On April 4, United announced that they would make their offer di-
rectly to NAT's stockholders during the annual meeting scheduled for April1 0 
in an attempt to circumvent the NAT Board while continuing to gain control 
through the market. By this time, Rentschler estimated, United was already 
the largest owner of NAT stock, controlling approximately 30 percent, or 
200,000 of the 650,000 outstanding shares. "We are seeking control of N .A. T. 
because we believe that great economies may be effected through the forma-
tion of a single transcontinental line, carrying mail, passengers, and express:' 
stated Rentschler. "If the N.A.T. lines were to be paralleled by a United line, 
one or the other might lose money. From an economic standpoint, the air 
between the two coasts is not big enough to be divided:'25 In preparation for 
this attempted coup, Rentschler sent a detailed letter to all NAT stockholders 
asking for their proxies and outlining what he felt were the advantages of such 
an affiliation.26 
National was willing to fight. In order to head off a possible stockholder 
uprising and a proxy fight, the NAT Board attempted to rewrite their corpo-
rate bylaws. On April?, the corporate constitution was amended allowing that 
board members could only be removed for cause and only by a two-thirds 
majority. Further, they arranged that future changes in the bylaws could only 
be made by a similar two-thirds majority of the stockholders, although the 
same laws could be amended by just a majority of the board. Finally, the size 
of a quorum was reduced from a majority of stockholders to one-third. On 
April9, NAT, through a complicated arrangement with its parent corporation, 
North American, issued 300,000 additional shares, enough, it was hoped, to 
preserve control and prevent United's takeover bid during the impending 
stockholder's meeting.27 
Clement Keys now rose to the challenge and appealed directly to NAT's 
wavering shareholders. He decried United's efforts as an attempt to destroy 
one of the nation's pioneer airlines and to create a destructive monopoly against 
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the public's interest. Rather disingenuously, he also railed against Wall Street 
interests gaining control: 
We do not think that it is to the best interest of the public, of our stockhold-
ers, or of the Nation as a whole, that the main line from New York to Chicago 
should be controlled by United Aircraft & Transport Corporation .... No eco-
nomic purpose can be served by such an economic consolidation and the very 
diversity of interest between the two has led, and will lead to a competition in 
quality of service to the public that would be eliminated by such a consolidation. 
The theory upon which this raid was based was, in effect, that it was time to 
eliminate from aviation the pioneer group who have created most of the things 
that have been created so far in the United States in this art, and to put them 
under a financial control centering in one of the largest banking groups in Wall 
Street.28 
The creation of one large transcontinental holding company controlling 
the two best air mail routes raised fears in many circles. William Gibbs McAdoo 
and James Edgerton, who were anxiously following the course of the discus-
sions concerning the Watres bill, saw the specter of monopoly in the merger. 
Growing increasingly pessimistic about the possibility of starting Southern 
Sky-Lines, McAdoo expressed the mounting fears of many independent op-
erators. "The way things are shaping in the air transportation game leads me 
to believe that a few powerful companies are going to have such a hold on it 
that it will be impossible for a new company to get a chance;' he declared. "I 
notice that Boeing had taken over, or is about to take over, the National Air 
Transport. This, of course, creates a very strong combination with which com-
petition will be most difficult, especially when that company has mail con-
tracts and will undoubtedly continue to receive the favor of the Department."29 
It was rumored by Western Air Express that Postmaster General Brown 
himself was angry with United and threatened to withdraw Post Office sup-
port and turn the industry over to the Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Negotiations over the Watres bill had reached a critical phase in early April 
and Brown was worried that members of Congress would see this move by 
United as an unwarranted step toward monopoly and an expression of their 
worst fears. Although Brown clearly favored the large holding companies, he 
did so only under his terms. He had no desire to see a true monopoly control 
the entire industry. This merger was viewed an attempt to circumvent his care-
fully laid plans, and it risked fatally damaging his air mail program. The ru-
mor, if true, noted William Bishop, might give his company an advantage: 
However, there is this angle, interesting as it is and certainly to our advan-
tage. Brown is plenty on the war path over the United-N.A.T. merger negotia-
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tions. He called someone at the National City Bank and told them that if the 
deal was made he would withdraw his support to aviation and put it under (the) 
I. C. C. He accused then of giving him the double cross, of making things embar-
rassing, and in general he let them have both barrels. 
Hainer said that he gave Paul Henderson just as much hell as he raised over 
the telephone. I don't believe, however, Henderson ever knew such a deal was 
hanging fire until he saw it in print.30 
By AprillO, United Aircraft had acquired a substantial amount of stock, 
but not enough had been transferred in time for Rentschler to gain control 
and oust the current NAT Board. Without sufficient proxies, United attempted 
to postpone the meeting by voting only two shares and challenging the legality 
of the new rules for a quorum. This was overruled when the board declared 
that a sufficient number of stockholders and proxies were present under the 
recently amended lower requirements. 31 Howard Coffin, chairman of the Board 
of NAT, declared victory: 
Efforts of the United Aircraft & Transport Corporation to secure control of 
National Air Transport through a publicly announced policy ofpreventing a 
quorum at the annual meeting today in Wilmington were signally defeated when 
a majority of the proxies at the meeting were voted for the retention of the 
present management. 
Two directors of the United Corporation, both of whom were named in the 
proxies solicited by the United interests, were present at the meeting. They voted 
only two shares of stock and did not offer the proxies obtained by United dur-
ing the last five weeks. This action is astonishing inasmuch as they solicited proxies 
from stockholders with the evident understanding that the stock would be voted 
at the meeting and then deliberately refused to vote and, in effect, threw a large 
block of other people's stock into the wastebasket. 
Failure to vote the stock was explained by a public statement read into the 
record of the meeting, which said that the United interests sought to prevent a 
quorum and thus invalidate the stockholder's meeting.32 
Congratulations poured in to Keys and NAT from around the industry. 
Harold Pitcairn was "delighted to see in the paper today that the control of the 
National Air Transport remains in the old hands."33 Graham Grosvenor ex-
tended his congratulations as well, with the hope that NAT and American would 
soon begin discussions concerning the acquisition of several of American's 
unprofitable lines. Neither Braniff, which paralleled CAM-3 between Dallas, 
Kansas City, and Chicago, nor Universal, which paralleled CAM -17 between 
Chicago and Cleveland, had air mail contracts and consequently were losing 
prodigious sums of money. National Air Transport, on the other hand, had 
announced that it wanted to open passenger service but did not yet have the 
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equipment or infrastructure. The acquisition of these two American compa-
nies would allow NAT to buy two existing passengers lines. American had ap-
proached Clement Keys with the deal and was to present it to his board before 
the AprillO meeting. Stated the minutes of AVCO's board meeting of April 7, 
"It is evident that N.A.T. must sooner or later commence passenger opera-
tions and it seems reasonable that at the reduced cost to them of operating this 
passenger line that it would be advantageous to takeover a 'going concern' rather 
than to build from the ground up."34 
Grosvenor and American would have to wait, for United had not given up 
the fight. Rentschler had already purchased control of NAT but had not enough 
time to execute their plan during the stockholders meeting. Responding to 
Grosvenor, Keys replied, "The change in the whole situation due to the pur-
chase of the control of NAT by United, may alter this entire situation but it 
does not remove the fact that it would be good judgment for our interests to 
draw closely together whenever possible."35 
In response to the sudden change in NAT's bylaws, United Aircraft went 
to the Chancery Court in Wilmington, Delaware, to ask for a restraining or-
der, which was granted on April 14, on the grounds that the board had voted 
proxies it no longer controlled. This prevented National from executing its 
plan to issue three hundred thousand more shares of stock and exchange it 
with Eastern Air Transport to preserve control of NAT by Keys's group.36 
Keys had no stomach for the fight, wisely recognizing that he could not 
win. He also sincerely felt that any further confrontation would be harmful to 
the entire industry, especially during the delicate negotiations that were con-
tinuing in Washington. After analyzing United's complaint, Keys decided that 
the "policies of the company should not be dictated by stock market consider-
ations."37 The arguments were moot now that United had acquired sufficient 
shares to control the company. Keys had more pressing concerns with TAT 
and his others aviation businesses. He expressed his opinion to Chester Cuthell 
in a telegram on Aprill9: "On further consideration, [of the] plan [for] hold-
ing N.A.T., the less I like it. If United has bought control we should let them 
have it without trying to make it hard for them, the other policy is not in line 
with our usual corporation policies because it will do no good to aviation as 
[a] whole, we have plenty to do protecting our other interests and even if we 
won it would only be for a little while [that] we could hold N.A.T."38 
On April23, Cuthell telegraphed back to Keys that he had settled the con-
troversy by agreeing to a one-to-three stock swap. The board concurred.39 
United was notified of the decision, and immediately Rentschler issued his 
formal proposal to the Board of NAT. The arrangement was contingent upon 
the withdrawal of National's plan to issue the additional three hundred thou-
sand shares and to reorganize the board according to United's wishes.40 Na-
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tional agreed. Control of NAT passed amicably to United Aircraft, as both par-
ties were intent on preventing further discord within the industry. Some ob-
servers nevertheless were surprised by the news. Observed James Edgerton, 
Two events of importance to us have occurred during the past few hours. 
The chief one is the passage of the amended Watres Bill by the Senate yesterday 
evening. It is expected to receive the signature of the President today. 
The second is the assumption of a stock control of National Air Transport 
by United Aviation. This came as quite a surprise here, especially the fact that 
this control is reported to be 56%. The reason I believe this affects us is that the 
Keys group have been outmaneuvered completely and will be looking to future 
openings to recoup.41 
Now, United Aircraft and Transport Corporation was perfectly positioned 
to take advantage of the new changes to be wrought by the Watres Act. In one 
swift coup, they had created the nation's first transcontinental airline. This 
was unprecedented. Not even the powerful railroads had been able to establish 
sole ownership of a major transcontinental line. In just over one year, the com-
pany would grow so quickly that the four major air transport components, 
Boeing Air Transport, National Air Transport, Pacific Air Transport, and Varney 
Air Lines, would be reorganized under one management holding company. 
On July 1, 1931, United Air Lines was born. But before this could happen, 
Walter Brown had an industry to reorganize. 
Chapter 9 
Drawing a New Map 
At long last, after the protracted struggle to revamp the air mail rate struc-
.1"1. ture and to enact the necessary legislation, Walter Brown was ready to 
take direct action. Passage of the Watres Act left him in total control of the air 
mail situation and the virtual dictator of U.S. air transportation. Acting as a 
one-man regulatory agency, Brown now had the power to redraw the air mail 
map to his satisfaction. 
He did so with deliberation. He totally controlled the establishment of 
new routes and the extension or consolidation of existing routes. The depart-
ment had already created a unified system of accounting and required the 
contractors to use it. Now Brown controlled the amount of mail carried, greatly 
influenced the type of aircraft used, and directly encouraged the carrying of 
passengers to offset expected losses. He determined the compensation as well 
as the subsidy allowed. 1 The Watres Act did not give him all of the power he 
wanted; he was still encumbered by the requirement for competitive bidding 
on long routes, and the interpretation of his ability to extend routes into new 
territory had yet to be determined. Nevertheless, Brown felt he now had suffi-
cient authority to act. 
Immediately following passage of the Watres Act, Brown prevailed on the 
airlines with contracts nearing expiration to exchange their contracts for ten-
year route certificates. This gave the original contractors an additional six years 
to fly the mail and would allow them to make long-term commitments to 
their investors with the expectation of a proper return. In exchange, they agreed 
to abide by the postmaster general's periodic wishes to reduce the rates they 
were paid. CAM routes 1 to 5, affecting Colonial, Robertson, National, West-
ern Air Express, and Varney, all received certificates.2 
Brown's new space system of payment alleviated the department of a com-
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plica ted, inefficient weight system and distributed the government largess much 
more equitably among the contractors. Each route was now considered equally 
important and operating in the public interest and was, therefore, entitled to 
an equitable disbursement of the air mail payments. The department was now 
also able to contract for space on passenger aircraft that flew into areas not 
previously served by air mail. Payment was not to exceed $1.25 per mile. In 
addition, the postmaster general was authorized to award new contracts on 
routes where the mail load would not exceed 225 pounds, that is, twenty-five 
cubic feet of space or 9 pounds per cubic foot-the same rate authorized by 
the Interstate Commerce Commission for mail carried by the railroads-to the 
lowest responsible bidder at a rate not to exceed 40 cents per mile. In a direct 
effort to forestall unprincipled bidders from creating an airline overnight with-
out proper financing or organization, all potential new entrants had to have 
owned and operated a regularly scheduled air service with a route of 250 miles 
or more at least six months in advance of the advertisement for bids.3 
The new payment formula, which became effective on April29, 1930, al-
lowed for two classes of air mail: B for routes carrying less than one hundred 
pounds and A for all other routes carrying more than one hundred pounds. 
Class A payments started with a base rate of 40 cents per mile. Brown specifi-
cally encouraged the development of safer, more powerful aircraft through 
the use of variables (i.e., bonuses), which were added on a per mile basis to the 
base rate and included 2 cents for difficult terrain, 2.5 cents for operating in 
typically foggy conditions, 3 cents for carrying a one-way radio and 6 cents for 
a two-way radio, and 15 cents if the entire route was flown after dusk. 
The postmaster general greatly preferred multi-engined aircraft for safety 
reasons, particularly if they were to carry passengers: in fact, he insisted on it. 
To encourage the use of these larger, more expensive but safer aircraft, he gave 
a bonus of 13 cents per mile for machines with multiple engines. 
Of great importance in sparking the subsequent development of a new 
generation of airliners that would revolutionize air transportation worldwide, 
the Post Office also gave bonuses for carrying passengers. Aircraft carrying 
from 2 to 5 passengers were awarded 1.5 cents per miles; 6 to 9 passengers, 3 
cents; 10 to 19, 4.5 cents; 20 to 29, 6 cents; and 30 or more passengers, 7.5 
cents.4 These rates were to remain in effect until the end of the year, when the 
department would review and possibly revise the payment scheme either up-
ward or downward. 
Although most of the contractors who had been living well off their pre-
viously high rates would see their payments reduced, they had the opportu-
nity, through these generous incentives, to improve their technological and 
operational efficiency, which would help to offset their decreased postal rev-
enues. The air mail carriers who had been forced to bid too low to earn any 
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profit along their routes were now presented with an equitable method of pay-
ment that would increase their income to a profitable level. 
Explicitly, Brown wanted the airlines to acquire better, more modern equip-
ment and to promote passenger travel that, when operating in the public in-
terest, provided citizens with a new and faster method of transportation. In 
turn, the increased revenue would help offset the postal payment and subsidy, 
thereby providing an improved mail service at lower cost to the taxpayer while 
promoting a new transportation system. 5 
Brown clearly understood his self-appointed role as a one-man public util-
ity commission. All that was now needed was to assemble the contractors in 
Washington to discuss the impact of the new legislation and to take action to 
bolster the industry and save the passenger lines from imminent extinction. 
Brown instructed Second Assistant Postmaster General W. Irving Glover to 
call a meeting of all the contractors and a selected group of the larger passen-
ger carriers to assemble in Washington on May 19, 1930, to work out a plan for 
implementation of the Watres Act. As in 1929, Brown was true to his Hooverian 
associative beliefs and wanted to discuss this legislation with the interested 
parties before taking action. While given virtual dictatorial power, Brown 
wished to cooperate fully with the airlines in order to make his vision for the 
future of the industry work. With the economy free falling again after a brief 
spring recovery, the need for action was pressing. 
The postmaster general's overwhelming desire, contrary to the opinion of 
future critics, was to save the major passenger airlines. He had no need for the 
small, newly created companies and specifically wanted no part of any airline 
created after February 1930, for it was obvious to him that the only reason for 
their existence was to take advantage of his new legislation for their immedi-
ate speculative profit. His Progressive Republican vision involved an integrated 
national network of transcontinental lines operated by large, well-financed 
corporations in regulated competition with one another. He also wanted the 
airlines to help him determine which airlines would serve what area, always in 
the public interest. 
Glover received explicit instructions from Brown for the forthcoming con-
ference. He wanted prominent industry leaders present and ordered that they 
find a way to aid the passenger lines without resorting to potentially destruc-
tive competitive bidding. Glover conveyed this message to Earl B. Wadsworth, 
superintendant of the Air Mail Service: 
The Postmaster General is desirous of having a conference with representa-
tives of Companies mentioned below; by this I mean a substantial representa-
tive like [George] Wheat for the United Aircraft; Hanshue, Western Air, and 
Maddux ofT.A.T. He sees the feeling developing among the passenger carrying 
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lines who have no contract and have no way of getting into the picture unless it 
is by competitive bidding, and he wants to have a meeting with these represen-
tatives on next Monday, May 19, at two P.M. in his office, and desires to have a 
talk with them along the lines of just the best way for them to approach the 
question of giving aid to passenger lines. In other words, he wants them to come 
to some understanding so that it will not all be thrown into the pot and the 
passenger line operators left entirely outside due to the fact that the air mail 
operators would have the inside and would have the territory covered.6 
Brown would later be accused of attempting to destroy the independent 
passenger lines through these allegedly collusive meetings, but as Glover's state-
ment clearly shows, Brown's intentions were quite to the contrary. He wanted 
to save the passenger airlines, not destroy them. But he wanted this process 
done by his rules and according to his interpretations, to which subsequent 
new entrant airlines took self-interested exception. As events would show, his 
methods would involve consolidations, forcing the small, weakly financed com-
panies into cooperative arrangements and even mergers with larger holding 
companies, all in the interest of preserving a strong air transportation indus-
try but at the cost of the independence of many small, inefficient operators. 
To this meeting were invited representative of United Aircraft, the Avia-
tion Corporation, Western Air Express, Transcontinental Air Transport-
Maddux, Eastern Air Transport, and Stout Air Services. No new certificates 
were to be issued until executives from these companies met with the post-
master general. Of these, TAT-Maddux was the largest purely passenger line, 
and Eastern and National were solely mail carriers. Brown wanted to save TAT-
Maddux while encouraging the strictly air mail lines to start passenger service. 
Other smaller passenger lines were not directly represented, but Brown had 
every intention of providing them a share of the air mail pie, though on his 
own terms. 
According to the official Post Office Department press release, the May 19 
meeting was "the first time that operators of the large passenger lines have had 
an opportunity to talk with the Postmaster General and exchange views with 
him since the Watres measure became law." In his typical associative way, Brown 
intended that the operators and the department meet "in order to acquaint 
themselves with the provisions of the Watres bill recently made a law through 
the signature of President Hoover." In so doing, "representatives of every large 
passenger and air mail carrying concern throughout the country conferred 
today with Postmaster General Brown, Assistant Postmaster General Glover 
and other officials of the Department in charge of the Air Mail service."7 
At two o'clock on the afternoon of May 19, twenty-six prominent indi-
viduals from Western Air Express, National Air Transport, United Aircraft, 
TAT-Maddux, Eastern Air Transport, SAFE Way, Thompson Aeronautical, Ford, 
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Pittsburgh Aviation Industries, U.S. Air Lines, Curtiss-Wright, and the Avia-
tion Corporation assembled in the Gold Room, immediately adjacent to the 
postmaster general's office on the fifth floor of the Post Office building on 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Though still spring in Washington, the temperature was 
unseasonably hot, and the noise of riveting on the new Post Office building 
under construction next door added to the oppressive atmosphere. 
Brown entered the room and proceeded to outline the Watres Act and his 
plan for its implementation. He encouraged the group to find ways to cooper-
ate in assisting the struggling passenger lines and wanted the established com-
panies to agree among themselves the equitable division of the country based 
on their current operations in their most important areas. In essence, Brown 
was giving the pioneer airlines the opportunity to stake their claims, after which 
the department would protect their interests against unwarranted intrusions 
from unfit airlines. This point was crucial to Brown, for as long as aviation was 
still in its infancy, he strongly felt that it needed such protection to survive, 
particularly against unprincipled competition. As with the ICC before him 
and the Civil Aeronautics Board created later in the decade, Brown's plan en-
visioned government-regulated cartels that protected the regional interests of 
the major, established airlines while permitting responsible competition. He 
wished to ensure the protection of the corporations from destructive compe-
tition but would encourage direct competition over the transcontinental routes, 
which of course the department controlled. To do so he requested that the 
airline representatives also determine among themselves the best airlines to 
operate the new central and southern transcontinental routes. To prevent the 
invasion of underfinanced, newly created airlines, Brown hoped to limit com-
petitive bidding on these routes with the understanding that through the ex-
tension of existing lines from proven carriers, the transcontinental routes would 
be completed swiftly. Earl Wadsworth summarized the day's events: 
The Postmaster General opened the meeting by discussing the general pro vi-
sions of the Watres Bill and invited suggestions from those present as to the ways 
and means of assisting the passenger operators, inasmuch as it is understood none 
of the so-called strictly passenger lines are breaking even and it is apparent that 
they will need some assistance if they are to continue. The PMG expressed the 
desire to know whether it is going to be possible for the so-called pioneers to agree 
among themselves as to the territory in which they shall have the paramount in-
terest. He outlined certain prospective routes that were in contemplation some-
what as follows: a Southern Transcontinental route from Los Angeles to San Diego, 
thence to Fort Worth and Dallas; also a route from New York to St. Louis to Kansas 
City and Los Angeles; from St. Louis to Tulsa and Fort Worth; St. Paul to Winnipeg; 
possibly from St. Paul and Minneapolis to Omaha; possibly a route south from 
Cheyenne, and possibly one from Albany to Boston.8 
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The operators agreed with the plan. As his airline was going bankrupt, 
Jack Maddux ofTAT-Maddux supported the idea. All were in agreement that 
it was wise to avoid competitive bidding if possible. Lou Holland, of tiny United 
States Airways, which flew from Denver to Kansas City, said, "I think it should 
be worked out by agreement as I am afraid that competitive bidding will result 
in wild promotions:' Colonel Henderson and William Mayo seconded that 
opinion, as did Harris Hanshue. Remarked Hanshue, "We are willing to do 
anything within reason to work out the plan rather than to go into competi-
tive bidding:' The operators also agreed that they could cooperate in the public 
interest to implement Brown's ideas. "I believe there is a community of interests 
among the operators and the Department;' stated Fred Coburn of AVCO, "and 
they are ready to cooperate and find out how to do it:' United's George Wheat 
echoed that opinion: "I feel sure the entire group would be delighted to go into 
such a conference and work it out along the lines suggested:'9 
After Brown and his lieutenants withdrew, the group decided to form a 
subcommittee to thrash out the plan. William MacCracken, the former assis-
tant secretary of commerce for aeronautks and now the representative of 
Western and PAIC, suggested that they split up according to region; Henderson, 
now representing United's interests, thought they should organize into air mail 
carriers and non-air-mail carriers. Eventually, with Brown's approval, one sub-
committee composed of Henderson, Hanshue, Daniel Shaeffer, Richard 
Robbins, Richard "Tex" Marshall of Thompson Aeronautical, Lou Holland, 
William Mayo, Hainer Hinshaw, Thomas Doe, and Frank Russell of Curtiss-
Wright reconvened in the Gold Room that afternoon. By unanimous consent, 
they elected MacCracken chairman of the subcommittee and began their de-
liberations to determine the new extensions of the present air mail routes. 
After meeting in MacCracken's Washington office the following morning, 
the subcommittee reported to Glover at 2:00P.M. and prepared a statement for 
a meeting with the postmaster general on May 23. Twelve routes were dis-
cussed but little action taken, much to Brown's frustration. For Route 1, the 
southern transcontinental from Los Angeles to Atlanta via San Diego, El Paso, 
and Dallas, United, AVCO, Eastern, Western, and Erle Halliburton elicited in-
terest. All but United were operating to one or more points along that pro-
posed route. Eastern was particularly anxious to acquire this potentially 
lucrative line. Captain Doe reported this possibility to the Eastern Board of 
Directors, which enthusiastically supported his claim. 10 Route 2, from Los 
Angeles to New York, through Albuquerque, Amarillo, Kansas City, St. Louis, 
Columbus, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia, was contested by almost all of the 
participants. United, AVCO, Eastern, and Western, Erle Halliburton, Clifford 
Ball, Transcontinental Air Transport, and PAIC each claimed the route. The 
third route, from Omaha to St. Paul and Winnipeg, was basically the territory 
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of Northwest Airways, although United and AVCO flew into Omaha. United 
claimed part of Route 4 from Albany to Boston, as Stout originally flew over 
part of that territory, but AVCO had a better claim because its Colonial and 
Colonial Western airlines operated throughout that region. As for Route 5 from 
Pittsburgh to Norfolk through Washington, Eastern, TAT, PAIC, and Clifford 
Ball all wanted their share. Eastern was already operating between Washing-
ton and Norfolk, and PAIC and Ball competed for traffic out of Pittsburgh. 
United,AVCO, Western, Halliburton, and Curtiss Flying Service contended 
for Route 6 from Louisville to Memphis, Dallas, and Fort Worth. All agreed 
that Route 7 from Kansas City to Denver should go to U.S. Airways because 
Lou Holland's airline was already flying that line. Route 8 from Pueblo to Fort 
Worth and Dallas was argued over by United, AVCO, and Western, and Route 
9 from Pueblo to El Paso was already being flown by Western without opposi-
tion. Route 10 was to link Amarillo with St. Louis through Dallas and Okla-
homa City. United, AVCO, TAT, Western, and Halliburton's SAFE Way all 
covered parts of this proposed route. The last two routes went uncontested: AI 
Franks of National Parks wanted Route 11 from Great Falls, Montana, to 
Lethridge, and United was the only party interested in Route 12 from Seattle 
to Vancouver, British Columbia. 11 Hainer Hinshaw reassured the absent Colo-
nel Brittin by telegram that Northwest Airways' interest were recognized and 
that despite a great deal of talk, little of consequence had been decided. 12 
Others were becoming uneasy with the method with which the postmas-
ter general was dividing the air mail map. James Edgerton, who was desper-
ately trying to pressure William Gibbs McAdoo into action in order to save a 
chance to build and fly Southern Sky-Lines, was not invited to attend the meet-
ings but acquired the press releases nonetheless. Their erstwhile partner, Erie 
Halliburton, was represented, thus giving Edgerton a slim hope that Southern 
Sky-Lines might be saved from oblivion. Edgerton reported to McAdoo that 
Brown's plan for consolidations and extension were meeting significant legal 
obstacles. "I was not eligible to be present, due to the fact that we had no op-
erations," he wrote. "I understand Halliburton was represented by Mr. Clark. 
The upshot of the meeting seems to have been that the Bill (Watres) made 
very poor provision for the forty-cent passenger mail contract. Brown pre-
sented some wild idea to take care of the situation. This plan was to issue these 
contracts on negotiation and without competitive bidding to existing air mail 
contractors under the clause permitting consolidations and extensions, who 
would then be supposed to sublet these contracts to the passenger lines. Of 
course, this is foolish and can be stopped by the Comptroller General." 13 
Foolish or not, this was precisely how Brown wanted to take care of the 
hard-pressed passenger lines without harming the existing pioneer air mail 
contractors. William Denning, a Fort Worth attorney based in Washington 
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who represented Thompson Aeronautical and would later lead the fight against 
Brown's air mail plans, concurred with Edgerton's appraisal and his skepti-
cism about Brown's plan, stating, "I am still more convinced that ever that the 
scheme proposed by the Postmaster General is not warranted by law!' 14 
Brittin managed to arrive in Washington in time for the subsequent delib-
erations of the subcommittee and noted the problems developing between the 
passenger lines and the air mail contractors. Carriers such as Thompson and 
Halliburton were desperate for immediate help yet were in cutthroat competi-
tion with one another over the chance of acquiring a contract. This infighting 
was undermining Brown's careful strategy. Brown had hoped that these busi-
nessmen would agree to cooperate in his associative program for the industry 
and was surprised to find them squabbling among themselves. After witness-
ing the Monday, May 26 session, Brittin wrote: 
It appears that the Postmaster General was not able to get sufficient autho-
rization in the recent Watres Bill to enable him to put air mail on Passenger 
Lines without competitive bids. In order to avoid putting up Air Mail Contracts 
over these routes, to competitive bidders, he has called the principle passenger 
operators together and advised them that if they could agree among themselves 
on an equitable apportionment of routes he would grant the Air Mail Contracts 
under the power given him to extend Air Mail Contracts of lines already carry-
ing air mail. This created immediately a difficult situation as practically all of 
these passenger carrying lines are competitive and extremely jealous of each 
other. They realized, however, the seriousness of putting these lines up for bids 
and are anxious to work out an amicable agreement among themselves. They 
have been trying to do this for the past two weeks. 15 
Despite the growing parochial conflicts among the ranks of the airlines, 
Brittin correctly perceived the broad scope of Brown's national plan for air 
transportation. The postmaster general clearly wanted a logical network of 
powerful independent carriers competing against one another in a rational 
manner and in the public interest. "It is the expressed intention of the Post-
master General;' Brittin stated, "to develop three competing trans-continental 
lines; each line distinctly independent of the other and each controlled by one 
or more of the strongest aviation groups. 'United' through its recent acquisi-
tion of the 'N.A.T.' already has a transcontinental air mail line .... The other 
two transcontinental lines to be awarded are route no. 1 (Los Angeles to At-
lanta) and route no. 2 (Los Angeles to New York). It is also the intention of the 
Postmaster General to develop five cross lines, North and South." 16 Brittin 
understood Brown's plan but questioned its legality, concluding that the plan 
was conceived "probably in iniquity" and was causing the operators no end of 
difficulties. 17 
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The conferences were rapidly degenerating into shouting matches between 
the rival claimants. "Thus far little progress has been made;' complained Brittin 
to Northwest's other officers. '"United' which is the strongest group in the 
country since its recent acquisition of'N.A.T.' is trying to defeat routes 1 and 2 
east of their Dallas-Kansas City-Chicago lines on the plea that these routes 
will carry business now transported by their Chicago-New York line." United 
was attempting to acquire Route 10 from Amarillo to St. Louis in the hope 
that this would be the eastern terminus of one of the new transcontinental 
routes. As for the central line, Brittin wrote, "Transcontinental Air Transport 
has claimed route no. 2 and route no. 5 (from Pittsburgh to Norfolk via Wash-
ington) with the hope of securing a transcontinental line branching at Pitts-
burgh to New York and to Washington and Norfolk. This route is considered 
the best route in the country next to the present 'Boeing'- 'N .A. T.' line ... al-
ready in operation. Most of the conflict is centered around these three trans-
continental lines.'' For Brittin, his efforts to secure Route 3 from Omaha to 
Winnipeg through Minneapolis-St. Paul were succeeding.18 
The horse trading continued the following day, Tuesday, May 27, with more 
progress slowly taking place. Brittin noted that his Route 3 was again approved, 
Route 11 in Montana was given to National Parks, and Route 12 linking Se-
attle with Vancouver, British Columbia, was awarded to United without argu-
ment. No permanent decisions were reached concerning the two 
transcontinental routes, although the early front runners in the race for the 
prizes were emerging. Along the southern transcontinental route Eastern Air 
Transport appeared ready to capture the Atlanta-Dallas portion. The subcom-
mittee agreed that Western Air Express should fly the route from Dallas to Los 
Angeles. Western's pioneer rights were also recognized along the central trans-
continental. Hanshue was assigned the rights to the Los Angeles-Kansas City 
portion of Route 2, and the purely passenger TAT was assigned the rest of the 
route to New York. This in essence repeated what Clement Keys had tried to 
do during his fruitless negotiations with Harris Hanshue in 1928. Erle 
Halliburton, the vociferous independent, was assigned route 10 from St. Louis 
to Amarillo with a possible route from Kansas City to Dallas taken from NAT's 
CAM-3 route. Western also received Routes 8 and 9, Pueblo to Dallas and 
Pueblo to El Paso, respectively. United States Airways would continue to fly 
Route 7 from Kansas City to Denver, and United was given Route 4 from Al-
bany to Boston despite the protests of AVCO. It was agreed that PAIC and 
Clifford Ball would jointly operate Route 5 between Pittsburgh and Norfolk. 
These decisions were still preliminary and dependent upon the ultimate 
judgment of Brown. "There is still some difference of opinion in eastern and 
western division of Routes No. 1 & 2;' Brittin stated. "These are to be negoti-
ated during the next few days and a final report made to (the) Postmaster 
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General next Tuesday (June 3 )." 19 Brittin was hopeful that Tuesday's session would 
be the last and that new contracts and certificates would be awarded presently 
with the two new transcontinental services opening around July 1, 1930.20 
The Tuesday meeting was delayed until the following day, June 4. At 3:15 
that afternoon, the representatives of the passenger airlines met with Post-
master General Brown to hear the conclusions presented by MacCracken's 
operators' committee and to see a map MacCracken had prepared for the oc-
casion. The results of their work left the postmaster general unimpressed. 
MacCracken's subcommittee had made recommendations on seven of the pre-
viously suggested twelve routes but had failed to reach agreements on five, in-
cluding the two critical transcontinental routes. Undecided was Route 5 from 
Pittsburgh to Norfolk; Routes 1 and 6, which were combined to form the south-
ern transcontinental from Atlanta to Los Angeles; and Routes 2 and 10, which 
were linked to make the central transcontinental from New York to Los Angeles. 
Brown, Glover, and Wadsworth withdrew to the postmaster general's of-
fice to discuss the proposals. Presently, Glover returned to the gathered repre-
sentatives and "informed them that the Department was somewhat 
disappointed in their report, inasmuch as they had in effect 'taken all the meat 
and left the bones:" 21 Brittin's recollection of the meeting was somewhat more 
vivid. In a telegram sent to Northwest's headquarters in St. Paul, he recounted, 
"The operators have been unable to compose their differences and have thrown 
[the] whole program of [the] assignment of contracts to [the] passenger lines 
in lap of Postmaster General with [the] request that he act as umpire and 
make final disposition. He is obviously much displeased at [the ]lack of coop-
eration among operators and states that he is undecided whether to go further 
or put routes up for competitive bids."22 
Unable to reach an agreement on the two primary transcontinental routes, 
the operators attempted to relinquish responsibility to Brown. Writing on be-
half of the committee, Hainer Hinshaw addressed the postmaster general: "The 
Committee has instructed me to advise you that the representatives of all the 
parties involved in the controversies desire to submit these controversies to 
you as arbiter and agree to be bound by your decision:' 23 They suggested that 
they present their cases individually to the department at Brown's discretion. 
It was then suggested that the operators prepare a supplemental report and 
produce some answers by the time Brown returned to Washington the follow-
ing week.24 
The reprise did little good. The squabbling continued as each company 
jockeyed for position at the expense of its competitors. Western Air Express 
and Eastern Air Transport were apparently sure they would receive a generous 
portion of the air mail pie. James Edgerton observed the tumultuous June 6 
session. "The report contained five points of controversy," he explained to 
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McAdoo, "the chief one being the fight between the Aviation Corporation, 
Western Air Express, and T.A.T. over the route from New York to Los Angeles 
by way of Kansas City. Western Air apparently intends to settle this by taking 
over T.A. T. Western Air also expects to get the Southern Transcontinental from 
Los Angeles to Dallas, and several other routes in the West. It is understood 
that the report is unsatisfactory to the Postmaster General due to these points 
of difference. Another fight, by the way, is between Delta and Eastern Air Trans-
port for the route from Birmingham to Dallas-Fort Worth. Eastern Air Trans-
port seems to think it a foregone conclusion that they will get this route."25 
The major operators were most distressed with Brown's apparent anger 
with their inability to come to an agreement among themselves. Despite his 
dislike of competitive bidding, he seemed to favor such action, at least in Brittin's 
opinion, as the simplest way out of this dilemma. That possibility greatly dis-
turbed TAT, Western, Eastern, and even the contentious Erle Halliburton.26 
In large part because of the committee's failure to agree on the salient 
issue presented to them by the postmaster general, Brown was growing in-
creasing wary of his ability to implement his plan as originally envisioned. 
According to Edgerton, "There is a belief here that the Postmaster General, 
following his return to the City Thursday, may throw out the report and pro-
ceed to settle matters himself."27 The infighting over the proposed transconti-
nental route extensions underscored the potential problems of using this 
method to avoid opening the new routes to competitive bidding and addi-
tional appropriations. 
Brown decided then that a ruling from the comptroller general was neces-
sary before he could proceed. He selected the proposed extension of Route 3 
from Omaha to Winnipeg, allotted to Northwest, as a test case and submitted 
it to John R. McCarl of the General Accounting Office. "In the meantime, the 
Postmaster General is having difficulty from another source;' Brittin noted in 
a letter to Northwest's other officers. "The Comptroller General-the sole au-
thority for government disbursements-interprets the extension clauses in the 
Watres Bill in a rather conservative way. He holds that the Bill gives him no 
authority to approve disbursements for transcontinental extensions to rela-
tively short air mail contract lines and the only way to settle the question is to 
submit all transcontinental lines to competitive bidding. He is willing, how-
ever, to approve reasonable extensions to existing air mail lines where the new 
mileage will not exceed the original mileage. This embarrasses the Postmaster 
General and makes it appear that all these conferences with the operators have 
been to no purpose whatever. If the situation were not so serious it might be 
rather amusing."28 
While Brown awaited the decision, the operators continued to plot. 
Edgerton was growing increasingly worried that not only were the contracts 
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going to be awarded to existing powerful carriers but that their supposed part-
ner Erle Halliburton was cutting his own deal. Halliburton's invitation to the 
conferences was a clear indication that Brown wished to incorporate South-
west Air Fast Express into its reorganization plans. Nevertheless, Halliburton, 
in his blustering way, was bullying the Post Office to ensure that result. Impa-
tient, he threatened to withdraw his support of Brown's plan and openly call 
for competitive bidding, despite his personal aversion to this method, even to 
the point of threatening legal action to overturn the Watres Act. "Unless 
[Brown] takes immediate action under the Watres bill and grants to the air 
passenger line air mail contracts in accordance with the provisions thereof;' 
Halliburton warned MacCracken, "then I shall be compelled to withdraw my 
consent to the Postmaster General to arbitrate the air mail route and demand 
not only the privilege of bidding on any additional route but shall take the 
necessary legal action to require a cancellation of any extension or route cer-
tificate that has been granted under the Watres bill:'29 
A frustrated MacCracken attempted to calm the obstreperous Halliburton 
and urged patience until Brown could sort out the various conflicting requests 
and determine the impact of the comptroller general's forthcoming decision.30 
Others saw Halliburton's actions through different eyes. Brice Clagett doubted 
the probity of the entire affair, stating, "Halliburton thinks he is inside with 
others to get contracts without bidding which I consider illegal."31 
Halliburton's machinations were also infuriating his supposed partners in 
the stillborn Southern Sky-Lines. A resigned and bitter McAdoo saw his care-
ful plans slowly disappearing. "There is no use trying to do anything with this 
aviation business unless we can get a chance, and it is on a basis which will 
enable us to raise capital;' he declared. "I don't see any chance to do that, espe-
cially since Halliburton has thrown in his lot with the monopolists[,] ... but 
Halliburton's defection has hurt us badly."32 Edgerton agreed: "With regard to 
Halliburton, your assumptions regarding him are entirely correct. He is the closest 
example of an individualist I have run across in some time, and he is certainly 
out for Mr. Halliburton. At present, he considers himself one of the 'ins' on this 
division of air mail spoils, and as long as he is satisfied that he will be taken care 
of, he will play along with the existing companies without giving us a thought."33 
An angry McAdoo contacted Halliburton, after considerable difficulty, and 
reproached him for his apparent duplicity. Countering Halliburton's conten-
tion that he had offered McAdoo an opportunity to buy into his company, 
McAdoo rejected that claim as irrelevant because it had nothing to do with 
Southern Sky-Lines: 
I recall no offer you ever made to me to "come in" except in the very begin-
ning of operation of your company .... I did not take this offer, which had 
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nothing whatever to do with our subsequent agreement, made here in Los An-
geles, to jointly fight for the southern transcontinental route and to cooperate 
with each other until action had been secured. 
You did cooperate until the hearing before the Post Office Department last 
fall. Since that time, however, I have had no evidences whatever of cooperation 
from you but, on the contrary, you have been playing your own game. I have felt 
that this was not acting in good faith, in view of our original understanding .... 
I feel strongly that if you had stood with us and made the fight as we set out 
to make it, that the outcome eventually would have been very much better for 
you and all concerned than if you throw your fortunes with the companies which 
are now dominating the air mail situation of the country. 34 
Halliburton's reply was to renew the offer to purchase into his airline, but 
no mention was made of Southern Sky-Lines or their previous arrangements. 
McAdoo reluctantly realized that Halliburton was desperately fighting for the 
survival of his own airline, no matter what the cost. "Naturally;' he stated, "I 
don't want to stand in the way of your doing what is necessary to save your 
enterprise because I realize that you have a very large investment and that it 
ought to be protected. I have felt, however, that if you were going to act inde-
pendently of me, you ought to have told me so long ago, so that I would have 
known what course to take, because I would have realized that I must proceed 
independently of you:' McAdoo concluded by saying that there were no hard 
feelings on his part. "I simply don't want to be put in a false position or to be 
misunderstood, so go ahead with your own plans, regardless of me."35 With 
that, Southern Sky-Lines was laid to rest. 
Edgerton urged McAdoo to pursue merger agreements with other inde-
pendents, such as Delta Air Service, which was sporadically flying passengers 
from Birmingham to Dallas, as well as completing arrangements with Detroit 
Aviation, the manufacturing holding company that now controlled Lockheed. 36 
Brice Clagett encouraged his father-in-law to pursue Delta as well for they had 
a legitimate claim for part of the southern transcontinental. 37 
Despite Eastern Air Transport's presumption that they were the line of 
choice between Atlanta, Birmingham, and Dallas, Delta's vice president and 
general manager, C.E. Woolman, had heard about the operators' conferences 
and made a hasty trip to Washington to stake his claim. Unlike Southern Sky-
Lines, which had yet to begin operations, or other passenger lines, such as 
Robertson and Braniff, that had garnered air mail contracts then sold their 
assets to the holding companies before reentering the airline business, Delta 
Air Service of Monroe, Louisiana, had been carrying passengers on regular 
schedule between Birmingham and Dallas-Fort Worth since August 1929 in 
addition to their profitable crop dusting operations along the lower Missis-
sippi River.38 Although the conferences were announced in the press, they were 
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by invitation only, so Delta had not heard of the discussions until MacCracken's 
committee had its preliminary report. Undaunted and desirous of acquiring a 
contract to keep Delta's nascent passenger service in operation, Woolman came 
to Washington and presented his case to the postmaster general: 
Like all passenger operations over the entire country, this Company in pio-
neering commercial aviation in the Central Southern States has lost money. But 
with faith in the future of aviation, and abundant confidence in the section over 
which it operates, it has continued operation in the firm belief it would eventu-
ally carry mail as well as passengers and thereby promote rapid communication 
between the two great sections of the South .... 
In no sense of seeking preferential treatment did we join this conference. 
Since the passage of the recent amendments to the Air Mail Act we had sought 
nothing more from the Post Office Department than the right to bid on this 
service. The present plan of the Post Office Department to extend the Air Mail 
System by negotiation only came to our attention a week ago, and in the interest 
of efficient and economical expansion of air transport communication, both 
mail and passenger, we submit most respectfully to the Postmaster General our 
claims, along with the other passenger operators represented at this hearing.39 
In suggesting a merger with Delta, Clagett mentioned to McAdoo that he 
had discussed the Delta situation with Woolman at some length and was con-
fident that Delta had a solid case. "I believe their claim to this route is very 
strong;' stated Clagett, "and that if they fight hard enough they will get the 
contract over this route, which would make a very valuable addition to a trans-
continental service:' He discussed the possibility of either a merger or a coop-
erative arrangement involving an exchange of stock. "They are to consider this 
and discuss it further:' he concluded.40 
McAdoo thought either of these two options best to salvage his airline 
aspirations, or at least derail the proceedings on behalf of the small indepen-
dents. McAdoo, a prominent attorney, offered the services of his firm to fight 
for Delta's case if need be. He held out little hope that Southern Sky-Lines 
alone could win against the large corporation, especially since it had yet to fly. 
"I don't see that we can do anything else:' wrote McAdoo. "I am quite sure that 
a fight by Southern Sky-Lines alone against the powerfully entrenched inter-
ests now in control of the air mail situation, would be futile."41 These old Pro-
gressive, New Freedom sentiments concerning monopoly echoed his 
father-in-law President Woodrow Wilson and would grow in intensity from 
other Democratic sources in the months to come. 
McAdoo felt that some good could come of the struggle on Delta's behalf 
if only it forced the recognition of the rights of the small independentsY But 
Delta could not wait for McAdoo's help. Its sudden appearance caught the 
Drawing a New Map 165 
Post Office Department unprepared. Delta's service was inconsequential com-
pared with the operations of its rival Eastern Air Transport and had been over-
looked. Much to the department's surprise, Delta had a legitimate claim to the 
pioneer rights along the Atlanta-Dallas route. The company was not well fi-
nanced and its operations were minuscule in comparison with the major car-
riers. In fact, its primary source of income was from crop dusting in Louisiana, 
particularly along the Mississippi delta (hence their name). Delta flew single-
engine Travel Air 6000 aircraft capable of carrying four passengers but little 
moreY They were not what Brown had in mind for an airline, but they were 
qualified. 
Brown did not want a plethora of little airlines covering the nation as had 
happened before the mergers the previous year. With the Depression deepen-
ing, there was no room for ill-prepared carriers operating inefficiently and not 
contributing to the public's welfare. Brown could not build a national air trans-
portation network around little companies. His solution was both practical 
and controversial. As had happened in 1929, the numerous inefficient airlines 
were swept up in the general consolidations then sweeping the aviation indus-
try. This made the industry more rational and promoted much greater econo-
mies of scale while building airlines of national scope. The postmaster general 
wished to repeat this scenario once again, this time with Delta. 
With this in mind, Brown approached the Aviation Corporation with the 
suggestion that they acquire Delta Air Service. This move would guarantee 
that Delta would receive its fair share of the forthcoming southern transconti-
nental route while preserving Brown's national plan: Despite AVCO's financial 
and managerial problems, the department still had confidence in its ultimate 
success, backed as it was by some of New York's largest investment houses. 
Delta was not enthusiastic about the prospect but understood that this was 
the only way the airline would survive as the route between Atlanta and Dallas 
alone was not open to competitive bidding, only extensions, provided the comp-
troller general agreed. Reluctantly, Delta acquiesced.44 
On July 25, C.E. Woolman signed an agreement with Gilbert Grosvenor to 
sell 55 percent of Delta Air Service to AVCO. The Aviation Corporation ac-
quired 16,805 shares for $143,000, approximately $8.50 per share, which was 
more than fair market value. Delta would operate their passenger service until 
October, when AVCO would disband the line and purchase the remaining capi-
tal assets. Afterward, Woolman and company reformed their crop dusting op-
eration as Delta Air Corporation, flying only occasional passengers.45 
Delta's timing was poor. On July 24, while Woolman was belatedly draft-
ing the contract to sell out to the Aviation Corporation, Comptroller General 
McCarl rendered his long anticipated verdict. Brown had hoped that the deci-
sion would clarify the law and allow him to proceed unencumbered by the 
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necessity to call for competitive bidding on all new transcontinental routes. 
The ruling left no one happy. 
Brown had asked the comptroller general if the postmaster general had 
the authority to extend any existing route any distance he deemed necessary in 
the interest of the public. The test case was Brown's desired intention to ex-
tend Northwest Airways' existing route from Chicago and Minneapolis (a dis-
tance of 664 miles) north through Grand Forks to Winnipeg, Ontario (a 
distance of 445 miles) and south from Minneapolis to Omaha through Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota (a distance of 340 miles). Brown clearly stated that his 
purpose in issuing such extensions was to cut overhead costs and improve the 
efficiency of the contract air mail carriers. Short routes were clearly more ex-
pensive to operate than long ones. To Brown it made little sense to issue new 
contracts to competing airlines extending from existing routes because that 
would cause ruinous competition and inefficiencies in the entire system. In 
writing to McCarl, Brown underscored his philosophy for air transportation: 
In the administration of the air mail service it has become clearly apparent 
that short routes of, say 500 miles or 600 miles, established separately and oper-
ated by separate companies, do not fit into the general plan of air transporta-
tion development. If there ever was a transportation medium which called for 
long routes, it is that of the air. The cost of operating air mail planes is high and 
this cost apparently must be borne by the Department in a large measure. To 
keep an airplane in the air seven to eight hours a day on long routes it is neces-
sary to meet its original cost, maintenance and operating expense, within the 
life of the plane; this is not possible on short routes, hence the increased cost. I 
cite this as only one factor in the reason for long routes and possibly fewer op-
erators. 
A line north from Minneapolis to Winnipeg would carry by plane certain 
air mail which is now given to trains; and consequently, by an extension of an 
existing route into that territory the public would be better served. The pro-
posed extension from Minneapolis to Omaha would provide a connection at 
Omaha to and from the transcontinental route, which connection is now re-
ceived via Chicago. It would speed up the delivery of a portion of the air mail 
now carried on the Chicago-Minneapolis route and permit the same contrac-
tor to provide the haul. It would appear to the Department that in view of the 
representations made by the Department for the enactment of this legislation 
and in view of the benefits to be derived thereby, it would be in the interest of 
the public to authorize such extensions.46 
McCarl's interpretation was different. While he agreed that the Watres Act 
gave Brown authority to issue contracts, grant certificates, and make exten-
sions, he strictly interpreted the law. Brown had the power in essence to nullify 
competitive bidding on new contracts with the issuance of route certificates, 
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but only on existing routes. Any extension must be a part of"an existing project 
of service, rather than itself a major project of service[,] ... and the extension 
must necessarily have a subordinate relationship to the existing service, project 
or route sought to be extended." A small extension to improve the service along 
a given route was acceptable; a long extension that in essence created a com-
pletely new route was not, at least without competitive bidding. McCarl cited 
Brown's testimony in support of the Watres Act-that some lines "could be 
very greatly improved by slight additions"-as proof of the department's in-
tention. The Winnipeg and Omaha extensions were not "slight" by McCarl's 
interpretation, as they involved expanding into new territory. The resulting 
new route from Omaha to Winnipeg was, by McCarl's definition, a major 
project that required competitive bidding on a new, separate route. 
Confusing the situation even further, McCarl stated that the extension 
from Minneapolis to Winnipeg was legal if the department had no intention 
of creating a new route through to Omaha, and in no way could the extension 
to Omaha be considered an extension of the Chicago-to-Minneapolis route as 
it was obviously too circuitous and against the postmaster general's earlier 
testimony. In essence, the ruling was interpreted by the department to mean 
that no extensions could be made if the distance covered was more than half 
of the original route. Brown had hit a brick wallY 
Brown refused to accept defeat, however. If he could no longer complete 
his grand transcontinental plan by route extensions, he would do so by com-
petitive bidding, but on his terms. Immediately, after McCarl's ruling, Brown 
and other Post Office Department officials met with industry leaders to dis-
cuss the changed scene. Opening the route to bidding could allow promoters 
hastily to form unfit airlines to underbid to win contracts. Their goal was to 
raise as much capital through public subscription to form the airline, win the 
contract, and then quickly sell off their assets at an enormous profit for them-
selves, as did many speculative railroads in the nineteenth century. They were 
not interested in actually running an airline, nor were they willing to absorb 
the huge startup expenses incurred by the legitimate air mail and passenger 
carriers. This, at least, was what Brown feared. To circumvent McCarl while 
staying within the law, Brown discussed the situation with MacCracken, the 
ad hoc head of the operators' committee. Their solution was simple: write the 
bidding requirements so restrictively that only legitimate carriers would qualify. 
To this end, it was agreed that all potential bidders would have to post a 
$250,000 bond to ensure compliance with the contract and to demonstrate 
their good faith. All government contractors by law were required to do so; in 
fact, all the previous contracts were secured by bonds. The difference this time 
was the amount. Generally, the average amount required for an air mail route 
was $11,000 to $16,000. The longest route up to that time required a $100,000 
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bond. Brown's requirement for a quarter of a million dollars underscored the 
importance placed on the two new transcontinental routes and sent a clear 
message that only serious bidders need apply. 
The second measure was the most controversial. Acting at Brown's request, 
William MacCracken analyzed the capabilities of the major airlines and deter-
mined that the inclusion of a night-flying requirement would separate the real 
bidders from the pretenders. The requirement was certainly reasonable if the 
needs of the Post Office were considered. Aviation's primary advantage over 
surface delivery is speed, but the speed advantage of aircraft is largely negated 
if transports are not permitted to fly at night, when the trains can continue to 
run. Although the Watres Act made no provision for night flying, the depart-
ment and MacCracken felt that the requirement was justified to guarantee the 
best service possible. In MacCracken's notes he suggested entertaining bids 
from airlines whose total route mileage exceeded 2,000 miles, 250 of which 
were flown at night. He also recommended that the airlines be required to 
carry a minimum number of passengers and be qualified by the Department 
of Commerce to do so at night. Furthermore, he wanted to reward the suc-
cessful bidders by giving generous allowances for the ability to fly at night, 
having two-way radio equipment installed, and for having passenger seats avail-
able in excess of that stipulated in the forthcoming advertisements.48 
Of great importance, joint bids were to be permitted. In this way several 
airlines could be joined into one coherent structure over the transcontinental 
routes. This would allow the department to award one contract to several air-
lines, in this way giving contracts to deserving passenger lines in certain terri-
tories as well as rewarding the existing contractors. The department and the 
air mail carriers approved of the plan. On August 1, Hainer Hinshaw of Ameri-
can Airways telegraphed his agreement to Earl Wadsworth: "We are satisfied 
to have [the] advertisement published tomorrow."49 
The next day, Second Assistant Postmaster General W. Irving Glover is-
sued an announcement and the advertisement for Contract Air Mail Routes 
33 and 34, the long-anticipated southern and central transcontinental lines. 
Reflecting the stipulations just worked out by MacCracken, the announce-
ment stated that it was the intention of the department to encourage the de-
velopment of passenger transportation by air. "With this end in view," declared 
Glover, "the advertisements sent out today carry a preference clause providing 
that the Department may award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder 
who has owned and operated an air transportation service on a fixed daily 
schedule over a distance of not less than 250 miles and for a period of not less 
than six months prior to the advertisement for bids:' Night flying was a spe-
cific requirement: "In order for a bidder to qualify he must submit evidence 
indicating he has had at least six months actual experience in operating air-
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craft on regular night schedules over a route 250 miles or more in length. A 
bidder on that route must submit evidence with his bid indicating that he can 
meet the requirements of the Department of Commerce with reference to a 
Certificate of Authority to operate the route."50 The department required the 
installation of advanced navigational and communications equipment and 
insisted that the schedule be flown at a minimum average speed of 100 miles 
per hour. 
Two payment rates were possible, and all prospective contractors were 
expected to place two bids accordingly. If the mail load were smaller than 
twenty-five cubic feet (225 pounds), the contractors would receive no more 
than 40 cents per mile and would be required to operate aircraft that could 
carry a minimum of ten passengers. If they were approved to carry mail loads 
larger than twenty-five cubic feet, they would be paid no more than $1.25 per 
mile and would be required to have space available for no fewer than seven 
passengers. In this way, passenger travel was deliberately encouraged and it 
was hoped that it could also help offset the direct operating costs of the win-
ning contractors. According to the advertisement, only conscientious bidders 
would be considered: "Air transportation is a serious business venture, requir-
ing sound and conservative financing. The Department will not countenance 
the promiscuous sale of stock or any undue promotion of the same, where it is 
evident that such action is unwarranted."51 
Brown's new plan was to guarantee that only those airlines approved by 
the department would qualify for the two lucrative contracts. In order to allow 
the incorporation of several smaller struggling passenger lines, he deliberately 
permitted joint bids provided at least one, but not all, of the prospective com-
panies met all of the requirements. "In the event a bid is submitted jointly by 
two companies," stated the announcement, "the experience of either company, 
or both, will be acceptable insofar as the requirements of the advertisement 
are concerned." In essence, the two contracts would go only to those who at-
tended the recent conferences. Tiny, underfinanced airlines need not apply. 
The conference participants tacitly understood this plan. Brown attempted 
to distribute the largess as equitably as possible and sought to address the le-
gitimate concerns of all involved as long as it was in the public interest. During 
the conferences several independent airlines sought and received entry into 
the proceedings. Though not invited, some, such as Delta Air Service, were 
clearly qualified and were therefore admitted into the discussions and a settle-
ment reached. Brown was intent on placating all the bona fide carriers despite 
their contrary behavior, including Erie Halliburton and his Southwest Air Fast 
Express. Halliburton's methods were unorthodox and controversial, but the 
postmaster general's plan was as fair as humanly possible given the restric-
tions of the law, its interpretation by the comptroller general, and, most im-
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portant, the restraints of the very limited federal budget during the deepening 
crisis of the Depression. 
Armed with the new advertisement, and comfortable in the knowledge 
that they were the carrier designated by the conference to cover the southern 
transcontinental route, American Airways' representatives turned their atten-
tion to preparing their bid for CAM-33. Eastern Air Transport had earlier as-
sumed that it would have the rights to the Atlanta to Dallas-Fort Worth section 
of the route. The unexpected arrival of Delta Air Service upset the company's 
plans, and the department agreed that Delta indeed had a fair claim. However, 
to conform to the postmaster general's plan, Delta merged with American in 
order to provide continuity and unified management along the entire route. 
Other problems emerged and were dealt with by the department. 
While the airline operators were deliberating during their conferences with 
the Post Office, Thomas Hudson McKee, representing Wedell Williams Air 
Service of New Orleans, Louisiana, gained access to the meeting and presented 
his company's application for an air mail contract. Despite the Interdepart-
mental Committee on Airways' clear decision to route the southern transcon-
tinental mail line from Birmingham to Dallas without diverting through New 
Orleans, McKee attempted to pressure the department to reverse the decision. 
He petitioned the Post Office on June 2, 1930, asking that Wedell Williams be 
considered, stating that his company had been flying for more than one year 
and, as of the day before, was operating a passenger line from New Orleans to 
Dallas and Fort Worth through Shreveport. 52 
Wedell Williams's two lengthy petitions were well argued but failed to sway 
the department into changing its planned route. Any such alteration would 
have skewed the direct route and left the department with the indirect and 
slow service it had been trying so hard to eliminate. The department felt it best 
not to alter its proposed route, despite receiving considerable political pres-
sure to the contrary. Nevertheless, Brown and Glover quietly began negotia-
tions with American Airways to do something on Wedell Williams's 
behalf-probably buy the airline out at a generous rate, as they had done with 
Delta. That nothing came of it was through a failure of American to cooper-
ate, not from the department's unwillingness to address the small independent's 
needs. This failure would come back to haunt Brown. 
Of greater immediate importance to the success of Brown's plans was the 
crescendo of complaints coming from Erle Halliburton. Throughout the sum-
mer Halliburton had cajoled or threatened the department for a contract as he 
had throughout the previous year. His ostensible partner, William Gibbs 
McAdoo, had correctly recognized that Halliburton was going to fight for his 
own selfish goals regardless of earlier promises and that Halliburton would let 
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nothing stand in his way. Despite Halliburton's protestations to the contrary, 
he had every intention of abandoning McAdoo if the opportunity arose. 
On March 3, while the department was fighting for the Watres Act, 
Halliburton wrote to the department requesting a route through his territory 
in Oklahoma and Texas and assumed for himself his earlier joint bid with 
Southern Sky-Lines. "I am ready and prepared with ample equipment and 
finances;' he stated, "to begin the transportation of air mail in accordance with 
my proposal of October 15, as amended, at $2.10 per pound for mail moving 
between New York City and Los Angeles by way of either St. Louis or Atlanta." 53 
McAdoo had no knowledge of this letter but was nonetheless convinced, cor-
rectly, that his partner had turned against him. 
For more than a year, both the department and the air mail contractors 
had attempted to placate the persistent Oklahoman with little success. Repre-
sentatives of the three large holding companies attempted to deal with 
Halliburton and remove his nettlesome presence from the scene. He refused 
to go quietly. National Air Transport, with Colonel Henderson now working 
for United, offered him part of CAM-2 between Kansas City and Dallas, but 
he refused, wanting a longer route. This upset the operators' plans because 
they had understood that once Halliburton had received a contract the Com-
merce Department and the Post Office would "absolutely forbid his flying over 
other mail contracts!'54 
To Daniel Shaeffer's request that Halliburton play ball with TAT and the 
other airlines, Halliburton tersely replied, "The Post Office Department should 
have acted in this manner more than a year ago and if I could have secured the 
cooperation of those parties who now want me to cooperate, this matter could 
have long since been adjusted." He threatened to upset Brown's entire scheme 
if he did not get his way, telling Schaeffer, "Unless I have definite assurance 
that there is to be an immediate adjustment I shall demand the right to bid on 
all extensions and new routes and am in a better position to do this than any-
one else in the business."55 Halliburton wanted no part of TAT: "I do not in-
tend to merge with, become connected with, or associated with T.A.T. who 
prostituted [the] names of Lindbergh and Earhart to [the] general public and 
then asked tax payers to pay for such prostitution."56 
Halliburton had no need for TAT because he was completing a deal with 
American Airways. At the instigation of the Post Office Department, Hainer 
Hinshaw and American approached Halliburton with a quiet offer to bid jointly 
with him for the southern transcontinental route. Both parties were aware 
that Halliburton's airline was not qualified to bid by itself, as it did not possess 
the requisite night-flying experience. Several secret meetings were conducted 
by Hinshaw with "Mr. Jones;' as Halliburton was referred to in telegrams, at 
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SAFE Ways' headquarters in Tulsa in late June and early July. Immediately af-
terward, Halliburton sent his explosive telegram of July 9 to William 
MacCracken, just to remind all parties of his presence by threatening once 
again to demand competitive bidding. 
Nevertheless, the petulant Halliburton was reaching an understanding with 
the department and American Airways. Brown made the situation clear to 
him that his airline was no different from the other small independent passen-
ger airlines the Watres Act was designed to support and that method of sup-
port was not going to be any different for Halliburton. The department strongly 
suggested that he agree to a takeover of his line at generous terms, thus ensur-
ing ample rewards for his efforts and for those of his stockholders while pre-
serving the economies of scale inherent in the operation of the southern 
transcontinental line by one company. By late July, Halliburton had agreed 
and, in the words of McAdoo, had thrown in his lot with the "monopolists." 
Stated Hinshaw to AVCO president F. G. Coburn, "Halliburton just telephoned 
me that he would be in Washington in two or three days and that we would go 
to New York together and talk to you about a consolidation or merger." 57 
One month later, Halliburton completed his deal with the Aviation Cor-
poration and agreed to file a joint bid for the southern transcontinental route 
with AVCO's Robertson Aircraft Corporation subsidiary. On August 23, two 
days before the bids were to be opened by the Post Office, American Airways 
signed a contract with Southwest Air Fast Express and Erle Halliburton. The 
deal for the joint bid involved the lending of $250,000 of Liberty bonds to 
Robertson and SAFE Way with the understanding that, should the two com-
panies be the winning bidders, they would immediately assign the contract to 
a new company organized by American Airways to be known as Southern Air 
Fast Express. Ten thousand shares of stock were to be issued and divided into 
two equal lots of five thousand. American would pay $1.4 million in cash for 
SAFE Ways' five thousand shares and, at the end of three months, maintain an 
option for the remaining five thousand at a price of $569,000. This latter 
amount would serve to cover American's cost of the Liberty Bonds it lent to 
Robertson and to give the new company approximately $300,000 of working 
capital. 58 "Halliburton finally made a deal with Aviation Corporation by which 
a joint bid was made in the names of both companies;' observed Colonel Brittin 
of Northwest, "but with a private understanding that if they secured the con-
tract Halliburton would sell out to Aviation Corporation at a fixed figure."59 
Indeed, the joint proposal from Robertson and Halliburton were the only 
bids received by the department when the bids were opened on August 25. As 
a result and as planned, they won the route award for CAM-33 at the 100 
percent of the maximum rate of $1.25 per pound per mile allowed by the 
Watres Act.60 Three weeks later Robertson Aircraft Corporation and South-
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west Air Fast Express signed their contract with the Post Office Department 
immediately placing their earlier contract with AVCO into effect.61 American 
Airways now had control of the new route through the newly formed South-
ern Air Fast Express. Just as important for the air mail contractors and the 
Post Office, Erle Halliburton was finally removed from the scene. 
With the southern transcontinental route settled, all that remained was 
the awarding of the central transcontinental line. The operators and the de-
partment during their recent conferences had decided among themselves that 
both Transcontinental Air Transport and Western Air Express had prior claims 
to the territory. Daniel Shaeffer outlined the important aspects of the debate 
to TAT's Executive Committee: "For the central transcontinental ... it was the 
desire of the Post Office Department that this be operated by one company, 
and as T.A.T. and the Western Air Express were the two important factors op-
erating large mileage on this route, it was the Postmaster General's suggestion 
that, if possible, these two lines consolidate or in some manner work out an 
operating arrangement to that end:'62 
When the operators' conference opened in late May 1930, one of the first 
issues raised by the Post Office was the combination of these two lines into 
one long, transcontinental air carrier. Two years earlier, Clement Keys had ac-
tively pursued Harris Hanshue with this very proposition but was rejected 
because Western had its own plans for transcontinental service. Postmaster 
General Brown was not to be denied, however, as he sought to rescue the strug-
gling TAT through a merger and a mail contract. Both companies were well 
run, and Western had grown rich through the largess of the department. Brown 
felt it was only proper that Western share the wealth. Western disagreed. The 
airline was one of the "$3 boys" and had profited greatly from its mail con-
tracts. It had expanded from Los Angeles eastward to Kansas City on one route 
and to El Paso on another. Western had no desire to merge with anyone, unless 
it maintained control. 
Reluctantly, Hanshue and company listened to the department's sugges-
tion to forge a relationship with Transcontinental Air Transport, but they did 
not have to like it. Transcontinental was in dire straits, its stock value rapidly 
declining. Its proposal to sell out at book value was not well received. Just as 
the operators' conferences were opening, J.A. Talbot telegraphed his partner 
Hanshue on May 21 regarding the opinion of Western's board of directors: 
Had [a] talk with [Harry] Chandler last night. ... We are unwilling to deal on 
basis indicated by your talk with Shaeffer and think after full discussion of mat-
.ter that basis of exchange in view of fact that we will have responsibility of man-
agement should be on five to one. Also that banker's options of 160,000 shares 
should be canceled leaving status as at present. Do not see how Shaeffer's asso-
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ciates can possibly figure on basis of book value as earning value and manage-
ment must be taken into consideration. Chandler very strong in convictions 
and I agree we are willing to sit in on this situation but only on basis that West-
ern and Western management shall control this being dictated by pure business 
reasons and also [the] fact that all interested have great pride in success [of] 
your company and will not surrender control to any other situation but would 
rather stay independent. Chandler and I leave matter in your hands.63 
A concerned Hanshue petitioned Postmaster General Brown, arguing that 
Western Air Express had pioneer rights on both the central and southern trans-
continental routes and that TAT's proposal to split the central route together 
with AVCO's assumption of all of the southern route would drastically cut 
into their profits. Hanshue reminded Brown of Western's well-earned inter-
ests in its territory and the risks the airline took in developing aviation in the 
West and Southwest and recited its excellent management and profitability. 
Not mentioned was the fact that the profits were made at an exorbitant pay-
ment rate Brown would no longer accept. Hanshue argued that Western was 
most profitable and efficient because it concentrated its operations form one 
central location, Los Angeles, and developed an interlocking, mutually sup-
porting network of routes. For these pioneering efforts, "Western Air Express 
confidently expected to receive, and now requests that it be granted air mail 
haul on the Central Transcontinental route ... and the Southern Transconti-
nental route .... This grant, we believe, is justified by our occupation and 
operation of these lines and the proof of our ability to maintain a schedule as 
yet unattempted by any other operator."64 
Western Air Express, Hanshue continued, was willing to entertain reason-
able proposals from other airlines provided the offers were based on the actual 
values of the companies involved. Discussions with TAT were under consider-
ation but would remain in limbo until after the two transcontinental routes 
were awarded. Stated Hanshue, "We have gone so far as to tentatively agree to 
two suggested alternative compromises-neither of which we consider justifi-
able in the face of all the facts." Specifically, Western was reluctant to share the 
central route with TAT or sell out its portion of the southern route to AVC0.65 
The operators during their conferences in Washington had recommended 
that only 340 of Western's 3,900 miles of passenger airways be left untouched. 
To this Hanshue took great exception. He wanted to maintain control of all of 
his routes and to preserve the operational control of his western regional air-
line. "We believe we have earned the right to air mail haul on every mile of 
airway we are flying," he declared. "We know that the great mass of people 
throughout the territory we serve are satisfied with the manner in which we 
have served them, and are eager to see this service perpetuated as a western 
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enterprise, financed, controlled, developed, and operated in the west unham-
pered by the suzerainty of eastern capital." 
Hanshue suggested that instead of dividing his company, TAT and AVCO 
be given additional routes or schedules in their own territories at profitable 
rates. Any other solution, Hanshue stated, would be hotly contested.66 
Hanshue was most unhappy with the present course of events. Western 
was feeling great pressure from the Post Office Department, through the min-
istrations of TAT andAVCO, to hammer out a compromise solution. Hanshue 
had no desire to give up control of his routes or to sell off the assets of any of 
his routes. "For us to concede to these proposals;' wrote Hanshue to Harry 
Chandler, "would so greatly restrict our operations and earning capacity as to 
reduce us to a very subordinate position in the industry!' Unfortunately, he 
was running headlong into Brown's plan for a national airline network of strong, 
independent, competing lines. Brown wanted three strong national transcon-
tinentallines; Hanshue wanted the nation served by strong regional lines, simi-
lar to the situation with the railroads. "The arguments against this sort of setup 
are the same that have operated to prevent transcontinental rail systems;' rea-
soned Hanshue, "that is greater economy and more efficient operation can be 
had by concentration in a natural territory rather than elongated single tracks. 67 
Hanshue's argument, while stating what appeared to be obvious, over-
looked the fact that the situation with the railroads was artificial, a product of 
much litigation and regulation stemming back to the late nineteenth century. 
Contrary to Hanshue's contention that regional concentration was more effi-
cient, a national transcontinental scheme, with centralized management con-
trolling the entire line without interruption was inherently more efficient. The 
railroads had earlier attempted to forge a national system but had been re-
buked by federal actions, specifically the Northern Securities case of 1904. By 
employing the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, the court blocked the forma-
tion of a giant holding company between the Union Pacific, Burlington, Great 
Northern, and Northern Pacific, fearing that such a national combination 
would reduce competition. It would have been able to do so because of its 
inherent economies of scale and greater efficiency. This the opponents of 
monopoly successfully fought to prevent, thereby creating an artificial mar-
ket. This Hanshue did not understand. 
Transcontinental Air Transport was fighting hard for its very survival. 
Brown appreciated these efforts and saw the logic behind combining the ex-
pertise inherent in both organizations into one powerful force. It was he who 
pushed so hard behind the scenes for a merger during the operators' confer-
ences in the spring of 1930. 
Transcontinental, losing prodigious amounts of money each day while 
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watching the value of its company steadily decline, was anxious to secure a 
life-saving air mail contract at almost any cost. Company officials were insis-
tent that TAT's value was higher than Western was claiming and were pressing 
Western for a deal, as they correctly understood that the department was will-
ing to accept a joint bid provided the winners formed a separate operating 
company.68 
Western already had valuable contracts and were it not for the powerful 
presence of the postmaster general in forging the new legislation and dictating 
the terms of its implementation, they would have continued happily as one of 
the $3 boys. Brown was determined to forge three separate, independently 
owned transcontinental lines and was not about to allow Western's intransi-
gent claims for sections of both routes to interfere with his grand scheme. 
Following the initial collapse of talks, Brown persuaded all the interested 
parties to return to the bargaining table with the unwritten promise that they 
would secure the winning contract. Transcontinental agreed to transfer its 
appropriate tangible assets at their depreciated, not book, value. Any differ-
ences in values were to be made up in cash. The new company would consist 
of $2.15 million in assets from Western, $2 million in assets from TAT, plus a 
cash contribution of $144,000 from TAT. An estimated working capital of ap-
proximately $700,000 would be subscribed, bringing the total value of the new 
enterprise to $5 million. 
After six weeks of intense sessions, Hanshue understood Brown's posi-
tion and ultimate coercive power and reluctantly began efforts to form an 
arrangement with TAT and AVCO along the lines prescribed by the confer-
ences. Of greatest significance, TAT and Western Air Express agreed to terms 
for the creation of a new company to bid on the central transcontinental. 
On July 15, 1930, Transcontinental and Western Air, better known as TWA, 
was formed. 69 
While the ink was drying on the contract, a third party laid claim to a part 
of the central transcontinental route. George Hann and the Pittsburgh Avia-
tion Industries Corporation, which played such an important role in the af-
fairs of the Aviation Corporation, were also desperate to participate in the 
forthcoming route awards. Pittsburgh Aviation had been instrumental in the 
construction of the Pittsburgh-Butler Airport and had successfully lobbied 
the Pennsylvania state legislature for funds to develop airways throughout the 
state. With their keen interest in aviation and the fact that Pennsylvania was 
astride the eastern terminus of the proposed central transcontinental, Hann 
and PAIC fought hard for inclusion. They had an argument. Although PAIC 
had yet to operate an airline, it conducted commercial operations from Pitts-
burgh. The company's claim was not strong, but it was in fact better than TAT's. 
Because TAT sent its passengers by train from New York City to Port Colum-
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bus, Ohio, it had no operating experience in Pennsylvania. George Hann made 
his position clear to Daniel Shaeffer of TAT and the Pennsylvania Railroad: 
As I very forcefully told you and Mr. Cuthell in Washington one afternoon, this 
Pittsburgh company is not a stepchild and we must insist upon working out our 
own problems, which means that in any final determination of this transconti-
nentalline, T.A. T., Western Air Express, and ourselves have got to sit around the 
table and work it out . 
. . . The matter has been clearly presented on two occasions to our Executive 
Committee and I am but voicing our unanimous opinion when I say that we 
consider that P.A.I.C. had preempted more than anyone else the territory be-
tween Columbus and New York, and we are going to make every effort to pro-
tect our interests in this territory. Also we have kept the Post Office Department 
advised of our work since the very beginning, looking to the very situation which 
now exists/0 
Hann's logic prevailed, particularly after direct meetings with Walter Brown. 
Transcontinental and Western signed an additional agreement on August 22, 
1930, this time merging PAIC with TWA. The new company already had agreed 
to authorize 1 million shares at ten dollars per share. Half of this originally 
was to be divided between the two companies with the other half held in re-
serve. With the inclusion ofPAIC, TAT and Western reduced their holdings to 
237,500 shares each, extending 25,000 shares to PAIC in return for half own-
ership in the Pittsburgh-Butler Airport and a promise to promote aviation in 
Pittsburgh. The new company also acquired PAIC's rights to the Harrisburg 
airport/' After this, George Hann withdrew from the board of AVCO to con-
centrate his efforts on the new transcontinental line. 
As had AVCO through Robertson and SAFE Way on the southern route, 
TAT and Western Air submitted their bid on the central transcontinental line 
after Second Assistant Postmaster General Glover called for bids on August 2, 
1930. This fact did not please some people. A disgruntled William Gibbs 
McAdoo summarized the feelings of the few remaining small independents in 
his commentary to his friend W.M. Kiplinger: 
Recently the Postmaster General has advertised certain air mail routes to 
Los Angeles, routes for which I have vigorously contended. His advertisements 
restrict the bidding to favorites and absolutely shut out worthy competitors, in 
violation of the letter, as well as the spirit of the act. It is really quite raw and I 
am wondering if he can get away with it . 
. . . As a result, a few monopolists and pets of the Department will get the 
business unless someone should contest the Postmaster General's authority. The 
Western Air Express, in which Harry Chandler is largely interested and of which 
Hoover's son is a prominent officer, will undoubtedly, get most of the "bacon."72 
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McAdoo continued to refuse to acknowledge the fact that he never started 
his airline and the remaining independents were too underfinanced to under-
take an enterprise of the magnitude requested by the department. These little 
companies could not raise sufficient funds to post the required $250,000 bond, 
much less develop and operate a national transportation system effectively. 
Nevertheless, he still objected. As for Harry Chandler, the powerful publisher 
of the Los Angeles Times, he was indeed an influential force in politics, but no 
more so than the illustrious McAdoo. Herbert Hoover Jr. was serving with 
Western, but not as a "prominent officer:' Reflecting his father's interest in 
technology in general and radio in particular, Hoover had been hired not for 
his familial ties but for his acknowledged expertise in communications. In 
fact, he was in charge of radio development for all of Western Air Express. 
Despite this, he was eventually forced to resign.73 
The protests mounted, however. After the call for bids was published, sev-
eral of the small passenger lines not included in the recent operators' confer-
ences threatened to take legal action, particularly over the recently imposed 
night-flying provision, which, they correctly felt, was designed to preclude them 
from bidding and would result in their eventual demise. The independents 
also hinted that they would ask for a Justice Department antitrust investigation 
or a congressional inquiry into the probity of the advertisements if their com-
plaints were not heard. Of greatest importance, they threatened to ask for an 
injunction against Comptroller General McCarl to prevent the payment on the 
contracts if they were rejected solely because of the night-flying requirement.74 
Much to the Post Office Department's displeasure, these independents 
submitted a bid. When Second Assistant Postmaster Glover opened the sealed 
bids in his office on August 25, he was surprised to find that TWA's bid of 97.5 
percent of the maximum rate was bettered by a new company's offer to carry 
the mail for only 64 percent of the maximum rate. While TAT, Western Air 
Express, and the Aviation Corporation had been carefully working with the 
department in preparing offers tailored to Brown's requirements, a new cor-
poration, known as United Avigation, had been quickly formed for the same 
purpose. 
Unbeknown to PAIC, other aviation interests in Pittsburgh were anxious 
to acquire a mail contract, particularly Pittsburgh Airways, a small struggling 
passenger line that was operating a tenuous schedule to Philadelphia and New 
York with just three aircraft. Backed by wealthy businessman and company 
president Oliver Kaufman, Pittsburgh Airways leapt at the opportunity to save 
itself with a mail contract. Kaufman contacted another small local carrier, Ohio 
Air Transport of Youngstown, as well as W.A. Letson, the owner of United 
States Airways, a small passenger carrier operating between Kansas City and 
Denver. To complete this new holding company, Alfred D. Chandler, the sales 
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manager at Bellanca Aircraft, and New York banker Sherman Adams agreed to 
participate in the new venture. On August 7, 1930, they met with the board of 
directors of United States Airways at the Athletic Club in Kansas City, where 
they first discussed the proposed merger and subsequent bid.75 
On August 18, the executives of the respective companies formed United 
Avigation for the express purpose of securing the central transcontinental route. 
They approved the issuance of 490,000 out of an authorized issue of 2 million 
shares of common stock-enough, it was hoped, to raise $1 million to finance 
the new enterprise, all contingent upon winning the contract.76 With this agree-
ment in hand, United Avigation placed its bid with the Post Office Department. 
The department was not happy with this unexpected bid. Letson had par-
ticipated in the operators' conferences and knew the postmaster general's plan. 
He grew increasingly uneasy when he realized that his action had angered the 
department and could possibly threaten his existing contract, although no 
threats were made. Nevertheless, he took immediate steps to distance himself 
from the controversy, expecting only that his bid be fairly examined. When the 
Baltimore Sun published an article concerning the protests of the independent 
passenger lines, Letson immediately telegraphed, stating that he had no knowl-
edge of the story nor the complainants.77 
An angry Glover suspected duplicity and was anxious to ensure that all of 
the offers were fairly examined. He had several articles from the Pittsburgh 
press quoting UnitedAvigation as willing to fight. ''Am enclosing clipping from 
Pittsburgh paper;' Glover wrote Chase Gave. "Looks as if they also wanted to 
be a second story man or men. Of course I know you would not accept any 
strengthening documents to the bids, but wanted to be sure." Glover wanted 
Gave and Earl Wadsworth to examine all of the bids and prepare them for 
examination by Brown "Have Earl go through the three bids and have their 
failings all lined up for the P.M. G. when he gets home;' he stated. "Be sure to 
save clipping and telegram."78 
The day following the opening of the bids, Glover departed Washington 
for a trip to Seattle. Brown had been out of town for several days as well. No 
more than one hour after Glover left, First Assistant Postmaster General Arch 
Coleman called Chase Gave and requested that all of the bids be turned over 
to him on the direction of an unnamed person at the White House for exami-
nation by the attorney general. Gave complied and was told by Coleman not 
to mention it to Glover. He wired Glover on the train anyway and informed 
the second assistant about the peculiar request. Glover placated an anxious 
Gave, telling him he had already discussed the matter with the White House 
and that, although the postmaster general would not be pleased "when he finds 
out that any action has been taken before he gets back and has a chance to see 
them ... that's not our funeral." 79 
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After examination by the attorney general's office, the files were returned 
later that afternoon. Immediately afterward, at 3:15, Chester Cuthell of TAT 
and William MacCracken representing Western Air Express called on Gove to 
examine the United Avigation bid, inquiring as to how much time they had to 
file a protest. Gove informed them that no decision would be made until Brown 
and Glover returned, which would give them sufficient time to file their brief. 
A suspicious Gove wondered whether there was any connection, stating, "Whether 
they had anything to do with the matter being handled as above indicated, I do 
not know and, of course, you can guess about that better than I can:'80 
Regardless of the source of the inquiry, MacCracken immediately went to 
work searching for flaws in the United Avigation bid. Just two days before the 
bids were opened MacCracken prepared a brief for the postmaster general 
reminding him of the superior position of the joint TAT -Western Air Express 
bid. He reminded Brown that the advertisement for bids allowed the postmas-
ter general wide discretion in determining the fitness of a bidding company. 
Brown was empowered to award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, 
and it was left to him to define "responsible:' 
The net worth of Transcontinental and Western was $9 million in excess 
of liabilities with cash assets in excess of $3.7 million, backed by the largest 
banks and most prominent financial minds in the country. The companies 
were certainly financially responsible and more than capable of developing 
and operating a transcontinental line based on the vast experience of their 
respective personnel who created and operated their large airlines. They also 
maintained their own airports, weather service, and radio communication 
departments, all developed at great expense in the interest of safety and effi-
ciency. Transcontinental had night-flying experience, gained when it acquired 
Maddux while Western was operating 1,000 miles of its normal route at night, 
660 miles of which were flown with the U.S. Mail. In addition, both airlines 
had the latest aircraft and equipment and a strong, well-trained staff. Such was 
the well-developed nature of the two companies that MacCracken boldly stated 
that if they received the contract, they could "within five days thereafter com-
mence the carriage of mail over the entire route."81 
Having established their strong economic and technological position with 
respect to the central transcontinental, MacCracken turned his attention to 
dissecting United Avigation. Among the seventeen objections, MacCracken 
stated that the bid itself was improperly addressed and not sealed in accor-
dance with proper procedure. More important, although United proposed to 
start service with a fleet of twelve powerful tri-motored aircraft, the company 
did not own these aircraft or the infrastructure at that time. The existence of 
their company was completely dependent upon receiving the contract. Al-
though TWA was also formed for that sole reason, its assets were to be drawn 
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from two viable, nationally operating companies. MacCracken claimed that 
United Avigation's bond was defective because the insurers only guaranteed 
half of the required $250,000 and that it was incorrectly altered and witnessed. 
Of great significance, MacCracken claimed that United Avigation was not fi-
nancially responsible, as it had no capital assets. The $1 million proposed for 
the company had yet to be raised because that sum was solely contingent upon 
winning the contract. The company did not even exist until after the announce-
ment of bids was made, something the department abhorred. In essence, 
MacCracken claimed United was a paper company. Most important, the pro-
spective bidder by its own admission had no night-flying experience. This, 
MacCracken hoped, would completely invalidate UnitedAvigation's petition.82 
After "a very satisfactory conference with Mr. Wadsworth;' MacCracken 
filed the protest with the department on August 29, safe in the knowledge that 
he had the department's support. Both he and officials from TAT thought that 
now the road was clear. 83 
United Avigation did not give up. Through United States Airways, which 
flew into Denver, Letson and company approached Colorado senator Lawrence 
Phipps. Phipps, who had helped shepherd the Watres Act through the Senate, 
lent a sympathetic ear, insisting either that the transcontinental contract be 
given to United Avigation or that an arrangement be made on behalf of this 
Colorado airline. 84 Richard Robbins was already urging Phipps to continue to 
support the postmaster general and reminded him that TWA was the only 
responsible bidder and the only one on that central line that could start ser-
vice immediately. United Avigation was a paper creation and would need many 
months to acquire the necessary aircraft and equipment before starting ser-
vice.85 These arguments were enough to temper Phipps's attacks. 
George Hann, speaking for PAIC, was growing nervously impatient with 
the incessant delays from the Post Office Department. With Brown out of the 
office attending conferences and political affairs in this difficult election year, 
Hann was worried that even the large airlines might not survive the autumn. 
He suggested drastic action. Calling for Hanshue, MacCracken, Robbins, and 
others to pressure the administration, even suggesting going so far as petition-
ing the president, Hann urged his partners to force a decision: 
It is financial suicide to continue carrying passengers as we are going today, 
and, with winter coming along, there is going to be a very sorry picture for those 
companies which attempt to force this passenger carrying business throughout 
the next six months. 
I think it should be very strongly stated to Mr. Brown that he must take the 
responsibility of giving aviation a solar plexus blow, or else feed out a little nour-
ishment at this time. I do not think that we should stop with Mr. Brown, but 
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that we should go also to President Hoover, and other members of the cabinet, 
and make this a real issue for cabinet discussion . 
. . . If this mid transcontinental air mail contract is not awarded on the 
present bid, and on a compensatory basis, I am going to recommend to my 
people that they withdraw entirely from this aviation development, salvage what 
cash they can and call it a day .... It is time to go to the mat, and we have nothing 
to lose but everything to gain.86 
Brown listened. On October 1, 1930, Transcontinental and Western were 
awarded the central transcontinental route despite their higher bid of 97.5 
percent of the maximum rate.87 They promptly requested and were granted 
permission to sublet the route to their joint TWA subsidiary on October 24.88 
While negotiations were continuing with the department, PAIC helped 
Brown solve another problem. For months, Clifford Ball had let it be known 
that his airline was for sale. He understood that Brown was not going to allow 
his little airline to continue with its lucrative but irrelevant air mail contract. 
Ball played AVCO off of TAT and PAIC until Brown made it clear to AVCO 
that a merger between Ball and Pittsburgh made more sense geographically. 89 
After tense negotiations, with Ball's contract set to expire at midnight on Oc-
tober 25, a deal was struck with Postmaster General Brown's approval whereby 
Ball sold his airline to PAIC for $137,000. The following month the company's 
name was changed to Pennsylvania Air Lines. 
Finally, on October 25, numerous officials gathered at Newark Airport 
just outside New York City for the inauguration of Transcontinental and West-
ern Air's first regularly scheduled transcontinental air mail and passenger ser-
vice along CAM -34. Among the passengers were Walter Brown, Irving Glover, 
Earl Wadsworth, Harris Hanshue, J. Cheever Cowdin, and Amelia Earhart. They 
boarded one of TWA's two Ford S-AT Tri-Motors and one Fokker F-14. Al-
most thirty-six hours later, six passengers and six hundred pounds of mail 
reached Los Angeles.90 Official opening of the route came just ten days after 
American Airways inaugurated its transcontinental line, through their South-
ern Air Fast Express subsidiary along CAM-33, and five weeks before Boeing 
Air Transport and National Air Transport followed suit with through passen-
ger service. 
Transcontinental, Western, and the Aviation Corporation had one more 
bit of business to attend to before Postmaster General Brown would settle the 
transcontinental route questions. Despite its stout arguments to the contrary, 
Western was forced to accede to the recommendations of the operators' com-
mittee and to the department and relinquish its claim to the southern route. 
Brown insisted that Western sell its property along the route that it had just 
recently acquired with the purchase of Standard Air Lines. 
The original contract called for a payment to Western of $300,000 for these 
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assets, an amount Western thought far too low. A clause permitted Western to 
request $500,000, provided the postmaster general made the final appraisal 
and decision.91 This came as a surprise to Brown, who upon his return split 
the difference between the two parties and advised them that the price would 
be $400,000. 
Believing it had invested at least $1 million, Western remained unhappy, 
but it was in no position to argue. An audit had set the value of the Standard 
properties at $290,000. Other details of the merger were equally contentious 
as Western was also forced to transfer its valuable in Alhambra airport in Los 
Angeles to TWA and was asked to cover additional unexpected expenses. Fur-
thermore, in order to free Western and the future TWA from any problems of 
interlocking directorships, AVCO, the largest owner of Western stock, sold its 
holdings in Western to TWA. The department forced Western to spend 
$1,115,500 to reacquire these twenty thousand shares for TWA at $55 a share-
$35 above the market price-thereby ensuring the independence of the new 
airline but at Western's considerable expense.92 In all, Western was compelled 
to spend $1.4 million to complete the various transactions involved with the 
two transcontinental routes by the end of the year.93 
By mid-December AVCO was demanding its money. The terms of its con-
tract with TAT and Western required the latter parties to pay American Air-
ways for Western stock immediately after winning the central transcontinental 
route and opening service. Transcontinental and Western Air was now flying. 
More than six weeks had passed, but TAT and Wdtern had yet to pay. The 
reason was simple: the award had been challenged and there now existed the 
distinct possibility that it would be invalidated. 
United Avigation had played one last card in the hope of snatching the 
award at the eleventh hour. On October 3, a dejected W.A. Letson wrote a terse 
letter to Walter Brown announcing the dissolution ofUnitedAvigation. Letson 
was "returning home disillusioned" after the trials of the past two months. 
Nevertheless, he and his partners had earlier threatened to challenge the legal-
ity of the night-flying clause and thereby the entire award process if they lost. 
This they now did. 
They turned to Comptroller General John McCarl for a ruling on the le-
gality of the bidding process. McCarl, the nemesis of Brown and the 
department's air mail plans, looked at the award for CAM-34 with a suspi-
cious eye. On October 9, 1930, he asked Brown for information that would 
support awarding the central transcontinental route to the highest bidder rather 
than United Avigation.94 
In a detailed report delivered on October 23, Brown outlined his reasons. 
Brown concentrated his argument on the fact that United Avigation did not 
have the requisite night-flying experience and was not a responsible bidder. 
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He also reiterated the numerous other points made by MacCracken in August, 
when Western challenged United's bid. McCarl was not persuaded. He ruled 
that the night-flying requirement was, in fact, illegal, because it existed no-
where in the law. McCarl quoted Brown's own Watres Act, which mentioned 
only that the prospective contractors be "responsible" and have "operated an 
air transportation service on a fixed daily schedule over a distance of not less 
than 250 miles prior to the advertisement for bids." 
He concluded that the illegality of this clause acted to restrict competition 
and therefore any contract awarded under these conditions was invalid-un-
less there were mitigating circumstances. McCarl suggested that Brown pro-
vide additional corroborating evidence that United Avigation was not 
responsible. "Perhaps an enumeration of such defects:' remarked McCarl, "will 
afford this office a better understanding of the matter."95 
An exasperated Brown once again provided additional information to the 
comptroller general. This time he emphasized the numerous other deficien-
cies on the United Avigation bid while disingenuously stating that it was not 
his intention "to give the impression" that their bid was rejected only because 
they had failed "to show the night flying experience prescribed in the specifi-
cations." Brown explained in detail the numerous flaws in United Avigation's 
proposal, particularly pointing out that there was no evidence that the three 
operating companies of United were actually owned by United. Also, Brown 
stated that United Avigation could not legally bid because its existence was 
contingent upon receiving the contract, and then only if it could guarantee a 
profit. The three existing component companies did not bid and would not 
have been bound for the faithful performance of the contract. These factors, 
Brown argued, compelled the department to conclude that United Avigation 
was not qualified to bid: 
At the time its bid was submitted, the Avigation Company had a bare, naked 
corporate existence, its assets consisting solely of an executory contract for the 
exchange of stock with the three alleged subsidiaries. Not only would the Gov-
ernment have been exposed to the risk of immediate default of any contract 
entered into with this company in such circumstances, but, since the Company 
had no assets beyond conditional promises to subscribe to stock, it would have 
been left without recourse to recover for the default except against the Company's 
securities. 
The Department knows of no way to make it clearer that the United Avigation 
Company was not a responsible bidder within the meaning of the law. 96 
Brown also informed McCarl that a subsequent conversation with Letson 
of United States Airways revealed that United Avigation had no intention of 
operating the entire length of the route, only from New York to Kansas City. It 
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hoped to sublet the remaining route to Western Air Express, though no discus-
sions with Western had ever occurred. Western had performed the necessary 
financial analysis and had concluded that its own 97.5 percent bid with TAT was 
the lowest possible to still make a profit. Flying the route as a subcontractor at 
less than that amount was not economically feasible. "It is the Department's 
opinion, therefore;' stated Brown, "that had an award been made to the United 
Avigation Company, that company would have been compelled to default on 
the contract from the beginning if for no other reason than that it could have 
made no arrangement for service over the western portion of the route:'97 
United had no tangible assets, no equipment, and no staff to operate such 
a complex operation. The planned financial arrangement to raise $1 million 
to provide for this and the entire route infrastructure was grossly inadequate 
for the task. The Watres Act was designed to prevent irresponsible operators 
from exploiting and wasting taxpayers' money and "to avert the discredit which 
would inevitably fall upon the entire aviation industry as a result of defaults 
and failures which would be bound to follow the award of contracts to irre-
sponsible concerns:' In the opinion of the department, concluded Brown, these 
additional facts "leave not the slightest doubt that the UnitedAvigation Com-
pany was not a responsible bidder:'98 McCarl finally agreed. 
On January 10, 1931, the comptroller general responded to Brown. "The 
facts now reported by you, together with those heretofore supplied by you, 
constituting the reasons for not accepting the low bidder ... ;' concluded 
McCarl, "appear such as to justify this office in not further questioning the 
administrative action in rejecting such a low bid."99 The award was legal. In 
fact, this ruling validated all of Brown's actions in restructuring the nation's 
air transportation system. McCarl confirmed that the bids from the strong, 
responsible airlines were proper and within the law as interpreted by the inde-
pendent Office of the Comptroller. 
With the final approval of the contract award to TWA in hand, Walter 
Folger Brown was able to complete his reorganization of the nation's air trans-
portation system. Brown's Progressive Republican vision had come to pass. 
After almost two years of unceasing effort on his part were forged three large, 
stable, financially powerful aviation holding companies, each formed around 
a solid core of air transportation companies, solely dependent upon the fed-
eral government for their support and thereby dedicated to operating in the 
public interest. America's airlines were rescued from the brink of extinction 
and given a clear vision for the future and a means to achieve that goal through 
the guidance of the Post Office Department. Brown determined the routes, 
the equipment, and the schedules to be flown. He determined the rates of pay 
and the amounts awarded, and, most important, gave direct incentives for the 
expansion of passenger air travel. By the beginning of 1931, the three holding 
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companies were providing regularly scheduled air service for mail and travel-
ers across the country along the nation's natural routes of communication. 
Brown's leadership provided the nation with a new, rational, efficient, and safe 
method of transportation for the benefit of every citizen. No clearer example 
of Progressive Republicanism can be seen. 
Not everyone agreed with his version of Progressivism, however. As the 
country's economic crisis deepened, the political climate began to change. In 
the November 1930 elections, the Republicans lost control of the House of 
Representatives. Several small independents, most of which had just recently 
formed, saw an opportunity to exploit the changing situation and sought re-
dress from the new, Democratically controlled House. Others sought to chal-
lenge the large airlines directly. Although Brown's vision for the future of air 
transportation had reached fruition, his problems were just beginning. 
Chapter 10 
Reaction 
T A Jith the tribulations of the transcontinental route awards finally behind 
V V him, Postmaster General Brown moved to continue his carefully con-
ceived efforts to promote the efficiency of the air mail carriers. The Watres Act 
had given him considerable power to make changes, particularly through the 
implementation of rate revisions on those lines operating under a route cer-
tificate. These certificates allowed the department to make periodic alterations 
of the air mail payment rates. Although the carriers disliked the ever-decreas-
ing rates, they welcomed the ten-year protection the certificates gave them 
over their routes and clearly understood that the department had no intention 
of subsidizing the airlines forever. They knew to expect periodic rate reduc-
tions and therefore made conscious efforts to increase their passenger-carry-
ing abilities and lower their overhead costs to promote greater economy 
-exactly the reaction the Progressive postmaster general wanted from this 
new industry. 
Brown nevertheless was becoming increasingly exasperated. Although 
holding great promise, the newly realigned American Airways and the newly 
created Transcontinental and Western Air were still losing considerable sums 
of money. American was still burdened with large overhead and top-heavy 
management, and TWA was suffering through difficult birth pangs. Although 
Harris Hanshue was the new president of TWA, the merger had not proceeded 
smoothly. Incessant bickering and the perception of all parties that the others 
were using TWA as a dumping ground for their depreciating assets to increase 
the net worth of the component companies greatly harmed its early opera-
tions. Eventually, TWA sorted out its problems with the help of the depart-
ment, but not before it too racked up considerable losses. Of the three 
transcontinental companies, only the airlines of United Aircraft and Trans-
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port Corporation, which received almost 50 percent of the air mail revenue, 
were operating profitably and efficiently. 
Brown once again called the operators to Washington for a series of con-
ferences starting February 16, 1931 to discuss the rate problem and to plan for 
the future. On May 6 the department and the airlines would complete their 
first year operating under the Watres Act. 1 
Brown pulled no punches. Despite the contractors' somewhat reluctant 
cooperation, the postmaster general lashed out at their inefficiencies. He made 
it clear that any continued government support was strictly dependent upon 
the continuing efforts of the air mail carriers to reduce costs and improve the 
quality and speed of service. The department was running a deficit of $150 
million for all of its operations, with the domestic air mail consuming $20 
million, two-thirds of which was subsidy. Brown warned the carriers that Con-
gress would ultimately decide their fate, either by increasing taxes to cover the 
deficit, which was highly unlikely given the terrible economic climate, or by 
forcing a reduction in expenditures, the more likely scenario.2 The airlines 
would have to improve their operations drastically in order to compensate for 
losses in expected postal revenue or face bankruptcy. 
Furthermore, the airlines were not keeping to their published schedules. 
The Post Office determined the routes, the frequency of service, and the speed 
of service. Despite this, aircraft were late and slow, and they often missed con-
nections for a variety of reasons, none of which the public would tolerate, no 
matter how valid. "These schedules are not being met;' Brown declared. "Fig-
ures furnished me indicate that the highest percentage in a fifteen day period 
is but 14 percent. This is very low and a rather rare experience. If these sched-
ules, as fixed, are too fast they should be modified. The average speed main-
tained by you operators is but 102 miles per hour. This is rather low and you 
ought to do better. Faster equipment may be necessary in order to maintain 
the schedules fixed by the Department .... While I realize that weather condi-
tions are a prime factor in flying operations, there is no doubt that better time 
should be made, taking into consideration all the elements involved."3 
Brown suggested that the operators consolidate their ticket sales offices in 
each city served and agree upon a uniform price for passenger tickets over 
routes of equivalent distance, as had the ICC before it with the railroads. "I am 
not suggesting any violation of the Sherman anti-trust law;' Brown remarked, 
"but there are no parallel air lines of any consequence now operating through-
out the country. There is a short service between Philadelphia and New York 
and one from Cleveland to Toledo but these are only incidental to the mail 
trunk lines at present in operation."4 This last point was of great importance, 
as future events would prove. The air mail carriers were beginning to run into 
direct competition from a new crop of passenger-only lines that threatened 
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the air mail carriers with their faster service. According to Colonel Brittin of 
Northwest, "Postmaster General Brown stated to the conference that he felt 
that the air mail operators should improve equipment and establish additional 
schedules sufficient to adequately serve their respective territories." Brown felt 
that newly formed passenger-only airlines were embarrassing the department 
because it appeared that the established air mail lines were not providing suf-
ficient service. Brittin noted that "this was particularly the case where the New 
York, Philadelphia, and Washington line recently established 'on the hour, ev-
ery hour' schedule in competition with the older Eastern Air Transport."5 The 
department felt compelled to fight this threat. 
These new carriers for the most part were unwittingly the products of the 
air mail carriers themselves. During the latter half of 1930, C. Townsend 
Ludington and his brother Nicholas established the New York, Philadelphia, 
and Washington Airway Corporation, better known as the Ludington Line. 
They, of course, were two of the original founders, with Clement Keys, of Na-
tional Air Transport, and were now offering direct passenger competition to 
Keys's own Eastern Air Transport. In the Southwest, Thomas and Paul Braniff, 
who had originally sold their airline to the Aviation Corporation and served 
that corporation as executives, left to reform their company when AVCO closed 
down their operation in the summer of 1930 because of mounting losses. Also 
in Texas, Temple Bowen reentered the scene, forming Bowen Air Lines, which 
was now operating against his old Texas Air Transport, now also controlled by 
AVCO. In each case, these individuals took the money paid to them by the 
large holding companies and set up their new airlines in direct competition 
with the existing air mail lines. 
They also deliberately used faster, though less safe, equipment. Their air-
craft of choice was the streamlined Lockheed Vega, an all-wood, single-engined, 
high-winged monoplane. With a cruising speed of 150 miles per hour, it was 
50 percent faster than the larger tri-motored Fords and Fokkers preferred by 
the Post Office and less expensive to operate. With a single engine, limited 
communications equipment, and, in some cases, poorly trained and poorly 
paid pilots and ground crew, however, Vegas were far more dangerous to fly. 
The new independents, ignoring their poor safety record, loudly advertised 
their superior speed of service, much to the embarrassment of the Post Office. 
The Post Office Department saw the efforts of these new, so-called inde-
pendents as no more than an unfair attempt by former air mail carriers, who 
had been bought out at more than a fair rate, to undermine the fragile net-
work of Brown's elaborate national air mail and transportation plan for their 
own selfish ends. These former air mail carriers saw themselves as indepen-
dent entrepreneurs challenging an unfair, oligopolistic system and immedi-
ately began to lobby for new contracts from the already apportioned air mail 
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appropriation. Brown would have none of it, but the independents would have 
the last word. 
Brown insisted that the air mail carriers join with the department to de-
termine a new lower rate system to compensate for the expected shortfall in 
appropriations and revenue because of the worsening Depression. Passenger 
and air mail traffic was down throughout the country. Once again William 
MacCracken assumed the lead in organizing the air mail representatives at the 
postmaster general's request. He formed three committees to study Brown's 
several proposals. MacCracken was confident that a useful accord would be 
reached but that he would have to guard against any duplicity from the other 
operators. To Daniel Shaeffer, he wrote, "On the whole I think this conference 
ought to work out very well for the future ofT & WA, but as you know it will 
necessitate our paying careful attention to see that the others do not slip any-
thing over."6 
After several days of discussion, the assembled airline executives agreed 
on a rate reduction plan. Generally, rates were reduced from 5 to 15 cents, 
depending on the weight-space bracket used.7 No reductions in the variables 
were made, with the exception of a drop from 2.5 cents to 2 cents in the fog 
allowance. "The Department estimates that this will result in a saving of over 
$2 million," MacCracken stated, "which they claim they intend to spend with 
the operators who are doing the best job with the passenger service."8 
Brittin was the outspoken representative for the smaller air mail lines. His 
Northwest Airways was fighting hard for survival and was desperately trying 
to expand westward from Minneapolis to complete a northern transcontinen-
tal route to Seattle. His initial efforts were constantly frustrated by the depart-
ment, which cited insufficient mail and passenger volume to justify the 
expenditures on this long and hazardous route. Nevertheless, Brittin persisted 
in hopes that in time his lobbying would wear down the department's opposi-
tion. In the meantime, he fervently fought to maintain his position and pro-
tect Northwest's territorial rights against all threats, real and imaginary. 
The savings effected by the rate revision, reported Brittin, were to be spent 
on route extensions, within the guidelines outlined last summer by the comp-
troller general. Brittin saw that the department was to extend lines from Pueblo, 
Colorado, to El Paso and Dallas; Kansas City to Denver; Louisville to Dallas; 
and from Pittsburgh to Washington and Norfolk. "Even with these lines estab-
lished," stated Brittin, "the air mail structure is obviously incomplete. Further 
extensions are absolutely necessary in the opinion of the Department to care 
for the requirements of a nationwide air mail service. The question before the 
Department is how to do this without increasing the annual appropriation 
beyond $20 million."9 
Brown stressed the matter of aircraft speed but only one company paid 
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The Boeing 247, the world's first modern airliner, was created for United Air Lines in 
response to a 1931 Post Office requirement for a new high-speed airliner. (Smithsonian, Sl# 
2000-6118) 
heed. Philip Johnson of United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, repre-
senting Boeing Air Transport, National Air Transport, Pacific Air Transport, 
Varney, and Stout, was present at the conference, as was Col. Paul Henderson. 
Johnson's companies were operating primarily Boeing Model 80 tri-motor 
biplanes, capable of carrying up to eighteen passengers, and the Boeing Model 
40 four-passenger, single-engine mail planes. Other aircraft in the fleet in-
cluded Boeing 95 mail planes and Ford Tri-Motors inherited from NAT and 
Stout. These aircraft were perfectly serviceable, but none were what the Post 
Office now had in mind. Boeing, however, had an ace up its sleeve. 
Under development for the U.S. Army Air Corps was the revolutionary 
Boeing B-9 bomber. This aircraft was all metal, was powered by two air-cooled 
engines, and possessed a fully cantilevered, that is, internally supported, wing 
of great strength and low drag. This was to be the world's first modern bomber 
and was capable of speeds up to two hundred miles per hour, as fast as con-
temporary high-speed fighters. Immediately after the conclusion of the con-
ference, the Boeing Airplane Company began a competition to develop a 
commercial mail plane based on the revolutionary design characteristics of 
the B-9. Originally intended as a high-speed mail plane that could carry eight 
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passengers as well as a two-thousand-pound mail load, the design evolved into 
the all-metal, cantilevered, midwing, twin-engine, ten-seat Model 247 with 
retractable landing gear-the world's first modern airliner-which was to enter 
service two years later, in 1933. This aircraft, with its cruising speed of 160 
miles per hour, was destined to change the face of commercial aviation and 
was deliberately designed to take advantage of the incentives provided by the 
Post Office's variable payment scheme. Thus the Post Office was directly re-
sponsible for inspiring the creation of an entirely new generation of commer-
cial aircraft, the design of which has changed little in the past sixty years. 10 
While this technological breakthrough was under development, the Post 
Office was more concerned with how to deal with unwanted competition. 
Ludington and proposed airlines operated by Errett Lobban Cord were now 
threatening Brown's carefully constructed airways system. Remarked Brittin 
in response to Brown's concerns, "In other words, the Postmaster General wants 
the air mail operators to be progressive and develop sufficient service to dis-
courage successful competition." 11 
The development of new aircraft of sufficient speed and greater efficiency 
was the best way in the long run to handle the competition. In the short term, 
Brown decided he must stay the course despite growing problems. His pro-
gram to improve the efficiency of the air mail carriers and wean them off sub-
sidy was working. "The Post Office Department is gradually reducing rates 
and multiplying schedules;' remarked Brittin. "This policy will shortly bring 
the operators to the point where air mail is not even paying the cost of their 
operations:' Brittin understood that this was deliberate, as it would force the 
contractors to expand their passenger and express service to offset the declin-
ing air mail income. "It is more necessary right now to develop potential pas-
senger schedules than it is to angle for relatively small increases in mail volume;' 
he concluded. "We are paid by the mile, not by the pound and this pay is get-
ting less and less."12 
The Watres Act was working as planned, but the question remained whether 
Brown would have enough time to complete his program before the voices of 
reaction grew too loud to be ignored. 
Brown's first point of contention was the new service between New York 
and Washington provided by the Ludington brothers. As they were in direct 
competition with their former partner, it naturally fell upon Clement Keys to 
deal with the new threat. The Ludingtons established their passenger shuttle 
service during the late summer of 1930 and immediately tapped a lucrative 
market of business travelers along the East Coast between New York and Wash-
ington through their base in Philadelphia. The brothers cautiously explained 
to Clement Keys that their service was intended as an experiment and was not 
designed as a threat to Eastern Air Transport. Keys tolerated the intrusion into 
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his territory until the competition grew too intense. "The Ludington crowd;' 
Keys told Shaeffer, "have invited sharp competition by coming in on an estab-
lished air mail line, in exactly the same way that the Aviation Corporation 
invited destruction by putting a passenger route over the N.A.T. line from 
Chicago to Kansas City, which has cost them a very large sum of money and 
which is now abandoned:' Keys was of course referring to Braniff, which AVCO 
had just shut down. "The same thing is almost certain to occur with respect to 
Ludington;' Keys continued, "because with our air mail routes established as a 
main line, we will be able to operate passenger service at a minimum of over-
head. In addition we will undoubtedly be able to obtain on some of our pas-
senger runs between New York and Richmond the minimum air mail rate. 
Ludington could not obtain this rate:' 13 
Keys was determined to take up this matter with the postmaster general. 
Brown insisted that the air mail lines carry passengers to offset their costs and 
had virtually demanded that they open such service. This Keys was preparing 
to do when he purchased Pitcairn and reorganized the all-air mail line into 
Eastern Air Transport. Unfortunately, the Ludingtons beat him to it. 14 
The Ludingtons opened service on Labor Day 1930. Two hundred and 
twenty three passengers flew with them that day, and passenger traffic was 
heavy thereafter. Eastern had opened service two weeks beforehand and re-
ported good traffic as well. The fight was on. 
By December, the competition had prompted Ludington to drop its al-
ready low fares to below the industry's goal of the cost of rail travel plus Pull-
man. A ticket from New York to Philadelphia was reduced 60 cents to $5.25, 
and a ticket from Philadelphia to Washington dropped 85 cents to $8.00. The 
Ludington brothers proudly reported that in four months of operation they 
had carried 17,139 passengers, and, more important, they claimed a year-end 
profit of $8,073, unheard of in the aviation industry. 15 
The numbers were deceiving. Despite the initial success, the competition 
with Eastern and a general decline in traffic once the market was saturated 
and the novelty had worn off eventually brought red ink to the operation. By 
the beginning of 1931, the Ludingtons were anxious for an air mail contract of 
some sort to stem their growing losses. Surprisingly, Brown was not unsympa-
thetic to Ludington's enterprising adventure. He suggested the creation of a 
special high-speed air mail service between New York and Washington using 
the Ludington line. Special air mail offered at a higher 25-cent rate would 
speed between the cities providing remarkable same day service along the line.16 
An enthusiastic Eugene Vidal, executive vice president of Ludington, 
jumped at the opportunity and wrote to Brown on January 16, 1931, offering 
the company's services for such a venture: "You will remember having informed 
us that you were considering for our operation, a deluxe airmail special deliv-
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ery service between Washington and New York to include the other major 
cities on our route. We are anxious to learn at this time, the status of this plan; 
first, because we are now planning additional schedules and equipment for 
the spring, and secondly, since air passenger competition has appeared, we 
have been forced to add considerably to our traffic costs which is proving seri-
ous at this time." 17 
They were feeling the pressure from Eastern. In order to demonstrate their 
commitment to such a plan, Vidal offered to fly this special mail at or below 
cost. "We are equipped to carry special delivery mail any and all hours of the 
day at an exceedingly low rate;' he stated, "and are willing to cooperate during 
an experimental period at cost to your department for say, one dollar per day:' 18 
Although the department was thinking about such a scheme, it had made 
no definite plans. Following a meeting with Brown, Vidal raised the stakes, 
accusing the air mail operators of wasting taxpayers' money and profiting at 
government expense. In direct reference to Eastern, Vidal wrote Brown, 
Another company carrying the United States mail has gone in competition 
with us on the passenger business. It is our understanding that all the Govern-
ment intends paying for the carrying of its mail is the actual cost which the 
carrier undergoes. However, the company in question reports a profit of $800,000 
for the first 11 months of 1930 to its holding company. This cannot be all from 
passenger carrymg. 
This money which obviously comes out of the United States Treasury is 
being used to support a passenger service in competition to ours. 
You told us that you would very much like us to succeed as you could cite us 
as an example in making other operators cut their costs and thus save the Post 
Office Department money. If this is to be possible, it is essential that the Gov-
ernment not help our competitors by giving them money on which to operate 
planes at rates cheaper than ours or to operate larger planes at the same rate. We 
are definitely not asking for mail, as we know we can stand on our own feet, 
providing another company does not have an unfair advantage over us in using 
profits from air mail to subsidize a passenger operation. 19 
Vidal failed to understand Brown's efforts in promoting his national air 
transportation plan, which, through the Watres Act, directly assisted the air 
mail carriers and the major independent passenger carriers operating at that 
time through subsidy payments, on Brown's terms. Vidal and Ludington, in 
fact, hoped for some sort of assistance in the form of a new air mail contract 
for the route or a special "de luxe" service.20 Brown, however, was not going to 
pay for any new service out of the $20 million annual appropriation for do-
mestic air mail. Such a measure would require a special appropriation from 
Congress, as would any new contract. Ludington would have to wait. 
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In the meantime, the competition between Eastern and Ludington was 
becoming personal. The two airlines shared the use oflanding fields in Phila-
delphia and Washington. Tensions increased throughout the winter when ru-
mors spread throughout both companies. Townsend Ludington had heard 
through unnamed but reliable sources that Eastern's Capt. Thomas Doe had 
sworn to a large gathering that they would drive Ludington out ofWashington 
within six months. The owners ofWashington Hoover Field wanted to sell out 
and tried to play the two airlines against each other. In so doing they promised 
Ludington, for the price of a loan, that they would not permit Eastern's com-
peting shuttle flights to land at their field. Only their air mail flights were to be 
allowed. 
When Clement Keys discovered this latest ploy, he took furious exception. 
He fired off an angry letter to Townsend Ludington, threatening cutthroat 
competition. "The proposition ... looks like a pretty direct challenge to begin 
the kind of competition with which all students of railroad history are thor-
oughly familiar;' he remarked. "I will try to hold down the natural desire of 
our organization to accept the invitation to a fight, but I cannot control the 
thoughts and ideas that have been engendered by this last episode:'21 
Ludington denied any wrongdoing while admitting that members of both 
organizations had made mistakes and ill-tempered statements. Even though 
his operations were a direct challenge to Eastern, Ludington urged coopera-
tion, believing that their operations were complementary, though he felt that 
Eastern's new passenger service was the unfair competitor. "We fail to see why 
Eastern should want to erect something which might wreck both outfits, when 
the Company should save much money and undoubtedly increase profits by 
playing along;' he wrote Keys. "The service Eastern Air gives seems to us to be 
essentially a deluxe through service, and ours it seems to us to be essentially a 
fast bus line. The two should complement each other .... If we should be 
forced into cut-throat competition, we would be forced to extend our activi-
ties into fields we are not now considering. In this case, I would be fearful that 
the result might be the upsetting of the whole air mail situation, which strikes 
me as being fairly delicate at the present time."22 
This was no idle threat. Not everyone in Congress accepted the postmas-
ter general's Progressive Republican vision of the airline oligopolies. Since 
November, rumblings had been heard from Congress, and the newly elected 
Democratic majority in the House was calling for an investigation of the air 
mail situation and Brown's handling of the contract awards. In the Senate the 
climate was also worsening. Although the Republicans maintained control, 
several outspoken Democrats had seized the reins and launched a preliminary 
attack on the Post Office. Sen. Clarence Dill of Washington, acting on behalf 
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of Marner Air Lines, a small independent passenger line in his state, decried 
the department's refusal to sponsor a northern transcontinental route from 
Seattle to Minneapolis. Despite clear evidence that such a route could not sus-
tain the traffic necessary to justify the expenditures by the Post Office and the 
Department of Commerce at that time, Dill attacked United Aircraft and Trans-
port Corporation for allegedly anticompetitive practices in forestalling the 
route. Heedless to the fact that Boeing was based in Seattle and already serving 
the Northwest well, Dill assailed UATC as a ravenous monopoly operating in 
connivance with the department to prevent competition. He demanded that 
the department provide pertinent data on the contracts and the contractors to 
support his claims and threatened an investigation.23 
Sen. Kenneth McKellar echoed Dill's sentiments. McKellar, the flamboy-
ant Democratic senator from Tennessee, was angered by the department's lack 
of progress in extending air mail service into his state, particularly his home-
town of Memphis. An old southern Progressive, McKellar was a far more dan-
gerous critic of the air mail than Dill and was motivated by his inherent dislike 
and distrust of monopolies to examine the workings of Brown's department. 
McKellar was the prototypical Wilsonian New Freedom Progressive who re-
acted almost instinctively against any economic concentration of power. In 
March 1931, along with Rep. Will P. Wood, he introduced an amendment to 
the deficiency bill calling for the complete investigation of mail contracts. This 
authorized a joint probe by members of the House and Senate appropriations 
committees. 24 Congress would not convene until the fall, however, giving Brown 
a temporary respite in the hope that the political climate might cool down. 
Paul Henderson, ever the astute observer, was not encouraged by the chang-
ing political attitudes. "I am sorry to say;' he remarked, "that I am afraid we are 
in a place where we are going to need the best possible handling of our affairs 
in order to avoid a smash-up": 
Commercial air transportation is costing the government now approxi-
mately 40 million dollars a year. This includes the domestic air mail at 20 mil-
lion; the foreign air mail at 7 or 8 million; and the Department of Commerce 
expense at 12 or 13 million. This is more money than the government seems to 
be justified in investing in this sort of effort. There is no small amount of Con-
gressional interest in the problem, a great deal of criticism of the situation has 
developed, and a general tendency toward a tightening up of government purse 
strings as far as commercial transport is concerned. The struggle will come with 
the opening of Congress in December, and unfortunately for us this next Con-
gress is one which is so evenly divided, Democrats vs. Republicans, as to make it 
look as though it may be almost impossible to accomplish much with them.25 
Clement Keys was keenly aware of the changing situation when he re-
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sponded to Ludington's challenge. Air mail lines were supposed to start flying 
passengers despite Ludington's belief to the contrary. Ever since the Watres Act 
became law, stated Keys, "the Post Office Department, very wisely, I think, has 
recognized the same principle, namely, that no trunk line can be built up on 
air mail alone but that all systems must be complete systems operating every 
branch of transport aviation over the rights of way provided by the Depart-
ment of Commerce from public funds." Far from encroaching on Ludington's 
passenger operations, Eastern Air Transport was obligated by the Post Office 
to start regular passenger service.26 
Keys, ever prescient, envisioned the day when large aircraft carried pas-
sengers in inexpensive or deluxe service in the same aircraft, allowing travelers 
to decide on their level of service, as they could while traveling the railroads. 
He also envisioned the increase of government regulation, first on the state 
level and then the federal, just as happened with the railroads, which would 
greatly restrict competition. Although he did not look forward to that time, he 
fully expected that there would be formal national regulation of the airline 
industry, more restrictive than regulations currently handed down from the 
Post Office and Commerce Departments. "Interstate air traffic does not yet 
come under the Interstate Commerce Act, but it ultimately will;' stated Keys, 
"and there will then be limitations upon the right of such institutions to du-
plicate one another's facilities to a destructive extent, but this is far off:' 
Keys suggested that there was enough room for both operations to fly be-
tween the financial and the political capitals of the nation, provided that both 
parties acted reasonably and not destructivelyY Townsend Ludington agreed, 
at least for the time being. He wrote back to his former partner, stating, "Inas-
much as we are all people of sense, I fail to see why we cannot work this thing 
out in such as way as to avoid the kind of competition which would be de-
structive to both."28 Eventually, through the good offices of William 
MacCracken, who had just become Ludington's representative in Washington 
as well as representative of Western Air Express and TWA, a mutually accept-
able agreement was reached for the use of the Washington airport. Ludington's 
suggestion to Captain Doe to sublet the mail contract from Eastern between 
New York and Washington was rejected by Eastern's board. 29 Thus an unsteady 
truce temporarily quieted the growing tensions. 
MacCracken had forged the compromise while observing the changing 
air mail situation in Washington. Not all of the other contractors were happy 
with Brown's recent rate reduction conference. As MacCracken wrote Townsend 
Ludington, "When I was over at the Post Office Department this morning, I 
came across Col. Brittin of Northwest Airways. Apparently he was feeling rather 
low, due to the cut in the air mail rates." MacCracken continued, "He sug-
gested that he might be interested in selling out to Cord. I think that it was 
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probably a bad cup of coffee that they gave him for breakfast that made him 
feel that way, but he promised to get in touch with me next week to talk fur-
ther on the subject. Do not pass this on to any of your friends in the Cord 
organization, but I thought you might be interested in it yourself."30 
"Cord" was none other than Errett Lobban Cord, the automobile mogul 
who had recently expanded his empire into aviation with the acquisition of 
the Stinson Aircraft Corporation and Lycoming Motors. The thirty-five-year-
old Cord had gained prominence first as a race car driver before World War I 
and then as an automobile salesman in southern California in the early 1920s, 
from which he broadened his interests to include trucking and automobile 
service and rental. By 1925, Cord had acquired sufficient capital to form his 
own corporation and promptly purchased control of the Auburn Automobile 
Company, the manufacturer of some of America's finest luxury and touring 
cars. Despite the economic crisis following the market crash of 1929, Cord's 
empire grew as he acquired the pinnacle of automotive grandeur, the 
Duesenberg company, and bought Checker Cab and Yellow Cab. 
In 1930, Cord entered the aviation field with the purchase of Stinson and 
Lycoming. Stinson was a manufacturer of a line of popular single-engined 
general-purpose aircraft. More important, the company also was producing 
an efficient ten-seat, high-wing, tri-motor that, though smaller than the stan-
dard Ford Tri-Motor, was significantly less expensive, costing only twenty-five 
thousand dollars as opposed to the fifty-thousand-dollar price tag for the Ford. 
Cord had Lycoming engines installed on these aircraft and marketed them to 
the smaller independent airlines just beginning to open service. One of these 
was LudingtonY 
Unlike the newly reconstituted Braniff and Bowen Air Lines, which relied 
on the high speed, single-engined Lockheed Vegas that the Post Office dis-
liked, Ludington deliberately chose the Stinson SM 6000B tri-motor because 
of the safety inherent in its three-engine redundancy. The aircraft was also fast 
enough to beat the larger Curtiss Condors flown by Eastern Air Transport and 
embarrass the Post Office in the process. The performance of this aircraft was, 
in fact, the catalyst behind the recent February operators conference. 
So pleased was Cord with the successful relationship with Ludington that 
he entered into a marketing agreement with the Philadelphia firm. Cord, the 
two Ludington brothers, and Cord's attorney, Lucius B. Manning, were either 
directors or officers of the new company, Airlines Inc. Through this arrange-
ment the Ludington Line acquired seven more Stinsons as their service ex-
panded and Cord's taste for the airline business grew.32 
Over the years, Cord had gained a well-earned reputation as an astute 
stock manipulator, an aggressive businessman, and a sworn enemy of orga-
nized labor. Having himself learned to fly, Cord was not impressed with the 
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qualities needed for piloting an aircraft. He felt that pilots were no more than 
glorified bus drivers and would pay them accordingly.33 Although not making 
for a happy work force, this would greatly reduce costs and enable Cord to 
compete directly against the major carriers-without an air mail contract. 
On March 23, 1931, Cord opened service with his new Century Airlines 
between Chicago and Cleveland, in direct competition with American Air-
ways. His pilots received $350 per month, half the pay required by the Post 
Office for air mail carriers. In July, he expanded his operations by creating 
Century Pacific, which flew out of Los Angeles to Arizona, again in direct com-
petition with American. This time, his pilots received only $150 per month. 
Cord discovered a buyers' market for pilots and was more than willing to ex-
ploit their desperate economic situation to his advantage.34 
Unlike most of the little independents, Cord's entry into the airline field 
was a serious threat to the existing air mail carriers. His unscrupulous busi-
ness practices and well-known business acumen together with his political 
connections in the Democratic Party made Century and Century Pacific dan-
gerous competitors for the air mail contractors and the Post Office. In Illinois, 
Cord was to prove exactly how dangerous. 
Century Airlines was based in Chicago and was flying passengers on a 
regular schedule from its headquarters to Detroit, Toledo, and Cleveland charg-
ing rates that matched the railroads. These routes placed Cord in direct com-
petition with both American and National Air Transport. Immediately, 
American and National reduced their fares to below cost in order to match the 
threat, which they could do secure in the knowledge that their air mail con-
tracts provided a sufficient cushion against short term losses. Cord kept the 
pressure on, despite mounting losses, as he angled to secure an edge in the 
market. In a stroke of near genius, Cord and Vice President Lucius Manning 
devised a unique scheme to thwart their rivals along Century's other heavily 
traveled route from Chicago to East St. Louis, Illinois. 
Using existing Illinois law, the first in the nation to regulate the railroads 
in 1886, Cord seized upon the idea of securing an exclusive certificate of con-
venience and necessity under the Illinois Commerce Commission and thus 
operate a legal monopoly within the state. If successful, this would prevent 
American from flying a competing route to St. Louis and force all of the pas-
senger traffic onto his new airline. 
Swiftly, however, the corporate counsels for AVCO and National Air Trans-
port prepared the necessary briefs and outlined several possible courses of 
action to forestall Century. The Chicago law firm of West and Eckhart exam-
ined the existing state law and concluded that the commission did indeed have 
jurisdiction over the operations of American's subsidiary, Robertson Aircraft, 
the holders of the air mail contract, as long as they flew within the state. With 
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that in mind, they recommended that American apply for a "certificate of con-
venience and necessity" in Illinois to counter Century's move so that both 
sides could be heard at the forthcoming April 29 hearing. This would enable 
American, through Robertson, to claim pioneer rights, as they had flown within 
the state since Charles Lindbergh began carrying the mail in 1926. If granted, 
American could outflank Century, receive the sole certificate, and push Cord 
out of the state entirely. 35 
National Air Transport rejected the notion that the Illinois Commission 
had jurisdiction, arguing that aviation was interstate transportation over which 
federal law prevailed. National's attorneys did not consider airlines a common 
carrier because they were not specifically mentioned in the state law. However, 
airlines could be considered public utilities over which the commission could 
exert regulatory control. Illinois could not interfere with carriage of the U.S. 
mail, but it might have authority over passenger traffic. Attorney Clarence 
Ross recommended that National move carefully so as not to anger the com-
mission and prejudice their decision in favor of Cord. He also feared that, if 
Cord were successful, a rash of similar suits would be filed in every state. "It 
seems advisable," stated Ross, "that if there is to be regulation of air transpor-
tation it should properly be in the hands of the federal government owing to 
the close relationship of air transportation with national defense."36 
Postmaster General Brown clearly understood the mechanisms of politics 
and was not about to allow a state commission or even the legislature to dic-
tate federal air transportation policy. On April21, Brown had Horace Donnelly, 
the department solicitor, appeal to the commission for a postponement until 
late May, which was granted. 37 Donnelly followed up this request with a de-
tailed brief outlining the department's opinion that Illinois did not have juris-
diction in the matter and should cease any action. In the department's opinion, 
even though not specifically detailed in the law, an air mail contractor is a com-
mon carrier engaged in interstate commerce over which, by the Constitution, 
no state has control, even if that company is engaged in intrastate business.38 
The federal government was spending millions of dollars annually to sup-
port the struggling airline industry under the direction of the Post Office De-
partment. It was Brown's opinion that the actions oflocal or state governments 
should not impede these efforts. In so doing he also reiterated the department's 
position concerning its relationship with the promotion of passenger traffic. 
"Thus it will be seen that the carrying of the mails is linked closely with the 
transportation of passengers, and in fixing the rate of pay the Postmaster Gen-
eral must take into consideration the remuneration the contractor receives on 
account of passenger transportation;' Brown declared. "It is apparent that if 
the State is to step in and give a competitor an exclusive right to operate an-
other passenger line over a route established and maintained by the Federal 
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government at high cost, such a kind of competition would make necessary 
either the abandonment of its major efforts to promote commercial aviation 
or the payment of a higher rate by the government and seriously hamper it in 
its endeavor to establish a network of airlines throughout the country and 
promote the cause of aeronautics."39 Brown reminded the governor that most 
of the states were willing to cooperate with the Post Office and Commerce 
Departments and restrain from exercising any attempts at local regulation. 
They generally accepted federal preeminence and followed national guidelines 
concerning licensing at the state level. Brown expected Illinois to do the same.40 
Charles Hadley, chairman of the Illinois Commerce Commission, re-
sponded through the governor to Brown's urgent letter, suggesting that all 
parties wait until the hearing to form a consensusY Apparently, American's 
plan was having success, as its subsequent application forced the commission 
to examine the entire issue of jurisdiction as well as American's superior claim. 
Century's officials also recognized that they were no longer in a strong posi-
tion and were running the risk of being excluded by American's claim. They 
decided to cooperate rather than fight. Lucius Manning wrote to Northwest 
Airways as well as National Air Transport and American, taking credit for the 
delay in the hearing schedule and requesting that all parties meet in Chicago 
to discuss the situationY 
After lengthy discussions with the commission in Century's Chicago of-
fice and hearings in Springfield in June, the airlines agreed to argue against the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the state. The commission reasserted its claim 
to jurisdiction but agreed not to interfere with the aviation industryY With 
this decision, the question of Century's attempt to secure an exclusive certifi-
cate to operate in Illinois became moot. In late August the commission ap-
proved the applications of Century and their American rival.44 No more was 
heard from Illinois, as promised. Postmaster General Brown and the air mail 
carriers carried the day; Cord was stymied-at least for now. 
While the Post Office was waging its struggle to contain state regulation, it 
was completing Brown's national transportation plan by filling in the map 
with supplemental lines, intended to feed traffic to the primary trunk routes 
or to link primary routes together. Others were made for political purposes. 
In April, Brown took care of past debts when he awarded American Air-
ways an extension of its route from St. Louis to Kansas City, stretching it now 
across Kansas and Colorado to Denver. Scheduled to open in June, this route 
was flown by W.A. Letson and his United States Airways. During the opera-
tors' conferences in May and June 1930, it was agreed that Letson had the 
pioneering rights in this territory. Now, though American had gained the ex-
tra mileage, it, with the direct encouragement of the Post Office, sublet the 
Kansas City-Denver portion of the line to United States Airways. Not proven, 
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though widely suspected, this was a reward for Letson not contesting too loudly 
his earlier bid attempt with United Avigation for CAM-34.45 
The Pittsburgh Aviation Industries Corporation also received the benefit 
of the department's largess when Pennsylvania Airlines, the product of its ac-
quisition of Clifford Ball's line, was awarded its long-desired route from Pitts-
burgh to Washington. George Hann and his PAIC compatriots had strongly 
backed the department's national plan and were instrumental in the creation 
of TWA, with the blessing of Postmaster General Brown. Brown repaid their 
efforts with a much-needed aerial connection between these important cities. 
The department had received a great deal of pressure to expand its air 
mail operation along the Mississippi River Valley. To this end, powerful politi-
cians, including Sen. Huey Long and Sen. Kenneth McKellar, pressured the 
Post Office for service into New Orleans and Memphis, respectively.46 Brown 
did what he could to accommodate the requests, but the department had no 
money; the appropriations for the fiscal year had already been allocatedY 
The route between St. Louis and New Orleans via Memphis promised great 
profits to the operators flying that line. The competition was intense, even 
though the Post Office did not offer this as an air mail route. From St. Louis, 
Frank and William Robertson, the former air mail contractors who had sold 
their operation to the Aviation Corporation, reentered the airline business in 
1930 and were now operating a small passenger line to the Crescent City, serv-
ing numerous towns along the way. Having pioneered the first route between 
St. Louis and Chicago, the Robertsons hoped to provide service that would 
enable travelers flying from Chicago to transfer to their new line and complete 
their aerial journey to New Orleans. Flying a fleet of eight-passenger, single-
engine Ryan Broughams, the Robertson Flying Service experienced initial suc-
cess but found the traffic was not enough to offset an average monthly loss of 
three thousand dollars. With this in mind, on January 6, 1931, Frank Robertson 
appealed to Walter Brown for a mail contract48 but was politely refused for 
lack of money.49 
The excuse of a lack of appropriations to deny the Robertsons and other 
subsequent petitioners appeared unfair but was nonetheless valid. A new con-
tract required the expenditures of additional federal funds, an extension did 
not. This important difference, overlooked in all previous interpretations of 
the air mail situation, is crucial in understanding the mechanisms of the Post 
Office's decisions. With no new appropriations available, the department could 
not legally award any new contracts. Only through extensions, which were 
paid out of existing funds that were reallocated at the expense of the existing 
contractors, could any additional service, at no additional cost to the taxpayer, 
be made in response to the public's demand for air mail. In fact, the contrac-
tors were often forced to fly schedules at reduced or even no pay, particularly 
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toward the end of the fiscal year, to ensure that no postal appropriation defi-
ciencies would exist. This did not endear Brown to the contractors, but they 
could only grumble, for it was the law. The Watres Act, which gave the depart-
ment authority to issue route certificates and the subsequent rate revisions, 
was intended to expand service at no extra cost to the government. Whereas 
the contractors resented the additional burden of providing new service with 
no additional revenue, except for that generated by passenger and express traffic, 
the independents saw only that the "monopolies" were apparently receiving all 
of the money to which they felt entitled, no matter how weak their claims. 
Few outside the department and the industry understood how Brown ap-
plied the Watres Act to expand the industry with a no-growth budget. Because 
of Brown's program, airlines expanded in a rational manner, with increasing 
frequencies of schedules and many more and longer routes-all on an annual 
budget of $20 million, a sum that remained constant throughout the Hoover 
years. Brown entered the Post Office in 1929 with a definite plan to hold down 
costs and to improve efficiency of the entire department. This he was deter-
mined to do. 
From New Orleans, famed racing pilot Jimmy Wedell and Harry P. Will-
iams of Wedell Williams, which had vainly petitioned the department for a 
contract the previous summer, were also flying a small passenger operation 
along routes to Baton Rouge, Shreveport, and on to Fort Worth and Houston. 
They, too, were losing money and were in dire need of a contract to keep them-
selves solvent. Politically well connected, Wedell Williams sought to influence 
Brown through the power of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Ernest Lee Jahncke, 
who appealed to the department on their behalf. This also was refused be-
cause of a lack of the necessary appropriations. Still, Brown did have a sugges-
tion that Glover passed on to Jahncke: Wedell Williams should merge with the 
Aviation Corporation. 50 
Williams conferred with Gilbert Grosvenor, who frankly told him that 
AVCO was not in a position to help, despite the Post Office's wishes. The fi-
nancial situation at AVCO was still precarious, and the corporation needed 
time to continue its reorganization while reaping the benefits of its new trans-
continental system. The corporation could ill afford to spare the cash or time 
to absorb another bankrupt company. As Hainer Hinshaw explained to 
Grosvenor, "I told Mr. Glover that we were positively through with buying 
people out, and he said if that was our attitude then it looked like a hard win-
ter for Wedell-Williams, as the Post Office was in no position whatsoever to 
give them relief' 51 
Brown, nevertheless, wanted to do what he could for these two struggling 
airlines. In May, he suggested that they themselves merge, after which, per-
haps, the department could provide some assistance if the new company could 
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serve as a subcontractor for American along the St. Louis-New Orleans route. 
Unfortunately, the merger discussions dragged through several months, as both 
bickering parties were reluctant to relinquish control. No agreement was 
reached in time; an exasperated Post Office awarded the route to American as 
an extension, not a subcontract.52 
Much behind-the-scenes lobbying had been conducted by Hainer Hinshaw 
and, particularly, American's vice president of publicity, Silliman Evans. Evans, 
the dedicated disciple of powerful Fort Worth Star Telegram publisher Amon 
Carter, a director of AVCO, had persuaded the Post Office in American's favor 
by cleverly eliciting the support of powerful politicians in the region. To this 
end, Democratic senators McKellar and Joseph Robinson of Arkansas, as well 
as Huey Long, wrote in support of American, convinced that this airline would 
provide the best service to their constituency. 53 American was already serving 
Memphis, to the delight of McKellar, and was in the best position to extend air 
mail and passenger service immediately through the rest of the South. 
American's efforts carried the day with the department, convincing Brown 
that neither Robertson nor Wedell Williams, either separately or together, was 
capable of carrying the mail according to the high standards of safety and 
reliability required by the department. Hinshaw wired Evans, "Your good work 
decides the matter in our favor."54 
Brown established the new route in an ingenious and controversial man-
ner. He extended American's CAM-2 south from St. Louis to Memphis, where 
it merged with a northward extension from the new CAM-33 transcontinen-
tal line from Jackson, Mississippi. This line was then extended south from Jack-
son until it reached New Orleans. In essence, Brown extended CAM-33 in two 
directions, both ninety degrees from the direction of the original line. Not 
unexpectedly, Robertson took violent exception to this creative interpretation 
of the Watres Act. 
On June 6, 1931, Robertson fired off an angry letter decrying the post-
master general's decision, claiming that it violated the spirit of the law. 55 In the 
postal officials' view, they had done what they could, but Robertson and Wedell 
Williams had been unable to work out their differences in time. Wedell Will-
iams had at the last moment refused to complete the merger because even 
with the 49-to-49 split, the 2 percent held by a third party would still give the 
Robertsons effective control. Of even greater significance, Robertson began 
flying passengers only days before the passage of the Watres Act, as had most 
of the independents, and, therefore, was not qualified to bid on the contracts 
offered in 1930. Because of the restricted appropriations, only extensions, not 
new contracts, were possible. 
Robertson persisted nonetheless. Through Republican state committee-
man E. B. Clements and other influential Missourians, he took his case directly 
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to President Hoover. Reminding the president that the situation was causing 
much unrest in some Republican circles, he appealed to Hoover's secretary, 
Walter Newton, "to ascertain the facts and let me know what I may expect if I 
continue to urge their claims."56 A concerned Newton asked Brown to reply, 
reminding him that Harry Knight, Harold Bixby, and P.D.C. Ball were gener-
ous contributors to the party whose continued support was vital. Brown re-
sponded with an explanation and a vague promise: 
The Department gave careful consideration to the claims of the Robertson 
Company. I personally had several interviews with the Messrs. Robertson and 
their representatives. It was impossible to reconcile the kind of operation which 
they were conducting with the present air mail and passenger transport standards. 
For your information, they sold out their air transport business about two years 
ago to the Aviation Corporation for a large sum of money. Recently they have 
started a small operation south from St. Louis, one which fails wholly to meet the 
requirements of the Post Office Department. The Robertsons are excellent people 
and of course the men in whom Dr. Clements is interested are pioneers in the 
aviation industry. We hope at a subsequent time to find a place for them all on our 
air mail map. However, it was not in the public interest to meet their wishes with 
respect to the service between St. Louis and New Orleans. 57 
Brown later suggested to the Robertsons that if they could survive for a 
while longer, and if Congress would approve an additional appropriation, the 
department would look favorably upon issuing a contract for a route for them 
from Tulsa to Atlanta. Writing to Clement Keys, Frank Robertson expressed his 
optimism. "Evidently, Mr. Brown is sincere in his promises to us," he remarked, 
"and I conscientiously believe if we do start the route, we will eventually receive 
mail:' 58 Unfortunately, neither the money nor the route materialized as Robertson 
was unwilling to take a route so far from his home base in St. Louis. 
As politics played an important role in the St. Louis-New Orleans extension, 
so too did politics dominate the awarding of another, controversial extension. 
South Dakota was feeling left out of the air mail picture. Although air mail 
routes criss-crossed the country, only South Dakota remained without ser-
vice. Beginning in the summer of 1930, politicians and civic groups began to 
petition the Post Office Department but with no success. The focal point was 
the small city of Watertown, strategically situated between Omaha and Min-
neapolis-St. Paul, which saw itself as a natural stopping point on a route con-
necting these two larger cities. The Post Office saw it differently, remarking 
that the air mail traffic in that region was insufficient to justify the expendi-
ture necessary to open service. Nevertheless, South Dakotans persisted. 
By the summer of 1931, progress was being made. John H. Kelly, editor of 
the Sioux City (Iowa) Tribune, had pressured the members of the Iowa and 
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South Dakota congressional delegation as well as representatives from North 
Dakota and Oklahoma to appeal to the department. Stitz Way, a member of 
the Republican National Committee from Watertown, applied tremendous 
pressure on Walter Brown until the department finally acquiesced. 59 Through 
efficiencies found elsewhere in the system, Brown managed to reallocate enough 
funds to support an extension of Boeing Air Transport's CAM-18 from Omaha 
to Watertown, with a promise to Colonel Brittin that the line would be ex-
tended no farther, thereby keeping United out of Northwest's territory.60 
Rapid Air Lines, Hanford's Tri-State Airlines, and Western Air Service (no 
relation to Western Air Express) were all small independents operating in the 
region, each desirous of an air mail contract. Boeing had no desire to operate 
this extraneous route and was willing to comply with the department's request 
to sublease it, provided Boeing would in no way be held legally responsible for 
the subcontractor's quality of service. Armed with this information, the three 
competing independents petitioned the Post Office for the subcontract. 
John Kelly argued strenuously in favor of Hanford, stating that its airport in 
Sioux City was perfectly suited for this service and that BAT should consider 
purchasing Hanford in its entirety. Hanford, as with all passenger lines, was los-
ing a great deal of money, especially under the poor management of Arthur 
Hanford Jr. Not mentioned was the fact that Kelly owned a significant part of 
the airport in Sioux City and wanted to protect his investment. Kelly admitted, 
however, that Rapid was the more suitable carrier, given their experience. 
Rapid Air had also petitioned the department. Rapid's operation, despite 
its financial losses, was well managed and had been in operation for five years 
over the very route in question. It needed the money; Boeing did not. Rapid 
Air was willing to subcontract the route if necessary. "We are firmly convinced," 
stated Rapid's president W.F. Halley, "that the Boeing Air Transport would 
gladly sublease the operation of this route to the Rapid Air Lines Corporation 
if the Post Office would signify its approval of this course."61 The Post Office 
did in fact approve, but Western Air Service did not and launched a successful 
campaign to forestall the arrangement. Western Air Service, like Braniff, oper-
ated from Oklahoma north into Kansas. Although the Watertown route ex-
tension was outside of the airline's immediate territory, it saw the extension as 
an opportunity to find a steady source of revenue for its struggling operation. 
Faced with a deluge of letters and complaints, Brown backed down tem-
porarily. Remarked Colonel Henderson to United president Philip G. Johnson, 
"Brown has decided to wait a few days on Omaha north extension believing 
that the atmosphere will clear with our help."62 United was not particularly 
concerned, as it did not want the route, but was acquiescing to pressure from 
the department to address Brown's political problems. United expected to be-
gin service on September 1, but this opening too was delayed, until January of 
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the next year. First Assistant Postmaster General Arch Coleman expressed the 
department's opinion succinctly: "Mr. Glover advises me that the proposed 
extension from Omaha to Watertown brought on such a disturbing political 
war that the Postmaster General postponed the matter indefinitely before he 
left on his western tour. This is all that any of us know about it."63 The delay 
pleased no one. Rapid Air Lines was left without the anticipated subcontract 
and Western Air Service, though successfully stopping the deal, was also left 
empty-handed after BAT opened service. 
Oblivious or unconcerned with the Post Office Department's predicament 
concerning appropriations, extensions, and new routes, several of the inde-
pendent passenger lines took exception to their perceived bad treatment at the 
hands of Brown. They did not share his Progressive Republican vision, instead 
favoring a Progressive Democratic antimonopoly view that abhorred all forms 
of economic concentration, whether or not operating in the public interest. 
Their mission now was to convince the rest of the country, and especially Con-
gress, of the correctness of their views. 
Tom and Paul Braniff had earlier established a new airline bearing their 
name, after taking the profits from the sale of their first airline to the Aviation 
Corporation. Temple Bowen did the same with the assets from his sale of Texas 
Air Transport. Bowen and the Braniff brothers worked closely in developing 
their new high-speed passenger air service, particularly in the oil-rich regions 
of Oklahoma and Texas. Both new airlines were created after the Watres Act 
became law, and both saw American Airways, built in no small measure from 
the assets of their earlier enterprises, expanding throughout the region. They 
in turn felt they possessed a right to some of the proceeds from the contracts 
and extensions, even though the contracts had already been awarded and no 
additional appropriations existed. Braniff and Bowen, as with Robertson, 
Wedell Williams, and Rapid Air, made unsolicited offers to the department to 
carry the mail for a fraction of the pay given the legal contractors. Though 
they possessed neither the equipment nor financial resources required by the 
Post Office to carry the mail and paid their employees at rates far less than 
required by the Post Office, they believed themselves qualified and took ex-
ception when their pleas went unheeded. 
During the summer of 1931, Paul Braniff contacted Robertson, Wedell 
Williams, Rapid Air, Western Air Service, Bowen, and others suggesting a meet-
ing to coordinate their efforts to break the air mail monopoly of the Big Three 
holding companies. Also attending as observers were representatives of E.L. 
Cord's interests. They were angry. Reacting to the perceived slights by Walter 
Brown, the independents met in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 10, 1931, to 
vent their frustrations and to plan a course of action. Their avowed purpose 
was to "discuss the organization of all non-subsidized lines into a group whose 
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immediate objective will be the correction of unfair practices and discrimina-
tion in the administration of the Air Mail Act and in the distribution of the air 
mail subsidy." Of greater significance, "It was unanimously agreed that an as-
sociation of independent lines should be formed without delay" in order to 
publicize the problem and lobby before Congress.64 Their purpose was to find 
like-minded representatives, particularly former Progressive Democrats such 
as Senator McKellar, who shared their notions concerning the evils of mo-
nopoly and stir them to action. 
In order to promote their parochial economic agendas, Braniff and the 
other independents sought to ally themselves with those in Congress who voiced 
similar antimonopoly sentiments by painting themselves as innocent victims. 
Although they were indeed at a serious disadvantage against the air mail con-
tractors, the independents entered the industry with the full knowledge of the 
situation. Most of them had previously held contracts with companies they 
had later sold during the industry consolidations of 1929. The air mail con-
tractors may have been part of large holding companies, but they were legally 
formed and had been operating legal contracts before most of these indepen-
dents were created. The independent passenger lines understood this, but sev-
eral, such as Braniff and the Robertsons, felt they had been unfairly forced to 
sell their operations, even at a large profit, and wanted back in the business 
they had helped to form. 
The meeting's keynote speaker was E.V. Savage, an attorney for Ludington 
who formerly worked for Eastern Air Transport. He had compiled a detailed 
list of purported facts that, "if made public might prove very embarrassing to 
the present postal administration and most effective in obtaining satisfaction 
for the independent operators." With the help of publisher George Putnam, 
the promoter and husband of Ludington's vice president for publicity Amelia 
Earhart, Savage was preparing to launch a thorough campaign against Brown 
"to inform the public mind correctly as to the equities of the independent 
lines and as to the present inefficiency, waste, and favoritism being practiced 
in the air mail service."65 
Savage made no attempt to interpret the Watres Act as it was originally in-
tended. Brown had specifically worded the act to prevent upstart airlines, just 
like those assembled in the Hotel President, from exploiting the new law to their 
advantage, correctly fearing that they would offer cut-rate service at cut-rate 
prices that would not promote the logical development of a national air trans-
portation network. Nevertheless, Savage incorrectly assumed that the Watres 
Act, which Brown wrote, was intended to benefit the new independents: 
I do not doubt that you have all laid awake nights trying to figure out some 
effective way to relieve the oppression and unfair discrimination which the non-
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mail operators as a group have most certainly suffered. Perhaps you felt such 
relief had come when the Watres Act was passed last year. Most people in the 
industry with whom I talked at the time-excepting of course the air-mail op-
erators themselves-were under the impression that the sole purpose of the Act 
was to distribute more widely the subsidy, giving especial consideration to pas-
senger lines then in operation, which had no mail support. 
Instead of an aid, then, the Act has really turned out to be a menace-an 
instrument with which the Post Office Department has sought to kill outright 
many of the worthwhile developments of passenger travel. 
Money which was originally intended to come into your treasuries to lessen 
your losses or increase your earnings, is now being paid to your competitors so 
that they may fight you in prodigal style in the very territories where you have 
pioneered the development of passenger travel.66 
Savage attacked the distribution of the air mail appropriation, correctly 
stating that virtually all of it went to the large holding companies. United Air 
Lines, the recently reorganized air transportation division of United Aircraft 
and Transport Corporation, did, in fact, receive more than 50 percent of the 
payment, but this was because they operated the primary transcontinental 
route from New York to San Francisco, which carried the most mail, legally 
and efficiently. This, Savage believed, was grossly unfair and proof that the 
system favored an unholy alliance of an aviation monopoly unjustly trying to 
destroy the small independent carrier. His skewed vision of the realities of the 
air mail situation further fanned the flames against the department. "From all 
this experience and these contracts I can only conclude that there exists a veri-
table ring of favored sons who are now sharing what amounts to a monopoly 
in the air mail appropriations," he said. "Even if we forget for the moment 
whatever reason there may be for this favoritism, we are still confronted with 
the fact that the ring does exist, and until it is broken, I am afraid that you 
gentlemen will not have a ghost of a chance of getting an even break."67 
Savage concluded that the public had thus far been blinded by the exploits 
of aviation and were unaware of the alleged crisis, believing as they did the 
department's statements and reasoning. This perception the gathering of in-
dependents wanted to change, and Savage sought to do so through a national 
publicity campaign and an assault on Congress. 
The independents voted unanimously at a subsequent meeting on July 17 
to form an association to promote their goals and quickly sprang into action, 
using Ludington's facilities and publicity expertise in establishing an immedi-
ate presence in Washington. Northwest Airways' Colonel Brittin recognized 
the significance of the Scheduled Airline Operators Association and the threat 
it posed. "The air mail lines should not underestimate the possibilities of this 
move;' he declared.68 Brittin was prophetic. 
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Ludington immediately put this new machine into gear. Their negotiations 
with the Post Office to this point had been cordial. But this polite atmosphere 
changed in July and was reflected in the independents' Kansas City meeting. The 
reason was clear: a new route was given to Eastern without bidding. 
Brown, master of the domestic air mail situation, also controlled the de-
livery of America's overseas mail. As he had with the three large holding com-
panies, he promoted one strong line to serve the public interest in the face of 
powerful state airlines competing with U.S. interests overseas, particularly in 
Latin America. 
Pan American Airways had been formed under the direction of former 
Colonial Air Transport executive Juan Terry Trippe in 1927 and had brilliantly 
extended its reach from Cuba and the Caribbean throughout South America 
with the blessing of the Post Office. As the operating subsidiary of the Avia-
tion Corporation of the Americas (not to be confused with AVCO), it was well 
financed through several prominent New York banking houses, and its inves-
tors included Richard Hoyt and Sherman Fairchild. Brown logically saw no 
sense in the federal government supporting more than one airline interna-
tionally; such unnecessary competition would hurt the U.S. companies trying 
to compete directly with the well-organized state airlines of France and Ger-
many operating in Latin America. In so doing he encouraged Pan American to 
expand and acquire, smaller, less-efficient U.S. lines such as West Indian Aerial 
Express and New York, Rio and Buenos Aires Line, better known as NYRBA. 
North American Aviation also harbored interests in Latin America, de-
spite the postmaster general's known preference for a single flag carrier. In 
Cuba, Eastern Air Transport had established a line in direct competition with 
Pan American. Meanwhile, Pan American had invested in a domestic line be-
tween New York and Atlantic City in hopes of eventually using this route to 
gain access across the Atlantic as it connected with the nearby U.S. Naval Base 
at Lakehurst, New Jersey, the center of dirigible activity on the East Coast. 
As these actions encroached on another contractor's territory, the post-
master general was deeply concerned that the resulting cutthroat competition 
would harm the best interests of the industry. Brown made it clear to Eastern's 
officials that they should abandon their Cuban line and directed Pan Ameri-
can to stay out of all domestic activity. Interestingly, this proscription against 
Pan American remained in place untill978. Brown instructed Pan American 
to abandon its Atlantic City route and then transferred control to Eastern as 
an extension.69 
Brown reminded Captain Doe of Eastern that the department was assist-
ing Eastern by giving it the Atlantic City extension in spite of Ludington's offer 
to carry all of Eastern's mail at a much lower rate. Their cooperation, there-
fore, was expected. 70 It was this act that infuriated the Ludingtons, for they felt 
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they had a right to bid for this route, even though it was an extension without 
an authorized appropriation. 
In Washington, the Ludingtons contacted the press on behalf of the newly 
organized association of independent airlines and themselves. Reporters Ray 
Tucker from Scripps-Howard and Fulton Lewis Jr. from Universal, William 
Randolph Hearst's organization, leapt at the opportunity to expose what seemed 
to be corruption in the Post Office and were fed tantalizing subjective infor-
mation by the association to encourage further investigations. In a series of 
articles appearing in late August, both reporters repeated the association's ear-
lier assertions concerning the present air mail system, claiming unfair prac-
tices and preferential treatment for the holding companies while reporting the 
plight specifically of Ludington and Robertson in their recent negotiations. 
They claimed that it was impossible for them to break the virtual monopoly 
held by big business on the contracts because no new routes had been awarded 
for almost a year. Extensions were viewed as an unethical way to prevent the 
independents from bidding on new routes while bolstering the incumbent 
carriers.71 
It was assumed in their articles that the air mail carriers were getting more 
money because of the extensions. Neither Tucker nor Lewis understood the 
department's problem concerning the postal deficit and the need for addi-
tional appropriations for new routes. The carriers received no payments in 
excess of the authorized appropriation. The press reported that the offers by 
the independents to carry the mail at almost one-third the current price were 
deliberately ignored. On the surface this indeed looked peculiar, especially in 
light of the department's expressed intention to reduce costs across the board. 
Unfortunately for the independents, Brown had neither the desire nor, more 
important, the authority to cancel the existing legal contracts to satisfy later 
lower bids, some of questionable responsibility. All of the contracts awards 
were legal, as verified by the comptroller general. Brown had made attempts to 
mollify several of the independents, specifically Robertson and Rapid Air Lines, 
but problems with the independents themselves precluded immediate action. 
Tucker and Lewis also failed to understand that the Watres Act had not 
been written with the new independents in mind. Brown had been very care-
ful in 1930 to ensure that the viable passenger lines were taken care of either 
through a contract or by a profitable merger into a larger company. With little 
money available for the industry, Brown specifically wished to exclude specu-
lators, which included those new passenger lines he knew were created during 
the negotiations over the Watres Act just to profit at the expense of the pio-
neering lines.72 
The air mail contractors understood that the assault in the press was a 
direct result of a well-orchestrated effort by the independents to influence 
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Congress and public opinion. Clement Keys, an astute observer of the indus-
try, thought the attacks had little actual effect. He saw that Ludington was the 
instigator of the reports. "Most of the information furnished to Scripps McRae 
has come from Mr. Paul Collins of the Ludington Lines;' he noted. "So far as I 
have heard about it, most of the information furnished has been accurate as to 
the facts, however inaccurate it may seem as to implication. The first point of 
contact, I understand between Scripps McRae and the Ludington Lines was 
Miss Amelia Earhart." 
More important, Keys believed that cooler heads were prevailing in the news-
papers as reporters were beginning to understand the impetus behind the ar-
ticles. "I think that another reason for the campaign not being quite so serious as 
it was at first;' remarked Keys, "is the fact that at least one of the editorial counsel 
of Scripps McRae paper has come to the conclusion that it is largely a campaign 
on the part of one or two independent interests to obtain mail contracts, rather 
than a genuine criticism of the contracts that have been let:'73 
The contractors also suspected Hearst reporter Fulton Lewis Jr. of ulterior 
motives. They conducted their own investigation and learned that Lewis was 
the· son-in-law of Claudius Huston, the former chairman of the Republican 
National Committee. They suspected, though without proof, that Lewis was 
settling old scores against the present Republican leadership on behalf of his 
father-in-law. Keys hoped to keep this information for future use if necessary. 
"Does it seem to you, from this fact, that the critical articles have a special 
meaning, as indicating possibly that Mr. Huston himself is trying to get even 
with some of his political enemies?" he asked Colonel Henderson. "Would this 
fact, if known to the Administration, be likely to make the Administration 
support Mr. Brown's policies more vigorously or otherwise? If so, what is the 
best method to use to get this fact generally known to the Administration?"74 
Hainer Hinshaw thought they had little to fear, for once Lewis looked into 
the entire air mail story, he believed, the reporter would find that Brown's 
actions were legal. "Of course if he had good wit;' Hinshaw remarked, "he 
would know that the Comptroller General has to approve all contracts before 
they are awarded, thereby making it impossible for the Post Office Depart-
ment to show any favoritism to anybody:' As for Tucker, "He is one of the aces 
of the Scripps-Howard staff, and I am rather surprised that Ray would travel 
in such company. I believed he was above such an association."75 
Brittin understood the political significance of the articles, nonetheless. 
The bloodhounds of the press were searching for scandals.lt was intended for 
this information "to be used politically in connection with the coming session 
of Congress and the work of the House committee investigating air mail:'76 
Despite the inaccuracies of the reporting and the relative calm evinced by the 
air mail contractors, the lobbying efforts of the independents were effective. 
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One of the targeted congressmen was Rep. Clyde Kelly, the "Father of the 
Air Mail;' who despite his party affiliation readily accepted the arguments of 
the independents. He had harbored deep resentment of the postmaster gen-
eral ever since their fierce debates over the Watres Act, and not coincidentally, 
over Brown's treatment of Kelly's brother-in-law, Clifford Ball. Full in the 
knowledge of the personal animosity between the two Republican leaders, the 
independents wisely appealed to Kelly when voicing their complaints against 
the department. Kelly readily concurred with their opinion, citing, in particu-
lar, the recent example of the Ludingtons' rejected offer to carry the mail be-
tween Washington and New York at twenty-five cents per mile, which, they 
incorrectly estimated, would save the department four hundred thousand dol-
lars.77 Kelly and the independents blamed monopoly. 
In a blistering attack on the air mail system, Clyde Kelly charged that Brown 
was "prostituting the Nation's air mail with monopolies" and promised that 
he would "force an absolute and uncompromising probe into the reasons for 
this the minute Congress convenes." Fulton Lewis Jr. took credit for exposing 
the alleged corruption of the Watres Act by reporting that the postmaster gen-
eral had lied when he claimed that the act was intended to support small pas-
senger lines and instead gave 90 percent of the appropriations to the holding 
companies. Unconcerned with Brown's real, stated intention to support only 
the financially strong and responsible passenger and mail lines, Kelly readily 
accepted Lewis's revelations as facts. 
Recalling his fight with Brown over the clause in the Watres Act eliminat-
ing competitive bidding, which was ultimately removed, Kelly affirmed that 
"Mr. Brown now completely disregards the intent of the committee when it 
backed me in insisting upon the amendments and continues to carry out his 
intention of granting these contracts without bids:'78 Of course, Kelly misun-
derstood that; in fact, no contract had ever been awarded without bids-only 
extensions, which required no additional congressional appropriations. Re-
gardless, the atmosphere in Congress was rapidly changing against the post-
master general. Although the contractors were not particularly concerned, given 
the highly partisan nature of the attacks, the very real threat of an investiga-
tion upset the department and interfered with the functioning of the air mail 
program. 
Rep. Melvin J. Maas of Minnesota met with TWA's traffic manager, H.W. 
Beck, in early September to discuss the deteriorating situation. Maas was highly 
critical of the awarding of90 percent of the air mail pay to the holding compa-
nies and was particularly suspicious when he learned that more than 50 per-
cent of it went to United Air Lines. He remarked, confidentially to Beck, that 
"United Air Lines was growing fat off the bulk of air mail payments." Although 
disturbed that so much money was going into so few hands, he understood 
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the practical reasons, as did most members of Congress. "Maas, however, ex-
pressed himself as favoring the financially strong, large, seasoned, and well-
managed airlines;' Beck related, "and we reminded him of the fact that many 
small lines had sprung up in this country after the passage of the Watres Bill."79 
Regardless of Maas's better understanding of the air mail situation, his 
personal animosity toward Brown did not bode well for the future. Brown's 
abrupt, dictatorial manner had antagonized many in Congress, and even in 
his own party, undermining much valuable and increasingly needed support. 
Maas, noted Beck, "was not at all backward about expressing his personal dis-
like of the Postmaster General and frankly stated his belief that Mr. Brown's 
efforts to get a large number of planes in the air all over the country were 
merely for political purposes." Maas underscored the immediate future for the 
department. Kelly's bombast aside, enough members of Congress were suffi-
ciently disturbed by the allegations to support an inquiry.80 
With the coming of fall, the Post Office Department and its air mail con-
tractors began to prepare for the worst. Congress was set to convene in De-
cember, and air mail was foremost on its agenda. 
Chapter 11 
Cord and Congress 
T A fatching the evolving contract debate with great interest was Errett Lobban 
t' t' Cord. He, too, was anxious for a contract to offset his mounting losses, 
though his initial efforts in Illinois had been defeated. The growing contro-
versy opened several new opportunities for him if given the chance. Cord was 
willing to attack the problem on several fronts: through the independents' as-
sociation, through starting another competing airline, through congressional 
action, and through back-door political maneuvering. 
He was persistent. In July 1931, Cord expanded his airline activities, creat-
ing Century Pacific to operate in California and Arizona, in direct competi-
tion with TWA, United, and, especially, American. Using his ubiquitous Stinson 
Trimotors, he opened service from Los Angeles (his home) north to San Fran-
cisco and south to San Diego, immediately precipitating a rate war with United's 
Pacific Air Transport and TWA. 1 It was Cord's intention to parallel all of the 
air mail contractors and undercut their rates. United vice president William A. 
Patterson informed Philip Johnson, his superior, of the situation, noting that 
Cord's activities were even threatening the railroads, and urged that United 
take direct action against Cord.2 
Patterson suggested undercutting Century's rates, even to the point of sug-
gesting collusion with TWA. "I pointed out to Mr. Robbins;' stated Patterson, 
"that two or three dollars in my opinion would make quite a bit of difference 
to them and that we would be defeating the purpose of lowering our rates 
originally if we at this time decided to raise them."3 Clearly, Cord's increasing 
presence disturbed the air mail carriers. 
Cord's plans included expanding eastward through Arizona and New 
Mexico through to Fort Worth in the hope of reaching a connection there 
with his Century Airlines, which he planned to expand southwestward. In Ari-
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zona, Cord was expanding eastward from California, providing a direct chal-
lenge once again to American Airways, the existing air mail contractors along 
CAM-33. This time, taking a lesson from Cord, American managed to head 
off Century Pacific's ambitions by securing an exclusive certificate of public 
convenience and necessity just as Cord had tried to do in Illinois. Cord at-
tempted to obtain an exclusive certificate, but when challenged by the Arizona 
Corporation Commission to produce the required passenger statistical reports, 
Century Pacific failed to do so and thus forfeited any claim. The fight in Ari-
zona was long and arduous and only completed in American's favor in March 
1932. Although American eventually won, the struggle reinforced the Aviation 
Corporation's fear of Cord. 
Cord had his trusted associate Lucius Manning travel to Kansas City in 
July 1931 to attend the meeting of the independent operators called by Paul 
Braniff. Although an interested observer, Manning left the meeting unimpressed 
and determined upon another course of action to secure an air mail contract.4 
Lyndol Young, a Los Angeles-based attorney representing Cord's interests in 
California, strongly recommended applying direct political pressure on the 
administration to force an air mail contract out of the Post Office. Young was 
personally acquainted with Mark L. Requa, a member of the Republican Na-
tional Committee for the state, a mining engineer, and a close friend of Presi-
dent Hoover. He telegraphed Manning, suggesting that they use Requa to 
further their goals: "Had very pleasant conversation with Requa today and he 
wants me to supply him with data with reference to our right to obtain share 
of mail contracts .... Requa is not tied in with any other interest, his connec-
tion with Hoover covers many years, he is a mining engineer and I personally 
know his influence in Washington is as strong as anybody's:•s 
Requa indeed traveled to Washington, where he met Hoover and Brown 
to discuss the present worsening air mail situation. Requa had requested and 
received a detailed report concerning Cord's operation and their version of 
the air mail history, which he then presented to Hoover. The president was not 
happy. According to Requa, Hoover was concerned with the rising chorus of 
criticism and the increasing embarrassment that this and his other crises were 
causing. In reviewing the course of events, Requa agreed with Cord that, at 
least on the surface, the awarding of the air mail contracts (he meant "exten-
sions"but did not understand the difference) was unfair to Century and Cen-
tury Pacific. "Day before yesterday, Requa was in Los Angeles with Vice President 
Curtis and dropped by the office to see me;' Young wrote Manning. "He said 
that he had personally been looking into the air mail contract situation and 
was satisfied that Brown's present policy in awarding air mail contracts to a 
favored few to the exclusion of Century was not a fair practice and that it was 
embarrassing to the President and the national administration and that he 
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was going to see to it that we received our share of the business, also that Mr. 
Brown would not continue to put the President in a bad position in connec-
tion with his campaign for re-election. Also Requa seemed piqued that Brown 
had not answered his telegram:'6 
The Republican National Committee was to meet in Washington on De-
cember 15. Requa had invited Young to attend to plead his case. Young was 
thrilled with the prospect. "Ed Thompson will probably go to Washington 
with us, and I think with the influence of these two gentlemen with Mr. Hoover 
and the administration, we are going to get some place;' he stated.7 Cord was 
as sanguine at the prospect: "Requa was very outspoken in saying that posi-
tively we were entitled to mail contracts and that as National Committeeman 
and in charge of Hoover's campaign he will see to it that we get them."8 
Cord suggested an immediate course of action. Century must start plan-
ning to expand its operations throughout the country as soon as possible to 
take advantage of the expected change in the air mail situation. If Brown re-
acted to Requa's pressure in the manner expected, Century had to be ready to 
exploit the situation. Cord hoped to force the cancellation of all present con-
tracts, along with their extensions, thus forcing a new competition for all of 
the routes. With their lower operating costs and growing route network, Cord 
hoped to be able to underbid the large airlines and thereby pick and choose 
those routes he wanted. "The important thing;' Cord stated, "is to develop 
some plan which will give Requa and the National Committee a program upon 
which to base their argument to force Brown and Hoover into recognition of 
the situation and to have that program so low in cost that the competition 
cannot carry it out unless they deliberately donate plenty of money to it."9 
By this time Brown had replied to Requa's telegram and turned him down, 
citing the usual reasons: the Post Office had no money and paying Cord for 
service paralleling the existing air mail contractors was not in the public inter-
est. Brown was blunt in summarizing his policy, which directly reflected his 
belief in the associative state. "We believe the present task of the Post Office 
Department is to subsidize an infant industry until it can become self-sustain-
ing;' he declared. "This was done in the case of the railroads during their early 
years. Today the government pays no subsidy to the railroads but compensates 
them for the actual service which they perform in carrying the mail."10 
Brown angrily decried the efforts of the newly formed independents seek-
ing to exploit the situation to their benefit and strongly argued for his pro-
gram. The contracts were never intended as a gift for anyone who desired to 
receive one. The department was charged with developing a coherent, nation-
wide system of air transportation operating in the public interest. The indus-
try was too important to the nation to allow inexperienced operators of dubious 
financial or ethical standards to provide this valuable service. 11 
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Hainer Hinshaw of American Airways angrily voiced industry's reaction 
to the rising tide of complaints from the independents. In arguing against 
Century Pacific's vain attempt to secure a certificate of convenience and ne-
cessity in Arizona, Hinshaw commented to International News Service reporter 
and former agent for Western Air Express William "Doc" Bishop that Ameri-
can had spent considerable capital in developing their routes while Cord had 
spent none. He openly challenged Century Pacific to find anything unsavory 
in the contract.12 
Hinshaw welcomed the pending congressional hearings because he felt an 
investigation would completely exonerate the air mail contractors of any false 
charges and the truth behind the wild claims of the independents would thereby 
be exposed to the public. "Personally;' he stated, "I hope that there will be a 
wide investigation. I would like for the world to know how these non-mail 
contractors operate. How they skimp maintenance; how they do not provide 
adequate communication; how they have no two-way radio, and how they fly 
only with God's arm around them, and some day God will forget to keep his 
arm around them and they will cash in accordingly. I think it would be most 
healthful for the world to know just how much it costs in order to provide for 
every possible safety factor in this business. I think the louder they cry the less 
they will help themselves and the more helpful it will be to us."13 
Hinshaw reminded Bishop of the disingenuous arguments propounded 
by most of the independents-that they were poor, struggling operators try-
ing to break into a closed system-when, in fact, many had already profited 
greatly from their previous involvement as air mail contractors. This, too, 
Hinshaw hoped would be exposed. "For instance," he wrote, "Ludington took 
around one million dollars out of N.A.T. and the old Pitcairn line. Universal 
paid the Robertson boys a cold million dollars for their three contracts. Uni-
versal bought out Braniff, and Temple Bowen made his out of the old Texas 
Air Transport. Personally, I think when these things are brought out it will 
show that the whole business is nothing other than blackmail on the part of 
most of the independents. They had their finger in the pie once and are now 
trying to chisel in and get another:' 14 
Hinshaw and the rest of the industry appeared confident that they could 
deal with these independents. Cord was another matter. He had no skeletons 
in his closet, except for a well-deserved reputation for predatory stock ma-
nipulation; he was a dangerous competitor. Quietly, the contractors began to 
extend overtures in the hope of silencing his attacks. According to Stinson vice 
president William A. Mara, his sources within the industry reported that "the 
older airline operators would be favorable toward getting down to business 
and attempting to work out a trade and see that Century got some business, 
providing Century didn't upset the whole applecart." Mara suspected that 
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American was anxious to stave off Century's direct attacks. He reported that 
Reed Chambers, a World War I ace and now a leading executive in the aircraft 
insurance business, "seems to think that Coburn, the President of The Avia-
tion Corporation, is the ring leader among the present holders of mail con-
tracts."15 Just how true this rumor was would soon be seen. 
Fearing the threat of the independents' organized resistance, Brown in-
structed the air mail contractors to form an association of their own to foster 
their own agenda. As early as May 1931, industry leaders were discussing the 
necessity of such an organization, citing the need for unity. Gathered at Fred 
Rentschler's New York office, William MacCracken, Colonel Henderson, and 
UATC executives agreed that "the principal air mail contractors would have to 
work together, as otherwise the non-mail contractors would be cutting in on 
the available appropriations, and all lines would go broke."16 
Following Brown's strong suggestion to form an association to counter 
the independents, all of the contractors met in Atlantic City on August 5, 1931.17 
In early October, the ten leading air mail operators formed the Pioneer Air 
Transport Operators' Association, which served as a clearing house for mat-
ters of common interest among the contractors and as a lightning rod for their 
activities in protecting their mutual interests. The association's first test came 
in December, when Brown once again summoned the contractors to Wash-
ington to discuss further rate revisions and reductions. 
Brown was feeling the pressure of the impending congressional investiga-
tion prompted by the Braniffbrothers and Errett Cord's efforts to force a con-
tract out of the department. In private meetings with Brown, Cord's 
representatives proposed to carry all of the nation's air mail for just thirty 
cents a pound, an offer that created quite a stir when it was made public at the 
subsequent Post Office appropriations hearings. 
Richard Robbins of TWA was perturbed by Cord's offer, rejecting it as a 
publicity stunt. It was not possible to fly the mail, under the department's 
strict guidelines, at such a low cost. ''Any operator who makes a public state-
ment that he can put on a performance comparable to ours, at 30 cents a mile;' 
remarked Robbins, "is deliberately misleading the public: Nobody has yet been 
able to operate tri-motored Fords the year round for less than a dollar a mile:' 
Robbins felt that Cord's efforts would prove futile because the courts and regu-
latory agencies had traditionally recognized the rights of pioneering compa-
nies in new industries. He didn't think Cord would "get far in attempting to 
tear down that which has been laboriously built up at great expense and from 
which the public is now deriving great benefit."18 
Cord and Manning understood exactly what they were doing. These ef-
forts were all part of Cord's earlier plan to force the department to accede to 
his wishes through either direct or indirect political pressure. Requa's work on 
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Cord's behalf was paying dividends. Brown agreed that no matter what the 
situation among the independents, Century and Century Pacific were well 
supported financially. Brown related Cord's offer to the contractors to remind 
them of their growing predicament. "This concern offers to take over the en-
tire air mail system and conduct flights in the daytime;' he stated. "There is no 
doubt about their financial responsibility, but I have not had an opportunity 
to give the proposition any serious consideration."19 
Brown reaffirmed the immediate necessity for the air mail contractors to 
reduce costs, suggesting a 10 percent reduction in their base pay to help offset 
an expected deficit of six hundred thousand dollars. The new rate would be-
come effective on January 1, 1932. Although the smaller operators were not 
pleased with another forced reduction, the contractors realized that they had 
no choice, especially with Congress looking over their shoulders.20 
As feared, hearings into the conduct of the Post Office Department in the 
letting of air mail contracts were scheduled to begin in earnest in March 1932. 
In preparation for these investigations, the new Democratic majority prepared 
its case well. W. Jefferson Davis, a California attorney widely recognized for his 
pioneering work in aviation law and an associate of William Gibbs McAdoo, 
prepared a detailed report on behalf of the National Democratic Committee, 
outlining the issues presented and the possible courses of action. The Davis 
report especially concentrated on the growing call for formal federal regula-
tion of all aspects of commercial aviation. Davis correctly reported that al-
though most of the major carriers were still averse to direct government 
intervention, some/such as United Air Lines, realized that regulation would 
protect the air mail carriers who had pioneered their routes while excluding 
new entrants. 
Davis correctly assumed that the recently formed Pioneer Air Transport 
Operators' Association of air mail carriers was created in part to influence the 
creation of favorable federal regulation and help deflect the attacks of the in-
dependents. Davis was reacting to reports that once again, Sen. Samuel G. 
Bratton of New Mexico was reintroducing legislation to bring aviation under 
the ICC. He saw this as "a smokescreen to conceal the real issues, which in the 
opinion of the independent air transport operators, call for a complete inves-
tigation of the air mail contract awards made under the Watres Act by Post-
master General Brown:' Davis concluded that the problems of the industry 
were so great that a massive overhaul was almost inevitableY 
Cord sought to use the House appropriations hearings as a launching pad 
for his proposals to stir up support and set the stage for his total assault. Lyndol 
Young outlined Cord's scheme to Lucius Manning, who approved the plan. 
They were working strenuously to influence Rep. Joseph Byrns, Democrat from 
Tennessee and chairman of the Post Office subcommittee of the House Ap-
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propriations Committee, to cut the appropriation to $11 or $12 million or delay 
any decision until after the House Post Office and Post Roads Committee, led by 
Rep. James Mead, a Democrat from Buffalo, New York, opened its investiga-
tions. Young recommended directly lobbying the appropriate congressmen: 
When the hearing commences before the Post Office Committee, in fact a 
few days before, I think it would be a good plan to have both a tri-motor and a 
junior plane here and get each member of the committee to inspect the same 
and take a ride. There are twenty-two members. Mead likes to fly and I know it 
would be worthwhile to take him up .... You can rest assured that Coburn and 
the other mail operators will open the old sack for entertainment and campaign 
contributions and we might accomplish the same result with less money by 
impressing the members of the committee with our products, and at the same 
time entertaining them with a ride-some of them perhaps would take their 
families along. I gave Mr. Byrns a letter yesterday afternoon in which I emphati-
cally stated that we believe the appropriation should be cut to 11 million. Mrs. 
Robertson, his secretary, and her husband are taking dinner with Mildred and 
myself tonight, so I will find out from her how Byrns took my letter. 22 
Cord was pleased with this plan. "It looks as though we will have a great 
party when the new air mail bills come up in Congress;' he stated. "Incidentally, 
we have been asked to write the new bill under which two proposed air mail 
appropriations will be made. If we can get them through Congress, and it looks 
like as though we had a lot of supporters, we will give the boys a merry chase."23 
In the early weeks of February, Lucius Manning appeared before the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee on the Post Office and formally set forth Cord's 
proposal to carry all of the nation's air mail for just 30 cents per pound per 
mile. During these hearings, Brown was grilled concerning the department's 
air mail expenditures and, while deftly deflecting the more direct attacks, was 
forced to concede that he envisioned increasing the air mail postage from the 
current 5 cents to 7 cents per ounce to offset the increasing deficit. This was 
the opportunity Manning was looking for. Instead of supporting the air mail 
operators' plea for an increase from $19 to $21 million, Manning presented 
his offer to carry all of the air mail for 30 cents a mile, some 70 cents less than 
the current average cost, and recommended an $11 million appropriation as 
planned. The offer created a great deal of interest and was widely reported in 
the press. Ironically, W. Irving Glover, speaking for the department, rebutted 
the offer on the grounds that such an offer, if accepted, would create a true 
monopoly in the transportation of air mail, which was unacceptable to the. 
Post Office.24 
Soon Cord was encountering unexpected difficulties. He could offer to fly 
the mail at such a low rate because he spent so little on overhead. Pilots were 
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no more than glorified bus drivers, in his opinion, and he paid them accord-
ingly. They disagreed. The average pay for pilots among the air mail carriers 
was $7 per flying hour, with the average pilot flying eighty hours a month. 
Cord had been paying his Century pilots a monthly retainer of $350. On Feb-
ruary 1, just as the House Appropriations Committee began its deliberations, 
Cord suddenly cut the retainer to $150, the same he paid his Century Pacific 
pilots. The disgruntled Century pilots appealed for help to David Behncke, a 
United Air Lines pilot and head of the newly formed Air Line Pilots Associa-
tion (ALPA). Cord refused to deal with Behncke but agreed to defer the pay 
reduction for ten days after meeting with a committee of Century pilots. No 
agreement was forthcoming, and when the pilots reported for duty, they were 
met by armed guards and Century management and presented with an ulti-
matum to resign and reapply for their jobs at the lower rate. The pilots refused 
and were promptly locked out.25 
Jumping into the fray to support its members, ALPA organized an effec-
tive public campaign against Century. Cord responded by hiring replacement 
pilots, which was easy given the terrible shape of the economy and the large 
pool of unemployed pilots anxious to work at any price. When ALP A's efforts 
to dissuade the replacements fell on deaf ears, Behncke turned to the press and 
Congress for action. 
Rep. Melvin Maas publicly denounced the lockout, as did Rep. Fiorello La 
Guardia, a former World War I pilot himself, who attacked Cord as an enemy 
of labor and promised to fight Cord's effort to secure a mail contract. Cord's 
attempts to paint the pilots and ALPA as bolsheviks and anarchists only fur-
ther served to enrage key members of Congress.26 Colonel Brittin of North-
west witnessed Manning's testimony for Cord and the repercussions of the 
Century strike firsthand: 
Century has been having a hard time here lately. Mr. Manning and Mr. Young 
secured a hearing before the Post Office sub-committee of the House Appropria-
tions Committee .... Mr. Manning handled the negotiation for Century. A mem-
ber of the Committee stated ... that he (Manning) tried to high pressure the 
Committee with the result that he made a very unfavorable impression. The mem-
ber stated that the Committee was rather favorably inclined toward Century origi-
nally and would undoubtedly have recommended that he be given an opportunity 
to demonstrate his ability to carry mail on one or two test routes, but that they 
had lost confidence in his plan at the conclusion of the session. 
On top of this, Mr. Manning and Mr. Cord precipitated a lock-out strike 
among their own pilots. This reached the floor of the House. Several of the 
members attacked Cord and his company openly for their treatment of the pi-
lots and a number of Congressmen served notice on the Postmaster General 
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that they wanted to be heard whenever Century makes an application for an air 
mail contract. Even Will Rogers has commented unfavorably on Century and 
Cord in his column in the daily papers. The Washington papers carried consid-
erable space on this situation and all of it was unfavorable to Cord.27 
With La Guardia's denunciations still ringing in his ears, Cord approached 
Representative Mead's air mail hearings with trepidation. The other airlines 
were equally concerned. Northwest Airways' Colonel Brittin worried about 
pressure from politics and competition. "The air mail situation is rapidly be-
coming a political problem;' he remarked. "The Postmaster General, as cam-
paign manager for the next presidential campaign, is forcing political 
considerations into the affairs of the Air Mail carriers. It seems almost impos-
sible to stay out of politics and hold our own with the other lines."28 
Cord was fully aware of the game, and despite his stunning setback with 
the House Appropriations Committee was willing to proceed at almost any 
cost to win a contract. The plan was to induce Representatives Mead and 
Brunner to introduce new legislation following Mead's investigation and re-
pair his tarnished image through intense lobbying efforts by Lyndol Young. 
Cord hoped to have Rep. William Brunner introduce legislation to lower air 
mail rates and cut the ten-year route certificates down to three years, thereby 
opening all routes to competitive bidding. Brittin, who had contacted both his 
connections in the Post Office Committee and Brunner, believed the legisla-
tion was to be used as "a vehicle for opening up a public hearing on the whole 
airmail situation." He learned that Lyndol Young was actually drafting Mead's 
proposed bill, preparing to present it as a less radical substitute that would 
"take a great deal of the power for extending lines and fixing rates out of the 
hands of the Postmaster General."29 
Young's efforts had helped convince Mead that Brown's air mail system was 
seriously flawed, and he encouraged Mead to elicit support from Comptroller 
General McCarl, who had opposed the postmaster general's scheme. Young 
wanted to give McCarl final approval for all route extensions as well as contracts. 
This was something Brittin desperately fought, as Northwest was slowly moving 
westward on its determined drive to open a northern transcontinental route 
and was the prime recipient of route extensions. Brittin was concerned about 
Cord's efforts but puzzled by his apparent political clumsiness.30 
Brittin learned of Mead's plan through his numerous Washington con-
tacts and reported that Cord was the vanguard of the efforts of the other inde-
pendents, particularly Braniff, Bowen, and Ludington. Mead was planning to 
take their testimony and then present his bill in lieu of the Brunner bill and 
have it endorsed by the independents. If this happened, Brittin was nervously 
fearful of the outcome in this election year: 
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If this new bill diminishing the power of the Postmaster General and in-
creasing the power of the Comptroller General in air mail matters is favorably 
reported out of the Committee, everything indicates that it will become a party 
measure on the floor of the House. Mr. Mead is evidently actively canvassing the 
Democratic members of his Committee to insure favorable action. It is per-
fectly possible that his plan may go quite a way as it happens that the Postmaster 
General is in charge of Hoover's campaign and therefore is an ideal Democratic 
target for an attack of this kind. 
Century's General Counsel Young has apparently stirred up Mr. Mead against 
monopolistic tendency in the air mail. At present his especial antagonism is cen-
tered on American Airways first and United second, with T.W.A. and Eastern a 
close third. Mr. Mead is looking for something special in the numerous extensions 
the American Airways has received from the Postmaster General during the past 
18 months. He intends to show that these air mail extensions are purely political 
and essentially matters of political patronage in the State in which they have been 
granted. With the recent break between the Democratic Speaker of the House and 
the President, this situation may develop important proportions. 31 
Brittin was also concerned that Mead had powerful friends in the Re-
publican Party as well, particularly Rep. Clyde Kelly. "It so happens," warned 
Brittin, "that Mr. Kelly is a bitter enemy of Mr. Brown's because the Post-
master General forced Mr. Clifford Ball, who is Mr. Kelly's brother-in-law, to 
sell the Clifford Ball Airlines ... to the Pennsylvania Airlines, an ally of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad."32 
On March 1, 1932, Rep. James M. Mead, chairman of the House Commit-
tee on the Post Office and Post Roads, opened his hearings into Walter Brown's 
air mail plan in the hope of recommending new legislation rewriting the cur-
rent Watres Act and removing much authority from the postmaster general. 
Opening testimony was provided by Second Assistant Postmaster General 
Glover, who vigorously defended the department's actions while calling atten-
tion to the success of the postmaster general's program to build a national 
transportation system. Glover criticized the two bills for undermining the 
present system and endangering the legal contracts now extant. The provision 
in the proposed Brunner bill, H.R. 8390, which would reduce mail pay from 
$1.25 to $1 per mile, was not objectionable, but the proposal to cut the length 
of the route certificates from ten years to three was, as it would jeopardize 
future investment in commercial aviation. As for the second bill, H.R. 9841, 
Glover rejected it outright. 
H.R. 9841 called for the cancellation of all contracts awarded without public 
advertisement and competitive bidding. In a letter from First Assistant Post-
master General Arch Coleman read by Glover, the department rejected this 
legislation simply because all of the contracts had in fact been legally adver-
tised and awarded, contrary to public statements made by the independents. 33 
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Glover defended the use of extensions over new contracts because this 
allowed the department to extend routes at no cost to the government while 
preventing unqualified airlines from profiting at public expense. The provi-
sions of the Watres Act allowed the postmaster general to extend routes with-
out calling for bids, and that was exactly what he did within the law. Glover 
then challenged the committee to decide for the nation what it wanted for 
commercial aviation. "It is coming to the point where Congress must decide 
whether it desires just an air mail service or an air mail service with the highest 
efficiency of an air-passenger service;' he said. "This flying game was just a 
new business. It was a new method of transportation; and go back, if you will, 
to the early days when railroads started out to pioneer their way; it took a long 
time before those railroads were on a basis, even with large government sup-
port, that they were able to operate such trains as the Twentieth Century Lim-
ited or the Broadway Limited."34 
The postmaster general provided the same support to the airlines that the 
railroads received and did so with the approval of Congress. This support, in the 
form of temporary subsidies, encouraged the carrying of mail and, especially, of 
passengers to help defray costs and improve efficiency and safety. "The Postmas-
ter General had a vision and that is best illustrated by the map that is being 
presented to your honorable body on the floor of the House today;' Glover said. 
"That map is practically complete except for feeder lines. These extensions were 
made by the act which gave him that privilege of extension:'35 
The government was receiving excellent value from its expenditures on 
air mail, stated Glover. Despite Cord's offer to carry the mail for thirty cents a 
mile, "the character of passenger service which the Postmaster General is de-
sirous of offering to the public at the present cost of operation cannot be given 
for much less than the rates which we are now being paid." Certainly if Con-
gress were only concerned with the carrying of mail, payments could be sig-
nificantly less. However, if Congress wanted to continue to encourage the 
growth of a new transportation system as it originally stated during the hear-
ings for the Watres Act, they should understand that the department was ful-
filling these obligations at the lowest possible cost to the government.36 
The committee again raised the issue of extensions but was swiftly re-
minded by Glover that despite protests to the contrary, all of the extensions 
were legal and had been approved by the comptroller general, in spite of the 
latter's known antipathy toward Brown. "And furthermore," Glover said, "to 
my knowledge, the Comptroller General and the Postmaster General have twice 
been in conference on these very matters, and the Postmaster General explained 
to him what he had in mind regarding extensions and what he planned to do, 
and with what results." Concluded Glover, "All extensions granted by the Post-
master General have been approved by the payments for services rendered:' 
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With that, the committee backed off its attack and tacitly acknowledged the 
competency of the department. Chairman Mead expressed, almost apologeti-
cally, his desire only to address the recent criticisms voiced by the indepen-
dents and seemed satisfied that the department was willing to cooperate to 
smooth the troubled waters.37 
Industry observers agreed that Glover had presented his case well. He had 
only to accede to the committee's request for assistance in modifying the pro-
posed legislation, the effect of which would limit the distance of future exten-
sions but not have a significant impact on the present system.38 
Next to speak was Frank E. Ormsbee of the Air Line Pilots Association, 
who gave the existing air mail contractors a resounding vote of support while 
attacking the policies of the Cord operations. "I just want to call to the atten-
tion of the committee at this time that Mr. Cord can not carry the mail at 50 
per cent less than it is carried to-day and do it safely, because the essential 
requirement in carrying air mail is cooperation between the pilots and the 
executives:' he said. "This is a young industry. It is in the same stage railroads 
were in several years ago; and the pilots have been practically the heart of the 
industry all through its development. We are trying and hope to guide its fu-
ture development along safe lines that will eventually lead to economy. Mr. 
Cord's offer is too radical." 
Ormsbee believed Cord's assertions were not being thoroughly investi-
gated by the committee. He challenged Cord to produce reliable data to sup-
port his claim that he could fly the mail for thirty cents a mile: "I think that if 
this committee will thoroughly investigate Mr. Cord's offer, his attitude with 
reference to his pilots, his equipment compared to other equipment, his meth-
ods of overhaul and upkeep, his salaries as compared to salaries of other oper-
ating companies, these will have a decided effect on the final decision of the 
committee."39 
Lyndol Young did his best to repair the damage done by the strike but was 
unable to persuade the committee to his cause. Other independents presented 
their case, including Paul Braniff, Temple Bowen, and J.M. Eaton and Eugene 
Vidal of Ludington. All restated their previous positions, underscoring their 
need for a contract and their perceived mistreatment at the hands of the Post 
Office Department. Braniff argued for the immediate cancellation of all air 
mail contracts and the reannouncement of bids. He reasoned that because of 
the lower operating costs of the independents, obliquely referring to their much 
lower pay scale, far more pilots could be hired if the independents could fly 
the mail at the present air mail appropriation of $19 million. William 
MacCracken was an observer who thought Braniff's remarks were well stated 
but not completely accurate. "Braniff also made a good presentation of his 
case, and got away without having it brought out that he had been previously 
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bought out by the Aviation Corporation of Delaware, and then gone back into 
competition with them;' he stated.40 
Two weeks after the testimony of the airlines, Postmaster General Brown 
appeared before the committee. Brown eloquently defended his carefully con-
structed system and stated unequivocally his Progressive Republican predilec-
tions concerning "good" monopoly and the public welfare. His antipathy toward 
destructive competitive bidding was never more clearly stated and his Pro-
gressive views never more apparent. Replying to direct questioning from Rep. 
Arthur P. Lamneck, an Ohio Democrat who asked Brown if competition in 
the airline business was possible, the postmaster general replied, "Probably 
not. I do not believe in competition in public service. I think competition in 
public service simply adds to the burdens borne by the public. Monopoly in 
public service under very definite regulation is my idea, and I think that is 
what will come here ultimately. We will have air systems knit together giving a 
competitive service:' Brown continued by presenting the excellent service pro-
vided by United Air Lines along its transcontinental line as an example of his 
plan in action. "In the old days, when the mail got to Chicago from the West it 
might be late and the New York plane might have had to leave;' he noted. ''As 
the system is now, United feels to be under obligation to get that mail through 
and it gets it through. Unless you have the responsibility of moving the mail, 
gentlemen, you do not realize all the complications that arise. For instance, 
carrier A may be late in making his connection with carrier B, which latter 
carrier has a definite schedule to maintain and met, and that throws the whole 
system out of harmony. That is why these unified systems work so much bet-
ter than a series of independent lines work:'41 
The large, well-financed, and well-managed companies were far better able 
to perform their duties than the poorly financed independents. Brown re-
minded the committee that United was able to provide a special airplane to 
catch up with the normal outbound flight if the inbound mail was late, some-
thing the smaller lines could never do, and United could do it safer as well. 
''Any day the air mail for New York is late in arriving in Chicago from the West, 
United has a special plane to pick it up immediately when the regular plane 
had to leave Chicago on time in order to make connections;' he said. "These 
big organizations with spare equipment and a variety of equipment-passen-
ger and mail planes, trimotor, bimotor, and single-motor planes-are much 
better able to do a job than a fellow with two or three planes and no money, 
with the sheriff just one leap behind him all the time."42 
The postmaster general clearly understood the nature of business, gov-
ernment, and public policy. He was only interested in developing a new indus-
try that would best serve the public. Although he felt that the current level of 
government involvement was sufficient to promote and protect the infant avia-
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tion industry, he completely understood the future necessity of formal federal 
regulation. "I think that the time will come when an airline operator will have 
to obtain a certificate of public necessity and convenience before he can oper-
ate;' stated Brown, "because I do not believe that a multiplicity of operators, 
operating at a loss is going to help."43 , 
In this as with many other observations concerning air transportation, Brown 
was prescient. In fact, this is exactly what happened. Between 1938 and 1978, 
America's airlines were regulated in precisely this manner, following Brown's 
script almost to the letter, long after he had disappeared from the scene. 
Brown's testimony was sufficient to persuade the House Committee to 
drop further investigation. Mead asked for a proper study to be made of the 
industry by Harvard economist John Crane, to be completed by the end of the 
year, but, more important, no legislation was introduced. Because of the fail-
ure of the independents to sway the influential committee, the Senate investi-
gation, prompted by the irascible Sen. Kenneth McKellar, proved anticlimactic. 
Although Democrats now controlled the House, they did not control the Sen-
ate, so further inquiries were blocked by loyal Republicans. 
Brown's lucid, Progressive Republican defense of his air mail system con-
vinced enough Democrats that the Post Office was acting correctly. Of even 
greater importance, however, was a significant practical change in the air mail 
situation: Errett Lobham Cord, the preeminent independent, sold out. 
Throughout the winter of 1932, while American was desperately fending 
off the advances of Century Pacific in Arizona, negotiations were quietly un-
derway between Cord and the AVCO Board. W. Averell Harriman, chairman 
and heir to the great Union Pacific fortune of his illustrious father, E.H. 
Harriman, was beginning to panic. Despite the reorganization of AVCO and 
the passage of the Watres Act giving American a reasonable transcontinental 
route system, the company was still losing money; for 1931 the total lost reached 
$3.2 million, half of that for 1930 but huge just the same.44 
Although losses had indeed been cut because of the increased revenue 
from the air mail, which produced an across-the-board profit for allAVCO air 
mail companies of $123,831 from $5,505,808 in total revenue for 1931, the 
value of AVCO stock remained low, hovering around two dollars per share, 
while the existence of a huge board of directors underscored the corporation's 
continuing problems with high overhead costs and inexperienced leadership.45 
Cord's attacks on the industry in general and on AVCO in particular drew 
especial attention to American's weaknesses, causing Harriman many sleep-
less nights. According to Sherman Fairchild, who had left AVCO in 1931 be-
cause of its continuing difficulties, "Harriman was just scared to death of the 
whole thing and was afraid that ... something would happen that would be-
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smirch the Harriman name, and he was just ready to do anything to get out of 
this mess that he was in:'46 
Cord, a master of the financial world, understood AVCO's weak position 
and sought to exploit the situation if his public attempts to secure an air mail 
contract failed. By early 1932, as it became clear that Cord was losing his pub-
lic fight, he turned his attention directly to AVCO, armed with the knowledge 
that the poor performance of that company was largely the result of bad man-
agement by the existing board of directors. In a subsequent interview, Roland 
Palmedo, one of AVCO's board members, recalled the situation distinctly: "I 
do remember that Manning and Cord had quite a club over The Aviation Cor-
poration, which-oh, let's say a cause for blackmail-which rather scared 
Harriman, because by this time, in 1931 or '32, The Aviation Corporation 
really had a sorry record .... Cord had some pretty good ammunition, and 
used it effectively. [He] also pointed with scorn at this bunch of directors here 
including Harriman and Bobby [Lehman] and a lot of other bankers and people 
of that kind who supposedly didn't know anything about aviation:'47 
Serious merger discussions began in February, and by early March, AVCO 
and Cord were completing the details of the acquisition of Cord's airline prop-
erties. After delicate negotiations were completed on March 31, 1932, E.L. Cord 
agreed to sell his Century and Century Pacific airlines to the Aviation Corpo-
ration. In return, Cord received $621,000 worth of AVCO stock (approximately 
138,000 shares) and two seats on the board of directors. In addition, Cord 
agreed to confine all of his future air transportation activities exclusively to 
AVCO, thus removing him as a direct competitor.48 
The agreement came at a crucial time for AVCO. Since 1930, Frederick G. 
Coburn, of the engineering firm of Sanderson and Porter, had served tempo-
rarily as president in order to supervise the reorganization of the corporation. 
He succeeded in reducing losses and managed to force the company to agree 
to a plan for the reduction of the size of the board. He also recommended the 
consolidation of all of American Airways' operations in a central location, pref-
erably St. Louis, while virtually eliminating AVCO's offices in New York City. 
Coburn also recommended the creation of an executive committee of Ameri-
can Airways, staffed with experts in air transportation and the strengthening 
of AVCO's board, separate from their own executive committee.49 Though 
Robert Lehman believed Coburn had not gone far enough in reorganizing 
AVCO and American Airways, on March 17, 1932, Coburn felt his job com-
plete and turned over the reins to La Motte Cohu. 
These events caused great consternation within both the corporation and 
the Post Office Department. With Cord now on the board, Hainer Hinshaw 
resigned from American as their Washington representative and accepted a 
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similar position with United Air Lines. Hinshaw was replaced by World War I 
ace Edward "Eddie" Rickenbacker. 
Regardless of Hinshaw's objections, Harriman and AVCO felt that it was 
necessary to buy peace through the acquisition of Cord's airlines. Harriman 
had hoped that this would end the battles but soon discovered his error. After 
reviewing Century and Century Pacific's books, he discovered that their claim 
of profitability was in fact a lie. These two airlines had been losing money 
despite their much lower costs. Had it not been for their acquisition by AVCO, 
Century and Century Pacific would have gone out of business anyway. 
An unnerved Harriman discovered that Cord had no intention of remain-
ing quiet. With his acquisition of 138,000 AVCO shares plus the additional 
100,000 he purchased on the open market, Cord was now the largest single 
holder of AVCO stock and, with two seats on the board of directors, aimed to 
gain control of the entire corporation. Board member andAVCO general coun-
sel William Dewey Loucks sounded the alarm. "La Motte:' he reported to 
Harriman, "has undoubtedly told you of the talk Mrs. Cord had with him at 
his dinner in which she said, in substance, that her husband had sold out his 
air operation, but of course, she supposed she should be satisfied as this only 
meant that he was running a larger enterprise."50 
Cord was now pressing hard for AVCO to purchase his Stinson airliners, 
Auburn limousines, and other equipment his companies produced while deni-
grating the existing personnel of the corporation. Loucks suspected that Cord 
wanted to reduce the board to only four or five members, Cord among them. 
In such a position, Cord could quickly dominate the corporation. Loucks 
warned Harriman that steps should be taken immediately to control Cord 
before it was too late. 51 
Unfortunately, Loucks's worst fears were about to come true. Cord was 
determined to gain command over AVCO, thereby reentering the air trans-
portation industry with well-financed airlines supported by government air 
mail contracts. Despite his reputation for stock manipulation, Cord was a 
shrewd manager who relied on capable lieutenants, such as Lucius Manning, 
for advice and expertise. Cord was indeed correct that AVCO was overladen 
with financiers and not enough aviation-oriented managers. In this complaint 
he had valuable allies, especially Sherman Fairchild, who had been stressing 
this very point from AVCO's inception three years earlier. Perhaps Cord's wis-
est move when he joined AVCO's board was pushing for the promotion of 
Southern Air Transport president Cyrus R. Smith as president of American 
Airways. C.R. Smith, a former accountant, brought order out of chaos and 
would soon lead American out of the doldrums and into a position of leader-
ship for the next three decades. Under Smith, American's operations improved 
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dramatically, helping to fulfill the promise held by the company from its earli-
est beginnings. 
But Cord wanted more. Almost immediately, Cord attacked the existing 
management of AVCO as inefficient and pressed for dramatic changes in an 
effort to gain control. Already Loucks and company had agreed to reduce the 
number of board members from sixty-six to twenty-four, a decision that was 
confirmed unanimously during AVCO's annual meeting on April29, but this 
was just the beginning for Cord. 52 Loucks was not a Cord supporter and, sud-
denly, along with George Hann, was removed from the AVCO Executive Com-
mittee after a disagreement with the new director. 53 
Sherman Fairchild was also dropped from the executive committee, even 
though he supported the installation of Cord and his associates on the board 
for their aviation expertise. This did not sit well with the AVCO founder, who 
demanded of Harriman his reinstatement. After some testy correspondence, 
he rejoined the committee. 54 George Hann resigned. 
Tensions increased toward the end of the summer as Cord moved to con-
solidate his position. Throughout the year, Cord successfully attempted to 
impose his Stinson aircraft and Lycoming engines on American's fleet, despite 
the opposition of pilots and mechanics, who found this equipment inferior to 
that which they were already flying. 55 Cord's wildly optimistic claims for the 
future of AVCO's stock combined with the growing confrontation was having 
an adverse effect on morale. 56 
During the summer, Harriman assumed the presidency of Union Pacific, 
the railroad his father had led to greatness. He wanted out of aviation and 
hoped to forge a settlement of some kind that would protect his interests, sal-
vage AVCO, and allow him to step aside into a business with which he was 
more familiar. 57 To this end, Harriman contacted Frank Vanderlip, a powerful 
financier, former chairman ofNational City Bank, and friend to both Harriman 
and Cord, who agreed to take the lead in resolving the brewing conflict. His 
initial efforts were overwhelmed by rapidly changing events. 
Cord constantly pushed for reforms to the extent that Loucks and others 
who remained on AVCO's drastically reduced board sought ways to contain 
this dangerous upstart. Earlier in the year Loucks and Cohu became intrigued 
with the idea of purchasing Eastern Air Transport, which would give Ameri-
can Airways a direct connection with most of the major cities in the East Coast 
through their connection in Atlanta. Loucks hoped to acquire Eastern by gain-
ing control of North American Aviation, its parent holding company, and even-
tually discarding those properties extraneous to AVCO's immediate needs. 
North American and Eastern were holding their own but, as with most avia-
tion enterprises, they were just managing to get by because of their air mail 
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and other government contracts. To many investors, the time was ripe for a 
merger on AVCO's terms. 58 
Following a contentious special meeting of the AVCO board in October, 
the differences erupted into a war. Cord and Cohu were vying for control of 
the Thompson Aeronautical Corporation, which operated Transamerican Air-
lines, a small air mail contractor flying in Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio. Cord 
owned 45 percent of Thompson and demanded that it not fall into the hands 
of Cohu, threatening legal action if need be. In a rather disingenuous state-
ment, Cord warned that the sale of Thompson to AVCO would violate federal 
antitrust statutes and would never be approved by the Department of Justice. 
Furthermore, he stated, with the deteriorating position of the present air mail 
system in the eyes of the public, such action would not be favorably viewed by 
the Post Office. 59 
Robert Lehman informed Cord of what was happening in AVCO con-
cerning Thompson. The corporation was prepared to exchange 1 7/8 to 2 shares 
of its stock for each Thompson share, provided that the North American deal 
was completed.60 Now Cord had another reason to stop Cohu. 
On November 1, 1932,AVCO made a formal offerto acquire North Ameri-
can Aviation. In return for 1,996,778 shares of AVCO capital stock North 
American would deliver all of North American's assets except for $1,175,000 
in cash, the Ford Instrument Company, and other smaller holdings. AVCO 
would acquire Eastern Air Transport, 26 percent of TWA, and 26 percent of 
Douglas Aircraft. 61 This would increase AVCO's outstanding stock to 4,977,000 
shares, thus reducing Cord's holdings from 30 percent to 17 percent. 
In a move reminiscent of United Aircraft's takeover of National Air Trans-
port two years earlier, Cord secured a court injunction blocking the merger 
offer and sought to win outright control of AVCO through a bitter, public 
proxy fight. Under Cord's direction, Raymond Pruitt outlined a campaign to 
gain proxies by outlining a detailed list of alleged misconduct by the AVCO 
Board. Particularly, Pruitt highlighted the incompetence and inexperience of 
AVCO and American management, which he believed led to vast losses as well 
as alleged corporate stock speculation by the investment committee. He fur-
ther outlined the board's refusal to accept Cord's numerous suggestions to cut 
costs and improve efficiencies. Pruitt underscored Cord's greater experience 
in aircraft manufacture and airline operation as proof of their competency 
and ability to improve AVCO's poor financial position. Pruitt appealed to the 
uncommitted stockholders for their support in blocking the North American 
and Thompson takeover bids and turning over control of AVCO to the Cord 
interests.62 
Immediately, in newspapers across the country, there appeared articles 
and advertisements bought by Cord in support of his plan, calling for proxies 
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for the forthcoming special stockholders meeting planned for December 21. In 
the published broadsides, Cord decried the proposed North American acquisi-
tion as bad for AVCO. Cord felt that North American's stock was overvalued and 
that the cost was therefore too high for a gain of just 35 percent in air mail 
revenues. He also felt that AVCO should not acquire additional manufacturing 
companies, but should stay in the air transportation and air mail fields only.63 
Cord became justifiably concerned when his lieutenants reported to him 
a conversation they had had with J.A. Talbot concerning the recent problems 
encountered by Clement Keys and his unsecured call loans. Talbot brought 
with him an auditor's report on North American. Apparently, as early as 1929, 
following the Wall Street debacle, North American directors had learned of 
Keys's inability to repay several million dollars worth of outstanding call loans. 
Keys had made it a practice for many years to borrow from his corporations 
for other investments, but he had always repaid the loans. Unfortunately, with 
the collapse of the stock market in October 1929, Keys was wiped out. Quietly, 
J. Cheever Cowdin and fellow directors allowed Keys to pay back as much as 
possible, seizing his remaining assets and writing off $766,997 in the hope that 
the unintentional embezzlement would not be discovered. In turn, Keys was 
forced to resign at the end of 1931. Armed with this knowledge, Cord was 
encouraged in his fight. He could use this information against Cowdin and 
company to force them and their accomplices into reneging on the sale of 
their North American stock.64 
La Motte Cohu and the board vigorously defended their position in pub-
lic, urging support for their plan that would give AVCO a direct connection to 
the East Coast and the prosperous northeast through the acquisition of East-
ern Air Transport thus strengthening American Airways' transcontinental sys-
tem. The merger would also reduce overhead costs while increasing revenue 
through additional passengers and air mail. Cohu strongly denied Cord's alle-
gations and showed how his plans were reducing AVCO's losses. The merger 
would increase the current assets of AVCO by $3 million, increase the number 
of shares from 5 million to 6.5 million, and reduce the par value of AVCO 
stock from $5 to $4 per share, which would produce a return of $1 per share to 
each existing holders of stock.65 Cohu claimed that far from attempting to 
improve AVCO, Cord's intervention actually prevented many planned reforms 
within the company and that his haste in attacking the proposed merger pre-
vented a logical and reasoned analysis of the situation.66 Neither side openly 
confessed to the actual reasons behind these maneuverings, as the stockhold-
ers would not have appreciated their investments being used as pawns in a 
personal power struggle. 
As the battle escalated, cooler heads finally prevailed with the realization 
of the possible harm to everyone's sizable investment such a fight was produc-
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ing. During the late evening of November 17, 1932, Cord and Cohu agreed to 
a compromise put forth by Frank Vanderlip that called for a new board of 
directors composed of fifteen members, five from the present directors, ex-
cluding Cord and Manning, five from Cord's interests, and five from indepen-
dents. The newly constituted board would resolve all of the other matters at 
issue. In return, all litigation, advertisements, and other negative publicity was 
to cease. To this Lehman, Fairchild, Cohu, Harriman, Vanderlip, and Manning 
affixed their signatures, thus ending the dispute.67 
The compromise was in fact a victory for Cord. His interests now con-
trolled one-third of the board. The North American deal was permanently 
blocked, which ironically allowed another suitor, General Motors, to acquire 
North American in March 1933. Also, on March 15, 1933, Cord secured the 
resignations of Cohu, Harriman, Lehman, George Hann, and Richard Hoyt 
from the board, thus giving him complete control of AVCO. Cord was elected 
chairman of the board, Manning, president, and Lyndol Young, vice presi-
dent.68 They also assumed similar positions with American Airways, thus fi-
nally securing the airline and air mail contracts for which Cord had so 
desperately fought. In addition, Cord managed to acquire total control of Th-
ompson Aeronautical by buying out Richard Hoyt and promptly selling it to 
AVCO, now that he had control of both corporations. 
An independent had now become an air mail carrier. While Glover and 
the Post Office Department did not care for Cord, they had more serious prob-
lems: Hoover had just lost the presidential election to Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt 
of New York. The Republican era was coming to a close, and with it its Pro-
gressive attitude toward business. In the air mail, the effect of this political 
change was not known but it was expected to be bad. Much depended on the 
attitude of the new president, his new postmaster general, and the new Demo-
cratic majority in both houses of Congress. 
Chapter 12 
The Democrats Take Control 
Cord's successful takeover of AVCO and its American Airways subsidiary drastically changed the complexion of the air mail industry. The carefully 
crafted and well-protected system of awarding air mail contracts to the three 
large holding companies had been successfully circumvented by perhaps one 
of the most controversial stock manipulators in the country. Overnight, United 
Aircraft and North American Aviation found themselves confronted with a 
former enemy now on the inside. 
They need not have worried. Cord was content with controlling AVCO 
and sought only to compete with the other holding companies, not under-
mine them. His vested interest now was in the preservation, not destruction, 
of the system, yet he was still feared. Under his leadership, American Airways 
greatly improved its efficiency and soon rose into a position of strength suffi-
cient to rival TWA and United Air Lines. Smaller air mail carriers, such as 
Northwest, were concerned as Cord entered into their territory. The remain-
ing independents felt betrayed. 
Cord's sellout to AVCO in March 1932 nullified a pending agreement he 
had made with the Ludington brothers. Already a faithful operator of Stinson 
airliners, the Ludingtons had fought hard for recognition and an air mail con-
tract, lending their strong voice in the recent congressional hearings. They had 
arranged a merger with Cord in the hope of forming a large, independent 
airline capable of competing directly with the air mail contractors, but it was 
not to be. After Cord sold Century and Century Pacific to AVCO, Ludington 
was left out in the cold. Sincere efforts by the Post Office to provide Ludington 
with a special express air mail service fell through when Congress would not 
authorize any additional expenditures. In 1933, Ludington, with William 
MacCracken as its corporate attorney, was sold to Eastern Air Transport. 
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Amon Carter, publisher of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram and major AVCO investor, confers 
with American Airways officials La Motte Cohu, Edward V. Rickenbacker, and C.R. Smith. 
Rickenbacker later became president of Eastern Airlines. Photo courtesy of American Airlines 
C.R. Smith Museum. 
Cord was also in the early stages of negotiating a deal with Braniff when 
AVCO stepped in. Initially a supporter of the Braniff brothers and Temple 
Bowen in their strenuous efforts with the Scheduled Airline Operators Asso-
ciation to force the Post Office to supply contracts to the independents, Cord 
chose to fight alone in 1931 before his deal with AVCO, believing that he could 
accomplish more without the baggage of supporting the efforts of other, far 
weaker independents. This situation left Braniff and Bowen abandoned, at 
least for the moment. 
Braniff and Bowen, serving the oil fields of Texas and Oklahoma and in-
stilled with the intense fervor of the independent wildcatters, took their fight 
into the political arena of the Democratic Party. Both airlines served Fort Worth, 
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the home of A.P. Barrett, the driving force behind Southern Air Transport, 
and powerful newspaper magnate Amon Carter, publisher of the Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram, an influential conservative Democratic paper. The Braniff broth-
ers and Temple Bowen both maintained offices in that city and were friends 
with numerous influential oil men and cattlemen. 
Carter was one of the original investors in Southern Air Transport and 
continued as a director of American Airways and the Aviation Corporation 
until Cord took over. He was a major force in the Democratic Party in Texas 
and one of the primary backers of the Speaker of the House, John Nance Gar-
ner. His faithful lieutenant, Silliman Evans, served him first as a reporter and 
then as vice president of publicity for American Airways. 
All of these men possessed a sturdy independent streak and resented the 
mess they believed their eastern financial partners had created in AVCO. While 
not enthusiastic supporters of the upstart E.L. Cord, they sympathized with 
his efforts to dean up American while pursuing constant efforts to push United's 
National Air Transport out of Dallas and Fort Worth. American, along with 
Braniff and Bowen, wanted the CAM-3 route from Chicago through Okla-
homa into Texas. 1 Braniff and Bowen traveled in the same social, political, and 
economic circles as the founders of American Airways and sought to use their 
connections to their advantage in the election year of 1932. 
Their chance came during the Democratic Convention in Chicago. Ear-
lier in the year, Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt had seemed a shoo-in for the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination. His term as New York governor had produced 
critical reforms in the face of the escalating economic crisis, placing him in the 
forefront of national politics for the forthcoming election. Running against 
him were former New York governor Al Smith and Speaker of the House John 
Nance Garner, both of whom trailed Roosevelt by significant margins. By the 
time the Democratic Convention opened in Chicago on June 27, 1932, 
Roosevelt's position had changed. Despite his overwhelming lead in delegates, 
666 1/4 to 201 3/4 over Smith, party rules required a two-thirds majority for 
nomination. This Roosevelt did not have. Campaign manager James Farley 
worked desperately for days to sway delegates to his candidate, but after three 
ballots little had changed. Sensing a growing harmful division within the party, 
Farley approached Garner for a deal. 
Leading Garner's Texas delegation were Rep. Sam Rayburn, Amon Carter, 
and Silliman Evans. Throughout the day of July 1 the two opposing camps 
hammered out a solution to the impasse using Evans as the messenger. By 
evening a deal was struck: in return for Garner's ninety delegates, Roosevelt 
would place Garner on the ticket as vice presidential candidate. The arrange-
ment was not favorably received by many of Garner's delegates, who disliked 
Roosevelt, but sufficient members, including Fort Worth attorney Karl Crowley, 
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acceded to Garner's wishes and swung to Roosevelt. News of the switch reached 
the California delegation, which was led by the defeated 1924 Democratic as-
pirant, William Gibbs McAdoo. With his attempts at entering the airline busi-
ness behind him, McAdoo had turned his attention completely to politics and, 
with the support of publisher William Randolph Hearst, had reentered the 
arena as a candidate for the U.S. Senate and the leader of the California del-
egation in support of Garner. McAdoo, with evident glee in blocking his former 
opponent Al Smith from the nomination, addressed the convention, announc-
ing on the fourth ballot that he was releasing California's forty-four votes to 
Roosevelt. Thus began the avalanche of delegates that swung the balance in 
Roosevelt's favor. 2 After the successful campaign, Farley, Evans, and Crowley 
were among the faithful workers rewarded for their efforts. 
Tradition required the new candidate to remain at home until informed 
of his party's decision. But Roosevelt, fond of impressive gestures and eager to 
break tired traditions, decided to accept the nomination in Chicago in person. 
Chartering a Ford 5-AT Tri-Motor from the Colonial Western division of 
American Airways, Governor Roosevelt, together with his wife Eleanor, son 
John, and several others, climbed aboard the aircraft at Albany on July 2 and 
flew to Chicago. Roosevelt's flight helped to dispel malicious rumors about his 
health. He worked and slept during the flight. The others got airsick. 
After a difficult flight, the entourage reached Chicago and was given a 
tumultuous reception by a throng clearly impressed with the new candidate's 
willingness to take risks. Roosevelt's invigorating speech to the convention, 
much of which he wrote while in flight, set the tone for his campaign. Speak-
ing to the assembled delegates, he asserted, "I pledge you, I pledge myself to a 
new deal for the American people."3 "New Deal" quickly became the rallying 
slogan and theme for his successful bid for the presidency. 
Once again, President Hoover's campaign was run by Walter Folger Brown, 
this time with little success. With the Hoover campaign foundering along with 
the economy and the catastrophe of the Bonus Army debacle firmly in the 
public's mind, Brown had little time to attend to air mail matters. 
That fall, as they reluctantly realized Hoover would lose the election, Brown 
and department officials slipped into a funk. The prospect of a Roosevelt presi-
dency produced some gallows humor on the part of Superintendent E.B. 
Wadsworth. Post Office executives were keenly aware that despite their appar-
ent victory during the recent Mead hearings, theirs was a losing battle as the 
independents gained strength with the rising Democratic tide. Wadsworth was 
concerned about the growing allegations of favoritism. In speaking with the 
superintendent about a particularly nasty attack in the press, Colonel 
Henderson reported, "Wadsworth was not a little concerned about the news 
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item and told us that his future address would probably be Atlanta" -the lo-
cation of the federal penitentiary.4 
Even the contractors managed to find relief in humor. In late 1932, as the 
polls were showing an ever-widening lead for Roosevelt, the Pioneer Air Trans-
port Operators arranged a gala dinner in celebration of their first anniversary 
and in honor of the postmaster general. Five hundred guests attended the fes-
tivities at the Newark Airport. When arranging the final details for the party, 
George Wheat of United Aircraft quipped to United Air Lines' Philip Johnson, 
"Both Brown and Glover insisted on flowers (probably sensing the November 
8th results) so please add that to the bill sent you:'s 
The air mail carriers were concerned that a Republican defeat would greatly 
upset the existing air mail situation and were preparing for the worst. Capt. 
Thomas Doe of Eastern Air Transport underscored the industry's concerns. 
"It becomes more and more evident that aviation in general and air mail in 
particular are headed for a fight for existence," he remarked. He felt that the 
coming battle in Congress would obviously center on the economy, particu-
larly the perceived inefficiency, apparent arbitrary route awards, and alleged 
corruption. The new leadership was particularly driven "to get at the bankers on 
the theory that these companies are all controlled by Wall Street;' Doe believed. 
"It makes no difference whether there are any just grounds or not. Back of this 
fight will be some of the railroads-pacifists-taxpayers leagues-enemies of the 
Post Office Department and a lot of 'new brooms' out to change everything:' 
Despite there being no basis for the attack, "attacking the air mail is going to be 
popular in the next Congress:'6 Doe's prediction was only too accurate. 
Disliked by both business and Congress, Brown, in January 1933, incurred 
the wrath of the House when he attempted to extend more routes rather than 
award new contracts? An angry House Post Office Committee drafted a resolu-
tion, H. Res. 359, urging Brown to cease making any further sweeping schedule 
changes that would benefit AVCO and North American. Hainer Hinshaw, now 
representing United Air Lines, speculated on Brown's reaction, stating, "He is a 
very strong minded man and had so often indicated his contempt for the gentle-
men on 'the Hill' that he may go ahead and carry out his original plans."8 
United hoped the effort would succeed, as it had not benefited from any 
extension, except the unwanted Watertown route. The airline had received all 
of its routes by competitive bidding well before Brown took office, and, there-
fore, wanted its name cleared before the coming investigations. "Congressman 
Maas is taking it wholly upon himself as the instigator of the resolutions, in-
sisting that Brown does not move in the extension matters;' stated Hinshaw. 
"This is most helpful for us because it removes us completely from suspicion 
that we might have been behind it."9 
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Brown responded to his critics with a thorough statement outlining his 
reasoning while refusing to cancel his latest extensions. The tardiness in mak-
ing these route extensions was due not to political maneuvering, stated Brown, 
but to inevitable delays because of the recent rate revision he finally produced. 
This revision lowered the average pay to approximately forty-five cents per 
mile. In addition, since several of the extensions went to American and TWA, 
Brown wanted to wait until the two-year grace period on contracts for CAM-
33 and CAM-34 had lapsed so that these airlines could exchange their con-
tracts for longer-term route certificates for their respective transcontinental 
routes. This would allow the department to place substantially lower rates in 
effect on these two important routes. 
Brown pointedly reminded the committee that any route or rate changes 
could only be made with airlines holding certificates, not contracts. Brown 
understood that new political pressures were being applied but managed to 
withstand the blast while delivering a none too subtle reminder of the parti-
san nature of the attacks and their ultimate source.10 In summarizing his posi-
tion to Chairman Mead, Brown took the opportunity to remind the committee 
of the purpose of his work. "In determining upon these changes the Depart-
ment has been governed solely by the public interest," he declared. "Our objec-
tive has been, first, to promote the most complete, widespread and effective air 
mail service for postal patrons possible within the limit of the appropriation 
for air mail, and second, to enable air mail operators to build up non postal 
revenues and to effect economies in operation which would be reflected in 
reduced operating costs to the government:'" Far from having received more 
money, the operators were furious at Brown's latest rate reduction, which cut 
their subsidy payments far more than they had originally thought. 12 
While Chairman Mead remarked that Brown was within the law, he and 
others warned that an even angrier Senate could hold up the appropriations 
for the next fiscal year. 13 Indeed, that was precisely the consequence when lame-
duck Brown ignored the committee's warning and turned up the fire one last 
time in their often bitter feuding. Colonel Brittin observed the deteriorating 
situation with great trepidation: 
Postmaster General Brown has hopelessly antagonized the entire Progres-
sive group in the Senate. He has also incurred the enmity of the entire Demo-
cratic Minority. Together Progressives and Democrats have formed an 
overwhelming majority against him. The sentiment is not only antagonistic to 
him but also against the extensions he has recently made. Some time ago chair-
man Mead of the House Post Office and Post Roads Committee asked the Post-
master General if he would defer making further extensions until the Committee 
report on Dr. Crane's investigation had been made. Mr. Brown replied that he 
The Democrats Take Control 241 
did not intend to make any last minute extensions. In spite of these assurances 
the Postmaster General recently made some very important changes in the air 
mail map and granted a number of extensions. This summary action ignoring 
the committee's recommendation altogether caused a great deal of unfavorable 
comment not only in the committee but throughout the whole Democratic 
majority of the House that had previously voted Mr. Brown his $19 million 
domestic air mail appropriation. 
This general development prompted the Senate yesterday to report out fa-
vorably the Black Resolution calling for a sweeping investigation of the entire 
air mail situation. It was formulated by a coalition of Progressives and Demo-
crats cooperating with the Post Office and Post Roads Committee of the House.14 
Brown's effrontery infuriated Senate Democrats so much that they briefly 
struck out the $19 million air mail appropriation altogether and moved to 
open their own hearings. They had already agreed to cut the expenditure to 
$10 million before the postmaster general's actions. It was later restored to $15 
million.15 
Brown also replied to his Senate critics. He recalled the accomplishments 
of the last four years and the purpose behind the Watres Act: 
Since the Department has been authorized by the McNary-Watres Act to 
exert pressure on air mail operators to carry passengers and express their rev-
enues derived from non-postal sources, which were practically nil four years 
ago, have steadily increased until at the present time they are running at the rate 
of $6 million per annum and constantly increasing, notwithstanding the busi-
ness stagnation. The increase in revenues from passenger and express traffic has 
enabled the Department to cut the average compensation per mile for air mail 
operators in successive stages from 82 cents in 1930 to an average of 45 cents 
effective November 1, 1932. With general business recovery I am confident the 
increased postal and other revenues that may reasonably be anticipated will jus-
tify further cuts to a level approximating the actual value of the service ren-
dered, excluding any subsidy.16 
In fact, the industry was about to be revolutionized. Following Brown's 
first rate revision conference in February 1931, he called on the airlines and 
aircraft manufacturers to build faster, larger, and more efficient aircraft, spurred 
by direct variables paid to the operators for such advancements as multiple 
engines, two-way radio, and larger carrying capacity. 
United Aircraft and Transport Corporation listened. On February 8, 1933, 
in Seattle, Washington, the Boeing 247 first took flight, ushering in the mod-
ern age of aircraft design. The aircraft, with its all-metal construction, twin 
air-cooled, cowled engines, retractable landing gear, cantilevered wings, and 
seating for ten, possessed a remarkable cruising speed of 160 miles per hour, 
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50 percent faster than any other commercial airliner, thus rendering the com-
petition obsolete overnight. By April, the 247 was in service with United Air 
Lines, and by June, it was operating United's transcontinental routes, at greatly 
reduced costs, cutting transcontinental travel time from twenty-four hours to 
nineteen and three-quarter hours. The one-way fare remained at $160 and the 
round trip at $260. 17 Compared to the 69.3-cents-per-mile operating cost of 
the Ford Tri-Motor it replaced, the Boeing 247 cost 51.9 cents per mile. The 
247 cost per ton mile of payload was much lower at 37.2 cents per mile versus 
43.3 cents per mile. This was even lower than the vaunted single-engine 
Lockheed Vega used by the independents. Its operating cost per mile was lower 
than the 247 at 38.1 cents per mile, but its cost per ton mile was higher at 56.5 
cents. 18 The Boeing was a technological breakthrough, but far more impor-
tant, it was more efficient to operate and therefore more profitable. It also led 
the way to the larger Douglas DC-2 and the classic DC-3, the first aircraft 
capable of making a profit by carrying only passengers-just as Brown had 
planned. 
The first flight of the 247 received little notice in Congress. The renewed 
attack on Brown's extensions alarmed Brittin of Northwest Airways. North-
west, though one of the smallest carriers, had received the lion's share of the 
route extensions. This was due directly to Brittin's well-orchestrated plan, which 
mobilized the congressional delegations in the northern and western states his 
airline served for additional service. All of his requests, done carefully, were with 
the determined goal of extending a fourth transcontinental line, this time from 
Minneapolis to Seattle through the sparsely populated states of the Northwest. 
Since 1929, the Post Office had constantly rebuffed Brittin's efforts, cor-
rectly stating that there was insufficient population to sustain a viable passen-
ger and air mail base. Despite the clear logic of the Post Office's rebukes, Brittin 
persisted. Gradually, he persuaded the department to grant his airline numer-
ous short extensions through North Dakota and into Montana, over the direct 
protests of Alfred Frank's National Parks Airline. Operating from Salt Lake 
City into Montana and Idaho, National Parks strenuously fought Northwest's 
advances and had the quiet, firm support of United Air Lines behind it. United 
was not overly concerned with the small Northwest Airways but had no desire 
for Brittin to enter Seattle, Boeing's home. 
Northwest was particularly frightened by the sudden appearance of E.L. 
Cord in its back yard. During the merger mania in the airline industry in 1929, 
Northwest was subjected to heavy pressure from both Transcontinental Air 
Transport and Universal Airlines, both of which wanted to extend their routes 
into Minneapolis-St. Paul. Already TAT had purchased 45 percent of 
Northwest's stock as part of a deal to include Brittin's airline in Keys's trans-
continental plan. This provided much additional capital but at the cost of some 
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independence for the fiercely independent Northwest. When Universal began 
to invade Minnesota, a dangerous confrontation was averted when Universal 
agreed to withdraw from the territory in return for half of TAT's share in North-
west. Since that time, Brittin had tried to force TAT and AVCO to sell back 
their shares, even attempting to have the Post Office act in their behalf, but 
with no effect. For three years the point was academic, as neither TAT nor 
AVCO attempted to unduly influence Northwest's decision making. The sei-
zure of AVCO by the ruthless Cord changed the situation dramatically for 
Brittin. 
Now Cord controlled Universal's 22.5 percent in Northwest. More impor-
tant, Cord also had just purchased Transamerican. This new arrangement di-
rectly threatened Northwest because it seemed to Brittin that Cord was planning 
to push into his territory either directly or indirectly. The climax to this struggle 
came over the question of control of Lake Michigan. 
A small independent operator had been flying a regular passenger route 
from Milwaukee to Detroit across Lake Michigan since 1929. Founded by Frank 
and John Kohler, the Kohler Aviation Corporation, as with other indepen-
dents, had desperately fought for an air mail contract to ensure its survival. 
Unlike the other independents, Kohler chose not to confront the Post Office 
Department openly but to work quietly and patiently behind the scenes with a 
tenacious letter-writing campaign and persistent political pressure. Even though 
Postmaster General Brown disliked overwater routes for his domestic air mail 
carriers and saw little need for the trans-lake service, Kohler finally prevailed 
in 1933, receiving a promise for help. 
As with other passenger lines before, Brown provided the route through a 
subcontract to an existing carrier who received the route as an extension. This 
obviated the need for additional appropriations and competitive bidding for a 
new route while preserving direct responsibility of the smaller company by 
the financial resources of the larger airline holding the existing route certifi-
cate. When Brown decided to provide for Kohler, he did so by awarding the 
extension to Transamerican, which in turn was instructed to sublet the exten-
sion to Kohler. 
For three years, Northwest had curtly rebuffed Kohler's numerous entreaties 
for a merger. Now, with the specter of E.L. Cord facing Northwest from across 
Lake Michigan, Brittin frantically leapt into action, anxiously trying to per-
suade the Post Office to give the extension to his airline. Brittin flooded the 
department with his desperate pleas to take the new route. He even called on 
Cord arguing that since AVCO owned 22.5 percent of Northwest, it would 
make sense to take the route and sublet it to Kohler, relieving Transamerican 
of the burden. 
Surprisingly, his efforts worked. To the department's astonishment, Cord 
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reversed his decision and declined to accept the trans-lake service, thereby 
giving the route to Brittin. Cord was not swayed by Brittin's arguments, nor 
was he overcome by a sudden wave of compassion for his competition: he 
simply felt that since he was a Democrat, unlike virtually all of the executives 
of the air mail contractors, he would receive a better deal directly from the 
incoming Roosevelt administration. 19 As events would show, he was correct. 
Freed from this immediate concern, Brittin and the other contractors 
turned their attention to the pressing need to determine the attitude of the 
incoming Democratically controlled Congress and new administration. Tho-
mas Doe's earlier assessment about the coming problems was astute: the ques-
tion of monopoly in the airline industry was foremost on Congress' mind. 
The event that triggered this renewed interest was the release of Professor John 
B. Crane's report on December 5, 1932. 
Crane, a professor of economics at Harvard University, was assigned the 
task of examining the nation's air mail system and reporting back to the House 
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads. After nine months of gathering 
information from the department and the airlines, Crane released his report, 
much to the dismay of the air mail contractors. 
Crane made six specific recommendations after completing his thorough 
examination. First, he suggested that "the air mail rates now being paid are higher 
than necessary, and that the air mail appropriations for the coming fiscal year 
could be reduced by $1,000,000 without seriously injuring the development of 
the air transportation industry, or defeating the fundamental objectives under-
lying the present governmental subsidy policy:' Crane's second suggestion was 
that field audits be conducted on the contractors in order to determine accu-
rately the actual costs upon which new rates could be determined. 
Third, Crane suggested that a new "cost-balancing principle of rate mak-
ing be required and that the administrative machinery in the Post Office be 
enlarged to enable this policy to be carried out:' This system would balance 
the actual expenses incurred by an airline and supply a subsidy to balance out 
the difference to break even but no more. Crane gave tacit approval for Brown's 
1930 decision to abandon Clyde Kelly's weight-based method of payment. Al-
though paying a contractor for only the mail load actually carried made eco-
nomic sense in a mature, profitable industry, air transportation was still in its 
infancy and required assistance to survive. "If this principle were rigidly fol-
lowed:' he stated, "from one-half to two-thirds of the present air mail route 
mileage would be eliminated at once, and several of the operators would go 
into bankruptcy in short order." Only those airlines operating mainline trunks, 
such as United and TWA, would prosper .. Crane's fourth recommendation was 
to reduce the present maximum payment rate from $1.25 to $0.75 per mile if 
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Congress chose to continue the Watres Act. Crane did not consider the re-
cently reduced rates imposed by Brown in November. 
Crane's final two recommendations dealt with the contentious issue of 
route extensions. He strongly urged that greater limitations be placed on the 
postmaster general to prevent the apparent arbitrary extension of routes and 
revision of rates. In this, Crane overlooked the careful work both Brown and 
the department usually undertook before such decisions were made, even in 
the face of strong political pressure to the contrary. 
More important, Crane argued that several of the present extensions were 
unnecessary and should be canceled. This latter point greatly upset those air-
lines most vulnerable, particularly American Airways and Northwest. Ameri-
can had its mileage increased by 63 percent and Northwest a remarkable 79 
percent through Brown's extensions. In contrast, United grew only 6.37 per-
cent and that was solely the unwanted Watertown extension. Crane's target 
was the expensive and unproductive "feeder" route that connected relatively 
unpopulated areas with the main line routes. This included Northwest's ser-
vice from St. Paul to Duluth and United's Watertown line. The elimination of 
eight of these routes, he estimated, would save the department more than four 
hundred thousand dollars each year. 
Surprisingly, while the report sought to streamline these apparently extra-
neous routes, Crane recommended the extension of Northwest's service west-
ward into Montana in the hope of eventually opening up a northern 
transcontinental just as Brittin had wanted. Furthermore, Crane saw little need 
for National Parks' service, which he deemed extraneous in light of the fact 
that most of the actual traffic served by this airline would be better served by 
an east -west line such as Northwest. Against many of the department's critics, 
however, Crane recognized that larger companies were inherently more effi-
cient. "The economics of the situation are such that in this way only can the 
operators hope to lower their costs to the point where ultimately a mail sub-
sidy will not be needed;' he stated. "Contrary to the opinions expressed by 
certain writers, transportation is clearly subject to decreasing cost as the scale 
of operations is enlarged."20 
In fact, Crane determined that operating costs dropped by more than half 
if the route mileage were doubled. He recommended that airlines have their 
schedules increased to provide greater service and produce lower operating 
costs with the aim of reaching financial independence. Ironically, by so stat-
ing, Crane confirmed the wisdom of Brown's earlier plan, as this was precisely 
what Brown had wanted to do when he fought for the Watres Act. In fact, 
Crane drew the same conclusion as Brown about the oligopolistic nature of 
this new, capital intensive, vertically integrated industry: "The air transporta-
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tion industry is one where neither complete monopoly nor pure competition 
is economically desirable. The ideal status is one of 'monopolistic competi-
tion' or balanced competition where a limited number of trunk lines compete 
evenly with each other in service at all important terminals."21 Brown could 
not have described his program any better himself. 
Crane argued for the eventual cessation of air mail subsidies and for al-
lowing the airlines to compete on their own. Most important was the con-
demnation of the power of the three major holding companies, stating that 
despite their youth, the aviation combines were as complex and intricately 
developed as the railroads and utilities, and dominated 98 percent of the air 
mail system. Specifically, the report singled out the corporate infrastructures 
of UATC and AVCO for review: 
A closer examination of each company's corporate structure ... reveals that 
United Air Lines controls four airmail operating companies through stock own-
ership, and is in turn owned 100 percent by United Aircraft and Transport, a 
holding company which controls airplane and airplane engine manufacturing 
companies as well as some propeller companies. 
American Airways controls numerous subsidiary companies, some of which 
have recently been liquidated, and is in turn owned 100 percent by the Aviation 
Corporation of Delaware, a holding corporation which is reported to have con-
trolled in 1930 over 118 companies through stock ownership, many of which 
companies lay in the aviation field. Many of these corporations were acquired 
through mergers and have since been dissolved. The Aviation Corporation of 
Delaware also owns 22-1/2 percent of the stock of Northwest Airways.22 
Crane nonetheless warned critics of the present air mail system that rash 
actions could irreparably damage a system that was functioning in the public 
interest even with its flaws. He noted that "extreme caution must be used in 
passing judgment upon the question of the excessiveness of air mail service. 
The motive responsible for the subsidy of the aviation industry by the govern-
ment are shown to be four; the military, the economic, the political, and the 
social. The economic benefits or losses are readily measurable, but it is virtu-
ally impossible to measure accurately the military, political, and social impor-
tance of air transportation. In the final analysis, whether the volume of air 
mail service is excessive or not must be decided by Congress itself."23 
Crane's report greatly upset the air mail contractors, even though his con-
clusions were mild, even complimentary, of the system. Nevertheless, the call 
for the elimination of several extensions and a lowering of the air mail appro-
priation and reduction of the rate system alarmed many in the industry. More 
important, the report laid the foundation for another investigation, this time 
by a Congress dominated by Democrats and insurgent Republicans. 
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On March 4, 1933, Franklin Roosevelt was sworn in as the nation's thirty-
second president. As was customary, the new president quickly filled hundreds 
of positions with his supporters and specifically gave his former campaign 
manager, James Farley, the nation's premier patronage post of postmaster gen-
eral. Serving alongside Farley were W.W. Howes of South Dakota as second 
assistant postmaster general, who was a backer of Rapid Air Lines' earlier at-
tempt to garner a contract; former American Airways vice president of public-
ity Silliman Evans, as fourth assistant postmaster general; and Fort Worth 
attorney Karl Crowley as solicitor. 
Brittin paid a visit to the Post Office Department and called on Howes 
and Evans to discuss the effect of the lower $15 million air mail appropriation 
facing the industry with the new fiscal year beginning on July 1. Brittin liked 
Howes but was deeply concerned about the latter's total lack of experience in 
air mail matters. In his favor, Howes was seen to be a studious and deliberate 
individual who would be easier to deal with than the autocratic Glover. As for 
Silliman Evans, Brittin was kinder. Evans wanted the post of second assistant 
because of his airline experience but was denied it by Farley because of pos-
sible conflicts of interest. Brittin had known Evans for years and was impressed 
with his work at American. Evans had supported LaMotte Cohu and had left 
AVCO after Cord took over. Brittin assumed correctly that Evans would be 
consulted by Farley and Howes on air mail matters. 24 
Brittin astutely ascertained the negative attitude of the new administra-
tion toward air mail matters and was not encouraged. "It appears that the new 
administration is thoroughly impressed with the idea that Mr. Brown's ad-
ministration of the Post Office Department was marked by many irregular 
acts of favoritism;' he remarked. He was concerned that the new administra-
tion in the Post Office thought that the Watres Act had been abused and that 
the system was in need of a good, housecleaning that could be politically ex-
plosive, however, if not handled well. "Mr. Farley," Brittin concluded, "wants 
to be relieved of the entire problem and has therefore given Mr. Howes com-
plete authority and entire support."25 
Air mail, however, was not the primary issue facing the new president. As 
Roosevelt took office, the nation was on the brink of economic collapse as the 
banking system was rapidly failing. Roosevelt quickly introduced a bank holi-
day to stem the tide of panic withdrawals, returning some stability to the weak-
ened system while instituting his remarkable "100 Days" of emergency 
legislation to bring relief to the struggling country. 
Roosevelt had no clearly defined public policy concerning air mail or the 
problem of monopoly. Though a former member of President Woodrow 
Wilson's administration, Roosevelt had yet to enunciate his views, thus leav-
ing such matters, at least temporarily, in the hands of congressional Progres-
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sive Democrats such as Tennessee senator Kenneth McKellar and Alabama sena-
tor Hugo Black. McKellar's record against the air mail "monopolies" was al-
ready well known in Congress and feared by the airlines. 
Black's position was made just as clear when in February he introduced 
legislation calling for a formal investigation of the alleged misconduct of the 
former postmaster general. Reacting against Brown's last-minute attempt to 
extend the eight routes, Black, suspecting massive corruption and malfeasance, 
called for the Senate to delve deeply into the workings of the Post Office, par-
ticularly the machinations of the airlines and their holding companies. Black's 
request was granted, and for most of 1933 he and his staff of investigators 
undertook the time-consuming task of searching the books of all of the air-
lines while conducting a massive campaign of interrogations. Black's special 
committee prepared for months in the hope of opening hearings in the fall. In 
the meantime, the House and the president were to make their presence felt. 
Republican representative Clyde Kelly, the sponsor seven years earlier of 
the original Contract Air Mail Act, proposed a revision to his bill on March 3, 
1933, that was intended as a protest of both Brown's actions and attitude. In 
this he had the total support of Chairman Mead and the Democratic majority. 
Kelly hated Brown and wanted to rearrange the air mail system completely 
and restore the original pound-per-mile basis for payment. Under Kelly's pro-
posal, no operator would be paid more than 2 mills per pound mile. This Kelly 
did despite Crane's recommendations and the success of Brown's weight-based 
method, which encouraged the development of larger aircraft but often re-
sulted in the under-utilization of equipment. The bill was designed to cut costs 
and waste and eliminate some forms of perceived corruption.26 Stated Kelly 
on the floor of the House, "During the past Congress the air mail service has 
been under fire, due largely to the undue development of this new branch of 
the service .... The United States air mail service has been a vital factor in 
building the aviation industry of the United States .... The quantity of air mail 
has steadily increased. A market has been furnished for planes and equipment 
and a large number of pilots have been giving the opportunity for training. 
However, the cost of these developments through subsidy payments has been 
increasing and has gone further than was originally intended. This service can 
and should be put on a self-sustaining basis:'27 
This speech set the tone for the forthcoming debate. Convinced that the 
previous administration had managed the air mail system improperly and 
with great wastage, congressional critics shortsightedly argued for immedi-
ate cost reductions rather than the gradual reduction plan with offsetting 
encouragement for passenger revenue instituted by Brown. The obsession 
with low-cost air mail service played into the hands of the independents, 
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who, without the requirement to carry passengers in safe aircraft, did indeed 
have lower operating costs. 
Determined to cut federal spending no matter the consequences, Demo-
crats and other air mail critics overlooked the long-range plan of Brown to 
develop a national air transportation system. In fact, Chairman Mead, in his 
final report on the 1932 hearings, recommended continuing much of Brown's 
work, particularly with regard to sponsoring the development of larger and 
safer aircraft, a continuation of the subsidy, and the return of the air mail 
postage of five cents per half ounce. This latter suggestion followed Brown's 
1932 air mail postage increase to eight cents, which he thought would increase 
revenue. Unfortunately, the increase was offset by a corresponding decrease in 
letters sent. The industry was pleasantly surprised with the generally construc-
tive nature of his report but was concerned with the chairman's interest in 
attacking the aviation holding companies. 28 
The recommendations of the Crane Report and the final report of the 
Mead committee moved Kelly to fight for another, more crucial provision in 
his bill. Under H.R. 3, he proposed that "no route warrant shall be issued to 
any air mail contractor who has any financial interest in or participates in the 
management of any line other than that covered in whole or in part by said 
route warrant."29 This would effectively prohibit one airline from operating 
another airline (thus receiving additional indirect federal payments). The large 
operators were in general support of the provision of H.R. 3, except for this 
provision.30 
With this, the question of monopoly in the airline industry was coming to 
the forefront. Progressive Democrats and renegade Republicans had been at-
tacking Brown's deliberate favoritism of the large holding companies for years 
with little effect. Brown ably demonstrated his Progressive Republican reason-
ing for favoring these more efficient operations, which were certainly operat-
ing in the public interest as they were wholly dependent upon the government's 
largess for their very existence. Now, however, with Brown gone and the Demo-
crats in power, the voices rising in opposition to the oligopolies became much 
louder. 
The debate from this point onward revolved around the matter of mo-
nopoly. The discussion shifted from deliberations on the efficacy and legality 
of extensions and accusations of excessive air mail payments to increasingly 
demonstrative attacks on the very structure of the industry. Braniff and the 
other independents took advantage of the situation, which was largely their 
creation, and sought to portray themselves as honest small businessmen de-
nied their right to a livelihood by the machinations of predatory monopoly. 
They carefully ignored mentioning their role in creating the very monopoly 
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they attacked. The pictures painted by the independents and by Congressional 
Democrats recalled the worst predations of big business during the Gilded 
Age. Compounding this issue was the entry of one of America's largest hold-
ing companies into aviation. 
In March 1933, General Motors officially completed its efforts to purchase 
control of North American Aviation, now that the battle between Cord and 
AVCO was settled. The company now gained control of Eastern Air Transport 
and TWA, as well as working control of Western Air Express, through a merger 
with its subsidiary, General Aviation Corporation, at a cost of $3,676,000.31 
The entry of GM clearly demonstrated that aviation was finally a serious, full-
scale enterprise, capable of producing profits for the investor and operator alike. 
Significantly, it signaled the end of the speculative age in aviation trading. 
A company as powerful and respected as General Motors would not enter 
a new field if the business conditions were not sound. Providing such a foun-
dation for the industry was Walter Brown's primary intention during his time 
in office. Aviation in general and the airlines in particular were finally on a 
sound financial basis, and GM was ready to take part. Such a move caused 
great consternation, nonetheless, and initiated a Justice Department inquiry 
concerning any possible infringement of the Sherman or Clayton antitrust 
acts. The government found that all was in order, but the entry of GM into the 
airline and aircraft manufacturing business only fanned the fears of antimo-
nopoly critics. They saw this move not as a benign turning point in the devel-
opment of commercial aviation but as a strong confirmation of their worst 
fears that monopoly, with all of its supposed evils, was dominating this new 
industry. Brittin aptly summed up the situation: "It seems to me that the fi-
nancial control of the big aviation holding companies have selected a most 
inopportune time to engineer their mergers and consolidations. They should 
at least have waited until the appropriation bill, upon which their very exist-
ence depends, had passed both Houses. I feel that their activities have seri-
ously disturbed the present situation."32 
The hearings on Kelly's new bill convened in April 1933 and revealed an 
unexpected maverick in the airline industry who urged that Congress bar in-
terlocking directorates altogether. Col. Lewis H. Brittin of Northwest had no 
love of combines. Though his airline was owned in large part by AVCO, Brittin 
was energetically attempting to buy back the company. He correctly sensed 
the mood of Congress and sought to portray his airline as a small independent 
struggling to break free of the grasp of monopolies and thereby gain backing 
for his northern transcontinental route. 
On April 20, Brittin broke ranks with the other air mail contractors and 
forcefully testified before Congress. "I feel that it would be distinctly detri-
mental to the development of this industry if we were to foster a monopolistic 
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tendency;' he said. "I think it is very important to keep alive this matter of 
independence among these air mail operators; and I do not think you could 
afford to encourage a situation where you will have in this country one, two, 
or three, perhaps, dominating systems of air mail. I think the public interest of 
this time would be promoted by your encouraging independent operations:'33 
Specifically, Brittin recommended prohibiting holding companies from re-
ceiving any air mail payments whatsoever. 
No other witness pleaded such a strong case. The other airline representa-
tives argued against the specific payment provisions and agreed with Thomas 
B. Doe of Eastern Air Transport that "this discussion of interlocking director-
ates and ownerships is premature. I do not think it is nearly so serious as some 
of us have heard .... As this Air Mail service develops it is going to be regulated 
by the government. And it will make little difference who owns them."34 
Surprisingly, H.R. 3 was generally well received by some air mail contrac-
tors. Especially supportive was United. The weight-based payment system 
would greatly benefit its service, as the airline carried the bulk of all transcon-
tinental air mail. Stated Frederick Rentschler to Philip Johnson, "As I indicated 
to you over the 'phone this morning, I am convinced that we ought to get 
solidly behind the Kelly Bill:' For Rentschler, the bill offered the opportunity 
to break free of the subsidy altogether, something the Watres Act had intended 
for the operators eventually to do, and thus free them from politically moti-
vated attacks.35 
American Airways officials felt differently. They feared that a return to the 
weight-based method of payment would drastically reduce their income, par-
ticularly over the lightly traveled southern transcontinental route. To prevent 
this from happening, Lucius Manning made a desperate appeal to the Illinois 
congressional delegation for support in heading off the Kelly bill. Cleverly 
employing the antimonopoly argument to his advantage, Manning told Rep. 
A.J. Sabath of Chicago, now that American had moved its headquarters to the 
shores of Lake Michigan, "We are strongly of the opinion that no emergency 
exists which would justify the adoption of the Kelly Bill at this time .... As far 
as our companies are concerned, we are willing to co-operate in any program 
which is in the interest of economy, and to take our share of the appropriation 
cut which has been made, but we shall oppose to the best of our ability a pro-
gram which, as you can readily see, will give the air mail monopoly to our two 
competitors, destroy most of our company's investment in air transportation, 
and entirely remove competition from the field:' 36 
Sabath responded quickly. Manning reported to Cord Corporation head 
R.S. Pruitt, "Congressman Sabath called me about 12:45 P.M. today and stated 
that he was leaving for Washington, also that he wanted us to know that he 
had called Jim Mead of the 'phone Sunday and arranged to have nothing fur-
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ther done about the hearings on the Kelly Bill until after he and Kelly reached 
Washington and had a chance to talk with Mr. Mead regarding the matter:' 
Manning need not have worried; the bill never left committee.37 
Any changes to the air mail legislation would have to wait until the forth-
coming Senate investigation. In the meantime, the Post Office and Congress 
were trying to find ways to address the alleged problem of the extensions by 
way of cancellation. 
One of the first efforts by Second Assistant Postmaster General W.W. Howes 
was to seek a way to annul the existing route extensions. Howes had approached 
Comptroller General John McCarl to ask if such a plan were possible. "Mr. 
Howes;' stated Colonel Brittin, "takes the position that Mr. Brown granted 
these extensions in the face of an already created deficit against the express 
provisions of the Watres Act that no extensions should be granted unless the 
funds were available to pay for them:' Brittin was worried that Howes was 
looking to both the new solicitor of the Post Office, Karl Crowley, and the 
comptroller general for an interpretation of the legality of the extensions.38 
Brittin saw this action as evidence that the new second assistant did not 
comprehend the intricacies of the existing law. Brown never incurred a deficit; 
he always made up for shortfalls caused by a new extension by lowering the 
rate to all of the contractors, even forcing them to fly the mail for free at the 
end of the fiscal year. This was the expressed purpose behind having the air-
lines exchange their contracts for route certificates and showed the complete 
command of the air mail situation possessed by Brown. Howes was a neo-
phyte compared to the former postmaster general and his second assistant. 
Brittin pointed out that although extensions had been granted in seeming vio-
lation of the Watres Act, "they have become legalized, so to speak, before the 
end of the year, due to the fact that the Post Office Department must inevita-
bly balance their budgets. The Post Office Department had in some instances 
reduced schedules to accomplish this, but mainly it has been done thru the 
reduction of rates. The Comptroller General has heretofore always concurred 
in these matters with the Postmaster General and has held that a deficit did 
not exist .... In this way literally thousands of miles of extensions and extra 
schedules have been authorized and financed without increasing or overdraw-
ing any domestic air mail appropriation."39 
The Democrats, controlling the Post Office and Congress, now sought leg-
islation to enable the government to cancel existing contracts. Known as the 
Independent Offices Appropriation bill, H.R. 5389 was reported out of com-
mittee in May and sent to the floor of the House for consideration. Section 6 
would allow the president to nullify or cancel any existing contract if it were 
deemed that that service was no longer in the public interest.40 While meeting 
strenuous opposition from most House Republicans, including Clyde Kelly, 
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the measure passed the House by a large majority. Fortunately for the contract 
air mail carriers, Section 6 did not survive the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee. Brittin was relieved; Second Assistant Howes was notY 
Unexpectedly, despite the recommendation of Sen. Carter Glass's Appro-
priations Committee, Section 6 was reinstated when it reached the Senate floor. 
Rumors spread that anti-air-mail senators McKellar and Black were behind 
the reinstatement as a result of the continuing work performed by Black's Spe-
cial Investigative Committee on Ocean and Air Mail contracts in preparation 
for their forthcoming hearings. 
Brittin felt more at ease having received the private assurances that his 
efforts to extend his line into Montana would not be blocked. Nevertheless, 
Brittin won the assurance from Sen. Gerald Nye that he would introduce an 
amendment to the bill stating that any such cancellation could occur only 
with sixty days' notice and would require a public hearing. This is, in fact, 
what happened, effectively removing the teeth from this legislation. Still, Brittin 
was concerned about the unexpected support Section 6 had from his compe-
tition at United. "Strange to relate, the cancellationists are being encouraged 
by Colonel Paul Henderson of United, Mr. Bruce Kremer, (of National Parks 
and United), and Mr. Sig Janus of American Airways;' he remarked. "The Gen-
eral Motors group and ourselves are the only ones attempting to oppose or 
modify the cancellation provisions of the Act."42 
Brittin had reason to be concerned. His strenuous efforts to extend his 
route westward into a northern transcontinental route to Seattle were meeting 
very powerful, though very quiet, opposition. Acting on behalf of National 
Parks, into whose territory Northwest was moving, and interested in preserv-
ing the integrity of its own service to the northwestern states, United was work-
ing behind the scenes to head off Brittin. 
Henderson, never a strong supporter ofWalter Brown's air mail policy, for 
years thought that Brown exceeded his authority with the WatresAct, particu-
larly concerning the legality of his numerous route extensions, the majority of 
which went to Northwest. With the coming of a new administration, Henderson 
sought to sway the new officers in the Post Office Department to his position 
and thereby forestall Northwest. Henderson attempted to do so by supporting 
these public efforts to negate Brown's extensions. In so doing, he would in 
effect abruptly stop Northwest's encroachment. 
Henderson felt that United and National Parks had nothing to hide be-
cause they were operating virtually the same routes they originally had been 
awarded through competitive bidding years before Brown had even taken of-
fice and had not benefitted from significant route extensions. Henderson did 
not perceive the mounting acrimony against United, the largest and most pow-
erful of the air mail "monopolies:' He only saw that their entire contractual 
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history with the government had been above board and that any rational ex-
amination of the current system would validate that obvious assertion. 
Henderson spoke at length with the Post Office and also with Senator Black. It 
was a mistake. 
Henderson also had another motive for arguing for the cancellation of the 
extensions. Throughout the summer, the air mail carriers were occupied draft-
ing plans to accommodate the drastic reduction in air mail appropriations. 
Despite the comptroller general's long-awaited ruling in late June that exten-
sions could be canceled, the airlines were no longer concerned as they realized 
that a significant body oflaw existed in their defense to the extent that the Post 
Office would not risk damaging suits if it canceled any route. They now could 
turn their attention to confronting the new reality of a 25 percent rate reduc-
tion for all of the carriers. 
With appropriations cut from $20 million to $15 million, many hard 
choices were forced upon the department. Armed with the provisions of the 
Watres Act incorporated by Brown to modify the rate payment through route 
certificates, however, the department made equitable, though painful, reduc-
tions with a new rate of less than 42 cents per mile. As had Brown and Glover 
before them, Farley and Howes called the air mail contractors to Washington 
for an operators meeting in July to discuss the new provisions. Numerous de-
lays ensued as Howes stalled the operators until the appropriations bill was 
passed. In mid-August the air mail contractors were given bad news directly 
from the White House: Roosevelt had cut an addition $1 million from the 
approved fiscal year 1934 budget of $15 millionY 
After a lengthy wait, Howes finally convened his first operators' confer-
ence on August 24. This initial meeting produced little.44 On September 5, the 
operators met with Post Office Department officials again in a marathon ses-
sion. The discussions began in earnest when Superintendent Cisler decided to 
read aloud each company's proposal. All approved except a shocked Brittin. As 
newly elected United president William Patterson reported to Philip Johnson, 
the new president of the United Aircraft and Transport Corporation, Brittin 
"immediately jumped to his feet stating that there were some very confiden-
tial suggestions made in his communication. My assumption is that his rec-
ommendation was to eliminate all lines but Northwest Airways. Brittin then 
proceeded to suggest that the appropriation be distributed on a cost ascertain-
ment basis. We all voiced our immediate objection to such a plan on the basis 
that it would be destructive and encourage extravagant operation."45 
Chairman Mead was also present at the deliberations at the invitation of 
Second Assistant Howes. Mead stressed the importance of determining a new, 
weight-based payment method to help offset the negative opinions held by 
most of Congress toward the current air mail system and its large subsidy. 
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Patterson reported that Mead made the statement that "in the minds of every 
Congressman and Senator the air mail appropriation is considered 100 per 
cent subsidy. He then impressed us with the importance of establishing some 
method of pay ... in order to clarify in the minds of the Congressmen and 
Senators the differential between actual revenue to the Post Office Depart-
ment and actual subsidy." Mead was also expressing the concern of many in 
Congress with the allegedly secretive nature of Brown's operator's conferences 
and to the numerous route extensions. Patterson worried that the new Con-
gress could not or would not discern the difference between the contracts 
awarded by competitive bidding and the similar looking but legally separate 
route extensions.46 
Mead strongly suggested that the air mail carriers quickly decide on a two 
mills per pound mile even if that would exceed the $14 million budget. An 
offer to fly the mail for free under this new method of payment, similar to that 
which had been done at the end of every fiscal year since 1930, would greatly 
impress Congress with the sincerity of their efforts and would go far in head-
ing off further troubles in Congress. Mead himself would then introduce leg-
islation similar to the Kelly Act that would stabilize the industry and remove 
any possible stigma against the contractorsY 
Patterson was delighted with what he heard. Such a plan fit United's re-
quirements precisely. As had been Postmaster General Brown's original inten-
tions as expressed in the Watres Act, United had been not only carefully building 
an excellent air mail service but also expanding its passenger and express op-
erations to offset costs and wean themselves off the subsidy. These efforts were 
now bearing fruit: "Congressman Mead's statements were music to my ears. We 
could not have outlined our own attitude more clearly. I considered that he was 
speaking in identical terms the thoughts we have had for the past two years."48 
The following day Patterson and company met again with the Post Office 
to voice their opinions about budget cuts and how different airlines reacted to 
them. United, he stated, took the yearly cuts without protest and turned to-
ward expanding into other markets to compensate. Other, smaller airlines, 
particularly Northwest, did not. "I pointed out to Mr. Howes;' stated Patterson, 
"that on each occasion when our air mail revenue had been reduced, we buck-
led up and went back to work to develop other sources of revenue; that we 
were enjoying as a result of this effort a very satisfactory passenger business;' 
although this new business did not completely offset the cuts as was widely 
thought. Nevertheless, United, Eastern, and TWA were enjoying profits be-
cause of their efforts. Even long-suffering American, for the first time in its 
history, reported a first -quarter profit. 
In fact, nationwide air traffic had risen dramatically over the past four 
years from virtually nothing to more than half a million passengers per year, 
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just as Brown had hoped.49 With the economic incentives in place and the 
direct encouragement of the government to build larger, faster, and safer air-
craft, the populace was losing its fear of flying. While air travel was still the 
preserve of the businessman and the wealthy because of its high fares, more 
people each year were choosing to fly rather than take the train or bus. 
Although subjected to vehement attacks from Progressive Democrats and 
other opponents of monopoly, the airlines were now effectively given the bless-
ing of President Roosevelt to maintain their holding companies and their route 
monopolies. Among the many new laws and agencies Roosevelt created dur-
ing his remarkable first one hundred days in office was the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA), signed into law on June 16, 1933, which was intended to 
lessen the impact of the Great Depression and correct perceived problems in 
the economy. 
It was widely believed that overproduction brought on by destructive com-
petition was the cause of the nation's economic woes. In order to address this 
perceived problem, Roosevelt sought to limit production artificially through 
industry-wide cooperation thereby preserving profits by fixing prices at vol-
untary minimum levels no lower than cost. Within each industry, the govern-
ment would protect business from antitrust laws, in effect legalizing cartels 
and restricting competition in exchange for a set of industrial "codes of fair 
competition" containing mutually agreed-upon production limits. In return, 
labor would be protected by legalized collective bargaining, guaranteed mini-
mum wages, and maximum hours with decent working conditions. 50 Led by 
Gen. Hugh Johnson and administered through the National Recovery Admin-
istration (NRA), the NIRA was seen as a cooperative plan uniting business, 
labor, government, and even consumers to extricate the nation from the eco-
nomic doldrums. 
This government -business cooperation was highly reminiscent of Hoover's 
associative activities and similar in practice to Postmaster General Brown's 
plan for the air transportation industry. Now the Roosevelt administration 
was in effect formally legalizing much of Brown's air mail scheme, protecting 
the air mail carriers from destructive competition from low-cost, indepen-
dent airlines while protecting labor. 
Although the contractors were never friends of labor, they were able to 
pay decent wages, unlike the independents, because of the generous subsidies 
they received and the clear understanding from the Post Office that they treat 
their employees fairly and pay them accordingly. As a result, unlike most in-
dustries, employment was not a problem as the air mail contractors were never 
forced to lay off any of their 5,461 workers or cut wages. 51 
In July, the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce, the major airlines' trade 
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association, was given the task of drafting the codes for the aviation industry: 
one set for manufacturing and the other for the air transport lines. The first 
task was to placate General Johnson. Because of the recent appropriations cuts, 
the contractors were reluctant to sign the NRA's blanket code before they had 
time to formulate their own. With the help of Edward T. Stettinius of General 
Motors, an emergency code was worked out with Johnson's approval, thereby 
allowing the air mail carriers to fly the distinctive NRA "blue eagle" to show 
their support for the president's recovery plan.SZ 
The next order of business was to develop an industry-wide code through 
the normal practice of hearings. Brittin was ill at ease with this process be-
cause, quite naturally, the ACC was dominated by the "Big Three" aviation 
holding companies, whose practices and policies were at odds with 
Northwest's. 53 In addition, Brittin attacked the virtual monopoly held by mem-
bers of the ACC on the proposed Code Authority, fearing that such an ar-
rangement "would certainly tend to promote monopoly, especially if the Code 
Authority is to be given power to control competition."54 In fact, Brittin had 
earlier withdrawn Northwest from the ACC in a demonstration of protest 
against the control of the "monopolists." 
On August 31, in the ballroom of the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, 
D.C., Leighton Rogers, executive vice president of the ACC, and American 
Airways president Lester Seymour, chairman of the Air Transport Committee 
of the ACC, sat down with David Behneke of ALPA and Rep. Fiorello LaGuardia 
to open the hearings. Despite the generally high wages paid by the air mail 
contractors, the labor question dominated the code discussions as the Ameri-
can Federation of Labor and its ALPA affiliate sought to guarantee good pay 
for not only the flight crews but also the mechanics. Numerous witnesses ap-
peared, including pilots, mechanics, and radio operators, along with indepen-
dent airline operator Temple Bowen. 
The hearings proved acrimonious and inconclusive. Rogers's handling of 
the testimony angered many in the audience and prompted direct criticism of 
the industry, exactly what the ACC did not want. At the last moment Rogers 
had substituted a revised code without notice or explanation, which was in-
troduced piecemeal throughout the proceedings. According to Brittin, who 
was present, "The tactics of the Chamber especially irritated the American 
Federation of Labor and the Labor Board. They also brought forth an extremely 
bitter attack upon the policy of the Post Office Department in encouraging a 
monopoly through the long-established system of granting extensions to ex-
isting air maillines."55 The recommended wage and hour guidelines also met 
with stern opposition: "The high minimum hours and the low minimum wage 
for pilots and co-pilots brought forth a great deal of opposition. Most of the 
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Washington newspapers actively supported the cause of the pilots and criti-
cized the operators. This sort of newspaper publicity at this time and in this 
place is anything but helpful to the cause of the air mail service."56 
In late September the airlines relented and established new wage scales 
providing a substantial increase to the pilots with base pay ranging from $1,600 
to $3,000 per year, depending on qualifications, with additional flying pay pro-
vided, from a low of $4.00 per hour for daytime flying in older, slower aircraft 
to $6.80 per mile for night flying in the latest generation machines. 57 William 
Patterson summed up the air mail contractors' position, stating, "Labor with-
out question, is sitting in the driver's seat!'58 
United Air Lines and the other large carriers could live with this situation; 
Braniff, Bowen, and the other independent, non-air-mail-carrying members 
of the Scheduled Airline Operators Association could not. Thomas Braniff 
and Temple Bowen appealed directly to General Johnson, arguing that the 
code as formulated by the ACC did not represent their views and that they 
opposed several sections. They particularly disliked Article VII, which pre-
vented the duplication of routes and service between two points already served 
by another airline. As stated in the draft code, "Members of the Code agree not 
to initiate service between cities already served by another member over an 
identical route." 59 This prohibition, which codified the Post Office Department's 
policy under Brown, would have forced the independents out of business en-
tirely as they deliberately competed head-to-head with the air mail lines over 
many routes. This, they believed, was not what Roosevelt intended. 
Ignoring the president's assumption that one of the primary causes of 
overproduction was destructive competition, Braniff went on to state that "the 
code is not designed to promote monopolies;' when, in fact, it readily did so. 60 
Braniff was correct in that the NRA was not intended to eliminate small busi-
nesses, but he rightly feared that the implementation of the code would do 
just that, as it addressed only those airlines possessing a treasured air mail 
contract. Braniff condemned the Post Office Department's policy of subsidy 
and extensions for squeezing out the small independents and blamed it for the 
creation of air transport monopolies.61 
By the time the code for air transportation was approved and signed by 
the president on November 14, Article VII had been modified by the NRA. For 
Braniff and Bowen this was a reprieve rather than a relief. After discussions 
with the ACC, the NRA decided that the clause should not be the basis of law 
but could be worked out separately as a trade practice agreement. Under the 
new Article VII, according to the ACC, the Code Authority still had power "to 
call a meeting and agree on conditions which new air lines would have to meet 
before they could legally operate. Once agreed to by the Administrator of the 
Code, these new conditions would be binding on the entire industry."62 With 
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the Code Authority dominated by five members from the chamber and chaired 
by United's William Patterson, Braniff and the independents stood little chance 
of opening any new routes. 
It was expected that the code agreements would be placed into effect by 
February. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, the existing oligopolistic 
state of the industry would now have the complete protection of the govern-
ment against the non-air-mail carriers. But unforeseen circumstances would 
indeed occur, and with devastating effect. The independents fully realized 
the consequences if the trade practice agreement was codified in February as 
planned: they would be out of business. Braniff and its allies had to prevent 
that at any cost. 
Chapter 13 
Congress Assumes Command 
Since February, Sen. Hugo Black had been calling for a sweeping investiga-
tion of all postal contracts. Black, a former police court judge, personal 
injury attorney, county prosecutor, and Ku Klux Klan member, and a future 
associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, was passionately predis-
posed against all concentrations of economic or political power. Growing up 
in poor east -central Clay County, Alabama, Black was raised in a Populist house-
hold. As a southern Progressive Democrat, Black vehemently opposed all mo-
nopolies and sought to expose their purported evil to the light of public 
scrutiny.' 
Remarkably, the air mail operators failed to perceive Black as a dangerous 
opponent. When drafting their lobbying program for the forthcoming elec-
tion of 1932, Eastern Air Transport thought Black "OK."2 They were greatly 
mistaken. In February 1933, Black had been infuriated by Postmaster General 
Brown's last-minute route extensions before leaving office and won approval 
to initiate a detailed public investigation of Brown's entire operation. Senator 
Black assumed the worst and, provided with subjective information carefully 
prepared by the independents, read all they wanted him to read. 
In particular, Fulton Lewis Jr., the conservative reporter who was provided 
information by Braniff and Ludington in 1931 to fuel their attacks against the 
department, gave Black a copy of his lengthy report detailing the alleged mis-
deeds of the department and the airlines. Lewis despised Brown on personal 
grounds because Brown had earlier successfully removed Lewis's father-in-
law, Col. Claudius Huston, from the chairmanship of the Republican National 
Committee. 
The document carefully pleaded the independents' position, exposing the 
alleged misappropriation of federal funds, waste, and fraud while ignoring the 
machinations of the independents' own deceptions, as most of them origi-
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nally had air mail contracts and only wanted back in after selling off at large 
profit. The report especially ignored Brown's Progressive Republican vision 
concerning the financial stability and capability of the large companies to fund 
the development of this infant industry. Such a report, despite its flaws, played 
directly to Black's fears. He was already predisposed to believe the worst. 
On the surface, without understanding Brown's plan, it did indeed look 
like deliberate favoritism of big business at the expense of small, struggling 
independents. Below the surface, it was much more complicated: the indepen-
dents were not viable entities and the government had an obligation not to 
expend public funds on shaky, underfinanced, unreliable enterprises. The cur-
rent independents had not existed when all of the contracts were originally let, 
so their claims of exclusion were invalid. Route extensions were the only way 
air mail service could be extended throughout the country without an increase 
in limited appropriation. This was overlooked. 
Evoking the biblical vision of money changers in the temple, Black saw 
only greed and evil. To an enthralled national radio audience, Black displayed 
his unique interpretation of aviation history: 
Men who had flown over the battlefields of France pioneered in the avia-
tion industry. Returning home with the spirit of flying controlling their thoughts 
and hopes, it was but a natural step for them to advance from the old barn-
storming days to a regular passenger air traffic. Realizing the value of this new 
development in time of peace and war, the people were anxious to foster it. 
Legislation to aid this new industry was quickly passed and provided for the 
payment of money for the carriage of mail by air planes. It was at this stage that 
the money changers saw their golden opportunity. Interested, as always, in the 
exploitation of the invention and genius and efforts of some one else, alluring 
advertisements of prospective gains fascinated the gaze of millions. A wild 
scramble for the fruits of government subsidies began. As usual, the weak fell 
before the strong. 
At the directors tables there sat, not the pioneer air pilots, but the masters 
of American finance. The control of aviation had been ruthlessly taken away 
from men who could fly and bestowed upon bankers, brokers, promoters and 
politicians, sitting in their inner offices, allotting among themselves the taxpay-
ers monies. Again fortunes were made overnight.3 
A closer examination would have revealed that the major aviation holding 
companies, particularly United Aircraft, were in fact organized, managed, and 
financed by aviation pioneers. When they realized the need for additional capital 
to expand their industry, they logically approached "the masters of finance" 
and shared power. Even AVCO, with its terrible problems, was started by avia-
tor Sherman Fairchild, and it required competent businessmen such as C.R. 
Smith, not pilots, to bring American Airways to profitability. Wall Street in-
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volvement was essential if the industry were to grow. Contrary to Black's claims, 
Walter Brown legally promoted the well-financed corporations over the under-
capitalized, stock-promoting independents. Nevertheless, Black's intentions were 
honest; he genuinely believed that a terrible injustice had been committed. 
Big business did triumph in aviation. To many, this fact alone was enough 
justification to fight for its elimination, especially at a time of breadlines and 
massive unemployment, when large aviation companies and their executives 
lived well off public subsidies while the general populace suffered immeasur-
ably. To this end, Senator Black's Special Committee on Investigation of Air 
Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts earnestly initiated its investigation in the spring 
of 1933. In particular, Black demanded an inquiry into the organization and 
financial conditions of the contracting companies and their efforts to reap 
federal subsidies.4 On June 10, the Senate adopted Black's resolution after quib-
bling over its cost, setting the stage for one of the Senate's most controversial 
hearings.5 
Heading the investigation was another Alabamian, Andrew G. Patterson, 
a former sheriff and now ICC investigator delegated to Black's committee. He 
too was a southern Progressive Democrat, harboring an intense dislike of 
monopoly, and did all in his power to uncover any evidence to prove his case. 
As the lead investigator, Patterson immediately went into the field, interview-
ing all of the executives of the airlines while collecting data and copying their 
records. To the airlines, Patterson also revealed his biases. 
On May 27 and 29, Hainer Hinshaw met alone with Patterson in room 
317 of the Senate Office Building. Hinshaw, now with United, was one of the 
industry executives most intimately involved with the creation and implemen-
tation of the 1930 Watres Act. Patterson started the interview by stating that 
he and Senator Black were only seeking to examine the industry and address 
the present criticisms in the hope that a new, conclusive government policy 
toward air mail could be determined for the benefit of all concerned. Patterson 
was particularly interested in learning about Brown's program of extensions, 
to which Hinshaw replied that all was legal, in order, and driven not by collu-
sive forces of Wall Street but by legitimate local political concerns: 
Mr. Patterson then introduced the subject of American Airways extensions. 
He inquired if collusion had existed in obtaining them. His memory was re-
freshed as to the wording of the seventh section of the Watres Act. His memory 
was again refreshed as to the numerous mass meetings held by the then Post-
master General, who was hearing arguments of various sections of the country 
as to their crying need for air mail service-how Mr. Brown had yielded to pres-
sure and had instituted in various sections of the country-how he had made 
these services as extensions on the theory that a few able companies would per-
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form more satisfactorily than many smaller ones-that the few able companies 
could so consolidate their operations that the Government would benefit through 
reduced rates to the companies. It was pointed out that the pressure came from 
the affected localities, as would be indicated of a list of the speakers at the meet-
ings was to be scanned.6 
Patterson was particularly interested in learning the details of the award 
of the southern transcontinental route, CAM-33, to American. He assumed 
that the arrangement unfairly excluded those present -day small independents 
who were complaining the loudest. Hinshaw corrected this misinterpretation, 
reminding the investigator that the cornerstone of Brown's plan was the cre-
ation and expansion of passenger service throughout the country and that 
that could not be done without government assistance: 
Mr. Patterson next wanted to know why it was that AM 33 had but one 
bidder and that bidder dared, or was so sure, to bid the maximum price. It was 
pointed out that Section Four of the Watres Act required certain qualifications 
before a prospective bidder could be qualified to bid; furthermore, the adver-
tisement contained certain requirements in the matter of speed, equipment, and 
seats to be furnished; that there were but five companies operating who could 
qualify as bidders; one operator was busy operating his route, two others com-
bined for one of the routes, and the last two combined on the second route to be 
advertised; that one route had two bidders but the lower of the bids could not 
qualify and they might as well have dared to bid the full price because as it was 
with the full rate they would have to carry a high passenger average to break 
even; that it must be remembered that those lines protesting against the present 
day air mail structure were not in existence at the time of the advertisements; 
and that their protests came long after the awards were made.7 
Hinshaw was concerned that Patterson saw little value in the air mail itself 
and, apparently, saw no correlation between the carriage of mail and the car-
riage of passengers, unlike officials in the Hoover administration. This was a 
recurring theme among the Democratic opposition concerning this public 
policy issue. Unlike his predecessor, Roosevelt never had a coherent national 
aviation policy. To Hinshaw the question of passengers was immaterial. The 
contract air mail carriers were compelled by Brown and the law to carry pas-
sengers on all of their routes. This they did in order to comply with the terms 
of their original contract and route certificates. "Hence the operators, under a 
bonded contract, could do nothing but follow the dictates of Mr. Brown and 
comply with their contractual terms;' stated Hinshaw. 
Patterson had already decided that the government was wasting money 
on a service as frivolous as the air mail, disregarding its role in fostering a new 
form of national transportation in the public interest. Hinshaw did not see the 
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investigation leading to any useful conclusion. "The opinion prevails;' he noted, 
"that Mr. Patterson had definitely convicted the industry as being of no value 
and a luxury for those that care to use it, that the industry has no place in the 
basic scheme of transportation facilities; that it may be possible for United Air 
Lines to carry the mail for a sum the government could spend but the rest of 
the operators could not-hence to require such a thing would be favoritism-
that the investigation will end as they have all ended-not even suggesting an 
intelligent answer to the problem."8 
On September 28, the Special Committee on Investigation of the Air Mail 
and Ocean Mail Contracts, under the chairmanship of Senator Black, began 
its work. The calm that followed was misleading. Black, desirous of unearth-
ing as much incriminating evidence as possible, had sent out his research staff 
months earlier while the committee examined the uninteresting ocean mail 
contracts. The aviation holding companies got a taste of upcoming events when 
in late December they received an official questionnaire asking about stock 
acquisitions, salaries, bonuses, and profits. "We want to know the original back-
ground of the company so that we may know how the monopoly was worked 
out and the actual cash set-up of the companies seeking mail contracts;' Black 
stated emphatically.9 
By this time Braniff and Bowen were getting desperate. In September, 
Temple Bowen had approached A.P. Barrett requesting a merger of his line 
with American; he was flatly refused. Barrett pointedly reminded Bowen that 
he had bought him out once before and was not about to do it again. Tom and 
Paul Braniff were working as hard as possible to secure a contract for their 
struggling line, but with the highly restrictive NRA Air Transport Code soon 
coming into effect, they were running out of options. The Air Transport Code 
Authority would meet in February and likely codify the restrictions on routes 
and direct competition between city pairs served by the contractors, leaving 
Braniff and the other independents without any chance to compete directly. If 
this were to happen, Braniff and Bowen would soon be out of business. Braniff 
and Bowen hoped to convince the Post Office Department or the Black com-
mittee that if they could be given a route directly or indirectly through a sub-
contract, they could demonstrate their ability to fly the mail at a lower cost. 
In October, Tom Braniff reminded A. G. Patterson as well as the Post Of-
fice that the administration now had the power to cancel or consolidate both 
contracts and route extensions. "Has it occurred to you that the Post Office 
Department has the authority to make the best possible test of the question as 
to whether or not the air mail carriers are overpaid?" wrote Braniff to Patterson. 
"They have the authority from Congress contained in the rider to the Inde-
pendent Offices' Appropriations Bill giving them the authority to cancel con-
tracts, and the Comptroller General has rendered them an opinion which in 
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the estimation of our attorneys and ourselves clearly give the Post Office De-
partment the right to summarily cancel so-called extensions which were granted 
under the previous regime." He suggested publicly and often that if the de-
partment canceled just one route and opened it to competitive bidding, "they 
would be amazed to learn how much money could be saved on carrying the 
mail."10 Though Braniff and Bowen did have lower operating costs than the air 
mail contractors, they were not flying to the higher safety standards required 
by the Watres Act, nor were they flying their passengers in the larger 
multiengined aircraft prescribed by the department or paying their employees 
decent wages. 
Braniff reminded Patterson that the year before they had offered to sublet 
all of CAM-3 from Chicago to Dallas-Fort Worth from United Air Lines but 
were refused by Philip Johnson. Through their political connections in the 
Post Office, however, Braniff and Temple Bowen finally found receptive ears. 
Second Assistant William Howes was a South Dakotan who had been an in-
vestor in Rapid Air Lines at one time and was interested in the affairs of the 
independents. In November he contacted Post Office Solicitor Karl Crowley 
and asked if it were possible for the department to extend the route along 
CAM-3 to several destinations between Oklahoma City and Fort Worth as yet 
without service. Howes wanted to know if such an extension would be legal 
and, if so, could it be subcontracted to serve Lawton, Oklahoma, and Wichita 
Falls, Texas. 11 
Crowley agreed that indeed the department had the power to create such 
an extension or consolidation of routes in the public interest. Subletting was 
also authorized; after all, this was how Brown had expanded the air mail net-
work. United Air Lines suspected that the department wanted the route to go 
to tiny, independent Reed Airlines, which was affiliated with Braniff and Bowen 
through the Scheduled Airline Operators Association. Just as easily, it could 
have been given to Braniff. Regardless, former Fort Worth attorney Crowley 
had clearly reaffirmed the department's authority in these matters and was 
well aware that it also had the power to cancel contracts and extensions if so 
inclined. Rumored to be a business acquaintance of Temple Bowen, Crowley 
was well acquainted with the Democratic social and political circles in Fort 
Worth and was sympathetic to the plight of the independents-so sympa-
thetic, in fact, that he was soon to assume the vanguard in their struggle. 
To promote their plan, Braniff also offered to assist the investigation in 
any way possible through testimony or correspondence. The offer to Patterson 
was readily accepted. 12 Indeed, Patterson provided a formal letter of introduc-
tion for Paul Braniff to discuss with Joseph Eastman, commissioner of the 
ICC, "matters pertaining to air transportation." Patterson noted that "Mr. 
Braniff has been helpful and cooperative in furnishing this Committee with 
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data and information relating to the investigation of air mail contracts."13 The 
Braniff brothers needed all the help they could get; on January 1, 1934, dwin-
dling revenues forced them to discontinue their service between Chicago and 
Kansas City and between Chicago and St. Louis, two extremely important 
routes. 14 
While the Braniffs were fighting a rear-guard action to save themselves 
from the brink of extinction by the impending regulations of the Air Trans-
port Code Authority, the air mail contractors were also maneuvering for posi-
tion. Colonel Brittin continued his fight for his own independence and sought 
approval from Senator Black. By this time, Northwest had managed to buy 
back the 22.5 percent of its outstanding shares held by TAT, leaving only AVCO 
as a major stockholder. 
Brittin took his fight to Black, underscoring the problem of interlocking 
directorates in the airline industry. Through Brittin's efforts lobbying the mem-
bers of Black's committee, he planted a story in the press in the name of the 
committee condemning "interlocking financial interests between air mail lines 
and threatening to put through legislation during the coming session that will 
force complete separation."'5 Brittin was pleased with the public endorsement 
by Black of his efforts to increase Northwest's independence. He was also pleased 
with the attitude of Black's chief investigator. "Mr. Patterson;' he remarked, "is 
decidedly anti-monopolistic and very sympathetic toward the aims of the 
Northwest Airways to develop an independent transcontinental service that 
will be owned and controlled in the territory it serves."16 
United, the largest of the air mail contractors, was developing its own plan 
to confront the coming investigation. Col. Paul Henderson, the former second 
assistant postmaster general and one of the founders of NAT, best expressed 
United's position. He, too, had no fondness for Walter Brown and felt that the 
air mail system as created by the Watres Act was flawed. He offered one solu-
tion-the one he had been offering since 1928 and one Brown prophesied in 
1932: formal federal regulation. "Because ofWalter Brown's high handed man-
agement of air mail from 1930 to and through 1932;' stated Henderson, "there 
has developed in Congress a suspicion that all air mail matters may be ques-
tionable in character." He correctly surmised that most members were ill versed 
in the intricacies of the air mail question. "Such knowledge as most the mem-
bers have;' he concluded, "comes to them a bit at a time from other members, 
from disappointed independent air line operators and from other sources." 
This left Congress with a distorted and unfriendly view of the contractors.17 
Henderson was actually somewhat sympathetic to the plight of many of 
the independent passenger lines. "Because of the fact that during Brown's en-
tire administration there were no truly competitive contracts let for air mail, 
the independent, non-mail carrying operators in the country have become 
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increasingly impatient with the situation and increasingly critical of all of us 
who enjoy mail contracts;' he stated. "They know that although they may have 
tried to get consideration from the Government that their efforts have not 
met with success."18 
In order to avoid future problems, Henderson suggested that United sup-
port the idea of route franchises in its discussions with Black and Congress. 
Underscoring Brown's understanding of the situation, Henderson stated, "From 
the beginning of air mail operations until now, air mail contracts and their 
following route certificates have practically served as franchises." The problem 
revolved around the matter of subsidies. As originally intended under the first 
Kelly Act, no subsidies were to be provided; the air mail was to pay for itself. 
Over time, with the understanding by Brown that the industry was too imma-
ture to survive and flourish without federal financial assistance, subsidy be-
came a crucial part of air transportation, and with it came the risk of great 
politicization of future route decisions. Henderson wanted federal regulation 
to control competition, limit politicization, and provide industry stability and 
reasonable rates. By federal regulation Henderson meant "the issuance of cer-
tificates of convenience and necessity by the Federal Government for all inter-
state airlines running exclusively to the holder as long as he lives up to certain 
established requirements." He also recommended legislation to compel the 
Post Office Department to put air mail on all lines that would operate under 
these franchises at a reasonable fixed rate. Although Henderson harbored no 
illusions about the possibility of this plan actually coming to fruition, he felt 
that the forthcoming Senate hearings would produce comparable legislation.19 
To this end Henderson met with Black in late December, much to the 
consternation of the other contractors, to help focus the committee's atten-
tion on these matters rather than on the perceived side issues of monopoly. He 
wished to discuss the problem of Northwest Airways' incursion into National 
Parks' territory in Montana and argue against unwarranted extensions. The 
result, he hoped, would be to focus the committee's attention on the problem 
of air mail reform while derailing Brittin's northern transcontinental plans. 
Henderson did not wish the committee to become sidetracked on secondary 
issues when he believed the entire air transportation system was ready for sig-
nificant legislative change. 
Regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming hearings, United was confi-
dent that it would remain in the clear; its contracts had been awarded through 
competitive bidding long before Walter Brown took office. Henderson and 
company thought the time was ripe to examine Brown's deeds honestly and 
with clear intentions. Unfortunately, Black and Patterson were fixated on the 
question of big business and monopoly. Remarked United's Washington, D.C., 
representative James P. Murray, "Col. Henderson reported that he had an in-
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teresting hour with Patterson, Senator Black's chief investigator of air mail 
contracts, but was unable to make any progress toward steering the investiga-
tion into the channel originally intended-viz-contracts and how obtained."20 
Instead, Murray understood Black's overriding obsession. "It was rumored that 
the 'hearings' would be announced but no witnesses called until after the Sen-
ate Committee had blared forth thru the press the sums of money made by 
prominent individuals in the industry;' he stated.21 
Just how accurate this prediction was would soon be seen. By early Janu-
ary 1934, with its work completed on the ocean mail, the special committee 
turned its attention to aviation matters and promised sensational revelations. 
On January 8, Black reconvened his committee. What followed was both seri-
ous drama and comic opera that generated garish daily headlines across the 
country. A succession of witnesses came forth who outlined Walter F. Brown's 
complicated machinations during the Hoover years. Few were complimen-
tary. Brown's high-handedness and virtual dictatorship over the airlines were 
documented amid much fanfare. 
Key to the apparent revelations of forced mergers, preferential treatment, 
and noncompetitive awarding of route extensions was the testimony of sev-
eral small independent operators about a series of supposedly clandestine 
meetings between Brown (aided by Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Aero-
nautics William MacCracken) and the representatives of the three holding 
companies. These gatherings were, in fact, the well-publicized operators' meet-
ings called by the Post Office in May and June 1930 to discuss the application 
of the new Watres Act. 
Especially controversial were the remarks of Thomas H. McKee, former 
operator of the Wedell Williams Air Service of Louisiana, who told of these 
"secret" meetings of Post Office officials with the trusts. He testified that these 
"Spoils Conferences" following passage of the Watres Act deliberately excluded 
the small independents, and that when he attempted to join the meetings, 
MacCracken, who was chairing this meeting, "was anxious to get rid of me 
and invited me in a cordial way to get out of the room." According to McKee, 
the brief encounter at the meeting "gave me the definite impression that Mr. 
Brown had placed this whole transport operation in the hands of a fixed group 
with an axe to grind."22 McKee and others testified that officials from the air-
lines controlled by UATC, North American, and AVCO were the sole industry 
representatives present. Wedell Williams, McKee claimed, was forced to sell 
out to American Airways. He failed to mention that Wedell Williams could 
have received a subcontract from American with the Post Office's blessing had 
they been able to work out a merger with Robertson. Others claimed they 
were "squeezed out by monopolists" (1447). None mentioned their poor fi-
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nancial condition or their inability to fly regular night service or meet other 
minimum Post Office requirements. 
Black pressed other witnesses concerning the events of these secretive con-
ferences and underscored the participants' ties to the interlocking director-
ates. Col. Paul Henderson, vice president of United Air Lines, confirmed that 
thousands of miles of new route extensions were never opened to bidding and 
admitted that the U.S. air map was drawn up at these meetings. Black asked 
him pointedly, "You understood that there were no competitive bids?" 
Henderson frankly replied, "No, none" (1457). 
But Brown could not have opened these extensions to bidding even if he 
had wanted to; Congress had not authorized any new routes nor had provided 
the money necessary for more air mail contracts. In May 1930 there were 14,659 
miles of air mail routes in the United States, and by May 1932 this had grown 
to 26,754 miles. Of that, 4,500 miles of lines were created by these extensions 
without competitive bidding as these were not new contracts. Henderson cor-
rectly asserted the crucial fact that as discriminating as these practices may 
have seemed, they were within the law ( 1462). 
Compounding the damage done by these allegations was the revelation of 
potential illegal activity within the Post Office. James Maher, a Post Office 
clerk, testified that he had burned potential evidence. "We destroyed every-
thing except the personal files Brown took with him" on the orders of the 
postmaster general's secretary, just two days before Brown left office. Maher 
did so, he claimed, despite reservations that "the next administration might 
want to refer to them" (1438). 
The show took a strange twist ten days later when Brown returned to 
Washington. On January 19, he arrived with a large suitcase and proceeded 
immediately to the office of his successor, James Farley. There he deposited the 
contents. 
Inside the bag were the missing documents, safely preserved, pertaining 
to the air mail contracts. According to Brown, he had found these "unexpect-
edly in a box with his personal papers, tightly secured." Absolving his former 
staff of any wrongdoing, Brown concluded, "There remains only one theory 
to wit, that these official files were surreptitiously placed among my personal 
papers at the instigation of someone who was engaged in a conspiracy of char-
acter assassination."23 
With this crisis resolved but with suspicions raised, attention turned again 
to the dealings of the holding companies, producing a series of nasty shocks. 
First, America's greatest hero, Charles Lindbergh, was implicated in the al-
leged stock manipulations of North American. Lindbergh at that time was a 
precious advertising commodity whose services were desired by every airline. 
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His aeronautical expertise was just as valuable. An astute businessman, Clem-
ent Keys had enticed Lindbergh to provide his name and experience as techni-
cal advisor to TAT. Senator Black revealed that in addition to a very generous 
$10,000 annual salary, the "Lone Eagle" also received twenty-five thousand 
shares of TAT stock worth $250,000. As expected with Lindbergh associations, 
the value of the stock soared and Lindbergh was advised by Keys to sell his 
new shares quickly to turn a tidy profit. He was also advised by Keys to keep 
the stock deal quiet.24 Still, like Brown's activity, Lindbergh's profit making 
may have appeared unseemly in the light of the existing economic conditions, 
but it too was legal. 
The loudest bombshell was yet to come. On January 16 and 17, officials 
from UATC, the largest by far of the holding companies, were summoned be-
fore Senator Black. First up was Treasurer Charles W. Deeds. Subjected to in-
tensive questioning, the thirty-one-year-old Deeds revealed that his two 
hundred shares of Pratt & Whitney stock, which he bought for $40 in 1926, 
was worth $5.6 million at its 1929 peak. He turned a $1.6 million profit when 
he sold off portions of his holdings, as did Rentschler and George Mead, when 
they allegedly engaged in a stock pool to inflate prices artificially.25 As damn-
ing as this was, the testimony unearthed even greater supposed profiteering 
when Fred Rentschler was summoned. 
Subjected to ardent questioning, the vice chairman and cofounder ofUATC 
revealed that he had turned his original modest $254 investment in his new 
company into a startling $35,575,848 by 1929. Despite the subsequent col-
lapse of the market, Rentschler still held $2.1 million worth of stock in various 
companies while continuing to receive a huge salary of $192,500, which had 
actually increased by 92 percent since 1927, even in the face of the ravaged 
economy. 26 Black and other committee members were appalled and infuriated 
by the profit taking, which was supported by federal funds. Pointedly, Black 
inquired, "Do you think it is right for the United States government to subsi-
dize any company when the officers draw salaries and bonuses of several hun-
dred thousand dollars?" An embarrassed Rentschler had no answer.27 
Believing he had confirmation of his suppositions, Black was ready to call 
for action. Speaking to a radio audience over NBC, Black stated that the evi-
dence his committee had gleaned over the past five months showed that the 
government should abandon its subsidy program, fly the mail itself, or com-
pletely revise the system of awarding contracts. Recalling the revelations of 
several witnesses, Black concluded that "when the air mail map had been re-
drafted it was found that the eighteen or more million dollars of taxpayers' 
money annually paid for the carriage of air mail was controlled more than 90 
percent by four companies."28 More fireworks were yet to come. 
On January 30, several witnesses attempted to implicate Walter F. Brown 
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in illegal stock dealings. Although quickly disproved, the allegations cast fur-
ther doubts on the former postmaster general's integrity, and though legal, his 
possession of three thousand shares of International Mercantile Marine ap-
peared questionable at the very least. Further testimony claimed that some 
vital correspondence between Brown and Secretary of the Treasury Andrew 
Mellon concerning the latter's interest in TAT was missing from Brown's re-
cently discovered files. 29 Interestingly, Brown had yet to be called. The ques-
tion of missing letters, however, would prove disastrous for one other 
unsuspecting individual. 
Colonel Brittin of Northwest, who had earlier condemned the monopo-
lies and supported total airline independence, was caught in a difficult posi-
tion. In the ensuing document search, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
for Aeronautics William MacCracken, who was now an attorney for several 
airlines, including Northwest, refused to allow Senate investigators access to 
his files, citing attorney-client confidentiality. Black retaliated by having 
MacCracken and Brittin arrested for contempt by the Senate sergeant -at -arms. 
MacCracken refused to relent and appealed to the Supreme Court, where he 
eventually lost his argument. Brittin did not fight; he spent ten days in D.C. 
Jail for contempt of Congress for allegedly destroying subpoenaed documents.30 
Despite the assumptions of a massive coverup, Black's investigators recovered 
all of the missing papers after having literally pieced together Brittin's trash 
taken from his office; they found nothing but laundry receipts and other irrel-
evant papers. 
By this time the press was in an antimonopoly hysteria, repeating the alle-
gations of conspiracy, corruption, and favoritism in massive headlines in news-
papers across the country. On the surface, a scandal rivaling the likes of the 
infamous Teapot Dome of 1923 seemed at hand, and the press and public 
readily accepted innuendo and half-truths as fact. 
Sensing an excellent opportunity to exploit the frenzied situation to the 
fullest on behalf of the struggling independent passenger airlines, Post Office 
Solicitor Karl Crowley presented a forty-nine-page brief for Postmaster Gen-
eral Farley on February 6, 1934. In it he detailed his interpretation of the facts 
surrounding the air mail controversy, paying particular attention to the re-
stricted operators' conferences held in the spring of 1930, now widely referred 
to as the "Spoils Conferences." Painting a bleak picture of a carefully chosen 
cabal huddled in secret conspiring to divide the air mail "spoils" among them, 
Crowley outlined all of the known facts surrounding the operators' meetings. 
He presented Brown's decisions to favor the large existing companies, which 
already had air mail contracts, as a conspiracy to prevent struggling indepen-
dents from joining in this exclusive club. 
Although there was a great deal of superficial truth in Crowley's asser-
272 Airlines and Air Mail 
tions, he had overlooked Brown's express purpose in carrying out the Watres 
Act: to use the air mail to support those existing and still-struggling all-pas-
senger lines, such as Transcontinental Air Transport, which were operating 
along important and natural trade routes. Crowley neglected entirely to state 
that none of the independents petitioning for contracts at this time had ex-
isted in viable form when the "Spoils Conferences" took place. Neither did he 
mention that Braniff and Bowen had at one time been air mail contractors 
who sold off their airlines to the so-called monopolies and promptly took the 
money to start new airlines in direct competition with the air mail lines that 
had existing contracts awarded through competitive bidding.31 
Despite strong evidence and the legal opinion of the comptroller general 
to the contrary, Crowley asserted that the bid by United Avigation for the middle 
transcontinental route in the summer of 1930 was actually "responsible." In 
his opinion, therefore, the award of CAM-34 to TWA was fraudulent. Crowley 
went on to claim that because of the route extensions and the policy of ex-
changing air mail contracts for route certificates, the government paid ap-
proximately $47 million more than it needed to (12). How he arrived at that 
figure when the annual Post Office appropriation for air mail never changed 
under Brown's tenure was not explained. Crowley went on to cite as evidence 
the recent testimony concerning the alleged destruction of Post Office records 
as proof of guilt. 
The solicitor then listed his numerous complaints. First, he stated that all 
existing air mail contracts and extensions were void because they were a prod-
uct of a combination in restraint of trade. Second, in a wild assumption that 
ignored clear evidence to the contrary, he stated that all present air mail con-
tracts "were executed as a result of a fraudulent, corrupt, collusive conspiracy 
to defraud the United States between the holders thereof and Post Office De-
partment officials" ( 15). 
In this Crowley was simply wrong. Every air mail contract with the excep-
tion of CAM-33 and CAM-34 and two irrelevant lines was awarded not by 
Brown but by his predecessor, and all of the contracts had been awarded through 
competitive bidding to the lowest responsible bidder and approved by an un-
sympathetic comptroller general. There were no exceptions, but this did not 
matter in the electric atmosphere generated in the Senate hearing room. 
Crowley presented Farley with a stark recommendation: "Since these contracts 
were procured as a result of fraud, conspiracy, and collusion between post 
office officials and the holders of such contracts, it is my recommendation 
that they be annulled (49). 
Armed with this conclusion, Farley took Crowley and his report to the 
White House. By this time, President Roosevelt was becoming increasingly 
concerned by the recent events. In a private luncheon with Roosevelt, Senator 
Congress Assumes Command 273 
Black outlined his findings and reminded the president that it was within the 
chief executive's authority to cancel the contracts. Receiving Roosevelt's full 
support, Black was urged to press on.32 Events began to move more quickly. 
Farley explained the events in his personal diary: 
Hearings on the Air Mail proposition had been going on for several weeks 
when I arranged to see the President on Thursday afternoon, February 8th, ac-
companied by First Assistant W.W. Howes, Second Assistant Harllee Branch, 
and Karl A. Crowley, Solicitor for the Department. 
We went over the situation with him and it was our advice to cancel the 
contracts and he said he was willing and that we must get the advice of the 
Attorney General. We went to [Homer] Cummings' office to place it before him 
and suggested we have a conference next morning at 10:30. 
A definite decision was reached as to the cancellation, everyone agreeing it 
was the thing to do, and while at that office an order was prepared for the can-
cellation of the contracts. It was agreed that the Attorney General and I would 
present it to the President after the Cabinet meeting on Friday and also that an 
Executive Order be prepared for his signature directing the Army and Com-
merce Department to take over the Air MaiP3 
The meeting was held in private, and no comment was made to the press.34 
The reason was clear the next day. 
On February 9, the president issued Executive Order 6591 declaring an 
emergency and canceling all domestic air mail contracts. Roosevelt directed 
that "the Postmaster General, Secretary of War, and Secretary of Commerce ... 
cooperate to the end that necessary air mail service be afforded," and further 
ordered that"the Secretary ofWar place at the disposal of the Postmaster Gen-
eral such airplanes, landing fields, pilots, and other employees and equipment 
of the Army of the United States needed or required for the transportation of 
mail, during the present emergency, by air over routes and schedules prescribed 
by the Postmaster General:'35 
Once again, as in 1918, the army was to carry the mail, pending a comple-
tion of the hearings and the drafting of new legislation. 
With their life's blood cut off by the stroke of a pen, the airlines struck 
back as best they could. Officials from United Air Lines were stunned by the 
allegations and the cancellations, for they thought that they were safe in the 
knowledge that their contracts were legally awarded well before Brown took 
office. William Patterson fired off an angry letter to Postmaster Farley: 
We have seen reference in the public press to the charge that contracts for 
the carriage of air mail were let pursuant to collusive agreements reached at a 
so-called conference of air mail operators called at the direction of Postmaster 
General Walter F. Brown in the spring of 1930. No such collusive agreements 
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were made by us. In this connection, we call your attention to the fact that the 
air mail contract covering this Company's Route No. 18 was awarded under the 
date ofJanuary 29, 1927, prior to the said conference and after competitive bid-
ding in which the original contractors, our predecessors in interest, were the 
lowest qualified bidders. 
As authority for your action, you appear to rely upon Section 432 of Title 
39 of the United States Code, which provides for the annulment of mail con-
tracts in certain cases of combinations or agreements to prevent bidding. We 
respectfully protest that that section furnishes no justification for the action 
you have taken in the case of this Company. We have at no time entered into any 
such combination or agreement.36 
TWA also filed a protest in the form a lengthy letter to President Roosevelt 
and a suit against the government claiming that the cancellation was a breach 
of contract and unduly injurious to the airlines. The lawsuit was eventually 
dismissed, with the help of some back-door politicking from Crowley in order 
not to embarrass the president or Farley.37 
Immediately, TWA played its trump card. The company called on its avia-
tion advisor, Charles Lindbergh, and Lindbergh sent an open letter to Roosevelt. 
"Your present action does not discriminate between innocence and guilt and 
placed no premium on honest business:' he stated. "Your order of cancellation 
of all air mail contracts condemns the largest portion of our commercial avia-
tion without trial."38 Fortune magazine condemned the action, which put out 
of work not only the big four but also several small operators and "kicked 
askew the underpinnings of a $250 million investment shared by 200,000 stock-
holders."39 Roosevelt never forgave Lindbergh for this attack. 
Charges and countercharges followed in an excited press as the adminis-
tration was both vilified and praised for its action. In the vain hope of deflect-
ing further criticism, Farley prepared a detailed open letter to Senator Black, 
edited by the president himself, repeating the administration's reasons for can-
celing the contracts.40 
Quickly, though, public opinion began to turn against Roosevelt because 
of unforeseen events. Only now did Black call former postmaster general Brown 
to testify, which Brown did for several days, defending himself ably and pa-
tiently explaining his actions in detail. Cross-examinations by Sen. Warren R. 
Austin of Vermont, one of only two Republicans on the committee, cornered 
Crowley and Braniff about their testimony, exposing numerous flaws in their 
arguments. Farley was particularly embarrassed when he was forced to admit 
that he knew little about the air mail situation and that the cancellation was 
done in haste. By this time the press' attention was shifting to more dramatic 
events. 
In an act of open defiance, American Airways vice president Eddie 
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When it entered service in 1934 with TWA, the Douglas DC-2 quickly superceded the Boeing 
247 and set a new standard for speed and comfort. (Smithsonian, SI# A48080E) 
Rickenbacker and TWA vice president Jack Frye took the opportunity to dem-
onstrate why the Hoover administration had carefully spent the monies it had 
on developing a national air transportation system and the equipment to op-
erate it. Despite the common assumption that monopolies restrict technical 
innovation, this was not the case in aviation. United had been flying its suc-
cessful Boeing 247 for almost a year and had reaped great economic rewards 
as a result. Not to be outdone by their competition and fearful that any delay 
in improving their equipment could prove disastrous, Frye approached Boeing 
with the hope of purchasing 247s for TWA. Over the objections of William 
Boeing himself, the United Aircraft and Transport Corporation decided to sell 
these aircraft to Frye only after all of United Air Line's original order for fifty-
nine had been delivered. Faced with overnight technological obsolescence, Frye 
turned to other aircraft manufacturers, requesting that they produce a better 
247. Douglas Aircraft Company did exactly that. 
In late 1933, the sole Douglas DC-1 took to the air and immediately de~-
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onstrated its dramatically superior performance over the 247 and all other 
competitors.41 Stretching this excellent design to carry fourteen passengers, 
four more than the Boeing, Douglas produced the DC-2, which Frye and 
Rickenbacker promptly flew to Washington, D.C., on February 22, 1934, in a 
record-shattering thirteen hours. TWA president Richard Robbins pointedly 
invited Senator Black to inspect the new airliner upon its arrival in Washing-
ton; Black politely declined.42 
B. C. Forbes, writing in the New York American, summarized the situation: 
Eddie Rickenbacker's record breaking flight (13 hours) from the Pacific to 
the Atlantic wasn't a stunt, but the result of painstaking development of air-
planes, aviation equipment on ships and on land, the investment of millions of 
dollars in new inventions, airports, amazing scientific instruments to flying safe 
during the night and during fog, to make "blind landings" safe, to establish 
meteorological service far ahead of the government's etc. 
Up-to-date commercial aviation isn't child's play. It isn't a picayune busi-
ness. It savors nothing of what Wall Street calls "fly-by-night" ventures. 
Rickenbacker's company, for example, sponsored by General Motors, has 
invested more money than it has ever collected from the government for carry-
ing air mail and from all other sources combined. It cost $300,000 to create the 
Douglas ship America's premier ace flew. The company, never dreaming that its 
air mail contract would be annulled without even the opportunity to present 
the facts, placed orders for $3.5 million worth of these ultra modern eagles . 
. . . But the axe fell on it as on every other air mail carrying company, with-
out its getting its day in court to prove its innocence.43 
Four days later the American was even harsher in its judgment: 
Attempts by various spokesmen to justify the Government's action have, 
without exception, proved to be unconvincing pleas in EXCULPATION-NOT 
JUSTIFICATION in any sense of the word. They merely reveal the extent of the 
complications in which the government is involved because of its hasty and ill-
considered action, and confirm the adverse judgment on the incident which is 
well nigh universal. 
THE NEW DEAL HAS BEEN WELCOMED IN MOST OF ITS PROCESSES 
AND PROVISIONS, BUT THERE ARE SOME INNOVATIONS WHICH THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NEVER ADOPT! 
And one is the condemnation of a man-any man-without trial or even 
formal accusation. This is precisely what the Government is guilty of in its head-
long cancellation of the air mail contracts .... 
The supposed guilty and the admittedly innocent have alike been struck 
down by a high-handed government which refuses to permit its conduct to be 
reviewed by ITS OWN COURTS, and is indifferent to the charge of injustice 
proceeding from ITS OWN CITIZENS. 
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Let us hope that the Government will soon reverse its hasty action and 
rectify its incomprehensible error.44 
Roosevelt had asked the army to assume all responsibility for flying the air 
mail with only ten days' notice. Unprepared, with flying equipment inferior to 
the airlines, and with the nation suffering through the worst winter in de-
cades, U.S. Army Air Corps pilots suffered several fatal accidents. Within a few 
weeks, twelve pilots were killed (eight in training) prompting Eastern chief 
Eddie Rickenbacker to condemn this loudly as "legalized murder."45 The pub-
lic outcry was overwhelming and forced Roosevelt to suspend the air corps' 
operation on March 10. Nine days later, the corps renewed its mail flights on a 
greatly reduced schedule.46 
Stung by the public's angry reaction, Roosevelt, an astute politician who 
was suffering his first major setback after a year of triumphs, realized that a 
better solution was needed immediately-one that preserved the reputation 
of the administration and accomplished important reforms while placating 
the airline industry and keeping it alive. He proposed immediate temporary 
legislation to return the delivery of the air mail to private contractors for a 
period of three months. Once passed, the law would allow a renewal every 
three months, if necessaryY 
While Congress hurried to prepare temporary legislation to tide the in-
dustry over, President Roosevelt also proposed a permanent change in the law. 
With the approval of Senators Black and McKellar, Farley and Howes drafted a 
letter for Roosevelt to send publicly to McKellar and Mead, chairmen of the 
post office committees in the Senate and House, respectively, outlining his 
plan. In the letter, the president called for the return of the air mail to the 
airlines under new contracts "to avoid the evils of the past" while encouraging 
the development of the entire industry. He suggested that all contracts be let 
for a period of three years after a fair and open bidding competition. New 
bidders were to be encouraged to participate and were therefore given a six-
month grace period to qualify to fulfil the original bid. So that the airlines 
would operate strictly in accordance with the public interest, Roosevelt re-
quested that the Interstate Commerce Commission rule on the question of 
public convenience and necessity and regulate subsequent air mail pay over 
the new routes. Ironically, Colonel Henderson got his wish for ICC control, 
but at a cost. 
In the most controversial aspect of his proposal, the president wanted to 
proscribe from bidding all airlines that were part of holding companies or 
were in any way connected with the aviation monopolies. Now, for the first 
time, Roosevelt abandoned his cooperative approach to the question of in-
dustry monopolies as seen in his NRA and returned to a Progressive Demo-
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cratic strategy. Trusts and monopolies were evil and must be destroyed. "I sug-
gest;' he stated, "that the proposed law prohibit the award of an air mail con-
tract to any company having connections with subsidiaries, affiliates, associates, 
or holding companies, directly or indirectly, by stock ownership, interlocking 
directorates, interlocking officers, or otherwise, if said subsidiaries, affiliates, 
associates, or holding companies are engaged, directly or indirectly in the op-
eration of competitive routes or in the manufacturing of aircraft, or other 
materials or accessories used generally in the aviation industry."48 
The president incorrectly assumed that the vertically integrated aviation 
holding companies restricted the technological development of aircraft, thus 
providing another rationalization for the breakup of the aviation trusts. "Such 
legislation will relieve air transport companies from paralyzing monopolistic 
control which has heretofore often influenced them to buy planes and other 
equipment from associates and affiliates;' he declared. "Real competition be-
tween the manufacturing companies will stimulate inventive genius, and should 
give to our people safer and better equipment both for commercial and mili-
tary purposes."49 
Roosevelt took this measure even further. In order to prevent any possible 
return of the aviation and airline monopolists, he wanted to forbid any indi-
vidual who had participated in the operators' conferences in 1930 from future 
contracts. Assuming that the participants of the so-called Spoils Conference 
were acting in a criminal conspiracy to restrict competition, even though no 
charges were ever filed nor any individual brought to trial through due pro-
cess, Roosevelt specifically stated, as noted in his own hand on the draft letter: 
"No air mail contract should be sublet or sold to another contracting com-
pany nor should a mail contractor be allowed to merge or consolidate with 
another company holding an air mail contract. Obviously, also no contract 
should be made with any companies, old or new, any of whose officers were 
party to the obtaining of former contracts under circumstances which were 
clearly contrary to good faith and public policy."50 This amounted to an un-
constitutional bill of attainder. 
Immediately, Chairman Mead in the House and Chairman McKellar in 
the Senate introduced permanent legislation to redraw the air mail map. Im-
mediately, too, Ernest R. Breech, president of North American Aviation, took 
exception to the president's proposal. Breech actually agreed with the prohibi-
tion against interlocking directorates and the problems of Wall Street domi-
nation. He agreed that control of the airlines by financiers and other 
non-aviation personnel was not in the best interest of the industry and that 
interlocking directorates could restrict competition. Access to capital, how-
ever, should not be curtailed, this the proposed legislation would do, to the 
ultimate harm of the industry. 
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Breech was quick to correct Roosevelt's erroneous assumption that the 
holding companies restricted technological development. As seen with the 
example of the Boeing 24 7, United Aircraft's refusal to sell any of these aircraft 
to TWA did not restrict aircraft development; it in fact, promoted it: 
During the past year there were three important developments of air transport 
planes in this country. Who brought out these developments? The Curtiss Con-
dor, the first development, was developed for Eastern Air Transport by the 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, which at that time was indirectly "affiliated" with 
EAT. The Boeing 247 in general use over United Air Lines, was developed by 
United Aircraft & Transport Corp. The TWA luxury liner was built by the Dou-
glas Co. which was "indirectly affiliated" with T.W.A. What developments con-
tributing to the advance of the aviation industry were brought out by the 
independent airlines which had no affiliation, direct or indirect, with manufac-
turing companies? Absolutely none! 
It is no accident that the above is true. These developments have been 
brought out by transport companies affiliated with manufacturing companies 
and none brought out by air transport companies not affiliated with manufac-
turing, for one reason, namely, it takes millions of dollars and complete coop-
eration in the exchange of technical knowledge and practical experience between 
the operator and the manufacturer to carry out the experimental and develop-
mentworkY 
Breech feared that the unwarranted abrogation of contracts, though legal, 
would open the industry once again to dangerous speculation, and that the 
routes pioneered by responsible companies would be taken by unscrupulous 
promoters, something Postmaster General Brown and the holding companies 
had fought hard to prevent (6). But Breech was most angered by Roosevelt's 
personal attack on the pioneer airline executives who were compelled to at-
tend the operators' conference at the request of the postmaster general. "I think 
the grossest injustice done by this recommendation;' he told the committee, 
"is the repeated condemnation of the pioneers of the air transport industry 
who, at the invitation of a Cabinet officer, met in the Postmaster General's 
office in Washington to discuss plans for the administration of the Watres Act 
and the future development of the air transport industry .... In view of all the 
charges of the Administration's officers in an effort to justify the cancellation 
order, most of the principal executives of air transport companies today would 
be excluded from ever being officers of an air mail carrying company in the 
future .... What tribunal, if any, is to determine this question of attainder of 
these officers, who have been so unfairly condemned without a hearing?" (2). 
Breech had five recommendations: first, that all of the contracts be re-
turned to their original holders; second, that a fixed pound-mile system of 
payment of 2 mills per pound be enacted, thus eliminating subsidies alto-
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gether; third, that a direct subsidy be paid to those contractors operating over 
thin routes; and fourth, that the air mail postage rate be reduced to five cents 
per half ounce. The fifth and most significant recommendation regarded the 
establishment of a unique federal commission dedicated strictly to the regula-
tion of the air transportation industry, "where sufficient rules can be laid down 
for prevention of abuses." Four years later this is exactly what happened with 
the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 
The enactment of such legislation would protect the investment of mil-
lions of dollars by hundreds of thousands of stockholders and restore the 
public's faith in the government's ability to carry out fairly its contractual ob-
ligations. It would also not inhibit the Justice Department from prosecuting 
any person or organization that had committed any alleged criminal conspiracy 
to defraud the government. "Despite all that has happened to date," fumed 
Breech, "we still have faith that if the House and Senate Committees will take 
the time to give this problem fair consideration, the air mail and air transport 
industry may still survive and be spared the complete chaos which would be 
brought about by the legislation suggested" (8). 
Breech's faith was misplaced. McKellar's committee had no intention of 
leaving the air mail contractors unpunished for their alleged crimes and fol-
lowed Roosevelt's recommendations almost to the letter. During hearings, 
which ran concurrently with the Black committee's investigation, McKellar 
brought forth a host of witnesses, primarily from the present Post Office ad-
ministration and the independent, nonmail carriers arguing for drastic changes 
in the air mail laws. The proposed bill, S. 3012, reaffirmed the requirement for 
competitive bidding for all routes, gave the Post Office responsibility for ad-
vertising competitions for new routes, and gave the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission responsibility for determining the payment rates to the lowest 
responsible bidder. New contracts were to be for three years and at a maxi-
mum rate of forty cents per mile. All interlocking directorates and other mo-
nopolistic practices were to be abolished, and all the participants in the 
operators' conferences of 1930 were enjoined from participation in all future 
bids for a period of five years. Section 7 stated in part, 
No person shall be eligible to bid on or hold an air mail contract if such 
person, through its officers, has entered into any combination to prevent com-
petitive bidding for carrying the mails, or has made any agreement or given or 
performed, or promised to give or perform, any consideration whatever to in-
duce any person not to bid for any such contract, or has employed any Senator 
or Member of Congress or Government official or officer of any political party 
to seek to influence the awarding of contracts, or has, as an officer or director, 
any person who has heretofore entered into any combination to prevent the 
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making of any bids for carrying the mails, or which pays any officer ... a sum in 
excess of $17,500 for a calendar year of full time service. 52 
In an astonishing clause, S. 3012 forbade the former contractors from fil-
ing suit against the government: "No person shall be eligible to bid for or hold 
an air mail contract if it or its predecessor is asserting or has any claim against 
the United States because of a prior annulment of any contract by the Post-
master General." 53 This punitive measure, designed by McKellar ostensibly to 
prevent the former, supposedly corrupt, air mail carriers from rebidding, went 
too far for the rest of the committee. Even Democratic members were angered 
by the clear vindictiveness of this measure. "That is about the most obnoxious 
thing I ever saw in a legislative bill;' remarked Sen. M.M. Logan of Kentucky. 
"If the government canceled a contract on a man and that man felt he had a 
reasonable claim, we are saying to that man: 'We will not allow you to have any 
dealings with the Government.' It is entirely autocratic and unfair." 54 All of the 
other members except McKellar agreed. Supporting Chairman McKellar, So-
licitor Crowley thought the clause appropriate. "I think it would have a salu-
tary effect on some of these people who have secured illegal contracts to say to 
them that they have secured a contract in this way and if they are asserting a 
claim against the government we are not going to have anything to do with 
them;' he asserted. Logan strenuously disagreed. "It might have a salutary ef-
fect on them," he said, "but I am wondering what it would do to the Constitu-
tion. We are living under the Constitution. If we are going to have a Government 
of men and not laws, that is probably all right" (73 ). 
Charles Lindbergh strongly supported Logan's position, much to the dis-
comfort of McKellar and the administration. In answering pointed questions 
from McKellar, Lindbergh stated, "The only point I have ever made is I feel 
that any organization or a citizen has a right to trial before being convicted or 
found guilty of a charge which if implied and not proven" (143). Eddie 
Rickenbacker, Richard Robbins, and William Patterson all testified against this 
provision. The clause did not survive. 
Understandably, the independents testified in strong support for the en-
tire bill but, with victory so close at hand, were anxious to protect their own 
interests. Representing Braniff Airlines and the Independents, as he had for 
many years, attorney William Denning sought a clarification of the qualifica-
tions for future bidders. Senator McKellar saw Walter Brown's measure to re-
strict bidding to airlines that had a minimum of six months of flying experience 
not as a reasonable requirement to prove responsibility but as "an old dodge" 
against the law. Braniff thought Brown's decision was deliberately discrimina-
tory-until now. 
In a remarkable about-face, Denning testified that Braniff now wanted to 
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include a restriction prohibiting new entrant airlines with less than six months' 
experience in flying routes under 250 miles from bidding-now that Braniff 
Airways was well established. Using exactly the same argument that Brown 
and Glover had made four years earlier, Denning sought protection from cheap, 
irresponsible competition: "We feel in justice to the independent operators, 
who have been carrying on for a period of 3 or 4 years, that experience in 
operating successfully a high class passenger transport service on a daily ser-
vice should be given some consideration as against an organized paper com-
pany" (393). Furthermore, Denning was no longer averse to noncompetitive 
bidding, provided that Braniff received an award: 
It seems to me that the Department would prefer to have some leeway 
in giving preference to experienced operators rather than having to take any 
company that might be organized, and, in order to get this air mail service 
into the hands of private operators, it seems to me something like that would 
be necessary .... 
. . . A great deal of discussion has been going on as to whether or not it 
should be by competitive bidding, or there should be something similar to the 
railroad mail bill. Now, the independent operators of the country that I speak 
for want to have an opportunity to bid, or else have the mail carrying awarded 
to him on a reasonable basis fixed by the Postmaster General or the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, without discrimination. 
Denning's only complaint about the McKellar bill concerned the ICC's 
ability to lower rates in the same fashion as the Post Office under the Watres 
Act. He felt that this regulation placed an undue burden on the smaller lines. 
Braniff wanted the government to possess the ability to increase its rate of 
payment if necessary (395). 
The major carriers belatedly approved the clause giving regulatory respon-
sibility to the ICC. Following Henderson's six-year argument for federal regu-
lation and Breech's recent recommendation, the Black-McKellar bill gave 
control of rate decisions to the ICC, although not to a body exclusively dedi-
cated to aviation matters. "We favor governmental regulation by a non-politi-
cal body," stated United president William Patterson, "but do not believe this 
should be the Interstate Commerce Commission. We believe it should be an 
independent aeronautical body created for the sole purpose of regulation of 
air transport and that it should have the power to award Federal certificates of 
convenience and necessity." 
Patterson, Rickenbacker, and representatives of the rest of the former air 
mail lines correctly felt that the ICC would be overburdened with the dual 
tasks of regulating the railroads and the airways and would not be in a posi-
tion to make timely, well-informed rate decisions. Furthermore, the ICC had 
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no one in its employ who was knowledgeable about aviation matters (337). 
Nevertheless, some fair regulation was better than none because it would pro-
mote the continued rational development of aviation begun during the ad-
ministration of the Watres Act. 
Deliberations on S. 3012, cosponsored by Senators McKellar and Black, 
continued for months following the close of formal hearings on March 20, 
1934. McKellar's proposed legislation ignored most of the entreaties of the 
former air mail carriers and followed Roosevelt's suggestion to the letter. So 
angry was TWA that Richard Robbins filed suit against the government for 
damages caused by the air mail cancellation. The airline had deferred filing its 
appeal of an earlier decision of the Second Circuit Court rejecting TWXs peti-
tion on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction, hoping that the Black-
McKellar bill would address the arbitrary manner in which the contracts were 
annulled and the company's belief that the contracts had been improperly 
broken. It did not. Robbins declared the bill "a hastily devised and ill-con-
ceived measure" that "fails miserably to deal with this immense problem in an 
intelligent manner. It is vindictive and punitive rather than constructive." He 
asserted further that TWA had been "wrongfully deprived of its rights and 
property" when its contract had been canceled. "We welcome a judicial inves-
tigation by an impartial tribunal;' he said. 55 
Despite the week-long hearings, only the clause forbidding claims against 
the government had been removed. Robbins was bitterly disappointed. "The 
sponsors of this latest Bill;' he said, "are either woefully ignorant of the most 
elementary principles of justice and rights guaranteed our citizens, as expressed 
in the Constitution of the United States, or else are determined to ignore the 
Constitution completely in their efforts to throw a smoke screen over the air 
mail cancellation bungle. Instead of rewriting their proposed legislation to 
meet the severe criticisms of every witness other than Government officials, 
this redraft is even more vindictive and punitive than the original measure." 
Robbins labeled the proposed legislation a bill of attainder that would 
inflict punishment without a judicial trial. He condemned the provision pro-
hibiting the former air mail contractors who attended Brown's operators' meet-
ings from future bidding. This appeared most unjust. "Can any better method 
be found for the Post Office to advise the air mail carriers as to policy and 
plans by conference with the principal officials of the airlines affected?" asked 
Robbins. "Is it a crime to confer with a cabinet official by his invitation?"56 
Robbins proposed a solution: return the contracts to their rightful owners 
under temporary provisions, as provided for in law, and allow those airlines 
charged with collusion a fair hearing. The impartial decision of the court would 
determine the outcome of the air mail crisis. 57 
The administration was not willing to be subjected to a humiliating pub-
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lie hearing but now was anxious to return the contracts to the airlines and 
defuse the crisis as swiftly as possible. While the Black-McKellar bill was de-
bated, Congress and the Post Office worked desperately to find an interim 
solution to relieve the government of the onus of its questionable cancella-
tions and the Army Air Corps of its burden of flying the mail. Under the tem-
porary solution as suggested by the president, the commercial carriers would 
return to carrying mail, thus ending the crisis-but with restrictions designed 
to allow the administration to preserve its dignity. 
On March 28, Postmaster General Farley announced that bids for tempo-
rary, three-month contracts for the carrying of mail would be accepted within 
the next three weeks. The bids were permitted based on existing law, and could 
be extended for three-month periods at the Post Office Department's discre-
tion. Assuming the validity of the claims of fraud and collusion, no former 
contractors or participants in the Spoils Conference, with the exception of 
National Parks, were allowed to bid. Ironically, all of the bidders had to agree 
to comply with the existing NRA industry codes. 
At noon, April20, on the fourth floor of the Old Post Office Building in 
Washington, D.C., 150 representatives of the airlines crowded into the private 
office of Superintendent of Air Mail Stephen A. Cisler. They were gathered to 
hear the results of forty- five bids for the first seventeen air mail routes re-
turned to civilian operation. Present were Postmaster General Farley, assorted 
government officials, and industry representatives. Not present were the indi-
viduals who attended the Spoils Conferences four years earlier. Also not present 
in name were the airlines these individuals represented. The big four, however, 
were there, but under new names, reflecting their corporate reorganization. 
American Airways became American Airlines; Eastern Air Transport, Eastern 
Air Lines; and Northwest Airways, Northwest Airlines. Others followed simi-
lar superficial changes. United kept its original title but lost its position as a 
managing company, having become an operating airline, as its four compo-
nent parts were now completely subsumed as one legal entity. Two other former 
contractors remained unchanged in name but were reorganized from within. 58 
Despite the desperate pleas by the independents in the Black committee 
hearings, only a few showed up that day. Not unexpectedly, the awards were 
given essentially to the same airlines that had flown the routes before. 59 These 
airlines had the equipment, personnel, money, and infrastructure already in 
place along these routes, as Walter Brown had always asserted. Realistically, no 
independent airline stood a chance of flying the mail more efficiently or safely. 
The irony was not lost on many observers. American, Eastern, and TWA still 
flew their old routes. Only United, the one airline completely innocent of any 
possible charge of collusion, was denied a desired route, but this was expected, 
even by United. 
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Philip Johnson had appealed directly to President Roosevelt to tell United's 
side of the story. Despite a lengthy audience with the president in March, the 
administration refused to see Johnson's position. Stated Johnson, "The whole 
matter was a prodigious political blunder brought about by ignorance of the 
whole matter and with no wish to become enlightened on the part of the Ad-
ministration men responsible for the action. We have done everything we can 
to protect the stockholders' interest, and I personally have spent some time 
with Mr. Roosevelt himself but to no real avail."60 
Johnson was deeply disillusioned. "Our contracts were all let on the basis 
of open competitive bidding and we were never party to any arrangements 
with any other companies which smacked of collusion of fraud;' he told First 
National Bank of Seattle vice president J.W. Spangler. "We have not been given 
the opportunity to have a fair hearing and as the result have instituted suit so 
as to get whatever relief we can in the courts."61 
Unfortunately, in order that the cancellations be justified and that Braniff 
and Bowen receive contracts for United's routes, Solicitor Crowley and the 
department had to remain firm in their assumption of United's illicit com-
plicity. For Crowley, United's mere presence at the 1930 operators' conference 
was sufficient proof of guilt.62 No hearing was necessary. "The evidence in the 
possession of the Department having been sufficient to demonstrate the illegal-
ity of the contracts referred to, the conduct of a hearing would have served no 
useful purpose and been only the means of unnecessary delay;' he stated.63 Pend-
ing the outcome of their suit, United would be forced to abide by the new rules.64 
United did indeed lose its route from Chicago to Dallas. Old CAM-3, so 
long coveted by the independents, was awarded to Braniff. Braniff benefited 
the most having won its fight for an air mail contract, but its operation of that 
route ran into considerable difficulty for several years. Braniff, as with the other 
independents, paid its pilots less than the industry average and now had to 
comply with NRA codes concerning labor. The Air Line Pilots Association 
filed complaints against Braniff almost immediately after the airline began 
flying the mail and won its complaints. Bowen too had immediate difficulties 
after winning a route in Texas. So poorly was the line operated that by 1936, 
Bowen sold his operation to Braniff. 
Despite paralleling Braniff's new route to a large degree, American Air-
lines also won a contract, with different intermediate stops, from Chicago to 
Fort Worth. American, under E.L. Cord, benefited greatly. Cord, a Democrat 
and former independent airline operator, had not attended the Spoils Confer-
ences. Through the good offices of the Texas delegation in Congress and the 
Post Office, American emerged the clear winner, gaining a parallel route to 
part of United's San Francisco-to-New York line between New York and Chi-
cago. Cord also asked for and received a straighter southern transcontinental 
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that bypassed Atlanta and went directly from Fort Worth to New York. In its 
place, a reborn Delta Air Lines was awarded the route from Atlanta to Dal-
las-Fort Worth. Eastern Air Lines' routes remained essentially unchanged. 
Transcontinental and Western Air retained its middle transcontinental 
route, although it too was straightened, to the extent that it no longer con-
nected Columbus, Ohio, with Chicago. It relinquished its air mail line from 
Los Angeles to San Francisco. The company lost approximately 40 percent of 
its previous year's income.65 New entrant Pacific Seaboard was awarded the 
line from Chicago to New Orleans, and Hanford Tri-State Airlines was given 
much of Northwest's system, gaining a route from Chicago to Pembina, North 
Dakota, through Minneapolis-St. Paul. This was a pyrrhic victory, for, as with 
Bowen in Texas, Hanford was not in a strong enough financial condition to fly 
this route, just as former Postmaster Brown had suspected, and eventually sold 
its air mail route back to Northwest. Northwest did win part of its long sought 
after northern transcontinental, from Fargo to Seattle. 
All of the winning bids were significantly lower than before, reductions 
averaging approximately 40 percent. The Post Office and administration could 
point with pride to the great reduction in expenditures, but others questioned 
the true cost. Senator Austin, the bete nair of the administration's air mail 
policy, condemned the original cancellations and attacked the probability that 
many of the new entrants were planning to use smaller, obsolete, though 
cheaper, equipment on their new lines. This, he reasoned, was needlessly risk-
ing the safety of the public for the saving of a few pennies. He also condemned 
the low bids noting that many of the airlines were operating at a loss before 
the cancellations and that under the new system they would receive far less 
than before. This, Austin believed, flew directly in the face of Roosevelt's NRA. 
"How can the Administration justify compelling corporations to do business 
for the government on a cost-minus basis;' queried Austin, "when they have 
written into many of the N.R.A. codes the provisions which make it illegal to 
sell goods or services below cost?"66 
Postmaster General Farley remained unbowed, reasserting his belief that 
the president had acted according to the law and that illegalities had indeed 
occurred under Brown, despite the preponderance of evidence to the con-
trary. Regardless of the ongoing debate, the administration held the advantage 
and was able to impose its own air mail policy over the objections of the in-
dustry and the Republican minority in Congress. Unwittingly, though, Farley's 
actions and the design of Senators Black and McKellar validated Walter Brown's 
program. 
After the smoke had cleared, the large, financially stable firms were once 
again carrying the bulk of the nation's air mail over a rational route system 
that followed closely Brown's original network. Only those companies deemed 
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"responsible" were permitted to fly the mail, and the entire system was regu-
lated to prevent destructive competition, thereby preserving exclusive rights 
to the existing routes. As before, rates were controlled and the contracts ad-
ministered according to department rules. Only now the Interstate Commerce 
Commission became involved. For all intents and purposes, the air mail sys-
tem created by the new legislation replicated most of Brown's program-with 
one critical exception. 
The most significant and last act in this drama would profoundly and 
permanently reshape the face of the American aviation industry and clearly 
reflected Wilsonian New Freedom attitudes. While Farley was giving out three-
month temporary contracts, Senators Black and Kenneth McKellar were com-
pleting legislation that would assimilate the findings of the special committee 
with the needs of the Post Office into a coherent plan for the air mail and the 
route network across the United States. After much testy debate on the Senate 
floor, during which the complicity of Braniff and Crowley was questioned by 
Republicans, and following a lengthy discussion in the House and in confer-
ence, the Air Mail Act of 1934, modified asS. 3070, became Public Law No. 308 
on June 12, 1934. 
The act made the temporary contracts permanent, thus reestablishing 
Brown's route network system. Air mail rates were reduced from $.49 per mile 
to as low as $.08 on some routes. The average was $.395, still a significant drop 
from the $.45 paid under Brown's last rate revision plan-although, arguably, 
under Brown's former system, the rate would have naturally been lowered to 
that level. The public benefited from the lower rates and from the addition of 
extra mileage, including Colonel Brittin's long-awaited northern transconti-
nental line, which served nineteen new cities and four states. As expected, rates 
and routes were to be determined by the neutral decision of the ICC, which 
would be the sole arbiter in all such matters.67 The Post Office was empowered 
to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidder as well as designating pri-
mary and secondary routes, but little more. The department could grant route 
extensions but only up to one hundred miles per contract. 
Under the new permanent law, Postmaster General Farley was compelled 
to withdraw from the active sponsorship and regulation of the airline indus-
try as these decisions were now to be made by the ICC. Fortunately for the 
industry, the work completed by Brown was too solidly in place for it to be 
undone, a fact the government tacitly acknowledged with passage of the Air 
Mail Act of 1934. The airlines fostered and created by Brown continued to 
dominate the industry, as they do today. Important for the airlines as well as 
the administration, however, the new legislation removed the stigma of ques-
tionable practices but at the cost of profits for the airlines. 
Unfortunately, Colonel Brittin and many of the greatest airline leaders 
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were now formally proscribed from the very industry they helped to create. 
The vehement objections of the former air mail carriers had fallen on deaf 
ears. Opponents of the punitive nature of the bill managed to insert a clause in 
the draft of the bill that permitted anyone to bid on contracts provided they 
met Post Office requirements. Farley strongly objected to this provision, for it 
would have publicly acknowledged that the administration had been in error 
in its reasons for the recent cancellations. "The Department:' he wrote McKellar, 
"has insisted on bidders for new air mail contracts complying with the exist-
ing law which prohibits any company whose contracts have been annulled on 
the ground of fraud and collusion from bidding, and which also prohibits any 
company bidding from having as an officer or director any person who has 
entered into a combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive bidding. If 
the new air mail bill expressly provides for the exemption of such companies 
and such officers and directors from the penalties of existing law, it will have 
the effect of Congress, by law, exonerating companies and officers who par-
ticipated in the collusive and fraudulent conferences of 1930:'68 
The clause was removed in conference. Now, as with the earlier temporary 
measure, no airline that had allegedly been involved in collusive bidding and 
no airline executive who had attended the Spoils Conferences would be per-
mitted to bid on a contract. Furthermore, these executives were forbidden from 
working for any air mail carrier for the same length of time. Although they 
had never been formally charged, tried, or convicted of any crime, the indus-
try leaders were punished ex post facto. Unfortunately for them, the airlines, 
the administration, the press, and the public were eager to put the air mail 
crisis behind them quickly, so ugly compromises were made in the name of 
salvaging the industry and the government's reputation. 
The airlines sued the government following the air mail contract cancella-
tions in February 1934, but with one exception, all withdrew their complaints 
by 1936. By then a quiet settlement had been reached whereby the govern-
ment admitted no wrong doing but paid the air mail contractors for their 
services for January and February 1934. The one exception was William 
Patterson of United, who was outraged at the shabby treatment of his mentor 
Philip Johnson by the administration and continued his suit until1942, when 
United also settled. United, too, was paid for its services in 1934, though the 
government was upheld in its right to annul the contracts. Most important for 
Patterson, Johnson, and former postmaster general Brown, the courts exoner-
ated them, ruling that no fraud had occurred at the operators' conferences in 
1930. By this time, however, the point was moot; the industry had moved on 
to other matters, now that World War II occupied the nation's interest. 
Of even greater significance, however, the Air Mail Act of 1934 reflected 
the administration's New Freedom roots concerning monopoly. The vertically 
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integrated holding company was now forbidden. The terms of the new act 
were clear: 
Section 7 (a). After December 31, 1934, it shall be unlawful for any person holding 
an air mail contract to buy, acquire, hold, own, or control, directly or indirectly, 
any shares of stock or other interest in any other partnership, association, or cor-
poration engaged directly or indirectly in any phase of the aviation industry, 
whether so engaged through air transportation of passengers, express, or mail, 
through the holding of an air mail contract, or through the manufacture or sale 
off airplanes, airplane parts, or other materials or accessories generally used in air 
transportation, and regardless of whether such buying, acquisition, holding, own-
ership, or control is done directly, or is accomplished indirectly, through an agent, 
subsidiary, associate, affiliate, or by any other device whatsoever.69 
After December 31, 1934, all aviation holding companies were forbidden 
from receiving federal subsidy through the air mail, thus effectively destroying 
these organizations, which were heavily dependent upon the government for 
funding. The combines soon divested their interests. American, Eastern, and 
TWA sold off their holdings in other aircraft manufacturing firms. United, the 
most efficient and most thoroughly vertically integrated company, was hurt 
the most. UATC gave up United Air Lines and Boeing Aircraft Company, thus 
becoming the United Aircraft Corporation. So angry was William Boeing over 
the Black committee hearings and the subsequent act that he retired from all 
of his aviation enterprises, not wishing to deal with the federal government on 
any level. 
As early as May 1934, United Aircraft had completed its formal reorgani-
zation plan to separate the transportation system from the holding company. 
Drafted by Philip Johnson, Joseph F. McCarthy, and Joseph P. Ripley, the plan 
outlined the eventual dissolution ofUATC. With Boeing in Seattle and Pratt & 
Whitney in Hartford, United Aircraft formally divided its manufacturing com-
panies along geographic lines. United Aircraft sold off all of its shares in Boeing 
Air Transport, Pacific Air Transport, Varney Air Lines, and National Air Trans-
port. A new company, United Air Lines Transport Corporation, was formed 
with an authorized share capital of 1.2 million shares at a par value of five 
dollars a share. Eight days after passage of the Air Mail Act of 1934, on June 20, 
1934, at a special stockholders meeting held at UATC's corporate headquar-
ters on Park Avenue in Manhattan, the plan was formally adopted, thus end-
ing a brief but highly influential enterprise in the history of U.S. aviation 
business.7° 
Thus, a short but turbulent period in American air transportation reached 
a watershed. Although the monopolistic holding companies are now gone, the 
oligopoly of airlines and manufacturers that existed under government regu-
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lation in the aftermath of the events of 1934 remains virtually intact and un-
changed, even in this day of deregulation. The foundation built in those diffi-
cult Depression-era years has served the nation and its citizens well, with the 
federal government, as it was from the very beginning, ultimately in control. 
From 1934 until1938, the U.S. airline industry struggled on in the face of 
drastically declining federal revenue and continued confusion on the part of 
the government. The ICC proved unable to handle aviation matters to anyone's 
satisfaction and several hearings and commissions sought to revamp the in-
dustry along more clearly defined terms. The Post Office, with its authority 
greatly curtailed, no longer played an active role in the industry. During this 
time, President Roosevelt remained aloof from aviation matters, providing 
little direction. 
With the advent of the superlative Douglas DC-3, a twenty-one-seat de-
rivative of the DC-2, the airlines were slowly able to fight their way back to 
profitability, as this remarkable aircraft, which, in the words of American's 
C.R. Smith, was the first aircraft capable of flying just passengers and making 
a profit, first entered service in 1936. By the end of the decade, this aircraft 
came to dominate the industry as it would for years to come. 
In the meantime, cooler heads prevailed in Congress and the administra-
tion. In 1938, Roosevelt signed into law the Civil Aeronautics Act, which pro-
vided for the unification of all federal regulation of commercial air 
transportation in the United States-exactly what Col. Paul Henderson had 
wanted for so long. The act created the Civil Aeronautics Board to regulate 
routes, fares, and restrict competition in order to promote the industry, ex-
actly what Walter Brown had done eight years earlier. In addition, the new law 
established the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which was given the avia-
tion responsibilities hitherto administered by the Commerce Department. 
Eventually the activities of this office became the responsibility of the Federal 
Aviation Administration. 
By 1938, public policy toward the air transportation industry returned in 
essence to that which had existed eight years earlier under President Hoover 
and his farsighted postmaster general Walter Folger Brown. Under this law, 
the federal government once again legally protected the oligopoly of existing 
pioneering airlines operating in the public interest under certificates of con-
venience and necessity. The industry grew and prospered under this strict, 
rational control for the next four decades until President Jimmy Carter signed 
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, signifying the coming of age of the air-
line industry. Ironically, the deregulation of the airline industry was designed 
to remove the barriers for new crop of "independents" who had been denied 
entry into the government-controlled cartel dominated by United Air Lines, 
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American Airlines, and TWA. Just as ironically, since 1978, few new airlines 
have survived, whereas United and American remain dominant. 
As from the very beginning of commercial aviation, this capital- and la-
bor-intensive industry has reacted naturally to the forces of the free market in 
producing oligopoly. As before, the existence of oligopoly does not necessarily 
preclude competition, as the American public reaps the advantages of the 
world's best and most affordable air transportation system due in large part to 
the policies of the federal government. 
Clearly, the actions and reactions of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations reflected old Progressive values placed within the context of a 
nascent aviation industry. These ideals profoundly affected the shape of Ameri-
can air transportation during its formation and infancy while guaranteeing its 
success during the most difficult of times and thereby ensuring its growth in 
the future. Progressivism did not die in 1914. It is with us today. 
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The Boeing Company, Historical Services, Archives, Seattle, Washington 
The archives preserves the records, files, correspondence, and photographs of the Boeing 
Airplane Company, United Air Lines and its predecessors, and United Aircraft and 
Transport Corporation. The records are thorough and are the only such source left, as 
no other aircraft manufacturer has preserved its documentary record. 
C.R. Smith Museum, American Airlines, Fort Worth, Texas 
The museum's archival holdings include records of the formation of the Aviation 
Corporation and American Airways/ Airlines. 
Herbert C. Hoover Presidential Library and Archives, West Branch, Iowa 
The library and archives contain the papers of Herbert Hoover as both Secretary of 
Commerce and President. The archival collection includes the William P. MacCracken 
Jr. Papers and a file on Walter Folger Brown, which is small but useful. Hoover left 
little concerning his involvement with aviation, though that which remains is valu-
able. MacCracken's thorough papers provide indispensable information concerning 
the airline industry. 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
Many of the most prominent names in the formation of the U.S. air transportation 
industry left their papers to the Library of Congress. The most valuable are the papers 
of Sherman Fairchild, W. Averill Harriman, and William Gibbs McAdoo. Surprisingly, 
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James A. Farley Collection 
W. Averill Harriman Collection 
Jesse Jones Collection 
William Gibbs McAdoo Collection 
Charles McNary Collection 
Mabel Walker Willebrandt Collection 
National Air and Space Museum-Archives, Washington, D. C. 
The Keys Collection provides a detailed documentation of the early years of U.S. avia-
tion, particularly concerning the formation of Transcontinental Air Transport. The 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce records are large and contain information of 
particular value concerning the industry's lobbying efforts and the implementation of 
the aviation's codes under the National Recovery Administration. 
Records Consulted: 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce Papers, Microfilm Collection 
Clement M. Keys Collection 
National Archives and Records Administration, Washington,D. C. 
The records preserved by NARA contain the bulk of material used in this work. RG 46, 
which preserves the Black committee papers, contains a treasure house of material on 
the airline industry and most of the individuals in business and government up to 
1933, as the committee's investigators subpoenaed and copied all of the corporate 
correspondence they deemed necessary. RG 28 contains all of the available records 
from the Post Office Department, particularly those concerning the issuance and en-
forcement of contracts. The early records from the Solicitor's Office are also quite 
useful, as they contain several files on the contract controversies. 
Records Consulted: 
Record Group 28. Office of the Second Assistant Postmaster General, Division of 
Air Mail Service, Contract Air Mail-Case Files 1924-1934. 
Record Group 28. Entry 42. Office of the Solicitor-Investigation of Air Mail/ 
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Record Group 28. Entries 155 and 157. Correspondence Related to Air Mail Routes 
and Stops. 
Record Group 28. Entry 160. General Correspondence of Superintendent, Divi-
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Rates. 
Record Group 46. U.S. Senate. Special Committee on Investigation of Air Mail 
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Record Group 151. Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. 
Record Group 233. United States House of Representatives. 
United Airlines Archives, Chicago, Illinois 
Housed at corporate headquarters, this rudimentary archival collection contains a 
small but highly useful amount of material concerning Boeing Air Transport, some of 
United Air Lines' corporate papers, and a small amount of correspondence concern-
ing air mail contracts. 
United Technologies, Archival and Historical Resource Center, East 
Hartford, Connecticut 
The center contains the records of the former United Aircraft and Transport Corpora-
tion, including transcripts and notes of the Technical Advisory Committee meetings. 
University of Texas at Dallas, Aviation History Collection, Dallas, Texas 
UT-Dallas specializes in preserving records concerning all aspects of aviation history, 
including the airline industry. They house the Braniff Airlines Collection, which con-
sists of the company's public relations papers. 
Other records exist but do not provide much useful additional information. Walter F. 
Brown's papers are housed at the Ohio Historical Society. Unfortunately, Brown was a 
careful politician throughout most of his life and did not keep his correspondence. 
His papers primarily consist of his records concerning legal attempts to clear his name 
after 1934. The records of Northwest Airlines are preserved by the Minnesota Histori-
cal Society and are quite good. However, the Black committee copied all of Northwest's 
correspondence relative to the air mail up to 1933. These records are currently pre-
served in the National Archives. Other airlines and aircraft manufacturers have either 
not preserved their records or have closed them to all public access. 
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rate revision, 67; and Interdepartmental 
Committee on Airways, 72; and regula-
tion, 85; chairs Interdepartmental 
Committee on Airways, 93-95; and 
Index 
southern transcontinental route, 93-94; 
seeks new legislation, 99-100, 101; and 
natural air routes, 100-101; sees need for 
government help to save air transporta-
tion industry, 112-13; fear of unfettered 
competition and support of monopoly, 
113, 114-15; Cleveland Speech, 113-14; 
wants mail on passenger airlines, 113-14; 
as regulator, 116; vs Kelly, 119; testimony 
supporting Watres Act, 119-27; supports 
passenger airlines, 122-23, 153; supports 
aircraft development, 123-24; supports 
bonuses, 123-24; supports space-based 
payments, 125-26; explains need for 
subsidy, 125-26; supports competition, 
130; compromises with Kelly, 133; and 
operators' conference (May-June 1930), 
153-62, 165-67, 169, 170; de facto 
regulator, 155; forces Halliburton to sell 
SAFE Way to American, 172; and 
formation of TWA, 173-76, 177; and 
central transcontinental route, 181-82; 
settles TWA merger problems, 183; wins 
approval of TWA route award, 183-85; 
and operators' conference (February 
1931), 188-90; pushes for better aircraft, 
188-90; wants special air mail service, 
193-94; vs Cord, 200-201; and question 
of monopoly, 227; supports federal 
regulation, 228; makes last route 
extensions, 239-41; and new aircraft 
development, 242; gives Kohler a 
subcontract, 243; and extensions, 252; 
testifies before Black Committee, 274 
Brunner, Rep. William 223 
Brunner bill (H.R. 8390), 224 
Bullard, W. Irving, 23 
Bureau of the Budget, 63 
Burleson, AlbertS., 1, 5 
Burlington Railroad, 175 
Burner, David, viii 
Burns, James MacGregor, xii 
Byrns, Rep. Joseph P., 69, 220 
Cable, Rep. John L., 99 
Cable bill, 99 
California Railroad Commission, 7 4 
Index 
Campbell, W.L., 138 
CAM routes. See Contract Air Mail (CAM) 
routes 
Canadian Colonial, 59; acquired by AVCO, 
61 
Carter, Amon, 75, 204, 236 il, 23 7 
Carter, Jimmy, 290 
Central Air Lines, 76, 141 
Century Airlines, 199,201,215,216,217, 
219, 220, 223, 235; lockout of pilots, 222; 
sold to AVCO, 228-30 
Century Pacific Lines, 199,215,216,218, 
220, 222, 235; sold to AVCO, 228-30 
certificate of route authority, 169 
certificates of convenience and necessity, 81, 
99,199,216,267,290 
Chambers, Reed, 25, 219 
Chance Vought Company, 50 
Chandler,AlfredD., 174,175,177,178-79 
Chandler, Harry, 25, 51 
Charles D. Barney and Company, 58 
Checker Cab, 198 
Cisler, Stephen A., 254, 284 
City Bank Farmers Trust Company, 144 
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, vii, 290 
Civil Aeronautics Administration, 290 
Civil Aeronautics Board, xi, 155, 280, 290 
Clagett, Brice, 90-91,93,94, 131, 132, 162, 
163, 164 
Clark, Virginius E., 53, 56, 111 
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914,81,250 
Clement, T.B., 82 
Clements, E.B., 204, 205 
Cleveland Chamber of Commerce, 113, 117 
C.M. Keys and Company, 22, 52, 59 
Coburn, Frederick C., 58, 110-11, 117, 138, 
139,144,156,172,219,221,229 
Code Authority, Air Transport, 259, 264, 266 
codes of conduct, industry, 257, 258 
Coffin, Howard E., 22, 148 
Coho, La Motte, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 236, 
247 
Coleman, Arch, 179, 207, 224 
Colonial Air Transport, 19-20,23,26,27, 54, 
58,74,76,77, 78,112,151, 157;acquired 
by AVCO, 59-{)1; rejects Stout's bid, 60 
Colonial Western Airways, 59, 157; acquired 
339 
by AVCO, 61; provides Ford Tri-Motor to 
Roosevelt, 238 
Colorado Airways, 25 
Columbia Air Lines, 27 
Colyer, Duard B., 30 
Commerce, Department of, viii, x, 12, 16, 50, 
68,81,94,99, 100,126,168,171,196,197, 
290 
common carriers, 81-82,200 
competition, fear of destructive, 155, 166, 
175,256,258 
competitive bidding, xii, 27, 92, 93, 99, 115, 
116, 119, 121-22, 124, 127, 128, 131, 132, 





conference, operators', 66, 80; May 1929,61, 
66-67; January 1930, 117; May-June 1930 
("Spoils Conference"), 153-70, 173, 174, 
179,182,255,262,268,271,273,278, 
279,280,283,285, 288; February 1931, 
188-92; August 1933,254 
Contract Air Mail (CAM) routes: CAM -1 
(New York to Boston), 23, 59, 101, 151; 
CAM-2 (St. Louis to Chicago), 23, 140, 
151, 171, 204; CAM-3 (Chicago to 
Dallas), 22, 28, 71, 148, 151, 159,237,265, 
85; CAM -4 (Los Angeles to Salt Lake 
City), 25, 151; CAM-S (Elko, Nevada, to 
Pasco, Washington), 23, 151; CAM-6 
(Detroit to Chicago),74; CAM-7 (Detroit 
to Cleveland), 7 4; CAM -8 (Los Angeles to 
Seattle), 24; CAM-9 (Chicago to 
Minneapolis), 24; CAM-10 (Atlanta to 
Miami), 25; CAM-11 (Cleveland to 
Pittsburgh), 25; CAM-12 (Pueblo, 
Colorado, to Denver), 25; CAM-14 
(Detroit to Grand Rapids), 74; CAM-17 
(New York to Chicago), 26, 27, 71,144, 
148; CAM-18 (Chicago to San Francisco), 
26, 29, 48,206, 274; CAM-19 (New York 
to Atlanta), 73; CAM-20 (Cleveland to 
Buffalo), 59; CAM-21 (Dallas to 
Galveston), 75; CAM-22 (Brownsville to 
Dallas), 75; CAM-23 (New Orleans to 
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Atlanta), 76;CAM-24 (Cincinnati to 
Chicago), 55; CAM-25 (Atlanta to 
Miami), 73; CAM-29 (New Orleans to 
Houston), 76; CAM-33 (Atlanta to Los 
Angeles), 168-69, 170, 204,216, 240, 263; 
-, formation of, 172-73; -, service 
opens, 182; CAM-34 (New York to Los 
Angeles), 168-69, 183,202,240, 272; -, 
formation of, 173-76; -,awarded to 
TWA, 182 
contract cancellation, xii, 217,224,226,252-
53,264,265,273-74,279,283,286,288 
contract extensions, 114, 134 
contracts, air mail, xi, xii, 48, 81, 135, 140, 
160,163,202,216,225,235,272,277, 
280, 285, 287, 288, 289; original bids, 18-
20; discussion of extensions, 62, 96, 97, 
101; question of corrupt practices by 
contractors, 66; proposed exchanged for 
certificates, 120; negotiated, 132, 133; 
passenger airlines' desire for, 158; fear of 
speculative bids, 167; bond requirements, 
167-68, 178; night flying requirement, 
168-69; temporary, 284,287 
Coolidge, Calvin, vii, ix, 10, ll, 13, 14 




Cord Corporation, 220-22, 251; and Illinois, 
199-20 l; offers to fly mail, 219; sells out 
to AVCO, 228-30; wins control of AVCO, 
231-34 
Cowdin, J. Cheever, 52, 73, 182,233 
Cramp Shipyard, 56 
Crane, John, 228, 240, 244-46; report of, 
244-46,248,249 
Crowley, Karl, 237,238,247,252,265,271-
73,274,281,285, 287; report of, 271-72 
Cummings, Homer, 273 
Curtis, Charles, 216 
Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Company, 21, 
47,52,55,59, 73 
Curtiss Flying Service, 15 7 
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 73, 145, ISS, 
156, 279 
Cuthell, Chester W., 22, 52, 72, 73, 149, 177, ISO 
Daniels, Josephus, 1 
David, Paul, 48 
Davidson, Trubee, 33 
Davies, Kenneth, xii 
Davies, R.E.G., x 
Davis, W. Jefferson, 220; report of, 220 
Deeds, Charles W., 51,270 
Deeds, Col. Edward A., 51 
Index 
Delta Air Corporation, formation of, 165 
Delta Air Lines, 286 
Delta Air Service, 161,169, 170; at operators' 
conference (May-June 1930), 163-65; 
acquisition by AVCO, 165 
Denning, William, 157-58; opposes 
competitive bidding, 281-82 
deregulation, xiii, 290 
Detroit Aircraft Corporation, 94 
Detroit Aviation, 163 
Deusenberg, 198 
Dickenson, Charles, 24 
Dill, Sen. Clarence, 195-96 
Doe, Captain Thomas, 156, 195, 197,239, 
244,251 
Donnelly, Horace, 200 
Dos Passos, John R., 86 
Douglas Aircraft Corporation, 52, 232, 275 
Drake, J. Walter, 12 
Drake Committee, 12-13, 14 
Earhart, Amelia, 171, 182, 208 
Eastern Air Lines, 284, 286, 289 
Eastern Air Transport, 95, 149, 156, 157, 159, 
160,161,163,165,170,189,193,197, 
198,224,231,232,236,239,250,251, 
255,260, 276; vs Ludington, 192-95; 
acquires Ludington, 235; renamed 
Eastern Air Lines, 284 
Eastman, Joseph, 265 
Eaton, J.M., 226 
economics, airline, 67 
economy, collapse of, 106-7 
Edgerton, Lt. James, 2, 6, 70, 87, 88, 89, 90, 
92, 127, 130, 132, 133-34, 147, 150, 157, 
158, 160, 161, 163 
E.F. Hutton, 58 
Egge, Carl, 27 
Egtvedt, Clairemont L., 29,30 
Index 
Embry, T. Higbee, 55 
Embry-Riddle Aviation Corporation, 55, 76, 
78,137 
Emmons, Harold H., 22, 95 
Evans, Silliman, 204,237,238,247 
FAA. See Federal Aviation Administration 
Fairchild, Sherman Mills, 23, 52-53, 54, 55, 
56,111,112,228,230,231,234,261 
Fairchild Aerial Surveys Company, 53 
Fairchild Airplane Manufacturing Company, 
58, 80, 111, 140 
Fairchild Aviation Company, 53, 57 
fares, 70,107-8,111-12,123,193,199,215, 
242,256 
Farley, James, xi, xii, 237,238,247,254,269, 
271,272,274,277,284,286,287 
Fausold, Martin, viii 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 290 
First National Air Traffic Conference, 82-84 
First National Bank of Seattle, 285 
Fokker Aircraft, 79, 80 
Forbes, B.C., 276 
Ford, Edsel, 20 
Ford, Henry, 20, 7 4 
Ford Air Transport, 20, 23, 7 4 
Ford aircraft, 105 
Ford Instrument Company, 232 
Francis, Brother and Company, 109 
Franks, Alfred, 157, 242 
Friedel, Frank, xii 
Frye, Jack, 275, 276 
Garner, John Nance, 237-38 
General Aviation Corporation, 250 
General Motors, 80, 234, 250, 253, 257, 276 
Glass, Sen. Carter, 253 
Glore, Charles F., 22 
Glover, Warren Irving, 18-19,20,21, 33, 68, 
91, 93, 95,97-98, 115, 116, 118, 119, 127, 
129,131,132,133,153-54,160,170,177, 
179,182,203,207,221,226,234,239, 
247, 254; testifies before Mead commit-
tee,224-25 
Gorst, Vern, 24 
Gove, Chase, 62, 63, 68, 179 
Great Northern Railway, 175 
341 
Grosvenor, Graham, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 
102,105,109,112,117,138,139,141, 
142, 143, 144, 148, 149, 165 
Gulf Air Lines, 75, 76 
Gulf Coast Airways, 76 
Hadley, Charles, 201 
Halley, W.F., 206 
Halliburton, Erle P., 82-83, 89, 92, 93, 94, 
116, 130-31, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162-
63, 169; partnership with McAdoo, 90; 
threatens Post Office for a contract, 105; 
opposes new legislation, 117-18; sells 
SAFE Way to American, 170-72, 173 
Hamilton, James, 112, 138, 139, 142, 143, 144 
Hanford, Arthur, Jr., 206 
Hanford's Tri-State Airlines, 206, 286 
Hann, George R., 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 76, 78, 
80,81,112, 136,141,176-77,181,202, 
231, 234; and aircraft development, 110-
11; urges AVCO reform, 138 
Hanna, Marcus, 64 
Hanshue, Harris M. "Pop;' 25, 54, 74, 98, 
102, 108, 117, 131, 145, 156, 159, 181, 
182, 187; and formation of TWA, 173-76 
Hardin, Tom, 112 
Harding, Warren G., 19,65 
Harriman, E.H., 21, 56,228 
Harriman, W. Averell, 56, 58, 78, 79, 110, 112, 
138, 143, 234; buys out Cord, 228-31; 
loses control of AVCO to Cord, 231-34 
Harriman and Brown, 56 
Harrisburg Airport, 177 
Hawley, Ellis, viii, xi, 9 
Hayden Stone, 56, 73 
Hays, Will H., 6, 7, 19 
hearings, air mail: Watres Act (1930), 119-
27; Mead committee (1932), 220-28; 
Kelly act (1933), 250 
hearings, NRA Code Authority, 257-58 
Hearst, William Randolph, 238 
Henderson, Col. Paul, 7-8, 17, 19, 21, 26, 27, 
54,62,63, 70,72, 101,102,103,104,105, 
117,130,132,146,148,156,171,196, 
206,219,238-39,269,277,282,290; 
opposition to competitive bidding and 
support of Brown, 127; criticizes 
342 
extensions, 253-54; meets with Black, 
267-68; opposes Brown and supports 
regulation, 266-67 
Heron, Samuel D., 32 
Hicks, Frederick, 9 
Higgs, Robert, ix 
Hinsburg, F. C., 69 
Hinshaw, David, 65 
Hinshaw, Hainer, 65, 79, 81, 96, 98, 102-3, 
104,105,115-16,117,132,134,137-38, 
142, 156, 157, 160, 168, 171, 172, 203, 
204,218,229-30, 239; works with Brown 
on Watres Act, 113; interviewed by A. G. 
Patterson, 262-64 
Hitchcock, Frank H., 4, 5 
Hitt, Farwell and Company, 77 
Hogg, Rep. David, 131 
Holland, Lou, 156, 157 
Hoover, Herbert, vii, viii, ix,x, xi, 11, 12, 14, 15, 
16,61,63,65,68,78,96,100,101,129,130, 
154,182,205,216-17,224,238,256,263, 
275, 290; and federal aviation regulation, 9; 
meeting with Aeronautical Chamber of 
Commerce (1929), 101-4; favors govern-
ment support of industry, 130 
Hoover, Herbert, Jr., 178 
Howes, William W., 247,252,253,265,273, 
277; calls for operators' conference, 254 
Hoyt, Richard F., 22, 56, 73, 234 
H.R. 3. See Kelly act of 1933 
H.R.359,239 
H.R. 5389. See Independent Offices 
Appropriation bill 
H.R. 8390. See Brunner bill 
H.R. 9500, 118; renumbered H.R. 11704, 135. 
See also Air Mail Act: Third Amendment to 
H.R. 9841,224 
H.R. 11704, signed into law, 135, 136. See 
also Air Mail Act: Third Amendment to 
Hubbard, Edward, 29 
Hudson Tubes, 86 
Hughes, Charles Evans, 28 
Huston, Col. Claudius, 260 
ICC. See Interstate Commerce Commission 
Illinois Commerce Commission, 199,200,201 
Index 
Independent Offices Appropriation bill 
(H.R. 5389), 252, 264 





Kansas City Conference, 207-10 
Interdepartmental Committee on Airways, 
68-72,85,90,91,92-95,97,104,105, 
124, 126, 144, 170 
interlocking directorates, 266, 269, 278, 280 
Interstate Airlines, acquired by Universal, 78 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 48, 
67, 82, 83, 99, 117, 121, 126, 130, 147, 148, 
152,155,188,197,220,262,265,277, 
280,282-83,287,290 
Jahncke, Ernest Lee, 203 
Janus, Sig, 253 
Johnson, Gen. Hugh, 256,257,258 
Johnson, Philip G., 29-30,51, 117, 126, 191, 
206,215,239,251,254,265,288,289; 
pleads case to Roosevelt, 285 
Joint Committee on Civil Aviation, 12-13 
Joint Committee on Reorganization of the 
Executive Department, ix 
Jones, Samuel M. "Golden Rule," 64 
Justice, Department of, 80, 232, 250, 280 
Kaufman, Oliver, 178 
Keating, Cletus, 81, 82 
Keller, Morton, viii 
Kelly, John H., 204, 206 
Kelly, Melvin Clyde, 10, 25, 26, 72, 100, 118-
19,122,124,130, 131,132;opposes 
space-based payments, 125-26; favors 
competitive bidding, 128; opposes Watres 
Act, 128; compromise with Brown, 133; 
vs Brown, 224, 244, 248, 252 
Kelly Act. See Air Mail Act of 1925 
Kelly act of 1933 (H.R. 3), 249-51,252,255, 
267 
Keys, Clement M., 21-22,47,51,55, 62, 63, 
73, 75, 76, 95, 101, 102, 103, 107, 144, 145, 
149-50,159,189,192,196, 197,205,270; 
Index 
call loans and retirement, 145, 233; NAT 
proxy fight, 145-47; vs Ludington 
brothers, 192-95 
Kiplinger, W.M., 177 
Knight, Harry, 205 
Knight, Jack, 6 
Kohler, Frank, 243 
Kohler, John, 243 
Kohler Aviation Corporation, 243 
Komons, Nick, x 
Kreider-Reisner, 80 
Kremer, Bruce, 253 
La Follette, Robert M., 13 
La Guardia, Rep. Fiorello, 222, 223, 257 
Lamneck, Rep. Arthur P., 227 
Lampert, Florian, 13 
Lampert Committee, 13-14 
Landsdowne, Cdr. Zachary, 14 
Lawrance, Charles, 22 
Lawrance Aero-Engine Corporation, 3 2 
Lawrance J series engines, 32 
Lawson, Alfred, 7 
Lee, David, ix, x 
Lee, Frederic B., 15 




Letson, W.A., 178, 183, 184,201 
Leuchtenburg, William, xii 
Levine, Charles, 27 
Lewis, Fulton, Jr., 260 
lighted airway system, 8 
Lindbergh, Charles A., xii, 32, 69, 70, 71, 171, 
200,269-70, 281; criticizes Roosevelt, 274 
Lipsner, Capt. Benjamin, 5, 6 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 94, 163 
Logan, Sen. Marvel M., 281 
Long, Sen. Huey, 202, 204 
Longworth, Rep. Nicholas, 129, 130 
Lott, E.P., 54 
Loucks, William Dewey, 58, 79, 80, 81, 82, 
112, 142,230,231 
Ludington, C. Townsend, 12, 22, 189, 192, 
195,197,198,218,235 
343 
Ludington Line (New York, Philadelphia, 
and Washington Airway Corporation), 
189,192,193,197,198,208,223,226, 
235, 260; vs Eastern, 192-95; failed 
merger with Cord, 235-36; sells to 
Eastern Air Transport, 235 
Lycoming Motors, 198, 231 
Lyons, Eugene, viii 
Maas, Rep. Melvin, 222, 239 
MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, 14 
MacCracken, William P., Jr., 15, 16, 33, 69, 
91, 102, 126-27, 128, 130, 131 133, 134, 
136, 145, 156, 162, 164, 167, 172, 181, 
190,219,226-27, 268; rejects federal 
regulation 83-84; and operators' 
conference (May-June 1930), 160; 
challenges United Avigation bid, 180-81; 
represents Ludington Line, 197-98; 
attorney for Ludington, 235; arrested by 
Black Committee, 271 
Maddux, Jack L., 73, 156 
Maddux Air Lines, 73-74, 106, 180 
Magee, J.V., 71,72 
Maher, James, 269 
Marner Air Lines, 196 
Manning, Lucius B., 198, 199,201,216,219, 
220,221,222,229,230,234,251,252 
Mara, William A., 218-19 
Marshall, Richard "Tex," 100, 156 
Mayo, William B., 20, 156 
McAdoo, William Gibbs, 69,86-87,89,91, 
102, 104, 105, 117, 127, 130, 131, 132, 147, 
157,161,164,170-71,172,177,178,220, 
238; fear of monopoly, 88; partnership 
with Halliburton, 90; opposes competitive 
bidding, 92; and Interdepartmental 
Committee on Airways, 92-95; opposes 
regulation 99; and Halliburton, 162-63 
McCarl, J.R., xii, 27, 92, 93, 131, 135, 157, 
178, 223, 224; supports competitive 
bidding, 133; restricts route extensions, 
161; and route extensions, 165-67; 
approves TWA contract, 183-85; rejects 
night flying requirement, 184; and 
cancellation of extensions, 252 
344 
McCarthy, Joseph F., 289 
McGraw, Thomas, viii 
McKee, Thomas Hudson, 170; and "Spoils 
Conference," 268 
McKellar, Sen. Kenneth, 70, 196, 202, 204, 
208,228,248,253,277,278,280,283, 
286,287,288 
McKinley, William, 64 
McNary, Sen. Charles L., 128, 136 
McNary-Watres Act. See Air Mail Act: Third 
Amendment to 
McPherson, Kenneth, 103, 104 
Mead, George, 32, 270 
Mead, Rep. James M., 131,221,223,224,226, 
240,248,249,251,254-55,277,278 
Mellon, Andrew, 57, 271 
Mellon, Richard, 57 
Merritt, Schuyler, 15 
Mitchell, Gen. William "Billy," 12, 13, 14 




288-89,290, 291; public policy toward, 
64; regulation of, 66; antitrust concerns, 
80, 81, 232; New Freedom aversion to, 86, 
164; fear of, 88, 130,250, 251; Brown's 
support of 113; legislation against, 175; 
legislation, 188; Progressive Republican 
view of, 195; independents fight against, 
208; dominates congressional debate, 
249-50; did not impede aircraft develop-
ment, 275 
Monro, C. Bedell, 54-55 
Moore, Robert, 132 
Morehead, Rep. John H., 131, 132 
Morrow, Dwight W., 14 
Morrow Board, 11, 14-15 
NAT. See National Air Transport 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronau-
tics (NACA), 5 
National Aeronautic Association (NAA), 9 
National Air Transport (NAT), 20, 21, 23, 26, 
27,51,52,54,63,71, 73,75, 76,95,98, 
104, 150, 151, 158, 159, 171, 182, 189, 
191,193,199,200,201,218,232,237, 
Index 
266; formation of, 22; stock collapse, 106; 
acquisition by UATC, 144-50; opens 
passenger service, 146, 148-49; dissolu-
tion of, 289 
National City Bank, 32, 49, 50, 51, 59, 148, 
231 
National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), 
256 
National Parks Airways, 157, 159,242,245, 
253,267,284 
National Recovery Administration (NRA), 
256-57,258,264,277,284,285,286 
New, Harry, 10, 18, 19, 25, 27, 48,66 
Newark Airport, 239 
new entrant airlines, 115, 127, 130 
New Freedom, viii, xi, xii, 196, 287, 288, 286 
New Nationalism, vii, viii, xi, xii, 64, 66, 113, 
114 
Newton, Walter, 103, 205 
New York Stock Exchange, 50, 79 
New York, Philadelphia, and Washington 
Airway Corporation. See Ludington Line 
Niles Bement Pond, 50, 51 
North American Airways, 27-28 
North American Aviation (NAA), 73, 85, 
231,232,233,235,239,269, 278; creation 
of, 52; stock collapse 106, 117; call loans 
to Keys, 145; acquired by General Motors, 
234, 250; and "Spoils Conference;' 268 
Northern Pacific Railway, 175 
Northern Securities case of 1904, 175 
Northrop, John K. "Jack;' 75 
Northrop Aviation Corporation, 75 
Northwest Airlines, 284 




286; and route extensions, 166; profits 
from extensions, 245; renamed North-
west Airlines, 284; awarded northern 
transcontinental route, 286 
Nye, Sen. Gerald, 253 
Ohio Air Transport, 178 
operating costs, airline, 107, 245 
Ormsbee, Frank E., 226 
Index 
O'Ryan, Maj. Gen. John F., 23, 60, 117 
Otis Elevator, 53 
Ovington, Earle, 4-5 
Owen, Rep. Ruth Bryan, 131 
Pacific Aero Products Company, 29 
Pacific Air Transport (PAT), 24, 191, 215; 
dissolution of, 289 
Pacific National Bank, 28, 49, 50 
Pacific Seaboard Air Lines, 286 
PAIC. See Pittsburgh Aviation Industries 
Corporation 
Palmedo, Roland, 55, 79, 138,229 
Pan American Airways, 23, 55 
Parker, James S., 16 
Parsons, G.A., 54 
passenger airlines, 112, 153, 160, 164, 168 
passenger service, 51,104,107,111-12,113, 
115,116,120,122,135,140,143,146, 
152,155,263,265 
Patterson, Andrew G., 265, 266; interviews 
Hinshaw, 262--64; meets with Henderson, 268 
Patterson, William A. "Pat;' 24,215,254-55, 
258,259,273,281,282,288 
Paul Braniff Air Transportation Taxi 
Company. See Braniff Airlines 
Pendleton Act of 1883, 4 
Pennsylvania Airlines, 182, 202, 224 
Pennsylvania Railroad, 108, 117, 177 
Phipps, Sen. Lawrence, 136, 181 
pilots, 226; and Cord lockout, 221-22 
Pioneer Air Transport Operators' Associa-
tion, 219,220,239 
Piper, Louis H., 58, 76 
Pitcairn, Harold, 73, 148 
Pitcairn Aviation, 73, 193, 218 
Pittsburgh Airways, 178 
Pittsburgh Aviation Industries Corporation 
(PAIC),72, 128,133,134,135,136,156, 
157, 159, 181, 202; creation of, 54-55; 
operators' conference, 155; merges with 
TWA, 176-77 
Pittsburgh-Butler Airport, 176, 177 
postage, 96, 280 
Post Office Department, vii, viii, ix, x, 1, 8, 9, 
17, 18, 20, 26, 28, 31, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 59, 
61, 72, 80, 81, 89, 90, 91, 94, 96, 99, 112, 
345 
115,117,120,126,127,131,135,139, 
140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 164 167, 168, 




280, 284, 287, 290; history of, 2-4; and 
aviation mergers; 47; budget, 62-63; and 
promotion of aviation, 65; control of 
airline holding companies, 66; and 
uniform accounting, 66-67; budget 
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